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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

1997 DIGILAW 765 (MP)

Mohd. Nasir v. Jama Maszid Committee

1997-11-19

R.P.GUPTA

body1997
ORDER 1. This appeal u/s 32 of M.P. Accommodation Centro1 Act, (herein after referred as 'The Act') is directed against the order dated 26th March 1996 passed by District Judge, Sagar, in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 19/92, which arose out of order dated 1.10.92 passed by Rent Controlling Authority in his case No. 3-A/90/1. The Rent Controlling Authority had fixed standard rent of the shop rented by the predecessors of the present appellant from Jama Maszid Committee, Sagar. On 1st Feb. 1988 there was written agreement between the landlord and tenant fixing the rent of the shop at Rs. 180/- per month. The tenant filed petition for fixing of standard rent on 29.6.88 urging that he was an old tenant and the rent was being increased by land-lord from time to time. The last rent was Rs. 40/-per month, It was got illegally enhanced to Rs. 180/- per month by written agreement which was result of his misrepresentation. 2. The rent controlling authority initially fixed the standard rent and then in appeal there was a remand of the case back to the Rent Controlling Authority as the landlord had asked for fresh opportunity to lead evidence regarding reconstruction. The opportunity was granted by the 1st Appellate Court. Since no evidence was led about reconstruction and the only evidence was regarding some repairs, the Rent Controlling Authority fixed the standard rent at Rs. 54/per month by allowing an enhancement of Rs. 14/- over the earlier rent of Rs. 40/-. The enhancement was at the rate of35%. The landlord approached District Court again in appeal and the District Judge passed the impugned order dated 26.3.96 holding that the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act did not apply to the waif properties as by notification dated 7.9.1989 such properties were exempted from provisions of the Act. Thus it was urged that on the date when the Rent Controlling Authority passed an order, the premises was exempt from rent control. The District Judge has held that merely because the petition was filed at the time when M.P. Accommodation Control Act was in force did not mean that the provisions continued to be applicable till the date of decision or that the standard rent could be fixed. So the appeal was accepted and the petition for standard rent was dismissed. The District Judge has held that merely because the petition was filed at the time when M.P. Accommodation Control Act was in force did not mean that the provisions continued to be applicable till the date of decision or that the standard rent could be fixed. So the appeal was accepted and the petition for standard rent was dismissed. It was ordered that the tenant has to pay the agreed rent and this would be the standard rent. 3. Counsel for appellant before this Court could not find fault with the fact that the M.P. Accommodation Control Act has been made inapplicable with effect from 7.9.) 989 to all the accommodations owned by wakf, registered under the wakf Act 1954. It is not in dispute that the present shop in dispute is owned by such a wakf So with effect from 7.9.89 this premises was exempted from applicability of M.P. Accommodation Control Act. 4. The question is what is the effect of such exemption. Can standard rent be fixed for the period from the date of petition till 6.9.89. The learned counsel for appellant has urged that proper and just construction would be to fix the standard rent for the period for which the Act was applicable. 5. The learned 1st, Appellate Court has relied on certain observations of Apex Court in the case of 1994 (1) MPWN 231, where in it was observed that after issuance of exemption notification u/s 3 (2) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act 1961, the party cannot take advantage of any of the provisions of the Act. Section 3 (2) of this Act as is under :- "The Government may, by notification, exempt from all or any of the provision of this Act any accommodation which is owned by any educational, religious or charitable institution or by any nursing or maternity home, the whole of the income derived from which is uti1ised for that institution or nursing home or maternity home." 6. In order to understand effect of applicability of the exemption notification, it will be proper to see certain definitions and other relevant provisions of the Act. Section 2 (h) defines 'standard rent' in relation to accommodations means standard rent referred to in section 7 or where the standard rent has been increased u/s 8, such increased rent" . In order to understand effect of applicability of the exemption notification, it will be proper to see certain definitions and other relevant provisions of the Act. Section 2 (h) defines 'standard rent' in relation to accommodations means standard rent referred to in section 7 or where the standard rent has been increased u/s 8, such increased rent" . Section 2 (a) of this Act defines "accommodation" means any building or part of a building whether residential or non-residential with certain inclusion". Section 2 (f) defines "Rent Controlling Authority" as meaning an officer appointed u/s 28 of the Act." Section 10 of the Act empowers Rent Controlling Authority to fix the standard rent on application made to it in this behalf either by the land-lord or by the tenant in the prescribed manne, (i) The fixation of the standard rent in accordance with Section 7 or (21) the increase if any referred to in Section 8. Section 10 (2) of the Act lays down as under: 'In fixing the standard rent of any accommodation or the lawful increase . thereof, the rent Controlling Authority shall fix an amount which appears to it to be reasonable having regard to the provisions of Section 7 or Section 8 and circumstances of the case." Section 10 (4) lays down "where for any reason it is not possible to determine the standard rent of any accommodation on the principle set forth u/s 7, the Rent Controlling Authority may fix such a rent as would be reasonable having regard to the situation, locality or condition of accommodation and amenities provided therein and where there are similar or nearly similar accommodations in the locality having regard also to the standard rent payable in respect of such accommodations" Section 10 (7) lays down "in fixing standard rent of any accommodation under this section, the Rent Controlling Authority shall specify a date from which the standard rent so fixed shall be deemed to have effect: Provided that in no case the date so specified shall be earlier than thirty days prior to the date of the filling of the application for the fixation of the standard rent." 7. Section 10 (7) clearly contemplates that standard rent has to be fixed by the rent controlling authority. Section 10 (7) clearly contemplates that standard rent has to be fixed by the rent controlling authority. The rent defined as standard rent u/s 7 read with section 8 of the Accommodation Control Act or Section 10 (4) of that Act does not automatically become standard rent for any premises unless there is an order fixing the same. The order has to be passed by Rent Control Authority appoint-ad under the Act. When the provisions of these Act ceased to apply to an accommodation, the authority ceases to be authority for the purposes of that premises. The question is whether it can be assumed that the authority passed the order on the date of the petition. This cannot be so. The authority must have jurisdiction as authority on the date of the order also. There could be no concept of standard rent for this premises on the date of order, May be, if the order had been passed before 7.9.1989; it would have been an order by a competent authority under the Act. but after the day i.e. 7.8.89; there could be no authority empowered to pass such an order of fixing standard rent for this promises. The definition of standard rent would not apply to such premises. It is also important to note that the date for fixing standard rent is in the discretion of the authority. So it is not as if the standard rent must be fixed from the date of petition. The authority could fix any date from period to one month before the petition, till the date of decision. It could fix even the date of decision as the proper date or applicability of standard rent. It has only to given legal reasons. This means that the date of fixation of standard rent is a volatile date, in the discretion of the Rent Controlling Authority. So, it cannot be said that after a petition is filed, and later on the premises are exempted from the applicability of the Act, the standard rent must be fixed for the period from date of petition till the premises is exempted from operation of the Act by some notification u/s 3 (2) of the Act. So, it cannot be said that after a petition is filed, and later on the premises are exempted from the applicability of the Act, the standard rent must be fixed for the period from date of petition till the premises is exempted from operation of the Act by some notification u/s 3 (2) of the Act. The necessary conditions for the authority to exercise its jurisdiction would, therefore be: (1) the Authority should have its legal status qua the premises concerned on the date of the order (2) the premises should be amenable to the controls provided under the Act on the date of order. 8. Since both these requirements are missing in the present case, the Rent Controlling Authority was not empowered to pass an order for fixing standard rent in this case, after 7.9.92. The order was without jurisdiction. No order could be passed even for the period from the dase of petition till 7.9.1989. The learned District Judge has rightly decided this legal question. Of course, the District Judge has erroneously or out of some oblivion, mentioned that Rs. 180/- per month, the agreed rent, would be the standard rent. That part of the observation was, legally incorrect as the concept of standard rent over this premises ceases with effect from 7.9.89. The agreed rent has to be payable. 9. The net result is that with the above observation the present appeal fails and is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs in view of legal questions involved.