ORDER 1. Invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for issuance of appropriate writ for quashment of the notice dated 12.6.97 (Annexure P-7), the order of suspension dated 19.6.97 (Annexure P-9) and the confirmation thereof by order dated 2.9.97 (Annexure P-20) all actions taken under Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and for such other ancillary reliefs to which the petitioner is entitled to. 2. Sans unnecessary details the facts which are essential for disposal of the present writ petition may be stated thus :-- The petitioner was elected as Sarpanch of Village Panchayat Bankhedi, Pipariya in the district of Hoshangabad in the election held in May 1994. The aforesaid Panchayat comprises of 20 elected members and a Sarpanch. As 10 out of the 20 elected Panchas of the Panchayat continuously absented themselves from the meetings of the Panchayat Committee, they incurred the disqualification to continue as office bearers of the Panchayat by virtue of the provisions envisaged under section 36 (2) (c) of the Act. This fact was brought to the notice of the Collector, Hoshangabad, the respondent No.2, by the petitioner by his letter dated 30.8.95. As the District Collector showed no inclination to take action in-spite of the timely information, the petitioner under compelling circumstances had to tap the doors of this Court in a writ petition No. 2129/96 seeking therein issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the Collector to take a final decision in the matter of disqualification of the said elected members. This Court by order dated 26.6.96 issued a direction to the Collector, Hoshangabad to dispose of the matter relating to disqualification of the Panchas within a period of four weeks from the date of the order. Thereafter the Collector passed an order on 13.3.97 in Revenue Case No. 181-B/121/95-96 disqualifying the 9 Panchas and the Up-Sarpanch from being the office bearer of the Gram Panchayat. The defensibility of the said order was called in question by the aggrieved Panchas in an appeal under section 36 (4) of the Act before the Additional Commissioner, Hoshangabad who passed a conditional stay order in favour of the appellants therein. The defensibility of the said order was called in question by the aggrieved Panchas in an appeal under section 36 (4) of the Act before the Additional Commissioner, Hoshangabad who passed a conditional stay order in favour of the appellants therein. As the petitioner was the main initiator, the dissatisfied members in a collective manner engaged themselves in making false and frivolous complaints against the petitioner before the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Pipariya, the respondent No.3. According to the petitioner the said SDO had an axe to grind against him as he (the SDO) wanted to do a favour to one Shri Ramvilas in regard to grant of permanent lease of some land situated near bus stand of Bankhedi but the said action of the SDO was not supported by the Gram Panchayat. This had irked the SDO, Pipariya who had borne it silent grudge against the petitioner. Therefore, after he received complaints against the petitioner, without making any preliminary inquiry with regard to correctness of the allegations, he issued a show cause notice dated 12.6.97 under section 40 of the Act along-with a charge-sheet. In the said show cause notice it was mentioned that Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat Bankhedi had submitted an inquiry report to the effect that on examination of records with reference to the complaints of the Panchas it was found there were irregularity in the functioning of the Village Panchayat and, therefore the petitioner was required to submit his reply to the show cause notice in promptitude. After receipt of the said show cause notice the petitioner submitted his reply on 17.6.97 denying the charges levelled against him and sought time to reply in detail to the charges as he was not equipped to file the detailed reply in absence of the documents, the complaints and the preliminary report. Without considering the preliminary reply submitted by the petitioner, as alleged, the concerned SDO with a mala fide intention passed an order on 19.6.97 placing the petitioner under suspension from the post of Sarpanch and directed him to hand over the charge of Sarpanch to Up-Sarpanch under intimation to him. After receipt of the said communication the Secretary of the Janpad Panchayat communicated to the Up-Sarpanch that the petitioner was out of station and charge would be handed over after his retum. After receipt of the said communication the Secretary of the Janpad Panchayat communicated to the Up-Sarpanch that the petitioner was out of station and charge would be handed over after his retum. As other members of the Village Panchayat were aware about the desire and design of the SDO they made a representatioJ1""to him informing that the Up-Sarpanch was disqualified by the Collector and the conditional stay order granted by the Additional Commissioner, Hoshangabad was deemed to have been vacated by flux of time. As the SDO did not receive the said representation it was sent by registered post. When the matter stood thus, the petitioner challenged the aforesaid action of the SDO before this Court. During the pendency of the writ petition, the State Government by order dated 2.9.97 confirmed the order of suspension passed by the SDO. It has also been brought to the notice of this Court that in the confirmation proceeding the competent authority of the Stale Government had issued a notice to the petitioner for personal hearing fixing the date to 15.9.97 but passed the impugned order of confirmation on 2.9.97. The show cause notice, the order of suspension and the confirmation of the same by the State Government are the subject-matter of challenge in the present petition. 3. A return has been filed by the respondents No.1 to 3, contending, inter alia, that the order of suspension has been passed in accordance with the provisions contained under section 39 (1) (b) of the Act and there is strict compliance of the said provision, hence the action taken by the competent authority does not warrant any interference. The plea of the petitioner that the State Government has confirmed the order without hearing him has been opposed to by the answering respondents on the ground that there is no requirement for complying with the principles of natural justice and, therefore, the order of confirmation passed by the State Government is invulnerable the further stand taken in the counter affidavit is that the petitioner should have preferred an appeal under section 92 of the Act. 4. Mr. 4. Mr. Vivek Tankha, learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended that though the competent authority, the SDO has the authority to pass an order of suspension under section 39 of the Act but before doing so, it is required of him to be satisfied with regard to the prima facie sustainability of the allegations made against the incumbent and as the same has not been done in the present case the whole action of the competent authority is sensitively susceptible. It is further proponed by the learned counsel that the overwhelming materials and the obtaining factual matrix do clearly establish that initiation of proceeding and the order of suspension have surfaced because of the mala fide of the competent authority; and any action which is founded on mala fide, is vulnerable in law. It is also contended by Mr. Tankha, that the order of confirmation passed by the State Government is vitiated inasmuch as the same has been passed without affording an opportunity to the petitioner though a date was fixed for personal hearing. Resisting the aforesaid contentions, Mrs. Shobha Menon, learned Govt. Advocate has contended that there has been no violation of any statutory provision by the competent authority and, therefore, the action taken by him cannot be found fault with. She has urged with vehemence that while confirming the order of- suspension the State Government is not required to afford an opportunity of personal hearing to the Sarpanch concerned and in absence of any statutory contemplation in that regard the principles of natural justice cannot be said to be attracted. She has also submitted that though it is ture the State Government initially issued a notice for personal hearing of the petitioner but as that is not the requirement of law, the same was given a go-bye and an order . has been passed in accordance with section 39 of, the Act. 5. Before I proceed to deal with the contentions taised by the learned counsel for the petitioner it is necessary to refer to the order passed by this Court on 13.8.1997. The relevant portion of the said order reads as follows "Learned counsel or the petitioner submitter that petitioner Ballabh Das Satal who was a Sarpanch bf Grain Panchayat Bankhedi, Dist Hoshangabad, was suspended u/s. 39 of the M.P. Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam 1993. The relevant portion of the said order reads as follows "Learned counsel or the petitioner submitter that petitioner Ballabh Das Satal who was a Sarpanch bf Grain Panchayat Bankhedi, Dist Hoshangabad, was suspended u/s. 39 of the M.P. Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam 1993. Suspension so made requires to be confirmed by the State Government within a period of 90 days from the date of receipt of such report by the Officer suspending him. In the event the order of suspension is not confirmed, by the State Government within the period provided it shall be deemed to have vacated. In the present case the period has not expired. In view of this if the State Government either did not suspend or either fail to suspend within the period specified, the order of suspension would become non est. If the State Government within the period provided, confirms the order of suspension, then the petitioner would be at liberty to challenge the same In view of this it is not. necessary either to direct or pass any order in regard to suspension for the time being. Learned counsel submitted that respondent N.5 Shri Brij Mohan Soni has been declared disqualified and on the ground of disqualification he was removed from the office by the Collector, Hoshangabad, against which he preferred a revision before the Commissioner and the Commissioner though for a short duration stayed the operation of the order of-the Collector but subsequently the interim order staying the removal of the respondent No.5 was not extended. In this view of the matter he is disqualified and he cannot be asked to take over as Sarpanch in place of the petitioner, who is uncler suspension. Respondent No.5 Shri Brij Mohan Soni is accordingly restrained from functioning as Sarpanch in place of petitioner Ballabh Das Satal." 6. From the aforesaid order it is absolutely clear that if the order of confirmation would not have been passed within the lime stipulated under the Act the same would be deemed to have been vacated. Leave was granted to challenge the order of confirmation if the same was passed by the State Government within the statutory period of limitation. As has been indicated earlier, the order of confirmation has been passed by the State Government on 2.9.97 which is challenged in the writ petition by amending the writ petition. Mr. Leave was granted to challenge the order of confirmation if the same was passed by the State Government within the statutory period of limitation. As has been indicated earlier, the order of confirmation has been passed by the State Government on 2.9.97 which is challenged in the writ petition by amending the writ petition. Mr. Tankha learned counsel for the petitioner assiduously tried to impress upon this Court that the order of suspension passed by the original authority and the confirmation thereof are wreaked with mala fide. He has also contended that the State Government had not applied its mind while confirming the same. To substantiate his contention he referred me to the notice dated 26.8.97 issued by the competent authority of the State Government wherein the petitioner was asked to appear at 3 p.m. before the competent authority on 15.9:97. Referring to the aforesaid notice Mr. Tankha has contended that the opportunity of personal hearing was decided to be given to him and accordingly the notice was issued but for reasons best known to the State Government the order of confirmation was passed on 2.9.97. It is contended by Mr. Tankha that while passing an order of confirmation principles of natural justice are to be followed by the State Government and as the same has not been done in the case at hand the order of confirmation dated 2.9.97 is indefensible. 7. To appreciate the submissions of Mr. Tankha it is necessary to refer to sections 39 and 40 of the Act. The said provisions read as under :- "S. 39. Suspension of office bearer of Panchayat. -- (1) The prescribed authority may suspend from office any office bearer --. (a) against whom charges have been framed in any criminal proceedings under Chapter V-A, VI, IX-A, X, XII, section 302, 303, 304-B, 305, 306, 312 to 318, 366-A, 366-B, 373 to 377 of Chapter XVI, section 395 to 398, 408,409,458 to 460 of Chapter XVII and Chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) or under any law for the time being in force for the prevention of adulteration of food stuff and drugs, suppression of immoral traffic in women and children and protection of civil rights; or (b) who has been served with a notice along-with a charge sheet to show cause under this Act, for his removal from the office. (2) The order of suspension under sub-section (1) shall be reported to the State Government within a period of ten days and shall be subject to such orders as the State Government may deem fit to pass. If the order of suspension is not confirmed by the State Government within 90 days from the date of receipt of such report it shall be deemed to have vacated. (3) In the event of both the Sarpanch and Up-Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, President or Vice-President of Janpad Panchayat or Zila Panchayat being suspended under sub-section (1), the Gram Panchayat, Janpad Panchayat or Zila Panchayat shall elect an office bearer qualified to hold the office of Sarpanch or President as the case may be, such person shall perform all the duties and exercise all the powers of Sarpanch or President of as the case may be, during the period for which such suspension continues. (4) A person who has been suspended under sub-sect ion (1) shall also forthwith stand suspended from the office of member or office bearer of any other Panchayat of which he is a member or office bearer, such person shall also be disqualified for being elected, under the Act during his suspension. S. 40 -- Removal of office bearers of Panchayat.— (1) The State Government or the prescribed authority may after such enquiry as it may deem fit to make at any time, remove an office bearer - (a) if he has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties; or (b) if his continuance in office is undesirable in the interest of the public; Provided that no person shall be removed unless he has been given an opportunity to show cause why he should not be removed from his office. Explanation. -- For the purpose of this sub-section Misconduct" shall include – (a) any action adversely affecting -- (i) the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India; or (ii) the harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of State transcending religious, linguistic, regional, caste or sectional diversities; or (iii) the dignity of women; or (b) gross negligence in the discharge of the duties under this Act. (2) A person who has been removed under sub-section (1) shall forthwith cease to be a member of any other Panchayat of which he is a member, such person shall also be disqualified for a period of six years to be elected under this Act." A bare reading of the aforesaid provisions it is clear as day that the principles of natural justice are not applicable before an order of suspension is passed by the competent authority or the same is confirmed by the State Government. There are two situations under which the prescribed authority can pass an order of suspension relating to an office bearer of Panchayat. The first condition relates to framing of charges as has been stipulated under section 39 (1) (a) of the Act and; the second situation pertains to service of notice along with a charge-sheet to show cause under this Act for his removal from the office. Sub-section (2) of the aforesaid section confers power on the State Government to confirm the order of suspension passed by the prescribed authority within 90 days from the date of receipt of such report failing which the same is deemed to have been vacated. Section 40 of the Act deals with removal and that envisages affording an opportunity to show cause and also contemplates due enquiry. Thus it is apparent that before removal of an office bearer principles of natural justice are to be complied with. But the said principles are not attracted at the time of passing of the order of suspension by the prescribed authority or later on at the time of order of confirmation passed by the State Government. As the order of suspension is passed as an interim measure pending removal and there is no express provision envisaging to afford opportunity of hearing to the incumbent, the principles of natural justice are not applicable, more-so. when a full fledged enquiry is provided for under section 40 of the Act. In view of this, the submission of Mr. Tankha that as no opportunity was afforded at the time or passing of suspension order by the prescribed authority the said order is vitiated does not merit consideration. The same is the position as far as confirmation of the order of suspension is concerned. But, in the instant case. In view of this, the submission of Mr. Tankha that as no opportunity was afforded at the time or passing of suspension order by the prescribed authority the said order is vitiated does not merit consideration. The same is the position as far as confirmation of the order of suspension is concerned. But, in the instant case. a meaningful one, the State Government had issued a notice to the petitioner on 26.8.97 requiring him to appear on 15.9.97. Thus, it is clearly perceptible that the Slate Government had desired to afford an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner may be possibly to satisfy itself. Though it was not necessary to take recourse to such a procedure but once the State Government thought it appropriate, may be under the prevailing facts and circumstances to hear the petitioner, it is against the concept of propriety to prep-one the matter and pass the order of confirmation. It does not amount to rectification of a mistake. It may be noted here that the compliance with principles of natural justice cannot be claimed as a matter or right by the petitioner, but once the same has been thought of being afforded and the thought has been concretised by issuance of a notice, hope is kindled in the incumbent to explain his stand to mitigate the situation. Every authority has to act with propriety, equity and with a sense of doing justice which is apparent as these are the basic tenants which help law and justice to go hand in hand in their conceptual eventuality. Therefore, the contention or Mrs. Shobha Menon that when there is 'no mandate in law to hear the petitiol1t,.r. there is no error in passing the order before the date fixed for hearing by the competent authority of the State Government, does not deserve acceptance, I am or the considered view that the order of confirmation is vulnerable on this count. 8. Mr. Tankha has addressed this Court on mala fides. But I do not intent to deal with the same as I have taken a view that the order of confirmation is unsustainable because of the procedural impropriety. Accordingly I direct that the petitioner should appear before the competent authority on 10.12.97 in the office at 11.00 a.m. on which date the competent authority would hear or may fix another date for hearing. Accordingly I direct that the petitioner should appear before the competent authority on 10.12.97 in the office at 11.00 a.m. on which date the competent authority would hear or may fix another date for hearing. It would be open to the petitioner to raise all his contentions with regard to mala fides before the said competent authority. The competent authority would be at liberty to pass an order without being influenced by any of the observations made by this Court in the present proceeding. 9. Resultantly, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order of confirmation dated 2.9.97 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the competent authority as indicated above. In the meantime, the interim order passed by this Court shall remain effective. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.