Judgment :- 1. C.R..P. Nos.978 and 979 of 1994 have been filed by the landlady, and the other two Revisions are by the tenants. 2. The landlady is the owner of a lodging house which she purchased in 1978. It originally belonged to one Ganesan, and because he was not getting good income from the property, he sold the same to the landlady in this case. 3. There are about 24 rooms in the building which are used for lodging purpose, and in the downstairs, there are some shoproems. The landlady filed eviction petitions against various tenants under Sec.14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, i. e., for demolition and reconstruction, and also for the purpose of additional accommodation. 4. Originally the Rent Controller dismissed the eviction petition. When the matter was taken before the appellate authority, it allowed the appeal on bom the grounds. 5. The matter was taken to this Court by one of the tenants. The same was not admitted, and the aggrieved tenant filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. It was contended before the Supreme Court that the appellate authority got confused itself regarding the grounds under Sec.l4(l)(b) of the Act and Sec.10(3)(c), and since it was not separately considered, the same required interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court accepted contention and held as follows: “We are not satisfied that the First Appellate Court considered the questions arising under the two provisions separately. The discussion of the appellate authority indicates that he considered the evidence simultaneously with reference to both the grounds which are governed by separate and independent statutory provisions. The bona fide need mentioned under Sec.10(3)(c) was examined by him with reference to the need for demolition. The need for demolition has to be established solely with reference toSec.l4(l)(o) and for that purpose the provisions of Sec.10 are irrelevant. Likewise, the need mentioned under Sec.10(3)(c) has to be considered solely with reference to the requirement of mat provision and not with reference to the need for demolition. The need for demolition has to be established solely with reference toSec.l4(l)(o) and for that purpose the provisions of Sec.10 are irrelevant. Likewise, the need mentioned under Sec.10(3)(c) has to be considered solely with reference to the requirement of mat provision and not with reference to the need for demolition. The need for demolition and reconstruction mentioned under Sec.14 (I) (b) has to be considered in the light of the principles laid down by this Court in P. Orr & Sons Ltd. v. Associated Publishers (Madras) Ltd P. Orr & Sons Ltd. v. Associated Publishers (Madras) Ltd P. Orr & Sons Ltd. v. Associated Publishers (Madras) Ltd (1991)1 S.C.C. 301 . In that view, the eviction order was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the appellate authority for reconsideration of the entire case on the available evidence. By the time the Special Leave Petition was disposed of by the Supreme Court, other tenants had also filed Revision Petitions before this Court and, in view of the order of the Supreme Court, eviction order passed against them was also set aside and the matter was remitted to the appellate authority for reconsideration. 6. Rent Controller, as per common order, held that the landlady required the building for additional accommodation, under Sec.l0(3)(c), but dismissed all the eviction petitions on the ground that the hardship of the tenant will outweigh the advantage that is likely to be obtained by the landlady by getting an order of eviction. Regarding demolition and reconstruction, it was found by the Rent Controller that Sec.14( 1 )(b) will not apply since the landlady does not require demolition of the building, but only wanted certain atter, came back to the appellate authority on remand, the changes to be made in the existing building. When the appellate authority also found that the requirement of the landlady for additional accommodation is genuine. It ordered eviction of Door Nos.146 and 145, i.e., the respective tenant in R.C.O.P. Nos.84 and 81 of 1981 was directed to vacate the building. In those cases, the appellate authority further found that there is no hardship to the tenant and accommodation is available in the locality or he could have searched for alternative accommodation in the nearby market. It was also found that the landlord will put to great hardship and inconvenience. In those cases, the appellate authority further found that there is no hardship to the tenant and accommodation is available in the locality or he could have searched for alternative accommodation in the nearby market. It was also found that the landlord will put to great hardship and inconvenience. But at the same time, tenants will not be put to any hardship: It is against the said order of eviction, C.R.P. Nos.1799 and 3074 of 1993 have been filed by the respective tenant.. 7. One of the rooms, namely, Door No. 143 in the ground floor and situated on the western side of the staircase of the lodging house was occupied by Co-optex. After the eviction Order was passed by the appellate authority earlier, it vacated the portion in its occupation. The same is now in the occupation of the landlady. But the landlady failed in her claim for eviction in regard to Door Nos.147 and 147-A, i.e., on the eastern extremity of the entire building where the tenants are conducting a hotel by name Lakshmi Bhavan and a small bunk shop. With regard to those portions also, the finding of the appellate authority was that the claim of the landlady is genuine, and it was also found that there will not be any hardship to the tenant. But at the same time, it dismissed the petitioners for eviction on the ground that the landlady will have to make certain changes to the existing building, and they are material changes. It found that the space occupied by those door numbers was bona fide required by the landlady to park the cars of various customers. But since it could not be used as such, the appellate authority was of the view that eviction cannot be ordered on, the ground of additional accommodation. For that reason alone, the eviction petition was dismissed. It is against that order, C.R.P. Nos.978 and 979 of 1994 have been filed by the landlady. 8. Both the Rent Controller and the appellate authority have held that eviction cannot be had under Sec.l4(l)(b) of the Act. The correctness of the said finding also cannot be doubted since the landlady does not intend to demolish the building. That finding of the Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority, therefore, does not call for any interference. 9. Both the Rent Controller and the appellate authority have held that eviction cannot be had under Sec.l4(l)(b) of the Act. The correctness of the said finding also cannot be doubted since the landlady does not intend to demolish the building. That finding of the Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority, therefore, does not call for any interference. 9. Both the authorities below have held that the need of the landlord for additional accommodation is a genuine need. It held that the area where the building is situated is one of the prime areas in the City and to conduct a lodge in that area is a profitable business. It has also been found by the Authorities below that the space now occupied by the landlady is too meagre. The authorities upheld the contention that due to lack of space various customers are put to great hardship which has affected the business and lodging business could be run more profitably if other conveniences are also provided. The claims of the landlady that for the upstairs portion and downstairs portion, she needs separate storeroom, a rest room, 3 receptionist, were all found to be genuine needs, and they are all necessary for a lodging house. It was also found that the rooms occupied by the tenants in the ground floor are also suitable for the needs of the landlady. The inconvenience to the various customers was also taken into consideration by the Authorities below to hold that the need of the landlady is bona fide. It was further found that being a lodging house situated in a prime locality and business area, various customers used to come in cars, and there is no parking space. The space occupied by Door No.147 will be suitable for the said purpose. It was found that certain changes will have to be made in the structural design and the plan filed by the Architect was accepted. If the space comprised in Door No.147 is available, four or five cars could be parked in that space, it being the front portion. I think it is better to extract the very passage of the finding of the Rent Controller for the reason that I need not once again repeat the evidence in that regard, especially when that finding is based on evidence. I think it is better to extract the very passage of the finding of the Rent Controller for the reason that I need not once again repeat the evidence in that regard, especially when that finding is based on evidence. The relevant paragraph, namely, paragraph 13 of the order of the Rent Controller reads thus: "TAMIL" The appellate authority has also believed the evidence of the landlady to come to the conclusion that the landlady has come to court with a genuine claim, and not with an oblique motive. He also discussed the entire evidence and came to the conclusion that the downstair portion occupied by various tenants, is absolutey necessary for the conduct of the lodging house. The only reason given by the appellate authority to dismiss R.C.O.P. Nos.83 and 84 of 1981 which relate to Door Nos.147 and 147-A, is that some structural changes-will have to be made. If that be so, Sec.l0(3)(c) of the Act could not be attracted. In regard to the other two rooms occupied by the tenants, i.e., Door Nos.144 and 145, since no alterations need be made, appellate authority, found that those two rooms could be used such. Therefore, eviction was orderted; Of course, in this case also, the appellate authority has found that there is no hardship to the tenants, if they are evicted. 10. In the revision petitions filed by the landlady, the only question that requires consideration is, whether the dismissal of the eviction petitions on the ground that some alterations are to be made in the building is correct, and whether that will take away the claim of the landlady from the purview of Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act. It is better to extract the reasoning given by the appellate authority, refusing the order of eviction. It reads thus: "TAMIL" The question is; how far the finding of the appellate authority is legally correct. Before going to the legal position, the wordings in Sec.l0(3)(c) of the Rent Control Act may be extracted. It is better to extract the reasoning given by the appellate authority, refusing the order of eviction. It reads thus: "TAMIL" The question is; how far the finding of the appellate authority is legally correct. Before going to the legal position, the wordings in Sec.l0(3)(c) of the Rent Control Act may be extracted. It reads thus: “A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, whether residential or non-residential, may notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be.” The above said sub-section permits the landlady to get possession from the tenant, if she requries the same for residential or non-residential purpose. The Only condition is that the landlady must be in occupation of a portion of the same building, and the other portion must be occupied by the tenant. In the case of own use and occupation, Sec.l0(3)(a)(i) or Sec.l0(3)(a)(iii) is the same, that is, requirement of the landlord for his own occupation or for any member of his family. The only difference is, in the case of Secl0(3)(c)(i), the building will be portions of the same building, but in the case of Sec.l0(3)(a)(i) and (iii), the buildings will be independent structures, but both contemplate own occupation of the landlord. Even though the word ‘members’ is not used in Sec.10(3)(c), the interpretation by the Supreme Court as well as this Court is that members of the family are also included, and a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant for additional accommodation, for being used by a member of his family also. In this connection, it is better to consider the definition of the word ‘building’ given under the Rent Control Act. In this connection, it is better to consider the definition of the word ‘building’ given under the Rent Control Act. It is defined as ‘any building or hut or part of a building or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non-resident that purposes and includes - (a) the garden, grounds and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building, hut or part of such building or hut and let or to be let along with such building or hut,… It has been decided by the Supreme Court in various cases that in the case of a landlord who requires his building for his own occupation, the requirement need not be in the same building. While getting an order of eviction, the landlord may demolish the building and put up a new building for his convenience, and he may remodel it or even make it as a pathway for his adjoining building. All these are only for the purpose of own use of the landlord. Some of the decisions of the Supreme Court may be considered at this juncture. 11. In Ramniklal Pitamhardas Mehta v. Indradaman Amratlal Sheth Ramniklal Pitamhardas Mehta v. Indradaman Amratlal Sheth Ramniklal Pitamhardas Mehta v. Indradaman Amratlal Sheth A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1676: (1965)2 S.C.J. 608 their Lordships were considering the bona fide requirements of a landlord of a building for his own occupation under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (57 of 1947). The question was, whether the landlord can put up a new building or remodel the existing building, when he pleads own occupation. The argument of the learned counsel was that the ‘own occupation’ must be in relation to the same building. Repelling the contention of the tenant, their Lordships said thus: “Occupation of the premises in Clause (g) does not necessarily refer to occupation as residence. The owner can occupy a place by making use of it in any manner. In a case like the present, if the landlords on getting possession start their work of demolition within the prescribed period, they would have occupied the premises in order to erect a building fit for their occupation.” 12. In Radhey Shyam v. Kalyan Mai A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 130 the question was under the M.P, Accommodation Control Act. There, the landlord contended that he wanted to make use of the building for effecting the required alterations. In Radhey Shyam v. Kalyan Mai A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 130 the question was under the M.P, Accommodation Control Act. There, the landlord contended that he wanted to make use of the building for effecting the required alterations. A contention was taken that since the building was required for effecting alterations, the landlord was bound to provide an equal extent of accommodation on such alteration. The said contention was repelled holding that the occupation was only of the landlord, and for that purpose he was making the repairs or alterations. In that case, it was held thus: “Where the order of eviction is based really and substantially only under Sec.l2(l)(f) of the Act, i.e., on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord, the fact that Sec.12( 1 )(h) which envisages eviction of tenant on the ground of effecting either repairs or alterations is also mentioned in the order does not make the order of eviction purely one under Sec.l2(l)(h). Consequently, Sec.18 will not be attracted and it would not be obligatory on the part of the landlord to provide accommodation of equal extent to the tenants in the new building to be constructed by him.” 13. In Atya Samaj, Sagar v. Pinjamal Atya Samaj, Sagar v. Pinjamal Atya Samaj, Sagar v. Pinjamal A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1789 : (1986)4 S.C.C. 3 also, it was held thus: “Sec. 12(g) deals with the situation where the building has become unsafe or unfit and the landlord wants the premises for carrying out repairs. Sec. 12(h) on the other hand deals with the case where the accommodation is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of building or rebuilding or making thereto any substantial additions or alterations and such additions or alterations cannot be carried out without the accommodation in the occupation of tenant being vacated. Similar provision in Sec.31(l)(g) under the Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 came up for consideration before this Court in Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta v. lnderadaman Amratlal Sheth Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta v. lnderadaman Amratlal Sheth Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta v. lnderadaman Amratlal Sheth (1964)8 S.C.R. 1 : A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1676. This Court held that the case in question fell under Clause (g) which is similar to Clause (f) of the instant case before us of Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, Sec. 12(f). This Court held that the case in question fell under Clause (g) which is similar to Clause (f) of the instant case before us of Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, Sec. 12(f). This Court further held that the mere fact that the landlord intended to make alterations in the house either on account of his sweet will or on account of absolute necessity in view of the condition of the house, would not affect the question of his requiring the house bona fide and reasonably for his occupation, when he had proved his need for occupying the house. Nothing further need be proved. In this case, the case of the landlord-appellant is clearly covered by Sec.l2(l)(f). The fact that the building had to be reconstructed for the said purpose is irrelevant.” [Italics supplied] 14. In K.A. Anthappai v. C.Ahamed K.A. Anthappai v. C.Ahamed K.A. Anthappai v. C.Ahamed A.I.R 1992 S.C. 1696 the case was under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. There, the landlord contended that he had to make alterations after eviction of the tenant. In paragraphs 10 and 11, their Lordships held thus: “The considerations which weighed with the High Court in taking a view contrary to that taken by the appellate authority do not, in our opinion, justify interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. That the appellant has been living with his son in the house belonging to him (son) cannot lead to the inference that the claim of the appellant that he wants to live in a house of his own is false and not bona fideThe same is true about the building in question not having the requisite facilities and being not in a fit condition for residence because the appellant can make suitable repairs and alterations in the same to make it fit for residential purpose. The claim of the landlord that he needs the building bona fide torhis personal occupation cannot be negatived on the ground that the building requires repairs and alterations before the landlord can occupy the same, In Devaky v. Krishnakutty (1987)1 K.L.T. 671 it has been observed: “…Once the landlord establishes that he bona fide requires the building for his occupation of the member of his family, he can recover possession of the building from the tenant in respective of the fact whether he would occupy the same with or without making any alterations.” (p.673) We are in agreement with this view which is in consonance with the decision of this Court in Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta v. Indradaman Amratlal Sheth (1964)8 S.C.R. 1 : A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1676. In that case, it has been laid down: “… The mere fact that he intends to make alterations in the house either on account of his sweet will or on account of absolute necessity in view of the condition of the house, does not affect the question of his requiring the house bona fide and reasonably for his occupation, when he has proved his need for occupying the house. There is no such prohibition either in the language of Clause (g) or in any other provision of the Act to the effect that the landlord must occupy the house for residence without making any alterations in it. There could not be any logical reason for such a prohibition. (p.5) (of S.C.R.):(at p.1678 of A.I.R.) Similarly in Sub-sec.(3) of Sec.11 there is no prohibition that a landlord must occupy the house for residence without making any alterations in it. The finding recorded by the appellate authority, after considering the pleadings and evidence on record, that the appellant has succeeded in establishing that he needs the building bona fide for his own occupation must, therefore, he re- stored.” 15. In one of the decisions of the Kerala High Court reported in Sarada v. Kumaran 1969 K.L.T. 133 landlord had put up a lodging house near the tenanted premises. He sought eviction of the tenant on the ground that he wanted to demolish the superstructure to provide a pathway to the lodging house, The question was, whether the same will come under own occupation. He sought eviction of the tenant on the ground that he wanted to demolish the superstructure to provide a pathway to the lodging house, The question was, whether the same will come under own occupation. There, learned Judge of the Kerala High Court held that once the bona fides of the landlord are proved, it is not the Courts concern whether he uses the building as such or whether he uses it as a pathway. I have already referred to the definition of the word ‘building’. In the ordinary definition of building, it means not only the fabric of the building, but also the land upon which it stands. In the decision reported in 969 K.L.T. 133, the learned Judge has held thus: “Under Sec.11(3) a bona fide need of the landlord need not be of the identical building as the purpose of the occupation is immaterial. If occupation by a landlord in the re-constructed building after demolishing the existing building is sufficient ground within the the meaning pf Sec.11(3) the question would arise whether the need to provide a passage through the site on which the original structure stood after its demolition will attractSec.11 (3). The word ‘occupation’ does not necessarily refer to occupation as residence. An owner can occupy a place by making use of it in any manner. The fact that the pathway is intended for the customers of the landlord to go to the lodging house and a restaurant belonging to him does not mean that the landlord will not be in occupation of the same. The term “building’ generally, though not always, implies the idea of a habitation for the permanent use of man, or an erection connected with his permanent use. It imports tangibility, and may include the land on which it stands, as well as adjacent land. The definition of the term building under the Act is not precise and an exhaustive definition of the term is also not possible. The meaning of the word “building’ “in ordinary language, comprise not only the fabric of the building, but the land upon which it stands.” The landlord for the purpose of the pathway is only going to demolish the superstructure or the edifice enclosing the space. The meaning of the word “building’ “in ordinary language, comprise not only the fabric of the building, but the land upon which it stands.” The landlord for the purpose of the pathway is only going to demolish the superstructure or the edifice enclosing the space. The pathway will be enclosed on the sides by the walls and the pathway which was part of the building will become part of the lodging houses to be constructed by him. Thus it will be a building itself as defined under Sec.2(l) of the Act. The conversion of the existing building into a pathway for the use of the landlord is a need covered by Sec.11 (3) of the Act. ” According to me, the same principles will have to be applied in the case of additional accommodation also. As I said earlier, ‘own occupation’ coming under Sec.10(3)(c) is another species of’ ‘own occupation’ coming under Sec.10(3)(a)(i) and Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) the only difference being in one case the landlord is making for the entire building and in the other only that part of the building occupied by the tenant. In a case of additional accommodation, the landlord comes to court with a plea that the present space is not sufficient, and he needs some more accommodation to suit his needs. He needs the building for his occupation. His need is not for an identical building. Once the bona fide is proved and court is also satisfied that the landlord is in need additional space. It is not the concern of the court, how the landlord uses it. In this, case, the appellate authority has held that the claim of the landlady is genuine, and she badly requires the premises in question for additional accommodation, but at the same time, it denied eviction on the ground that certain structural alterations will have to be made Rent Control is not expected to see how the landlord uses it. The court is concerned only with the question whether the claim is genuine or not. That part of the finding of the appellate authority is not within his realm. If the landlady makes use of it as a car park after making structural changes and after demolishing the eastern or southern wall, it cannot be said that she is not using that as additional accommodation. That part of the finding of the appellate authority is not within his realm. If the landlady makes use of it as a car park after making structural changes and after demolishing the eastern or southern wall, it cannot be said that she is not using that as additional accommodation. On the other hand, that will amount to her making use of the building for her requirement, and that too as additional accommodation. According to the court, the very section also gives a clue in that regard. While interpreting this section, the Court, in various cases has held that in a claim under Sec.10(3)(c), the landlord has been given some more indulgence. In an early decision of this Court reported in Saraswathi Sriraman v. P.C.R Chettys Charities Saraswathi Sriraman v. P.C.R Chettys Charities Saraswathi Sriraman v. P.C.R Chettys Charities (1972)2 MLJ. 515 , it washeld thus: “In Sec.10(3 )(c) of the Act, the building referred to is the entire building and not the building with the restricted meaning i.e., in occupation of the tenant alone or of the landlord alone. When the landlord wants additional accommodation he may either need it for residential or for non-residential purposes. The restrictions that are made ap- plicable to Sec.3(a) with regard to the nature of the user, are not insisted upon in case of application under sub-Sec.3(a)(c). The purpose behind the section also appears to be obvious that in the case of additional accommodation, the landlord is given a little more indulgence.” So, even if the tenant is making of the building for residential purpose, landlord, if he proves a claim under Sec.10(3)(c) can make use of the same for nonresidential purpose of vice versa. This denotes that structural alterations is also contemplated in their claim. It was held in V.S. Ahmed Thambi Maraicayar v. M/s.Revathi Stores V.S. Ahmed Thambi Maraicayar v. M/s.Revathi Stores V.S. Ahmed Thambi Maraicayar v. M/s.Revathi Stores (1976)1 MLJ. 307 That in suchcases the landlord, if he wants additional accommodation either for one of the purpose or both the purpose, residential or non-residential, is entitled to get ah order in his favour. If mis is the aim that was sought to be achieved by that section, the dismissal of the eviction petition on the ground that material alterations will have to be made to the structure, cannot be sustained. 16. If mis is the aim that was sought to be achieved by that section, the dismissal of the eviction petition on the ground that material alterations will have to be made to the structure, cannot be sustained. 16. In the result, C.R.P. Nos.978 and 979 of 1994 will have to be allowed, and they are accordingly allowed. The landlady is entitled to get possession of Door Nos.147 and 147-A, on the ground that those premises are required by her by way of additional accommodation. 17. C.R.P.Nos.1799 and 3074 of 1993:In regard to both these revisions filed by the tenant, both the Authorities below have concurrently found that the claim of the landlady is bona fide Once it has been found that the claim of the landlady is genuine, it not for the court to consider the sufficiency of the existing accommodation. In the decision reported in KSrinivasan and another v. K.S.Muthu Mudaliar and Sons by Partner, K.S.Muthu Mudaliar and others KSrinivasan and another v. K.S.Muthu Mudaliar and Sons by Partner, K.S.Muthu Mudaliar and others KSrinivasan and another v. K.S.Muthu Mudaliar and Sons by Partner, K.S.Muthu Mudaliar and others (1996)2 MLJ. 428 it washeld thus: (Vide Headrtotes) “In this case, there is ho dispute that the landlords son is carrying on business in partnership with others in a rented building viz., at Door No.388, Bazaar Road. It is also not in dispute and as could be seen from the oral evidence, that the landlords son is carrying on a partnership business in Door No.19-A. Under such circumstances, it is difficult for the court to appreciate the reasoning of the Rent Controller, as confirmed by the appellate authority, that the landlord can search for better place for his sons business, that the accommodation available with the tenant is not sufficient, etc. [Para. 11] In the instant case, it has been clearly established that the landlord has not only a genuine requirement to possess the shop let out to the tenant but it is necessary for him to do so in order to carry on the business of his wife and son in order to augment their income and maintain themselves properly. Being the owner of the premises, he cannot be denied eviction and be compelled to occupy a rented building merely to enable the tenant to carry on his business at the lost of the landlord. Being the owner of the premises, he cannot be denied eviction and be compelled to occupy a rented building merely to enable the tenant to carry on his business at the lost of the landlord. This shows that great prejudice will be caused to the landlord if his petition is dismissed. “ [Para. 12] An argument was taken by learned counsel for the petitioner in this case that subsequent to the eviction petition, landlady had obtained possession of Door No.143 which is situated’ on the western side of the staircase, and that will satisfy the demands of the landlady. In view, of the decision cited supra, I do not agree with the said submission. That apart, in this case, the landlady filed eviction petition against that tenant also claiming that she wanted the entire ground floor as additional accommodation. Authorities below have found that the, requirement is genuine. Merely because the landlady, obtained possession of one room in the ground floor, that will not satisfy her demands. 18. Learned counsel also submitted mat with regard to Door No.146, there had been prior proceedings between the very same landlady and tenant The tenant had to move the Accommodation Controller since certain amenities were cut off and it was only thereafter the present petition was filed. These facts were considered by both the authorities below, and they have rightly come to the conclusion that the earlier proceedings have nothing to do with the present bona fide claim. It was also faintly argued by learned counsel about the relative hardship and advantage. Even though the rent controller found that point in favour of the tenant, the appellate authority reversed it. I do not think that the decision of the appellate authority in that regard is in any way incorrect. The tenants have contended that they are in occupation for a long period and they will not be in a position to get a building with similar convenience in the same locality. According to them, they have spent huge amount for interior decoration, huge amount is due from their customers, etc. None of these can be considered as a hardship. Interior decoration alone by them was for the purpose of their business, to attract customers. Suggestion was put to the tenants whether they verified if alternative accommodation is available in the near by market. They simply pleaded ignorance. None of these can be considered as a hardship. Interior decoration alone by them was for the purpose of their business, to attract customers. Suggestion was put to the tenants whether they verified if alternative accommodation is available in the near by market. They simply pleaded ignorance. If they proved that no additional accommodation is available at all anywhere in that town, that would have been a genuine ground. But what they expect is an alternative premises in this very some locality. This demand or clairn by the tenants can only be construed as a demand of impossibility. It has been so held in the decision reported in Mst.Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahmed Khan (dead) by L.Rs. and others Mst.Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahmed Khan (dead) by L.Rs. and others Mst.Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahmed Khan (dead) by L.Rs. and others (1979)1 S.C.C. 273 . There also, the tenant was conducting a hotel for more than 30 years and he said that he is not in a position to get a building in that locality. The said contention was rejected. In paragraph 24, their Lordships held thus: “It was then submitted by Mr. Andley, counsel for the respondents that if the respondents are evicted they will be thrown out on the road; that the hotel is the only source of their sustenance and they are not likely to get any alternative accommodation on being evicted. If the defendants had proved that they will not be able to get any accommodation anywhere in the city where they could set up a hotel, this might have been a weighty Consideration, but the evidence of all the witnesses examined by the defendants only shows that the defendants may not get alternative accommodation in that Very locality where the house in dispute is situated, there is no satisfactory evidence to prove that even in other business localities there is not possibility of the defendants getting a house. To insist on getting an alternative accommodation of a similar nature in the same locality will be asking for the impossible. The defendants are tenants and had taken the lease only for 10 years but had overstayed for 20 years and they cannot be allowed to dictate to the landlord that they cannot be evicted unless they get similar accommodation in the very same locality. ” 19. The defendants are tenants and had taken the lease only for 10 years but had overstayed for 20 years and they cannot be allowed to dictate to the landlord that they cannot be evicted unless they get similar accommodation in the very same locality. ” 19. In a recent decision of our High Court reported in Hotel De-broadwqy, etc. v. t M/s.Snow White Industrial Corporation: etc Hotel De-broadwqy, etc. v. t M/s.Snow White Industrial Corporation: etc Hotel De-broadwqy, etc. v. t M/s.Snow White Industrial Corporation: etc (1997)1 L.W. 421 a learned Judge of this Court has held thus: “Mere inconvenience of the tenant cannot deprive the landlord of his bona fide right to have additional accommodation in the premises.” Learned Judge further held thus: “The problem of getting alternative accommodation cannot be taken as a relevant ground for rejecting the claim of the landlord. Once the landlords requirement regarding the portion of the premises, in question in the occupation of the tenant for his additional accommodation is bona fidethe fact that the tenant cannot get an alternative accommodation alone, cannot be the basis to reject the landlords claim.” I fully agree with the conclusion of the learned Judge. Therefore, C.R.P. Nos.1799 and 3074 of 1993 are liable to be dismissed, and they are accordingly dismissed. 20. In the result, C.R.P. Nos.1799 and 3074 of 1993 are dismissed. C.R.P. Nos.978 and 979 of 1994 are allowed. There will be no order as to costs in all these revision petitions.