Judgment :- 1. Plaintiffs in Original Suit No. 162 of 1986, on the file of Additional Subordinate Judges Court, Tirunelveli, are the appellants. Suit filed by them was, to declare their title to the plaint schedule property and to direct defendants 1 to 3 and 5 to handover possession of the same with mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 600/- per mensem, and for costs. 2. Late Abdullah Tharaganar was a big businessman, and he acquired various items of properties. He had two wives. First wife was Uma Fathima, and second wife is the third defendant. In this case, we are not concerned about the first wife. Fourth defendant is the son of Abdullah Tharaganar by the second wife. While the fourth defendant was a minor, (it is seen that he was born on 1-5-1943), his father executed Ex. A-1 gift deed on 11-5-1951. As per the said gift deed, he settled the plaint schedule properties along with other properties. They are, Door Nos. 69, 26, 43 and 44, and 41 cents of nanja land. The subject matter of this suit is Door Nos. 43 and 44 which is also known as the ‘western house’. Door No. 69 is known as ‘big house’, and Door No. 26 is known as ‘small house’. Items 43 and 44 were really a car shed, which was subsequently converted into a residential building. Plaintiffs are the sons of the fourth defendant. It is the case of the plaintiffs that their father continued in possession of the plaint schedule properties and on 1-5-1984, the same was orally gifted to them. It is their case that the first defendant is now the second husband of the third defendant. Fourth defendant and his mother third defendant were for some time in strained relationship, and, taking advantage of that, defendants 1 and 2 interfered with their possession, and also inducted the fifth defendant in to the suit property. It is under the above circumstances, the suit was filed for the above reliefs. It is their further case that from 1951, the fourth defendant continued to be in possession of the property as absolute owner, and pursuant to the oral gift, they became the owners. 3. Defendants 1 to 3 filed a joint written statement. In the written statement, they admitted that the property originally belonged to Abdullah Tharaganar, and they also admitted that as per Ex. 3. Defendants 1 to 3 filed a joint written statement. In the written statement, they admitted that the property originally belonged to Abdullah Tharaganar, and they also admitted that as per Ex. A-1, Tharaganar executed a gift in favour of the fourth defendant. It is their further case that as per Ex. B- 6 dated 1-4-1970, the fourth defendant executed a gift deed in favour of his mother (third defendant) due to love and affection. Thereafter, third defendant became the absolute owner. After the gift, third defendant has also alienated various items in the gift deed by exercising ownership. They further contended that even the fourth defendant subsequently has taken documents from third defendant admitting that she is the owner. They have further said that in so far as the plaint item is concerned, the third defendant has executed Ex. B-8 and B-9 gift deeds on 2-5-1985. Under Ex. B-8, third defendant has executed a gift deed in favour of first defendant (her husband). That was in relation to Door No. 44, and on the very same day, she has executed another gift deed Ex. B-9 in favour of second defendant in relation to Door No. 43. Since there was some mistake in the door number in Ex. B-8, the same was also corrected by executing a rectification deed on 28-5-1985, as evidenced by Ex. B-10. They also said that long before the institution of the suit, mutation has been effected in the name of the donees. It is also contended by them that under Ex. B-14 dated 1-6-1986, third defendant executed a gift deed in favour of her son born through the first defendant by name Siyavudeen Ahmed, who is not a party to the suit. The property so conveyed under Ex. B-14 is Door No. 26 mentioned in Ex. A-1. Later, Siyavudeen Ahmed executed a sale deed in respect of that Item in favour of the fourth defendant under Ex. B-4. After the execution of Ex. B-4, the fourth defendant also applied to effect mutation in his name and he himself applied as per Application dated 6-3-1986, evidenced by Ex. B-1. It is also contended that Item No. 1 in Ex. A-1, i.e., Door No. 69, which belonged to the third defendant as per Ex. B-6, was again gifted to the fourth defendant under Ex. B- 2 and B-3 dated 14-1-1986 and 17-1-1986 respectively. B-1. It is also contended that Item No. 1 in Ex. A-1, i.e., Door No. 69, which belonged to the third defendant as per Ex. B-6, was again gifted to the fourth defendant under Ex. B- 2 and B-3 dated 14-1-1986 and 17-1-1986 respectively. From the above documents, according to them, it is too much to contend that the fourth defendant continued to be the owner till 1984. There cannot be any oral gift of any property which had already been gifted to the third defendant, who in turn has executed other documents. It was further contended plaintiffs are basing their claim on the oral gift. There cannot be an oral gift in respect of the property over which the fourth defendant did not have any right, and the claim is not sustainable. They prayed for dismissal of the suit. 4. It is seen that pending suit, relationship between the first defendant and third defendant got strained, since the first defendant married another woman by name Ayisha, in the year 1987. She (third defendant) came back to her son-fourth defendant. 5. Thereafter, an additional written statement was filed by her, contending that she had been asked to execute various documents by the first defendant, and she being an illiterate, was not aware as to the real nature of the documents. She further declared that as per Ex. A-1, the fourth defendant continued to be the owner, and she is not aware of Ex. B-6, nor has she obtained possession under that deed. She further contended that Ex. B-2 and B-3 were also cancelled by executing Ex. A-19 and A-20 documents. She said that on the basis of the oral gift given by the fourth defendant, the plaintiffs are entitled to the property and, therefore, they are entitled to recover possession from the persons in possession. 6. After the joint written statement of defendants 1 to 3 was filed, and before the third defendant filed an additional written statement, a reply statement was filed by the plaintiffs. 7. In the plaint, there is no reference to Ex. B-6 or any of the documents referred to in the written statement. But in the reply statement, they admitted that the fourth defendant has executed such a deed, but possession did not pass. 7. In the plaint, there is no reference to Ex. B-6 or any of the documents referred to in the written statement. But in the reply statement, they admitted that the fourth defendant has executed such a deed, but possession did not pass. From 1951 to 1984, tax was being paid only in the name of the fourth defendant, and he was exercising acts of ownership. According to them, Ex. B-6 does not satisfy the requirements of a valid gift under the Muslim Law. It is their case that Ex. B-6 has not come into effect. It is only a sham transaction. They also explained the reason for executing such a deed. Fourth defendants father died in the year 1953, when fourth defendant was very young. First defendant who is distantly related to third defendant came to the house to help them. He started a medical shop by name Noor Medical in the year 1969, and fourth defendant was also inducted into it. Subsequently, first defendant married third defendant on 7-7-1970. It is their case that there were so many creditors, and the third defendant was also a partner in the medical shop, and, therefore, there was a possibility of the creditors snatching away the property covered by Ex. A-1. So, at the instance of the first defendant, a sham document was executed under Ex. B-6. Both the fourth defendant and third defendant did not have an intention that the document should come into effect, and that is why the fourth defendants name was not removed from the Registers of the Local Authority. It is their case that till 1983, kist or revenue was paid in the name of the fourth defendant, as if he is still represented by his mother, third defendant. 8. On the above pleadings, the trial Court raised eight issues. On the side of plaintiff, Ex. A-1 to A-21 were marked, and on the side of defendants, Ex. B-1 to B-36 were marked. First plaintiff was examined as P.W. 1. Third defendant was examined as D.W. 1. Fourth defendant was examined as D.W. 2, and first defendant was examined as D.W. 3, and an independent witness was examined as D.W. 4. 9. After evaluating the entire evidence, trial Court was of the view that Ex. B-6 has not come into effect. It is a make-belief document, and possession did not follow. Fourth defendant was examined as D.W. 2, and first defendant was examined as D.W. 3, and an independent witness was examined as D.W. 4. 9. After evaluating the entire evidence, trial Court was of the view that Ex. B-6 has not come into effect. It is a make-belief document, and possession did not follow. It further came to the conclusion that all these transactions were put through only by the first defendant, who wanted to snatch away all the properties which belonged to the third defendant. It was further found that when Ex. A-1 was executed by Abdullah Tharaganar, he would not have intended that the property should go out of the family. The first defendant is a very scheming person, and both defendants 3 and 4 became the victims of his fraudulent scheme. The trial Court also believed the evidence of D. Ws. 1 and 2, who supported the case of the plaintiffs in their evidence. The suit was decreed. 10. Aggrieved by the judgment, defendants 1 and 2 preferred A.S. 81 of 1990, on the file of District Court, Tirunelveli. The lower appellate Court, after reconsidering the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs had no title to the property, and the oral gift is invalid. It further held that even though the fourth defendant was the owner, he has validly executed a gift deed in favour of his mother under Ex. B-6, and the same came into effect. It further came to the conclusion that after the execution of the gift under Ex. B-6, fourth defendant cannot give an oral gift to the plaintiffs. It also came to the conclusion that the gift deed Ex. B-6 came into effect, and the third defendant became owner. It was also held that even though the 3rd defendant has now changed her stand, that is not going to affect the rights already created by her. Her pleading in the additional written statement that she was an illiterate and she was not aware of the contents of the transactions, and the nature of transactions she had entered into, could not be believed. It was further found that the fourth defendant himself has accepted the benefit of the gift under Ex. B-6 by taking sale deeds and gift deeds and, therefore, he cannot deny the title of the third defendant. It was further found that the fourth defendant himself has accepted the benefit of the gift under Ex. B-6 by taking sale deeds and gift deeds and, therefore, he cannot deny the title of the third defendant. It was further found that even though the kist was being paid by the mother as guardian of the fourth defendant, the completeness of the gift Ex. B-6 was in no way affected. The lower appellate Court felt that the mere payment of tax in the name of the donor will not invalidate the already completed gift when the same satisfied all the requirements under Muhammadan Law. The suit was dismissed with costs by allowing the appeal. It is against that judgment, plaintiffs have preferred this Second Appeal. 11. At the time of admission of the Second Appeal, the following substantial questions of law were raised for consideration:— “1) Whether the lower Appellate Court is right in holding that Ex. B-6 is a genuine one having regard to the admission of D.W. 1 and D.W. 2 and Ex. A-2 to A-4 2) Whether the lower Appellate Court is right in holding that the oral gift by the 4th respondent in favour of appellants is not valid in law” 12. I will consider the above questions of law in seriatim. 13. The first question deals with the point as to how far Ex. B-6 can be construed as a complete gift under Muhammadan Law. The question is, whether Ex. B-6 was acted upon, and whether it is a valid gift under Muhammadan Law. 14. I have already said that in the plaint, there is no statement about Ex. B-6. It simply says that the fourth defendant became the owner under Ex. B-1 and he continued to be in possession till 1984, and on 1-5-1984, the same was orally gifted to the plaintiffs. A common written statement was filed by defendants 1 to 3 whereby they gave details of various transactions, and how far the fourth defendant is incompetent to give the properties under an oral gift and also the circumstances under which Ex. B-6 was executed. They also narrated the history thereafter, and how the third defendant was dealing with the property till the date of suit and even thereafter. 15. Fourth defendant has also filed a written statement supporting the claim of the plaintiffs. 16. B-6 was executed. They also narrated the history thereafter, and how the third defendant was dealing with the property till the date of suit and even thereafter. 15. Fourth defendant has also filed a written statement supporting the claim of the plaintiffs. 16. At the time of institution of the suit, plaintiffs and fourth defendant were residing together. So, under normal circumstances, plaintiffs also might have been aware about Ex. B-6 document. Only in the reply statement, they came forward with a case that Ex. B-6 was executed as a sham transaction. It was never intended to come into effect, and possession did not pass. The reason for executing the document is also extracted in the reply statement. It is said that the fourth defendant became a partner in Noor Medicals in the year 1969. At that time, first defendant was also looking after the affairs of the family, though he was not married to the third defendant at that time. First defendant was not having any funds of his own, and, according to him, he was virtually a pauper. The said fact is sought to be proved by Ex. A-11, a partition in the family of the first defendant, in the year 1964. In that partition, first defendant obtained a cash of Rs. 1,500/-. He had no property. It is their further case that after the fourth defendant had become an ally to the business at the instance of the first defendant, Ex. B-6 came to be executed. The reason for such execution is said to be, that they were expecting suits from various creditors, and the intention was to shield the property from creditors. 17. After Ex. B-6 was executed, there was no suit against the fourth defendant, or against the third defendant. It has come out in evidence that when the father of the fourth defendant died in the year 1953, he (D-4) was only a minor. His father was a big businessman. He had incurred debts. After his death, third defendant was appointed as guardian of fourth defendant by Court, and, thereafter, third defendant was conducting various litigations. It has come out in evidence that there were 22 litigations immediately after the original owner Abdullah Tharaganar died. She had also given away her ornaments for the conduct of the litigations. In Ex. He had incurred debts. After his death, third defendant was appointed as guardian of fourth defendant by Court, and, thereafter, third defendant was conducting various litigations. It has come out in evidence that there were 22 litigations immediately after the original owner Abdullah Tharaganar died. She had also given away her ornaments for the conduct of the litigations. In Ex. B-6, the fourth defendant has narrated the circumstances under which he decided to execute such a deed, and he further says that due to love and affection towards his mother, he was gifting the property to her, and possession was also delivered to her, and she was allowed to deal with the property as absolute owner. 18. The original of Ex. B-6 is produced by second defendant. It is his case that when third defendant executed Ex. B-9 on 2-5-1985, the original gift deed was also handed over to him. While narrating the facts, I have already said that Ex. B-9 is in respect of the plaint schedule property. An explanation is offered by the plaintiffs that mere production of the original will not prove, unless the essentials of a gift under Muhammadan Law are satisfied. It is their case that the third defendant and fourth defendant were all along residing together along with others, in ‘Big House’, namely, Door No. 69, and the first defendant is none other than the second husband of the third defendant. When they were living together, there is no difficulty in getting the original and producing the same. This explanation is offered only at the time of arguments before trial Court. As I said, the very execution of Ex. B-6 is suppressed in the plaint and even in the reply statement, nothing is said about the original. When t he additional written statement of third defendant was also filed, there is no reference to Ex. B.6. She only said that she is not aware of such a document, and she has never seen it. When that was the case, the document can only be with the 4th defendant. Nobody has a case that the document in the hands of fourth defendant stealthily removed by defendants 1 and 2. The explanation is only an after thought. 19. The fact that the original must have been with the third defendant is clear from the various other transactions in the case. Nobody has a case that the document in the hands of fourth defendant stealthily removed by defendants 1 and 2. The explanation is only an after thought. 19. The fact that the original must have been with the third defendant is clear from the various other transactions in the case. One of the earliest documents is Ex. B-7 dated 5-3-1971, i.e., within one year from Ex. B-6. I have already said that in Ex. A-1, one of the items was 41 cents of nanja lands, which the fourth defendant obtained. This nanja land was also the subject matter of Ex. B-6. The third defendant, claiming right under the gift, sold the property to one Fathima Begum for a consideration of Rs. 5,000/-. If the gift had not come into effect, third defendant would not have alienated the property. Admittedly, that item is not scheduled to the plaint. It is admitted by the counsel that they are not claiming any right over 41 cents of nanja lands, since it is in the hands of a stranger, and on the date of suit, they cannot claim any right. Admittedly, after Ex. B-6, the fourth defendant has not executed any document in respect of the nanja land. Possession passed to the stranger only under Ex. B-7, which was executed by third defendant, where she asserts her title under Ex. B-6. That is a very big circumstance against the plaintiffs and also the fourth defendant, to contend that Ex. B-6 has not come into effect. 20. In regard to Door No. 26 also, documents were executed by third defendant. A few months before the date of suit on 1-6-1985, evidenced by Ex. B-14, third defendant executed a gift of that item in favour of her younger son though first defendant. That younger son executed a sale deed for a sum of Rs. 10,000/- in favour of the fourth defendant. That document is produced as Ex. B-4. The fourth defendant himself recognised the title of his vendor and also his mother, third defendant. Not only that he takes a sale deed, he also moves the Authorities to have the mutation effected in his name. Ex. B-1 is the copy of the Application dated 6-3-1986, given by fourth defendant. Fourth defendant was questioned about it when he was examined as D.W. 2. Not only that he takes a sale deed, he also moves the Authorities to have the mutation effected in his name. Ex. B-1 is the copy of the Application dated 6-3-1986, given by fourth defendant. Fourth defendant was questioned about it when he was examined as D.W. 2. In cross-examination, fourth defendant has said thus:— Tamil Little down, he has said thus:— Tamil He has further said thus:— Tamil 21. I have already said that under Ex. B-2 and B-3 dated 14-1-1986, the entire Door No. 69 was conveyed to the fourth defendant by his mother. Under Ex. B-5, he applies to the Electricity Board, to give him electric connection to Door No. 69, claiming his right under Ex. B-2 and B-3. In his deposition, he has further said that ‘Ex. B-5 D.W. 2 further admitted that in respect of the 41 cents of nanja land, it is the third defendant who executed the deed, though he received the consideration. In the earlier portion, he also said that Ex. B-6 was executed to preempt the creditors in case he suffers any loss in the business. He also said: Tamil This evidence of D.W. 2 is patently false in view of the subsequent dealings by the third defendant, the benefit of which was also received by him. 22. Further, a reading of Ex. B-6 also shows that all the ingredients of a gift under the Muhammadan Law are stated therein. There is a declaration of a gift. There is also a statement that the mother has accepted. There is a further statement that possession was also handed over to her. The reasons for executing the deed are narrated in detail. The lower Appellate Court has considered this aspect in paragraph 9 of the judgment. When there is a statement satisfying all the requirements of a gift under the Muhammadan Law, and the same is attacked as a colourable transaction, it is for the person who attacks it, to satisfy the same. 23. The decision reported in A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 13=35 L.W. 1 18 (Nawab Mirza Mohammad Sadiq Ali Khan v. Nawab Fakr Jahan Begum) is in respect of a case of a gift by a husband in favour of the wife. 23. The decision reported in A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 13=35 L.W. 1 18 (Nawab Mirza Mohammad Sadiq Ali Khan v. Nawab Fakr Jahan Begum) is in respect of a case of a gift by a husband in favour of the wife. In that case, their Lordships said thus:— “Where in the case of gift by husband to his wife it is contended that the gift deed is merely colourable, there being no intention on the part of the donor to transfer the property to the donee; the objection being against the tenor of the deed, the burden of proof is clearly upon those who dispute the gift.” Further down, their Lordships said that a declaration in a gift is binding on the donor and the persons claiming under him. 24. In a Division Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported in A.I.R. 1937 All. 547 (Jamilunnissa v. Sheikh Mohammad Zia), it was held thus:— “The admission made by a Mohamedan donor in a registered deed that possession had been delivered to the donee is binding on the donor, and even if it does not amount to estoppel, it certainly throws a heavy burden on the donor to show that the statement was false.” 25. In A.I.R. 1962 Jammu & Kashmir 4 (Mt.Aziziv. Sona Mir), a learned Judge of that High Court said thus:— “A declaration by a donor of having parted with possession of the property to the donee is an admission binding upon those claiming under him. Where the gift deed expressly recited that possession of the subject matter of the gift had been transferred to the donees, and there was also an express endorsement by the donees themselves that they had taken possession of the properties, then in the face of these recitals in the gift deed a person who claims as an heir of the donor and who challenges the gift cannot succeed unless he affirmatively establishes that there was no delivery of possession to the donees in the eye of law.” 26. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the decision reported in A.I.R. 1974 Patna 54 (Ismail and others v. Idrish and others), has held thus: “Where a deed of gift of certain lands contains a clear recital that the donor has divested all his interest in the gifted lands and put the donees in possession treating them as full owner, the gift is valid and binding on the donors heirs and the fact that subsequently one of the heirs of the donor who is disputing the validity of the gift is found in possession of the gifted lands cannot detract from the completeness of the gift.” In that case, their Lordships followed an early decision of the Supreme Court reported in (1963) II S.C.W.R. 318 = A.I.R. 1964 S.C 275 (V.P. Katheesa Umma v. P.N. Kunhamu). In the decision of the Supreme Court, their Lordships followed the earlier decision of the Privy Council reported in AIR 1932 P.C. 13=35 L.W. 118 (supra). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court accepted the principle enunciated therein that even mutation of names is not necessary if the deed declares that possession was delivered and the deed was handed over to the wife. The Supreme Court also approved the principle enunciated by our High Court in the decision reported in A.I.R. 1915 Madras 972 (Nabi Sahib v. Papiah) wherein it was held that though law regarding Muhammadan gifts is strict, it cannot be taken to be made up of unmeaning technicalities. 27. Merely because the building tax was paid in the name of the fourth defendant treating him still as a minor for years thereafter, that by itself will not conclude that Ex. B-6 has not come into effect. 28. Great reliance was placed on the evidence of D.W. 1, i.e., third defendant. According to me, her evidence is of no value in this case in view of the inconsistent stand taken by her. She filed a joint written statement along with defendants 1 and 2 where she has asserted her exclusive right and only when her interest went against the first defendant, or when there was misunderstanding between them, she thought of withdrawing from her case, and she put forward an inconsistent version by filing an additional written statement. She filed a joint written statement along with defendants 1 and 2 where she has asserted her exclusive right and only when her interest went against the first defendant, or when there was misunderstanding between them, she thought of withdrawing from her case, and she put forward an inconsistent version by filing an additional written statement. It has come out in evidence that at the instance of D.W. 1 herself, the very additional written statement was prepared by plaintiffs counsel in his office, and everything was prepared only by plaintiffs in this case. She admitted that she is now under the care and custody of plaintiffs. The various documents executed by her themselves are sufficient to show that what she said subsequently is false. The finding of the lower Appellate Court that Ex. B-6 is valid and was acted upon therefore does not call for any interference. 29. Learned Senior counsel for the appellants further submitted that the filing of the additional written statement by the third defendant contending that she was not aware of the contents of various documents after Ex. B-6 will show that she is pleading non east factum. According to the learned counsel, the said contention will have a great bearing to consider even the validity of Ex. B-6. I do no think the third defendant can plead non east factum in this case, for, she does not want to ignore any document executed by her. If she says that she has executed certain documents without knowing the contents, she must admit that she has got certain rights over the properties, and those rights were purported to have been taken away by asking her to execute certain documents without understanding the contents of those documents. That is not the case that is pleaded in the original written statement she claimed to be the owner, and she also said that she has validly executed the deed. It is only in the additional written statement, an inconsistent case has been put forward. Merely because she is an illiterate, it cannot be said that all the documents executed by her are invalid. During the relevant time when she executed the deed, she had no case that she was not on good terms with either the second defendant or the first defendant, or with her own son, the fourth defendant, who is now supporting her case. During the relevant time when she executed the deed, she had no case that she was not on good terms with either the second defendant or the first defendant, or with her own son, the fourth defendant, who is now supporting her case. Non est factum also cannot be pleaded by her, for, after the institution of the suit, she herself cancels Ex. B-2 and B-3 by executing Ex. A-19 and A-20 stating different reasons. The explanation now offered is nothing but another excuse to support the plaintiffs, and she is now dancing to their tunes. I do not find any merit in the said contention. 30. The reasons stated above are sufficient to dismiss the Second Appeal, But, there is another substantial question of law that has been raised, namely, regarding the locus standi of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have come to Court on the basis of an oral gift dated 1-5-1984. Respondents counsel seriously challenged the veracity of the statement. It was further contended by learned counsel that there could not be a valid oral gift also. The said argument cannot be brushed aside for various reasons. 31. In ‘Asaf A.A Fyzee outlines of Muham madan law’ - Third Edition (1964), the learned Author deals with oral gifts in Chapter VIII. At page 210, he has said thus:— “Writing is not essential to the validity of any gift; in Muhammadan law a gift can be made validly by word of mouth. It is firmly settled that under the Muhammadan law, a gift of immovable properties can be made verbally without recourse to a written document.’ Sec. 129 of the Transfer of Property Act lays down that Chapter VII of the Act, dealing with gifts, does not apply to gifts made under Muhammadan law. Thus the validity of gifts made by Muslims is to be tested solely by Muhammadan Law.” Thereafter, the learned Author says:— “We must now consider the question of registration. A gift may be made either orally, or in writing. In the case of an oral gift, if the conditions necessary in Muhammadan law are all strictly followed, the gift is complete and valid. Thus, A makes a declaration of gift of a landed property to B in the presence of a large gathering. A gift may be made either orally, or in writing. In the case of an oral gift, if the conditions necessary in Muhammadan law are all strictly followed, the gift is complete and valid. Thus, A makes a declaration of gift of a landed property to B in the presence of a large gathering. B accepts the gift and A hands over the possession of the property then and there to B. Here the gift is complete, and no question of writing, much less of registration, arises.” (Emphasis Supplied) Further down, the learned Author has said thus:— “the gift may be made in writing. Now a writing may be of two kinds: (i) it may merely recite the fact of a prior gift ; such a writing need not be registered. On the other hand, (ii) it may itself be the instrument of gift ; such a writing in certain circumstances requires registration..” (Underscored portion is in italics in the Original) 32. From the above passage, it is clear that really the registration gives public notice of the gift and that is notice. Execution and registration is evidence of gift. If it is not in writing, the same must be declared to some other person and known to others. Naturally, it cannot be a secret act. A decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in A.I.R. 1984 A.P. 344 (Ratan Lal v. Mohd. Nabiuddin) has taken the said view. There, a learned Judge of that High Court has held thus:— “Under the Mahomadan Law, gift of immovable property can be made orally provided three ingredients are satisfied, namely, (1) a declaration of gift by the donor (ii) acceptance of the gift by the donee and (iii) delivery of possession of subject-matter of gift to the donee. Even if actual possession is not given, possession which the property is capable of being given would satisfy the requirement. Unless the three valid requirements of declaration, acceptance and delivery of possession are satisfied or al gift under Mahomedan Law is not valid. Even if actual possession is not given, possession which the property is capable of being given would satisfy the requirement. Unless the three valid requirements of declaration, acceptance and delivery of possession are satisfied or al gift under Mahomedan Law is not valid. In order to establish a declaration of gift it must be shown that the donor either in the presence of the witnesses or otherwise made a public statement that he gifted the property in favour of the donee and that he divested himself of the ownership of the property by delivering such possession as the property is capable of to the donee who accepted the gift. A declaration cannot be made unilaterally without making a public statement of the gift. Where the plaintiff in the suit filed by him claimed to be owner of the house in suit under an oral gift made in his favour by his father, the statement of the father in Court that he had made an oral gift of his house to his son, the plaintiff and that at the time of making the gift nobody was present is not sufficient to establish the oral gift because it is destructive of valid requirement of declaration.” (Emphasis supplied) In the aforesaid decision, the learned Judge relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1194 (Maqbool Alam v. Khodaija). 33. Regarding whether there was public notice or public statement, D.W. 1 has said thus:— Tamil It is her case that she was not aware of the gift in favour of the plaintiffs. But when the alleged donor (Defendant No. 4) was examined, he has said in cross examination thus:— Tamil However he says that he made such a statement before or at the time of making the alleged gift. Except for publication in a local daily on 22-9-1985, evidenced by Ex. A-5, there was no action on the part of either the fourth defendant or the plaintiff on the basis of the so called oral gift. 34. Such an oral gift would not have taken place since the third defendant has been dealing with the property even thereafter. Ex. B-2, B-3, B-8, B-9, B-10 and B-14 are all documents executed by third defendant. Ex. B-2 and B-3 were to the fourth defendant. 34. Such an oral gift would not have taken place since the third defendant has been dealing with the property even thereafter. Ex. B-2, B-3, B-8, B-9, B-10 and B-14 are all documents executed by third defendant. Ex. B-2 and B-3 were to the fourth defendant. When he himself had no title on the date of alleged oral gift, how can he convey all those properties by way of oral gift. Ex. B-8, and B-9 are of May 1985. The property stands in the name of the second defendant. Mutation has also been effected in his name. If the third defendant also knew that an oral gift was given within one year of the alleged oral gift, he would not have dealt with the property thereafter. All these belie the case of the plaintiff that he obtained the right on the basis of an oral gift. 35. There is also a legal impossibility for the fourth defendant to give an oral gift. If Ex-6 had come into effect, unless it is revoked, there cannot be another gift of a property which did not belong to him. If at all any oral gift could be given, it could be done only after revoking Ex. B-6 gift. Under Muhammadan Law, after delivery of possession, a gift cannot be revoked, except by a decree of Court. Nobody has a case that such a procedure was taken either by fourth defendant, or third defendant reconveyed the property earlier to the alleged oral gift. There is no case by either party in that regard. The finding of the lower Appellate Court that the case of oral gift is something invented for the purpose of this case is only to be believed. 36. In the result, I confirm the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court, finding both the questions of law against the appellants. The Second Appeal is dismissed with costs. Consequently, C.M.P. 5533 of 1997 for injunction, filed by the appellants, is also dismissed. No costs in the CMP.