D.N. Chowdhury, J.— The constitutional limit of preferential treatment in the matter of admission in the Medical Colleges of Assam and the Regional Dental College of Under Graduate Students is the core question in thie appeal. 2. The admission of Under Graduate students in the Medical Colleges of Assam and the Regional Dental College at the relevant time was regulated by a set of Rules known as the Medical Colleges of Assam and the Regional Dental College (Regulation of Admission of Under Graduate Student) (Amendment) Rules, 1994. Rule 6(1) of the Rules contained the provisions for reservation of seats for MBBS Course. Altogether 37% of the seats were earmarked for the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes (both Plain and Hills) and Other Backward Classes including the More Other Backward Classes. In addition another 23 seats were reserved for the sons and daughters of seven categories of persons. The writ petition was related to the six seats reserved for the sons and daughters of the employees serving in the Health Department as mentioned hereinunder in Rule 6 (1) (i): "6. Reservation of Seats : (1) For MBBS Course : Available seats shall be reserved for the following catgories of candidates of the State of Assam. (a)...,..... (b)...:..... (c)......... (d)......... (e)......... (f)......... (3)......... (h)......... (i) Sons and daughters of all categories of employees serving under the Health Department of Assam. 6 seats in total (out of this three will be reserved for sons and daughters of doctors who have served in rural areas for five years or more." 3. The Teachers Association, Silchar Medical College, Silchar as well as a Professor of the said college assailed the vires of Rule 6 (1) (i) of the said Rules as discriminatory and at the time sought for a direction for providing preferential treatment to the sons and daughters of the teachers of Medical Colleges of Assam. The learned Single Judge on hearing the respective parties and on survey of the relevant laws, held that the provision contained in Rule 6 (1) (i) of the Rules as arbitrary and discriminatory and accordingly struck down the said provision of the Rule as ultra vires and rejected the plea of reservation of seats for the sons and daughters of the teachers of the Medical Colleges of Assam (1995 (2) GLJ 185). 4. 4. Now the parties to the writ proceeding accepted the verdict of the learned Single Judge and did not prefer any appeal. The present appellant Association was, however, not a party to the proceeding. One of the grounds questioning the legality of the judgment of the learned Single Judge was for not arraying the appellant as a party to the proceeding. The appellant also assailed the merits of the decision. Mr. S. Medhi, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the ultimate decision of the learned Single Judge affected the rights of the persons whose cause is espoused by the appellant before this Court. Rule 6 (1) (i) conferred a vested right on the class of persons enumerated therein and the decision of the case directly affected the rights and interests of those persons. The said persons as well as the appellant before us, according to Mr. Medhi, were the necessary parties in the proceeding and therefore the impugned decisions affecting the rights of those persons whose cause the appellant is espousing here is liable to be set aside on the ground of absence of necessary parties inasmuch as the relief sought for could not have been granted in the absence of the necessary parties. Mr. Medhi, the learned counsel, further submitted that the rule making authority in its wisdom considering all aspects of the matter along with other like persons conferred certain benefits to the sons and daughters of doctors who have served in the rural areas for five years or more. The policy of reservation, according to Mr. Medhi, was meaningful in content and in conformity with the constitutional norm. The doctor in the rural areas give their life and blood for the cause of the people and if in turn some benefits are given to their sons and daughters no infirmity can be traced out. Article 14 only forbids class legislation but it does not forbid reasonable classification, submits. Mr. Medhi. Mr. Medhi in support of his contention brought our attention to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Kumari Chitra Ghosh & another vs. Union of India & others, reported in AIR 1970 SC 35 and DN Chanchala vs. State of Mysore & others reported in AIR 1971 SC 1762 . Mr. Medhi. Mr. Medhi in support of his contention brought our attention to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Kumari Chitra Ghosh & another vs. Union of India & others, reported in AIR 1970 SC 35 and DN Chanchala vs. State of Mysore & others reported in AIR 1971 SC 1762 . According to the learned counsel Article 15 (4) itself provides for making special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. The said provision envisages an affirmative State action towards the socially and educationally backward classes so that in course of time they stand in equal position with the more advanced community in the society. In the same principle the benefits were conferred on the sons and daughters of the doctors who have served in the rural areas for five years or more. The object for such reservation was that those serving in the rural areas or those who had so served are/were put in a disadvantageous position in providing education to their children. The learned counsel Mr. Medhi also assailed some of the reasonings of the learned Single Judge. 5. Mr. BP Borah, the learned Senior Govt Advocate, Assam, on the otherhand, took up the plea of locus of the appellant and also questioned the maintainability as well as merits of the appeal. The appellants, according to Mr. Borah, are not the persons aggrieved. The real affected persons are the sons and daughters of the doctors concerned and not the members of the Association. Mr. Borah, the learned Senior Govt Advocate also further submitted that the State Govt have accepted the decision of the Court and in pursuance to the order of the Court, rules were amended and no seats are now earmarked for the sons and daughters of all categories of employees serving under the Health Department of Assam including the seats reserved for the sons and daughters of doctors who have served in the rural areas for five years or more. The learned Senior Govt Advocate in support of his contention relied upon the affidavit of Sri Prem Prasad Verrna, Commissioner and Secretary to the Govt of Assam, Health and Family Welfare Department and produced in Court the new Rules of 1996 superseding the old rules which came into force from 1st July, 1996. 6. The learned Senior Govt Advocate in support of his contention relied upon the affidavit of Sri Prem Prasad Verrna, Commissioner and Secretary to the Govt of Assam, Health and Family Welfare Department and produced in Court the new Rules of 1996 superseding the old rules which came into force from 1st July, 1996. 6. The wholse controversy centres round the permissible limits of the preferential treatment under the constitutional set up. The people of India resolved to constitute India into a democratic republic and to secure to all its citizens justice, social, economic and political; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; equality of status and of opportunity and to promote among them all fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual. The Preamble in fact contains the ideals and aspirations of the people of India. The great equality clause is incorporated in Article 14 of the Constitution of India prohibiting the State from denying persons equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. The State is prohibited from making any hostile discrimination amongst the same class of persons. The Article prohibits unreasonable classification and class legislation. This, however, does not deprive the State in classifying person or persons on valid and legitimate grounds. There cannot by any mathematical precision in the matter of equality before the law or equal protection of the laws. A classification or arrangement to a some degree is likely to create some form of unevenness but that by itself cannot be said to be violative of Article 14. There will be violence of the equality clause only when there is no reasonable basis for the differentiation. A permissible legislative classification must meet ti dual tests, namely, (a) that the classification must be based on intelligible differentia which differentiate persons or things that are grouped together from the others who are/were excluded from the group; and (b) that the differentia must have rational connection to the object sought to be achieved by the statute or the rule in question. There must be a discernible ground containing the basis for the classification and the object of the statute under consideration. All such actions including the legislations must conform to the test of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, and the same must be informed with reasons. There must be a discernible ground containing the basis for the classification and the object of the statute under consideration. All such actions including the legislations must conform to the test of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, and the same must be informed with reasons. The Article incorporates the principles of equality and thereby prohibiting discrimination to pass the test of Article 14. The State actions including legislation are required to be just, fair and reasonable and devoid of arbitrariness. The content of the equality clause is pithilly described in the following passage of the Supreme Court in EP Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in AIR 1974 SC 555 : "...Now, what is the content and reach of this great equalising principle ? It is a founding faith, to use the words of Bose, J, 'a way of life', and it must not be subjected to a narrow pedantic or lexicographic approach. We cannot countenance any attempt to truncate its all embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be 'cribbed, cabined and confined' within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14, and if it affects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Article 16. Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They require that State action must be based on valid relevant principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that would be denial of equality. Where the operative reason for State action, as distinguished from motive inducing from the antechamber of the mind, is not legitimate and relevant but is extraneous and outside the area of permissible considerations, it would amount to malafide exercise of power and that is hit by Articles 14 and 16." 7. Where the operative reason for State action, as distinguished from motive inducing from the antechamber of the mind, is not legitimate and relevant but is extraneous and outside the area of permissible considerations, it would amount to malafide exercise of power and that is hit by Articles 14 and 16." 7. The contents of Article 14 and the policy of reservation is dealt out in a recent case by the Supreme Court in Thapar Institute of Engineering and Technilogy vs. State of Punjab & others reported in AIR 1997 SC 793 . In the aforesaid case the Supreme Court examined all the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court relevant to the issue including the case of Minor P. Rajendran vs. State of Madras, reported in AIR 1968 SC 1012 , Kumari Chitra Ghosh & another vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1970 SC 35 ; A. Periakaruppan vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in AIR 1971 SC 2303 ; DN Chanchala vs. State of Mysore, reported in AIR 1971 SC 1762 ; State of Gujrat vs. Meghji Pethraj Shah Charitable Trust, (1994) 3 SCC 552 and Chairman/Director, Combined Entrance Examination (CEE) 1990 vs. Osiris Das reported in (1992) 3 SCC 543 . The aforesaid case was a case relating to reservation of seats for wards of employees in the matter of admission to institutions imparting technical education. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case observed that the reservation of seats in favour of wards of the college and mill school staff of the Technological Institute of Textile and Science does not satisfy the test of admission being given strictly on the basis of merit. The Supreme Court held that the reservation for wards of staff of the institute does not make such reservation permissible. 8. The learned Single Judge dealt with the issues raised and on his considered opinion that the provisions contained in Rule 6 (1) (i) is ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The decision is based on proper reasoning given by the learned Single Judge with which we are in full agreement. We could not find any infirmity or illegality not to speak of arbitrariness in the finding of the learned Single Judge. The finding of the learned Single Judge in fact accepted by the concerned authority. The decision is based on proper reasoning given by the learned Single Judge with which we are in full agreement. We could not find any infirmity or illegality not to speak of arbitrariness in the finding of the learned Single Judge. The finding of the learned Single Judge in fact accepted by the concerned authority. We have ourselves examined the relevant rule as it stood at the relevant time and in our own also we could not find any valid reason for the classification sought to be made and giving an added preference to the sons and daughters of all categories of employees serving under the Health Department including the sons and daughters of doctors who have served in the rural areas for five years or more. We are also not convinced with the arguments of Mr. Medhi that the impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside for not impleading the necessary parties in the proceeding. An application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not to be equated with a regular suit and therefore only the persons against whom the relief is claimed are the only necessary parties. It is not a case where the relief sought for could not have been granted without making the classes of persons specified in Rule 6 (1) (i) a party to the proceeding. 9. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.