Honble SHARMA, J. – In this appeal, preferred by the defendant appellant (for short the defendant) challenge has been made to the decree and judgment dated 18.2.1995 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No. 2 Jaipur City, Jaipur whereby the suit for specific performance of the contract instituted by the plaintiff respondent (for short the plaintiff) was decreed. (2). The pleadings of the parties reveal the following generalogy and facts :– (i) Anil Kumar, the husband of the plaintiff, was inducted as tenant in the disputed shop by the defendant in the month of March 1982 at the rate of Rs. 450/- per month as rent. The defendant offered rupees one lakh many a time to Anil Kumar and persuaded him to vacate the said shop but Anil Kumar did not agree. At last the defendant became ready to sell the shop in consideration of rupees one lakh fifty seven thousand. Anil Kumar agreed to purchase the shop in the name of the plaintiff. On 15.8.1988 an agreement duly drafted by the defendant advocate, was handed over to the plaintiff by the defendant after putting his signatures over to the plaintiff by the defendant after putting his signatures over it. The defendant though received rupees fifty seven thousand in advance but in the agreement, only rupees five thousand was shown to have taken in advance and it was agreed that the plaintiff would pay remaining amount of rupees one lakh on or before 31.4.1989 and thereafter sale deed would be registered and possession of the house would be handed over to the plaintiff. Butthe defendant refused to perform the agreement in the month of Dece- mber 1990. Thus the plaintiff sought relief in the form of decree of specific performance of the agreement dated 15.8.1988. (ii) The defendant in the written statement pleaded that at the time of induction of Anil Kumar as tenant in the disputed shop, a sum of Rs. 12,000/- was taken by the defendant on security towards the pay- ment of rent. Since the shop was required for bona fide personal necessity of the defendant he requested Anil Kumar to vacate the shop and Anil Kumar agreed to vacate the shop by 30.4.1989 subject to the condition that the security deposit of Rs. 12,000/- was returned to him. In this regard he executed and affidavit on stamp paper of Rs. Since the shop was required for bona fide personal necessity of the defendant he requested Anil Kumar to vacate the shop and Anil Kumar agreed to vacate the shop by 30.4.1989 subject to the condition that the security deposit of Rs. 12,000/- was returned to him. In this regard he executed and affidavit on stamp paper of Rs. 5/- on 15.8.1988 in which it was stated that Anil Minocha had received Rs. 12,000/- which was deposited towards security of rent. When the shop was not vacated, the defendant instituted a suit for eviction of the said shop against Anil Minocha on the ground of bona fide necessity and default in payment of rent. The said suit is pending in the Court of Additional District Judge No. 2 Jaipur City. Much after filing of the suit for ejectment the plaintiff in collusion with her husband instituted a suit for specific performance on the basis of a forged document. The defendant neither executed the said agreement nor received any amount from Anil Minocha or the plaintiff. (iii) following three issues were framed out of the pleadings of the parties :– (a) whether the defendant executed agreement to sell on 15.8.1988 after receiving Rs. 57,000/- as advance against Rs. 1,57,000/- the total sale price of the shop? (b) whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform the agreement to sell dated 15.8.1988 and was entitled to specific performance of the same from the defendant? (c) Relief ? (iv) The plaintiff examined Anil Kumar PW 1, Rajeev Bindal PW 2, Peru Mal PW 3, Chandra Prakash PW 4, Nathu Singh PW 5 and Krishna Charan Saxena Hand Writing Expert PW 6. As many as 21 documents were exhibited by the plaintiff. The defendant produced himself as DW 1, Jugal Kishore DW 2, Mohd. Umar DW3, Gyan Prakash Sharma, hand Writing Expert DW 4. Report of Hand Writing Expert was exhibi- ted as Ex. A/1. The learned trial Court decreed the suit as mentioned hereinabove. (3). Before adverting to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, following salient features of the document Agreement to sell Ex. 1 are necessary to be looked into – (a) Columns of dates at pages 1 & 3 of the document have been left blank. The document does not bear any date. (3). Before adverting to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, following salient features of the document Agreement to sell Ex. 1 are necessary to be looked into – (a) Columns of dates at pages 1 & 3 of the document have been left blank. The document does not bear any date. (b) Date `31.4.1989 has been mentioned repeatedly four times as dead line of payment of Rupees one lakh and for delivering the posse- ssion of the shop whereas the month of April ends on 30th. (c) It has also been stated in the document that plaintiff Risal Singh obtained Rupees five thousand from the plaintiff Smt. Sarita Minocha and issued receipt to her. (d) The document was witnessed by Sultan Khan and Anil, the hus- band of the plaintiff. (e) Neither the signatures of the executants of the documents were identified nor they were attested by any attesting authority. (f) The stamp of Rs. 5/- was purchased from stamp vendor Shri Mohan Lal Agrawal on 7.7.1988 in the name of Risal Singh but the column as to for what purposes it was purchased, left blank. (4). There is yet another document `Affidavit of Anil Minocha Ex. 22 salient features of which are as under :– (a) Affidavit was executed on stamp of Rs. 25/- purchased on 7.7.1988from stamp vendor Shri Mohan Lal Agarwal in the name of Anil Kumar. The column as to for what purposes it was purchased left blank. (b) In the affidavit Anil Kumar admitted that he received back rupees twelve thousand paid against security for rent from Risal Singh. (c) The affidavit was executed on 15.8.1988 and Anil Kumar promised that he would vacate the shop on or before 30.4.1989 failing which Risal Singh could take recourse of legal action. (d) The affidavit was executed in presence of witnesses Yasin Khan and Gulab Chand. (e) Anil Kumar was identified by Advocates Lakshmi Raj Singh and S.C. Khandelwal. (f) The affidavit was attested by Notary Public on 15.8.1988. (5). Now I deal with the respective contentions. Mr. Sagar Mal Mehta learned Senior Advocate appearing for the plaintiff vigorously canvassed that it is inconceivable that the affidavit Ex. (e) Anil Kumar was identified by Advocates Lakshmi Raj Singh and S.C. Khandelwal. (f) The affidavit was attested by Notary Public on 15.8.1988. (5). Now I deal with the respective contentions. Mr. Sagar Mal Mehta learned Senior Advocate appearing for the plaintiff vigorously canvassed that it is inconceivable that the affidavit Ex. 22 and the agreement to sell were executed on the same day then only the affidavit was attested and duly notarised by the Notary Public whereas the agreement to sell was neither notarised nor signatures of the executants were attested. Why the same witnesses who put their signatures on affidavit, were not signed on the `agreement to sell. The defendant who returned Rs. 12,000/- on 15.8.1988 and wanted vacant possession of shop before 30.4.1989 then why would he execute agreement for sale of the said shop on the same day? The alleged receipt mentioned in the agreement issued by the defendant for a sum of Rs. 5000/- was not produced therefore adverse inference must be drawn against the plaintiff. Sultan Khan, the alleged witness of the agreement was not produced. Plaintiff Smt. Sarita Minocha too, did not appear in the witness box. The signatures of Risal Singh are per se forged. There is a material contradiction between the averments made in the plaint, averments made in the `Agreement and averments made in the statement of Anil Minocha PW 1. The plaintiff utterly failed to prove the advance payment. The handwriting experts have been produced by both the parties. The opinion of hand writing expert Shri Krishan Chand PW 6 was obtained by the plaintiff about a year prior to the filing of the suit. The mala fide and ulterior motive of the plaintiff is self evident from the fact that she did not mention in the plaint regarding filing of the earlier suit for ejectment against her husband Anil Minocha. The alleged agreement is opposed to public policy in an as much as there is evasion of stamp duty. Mr. Mehta, learned counsel substantiated his submissions by various authorities which I shall discuss in foregoing paras. (6). On the other hand Mr. The alleged agreement is opposed to public policy in an as much as there is evasion of stamp duty. Mr. Mehta, learned counsel substantiated his submissions by various authorities which I shall discuss in foregoing paras. (6). On the other hand Mr. R.K. Agarwal, learned counsel for the plaintiff supported the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court and contended that execution of agreement to sell was fully proved and from the testimony of Handwriting Expert PW 6 the signatures of Risal Singh have been proved as genuine. Even u/s. 73 the trial Court also compared the said signatures and observed that there was no doubt about its genuineness. The trial Court rightly relied on the testimony of Anil Minocha PW 1. Mr. Agarwal placing reliance on Sarjoo Prasad vs. J.P.N. Singh (1), contended that this Court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact. Referring Babura Bagajis case (2), Mr. Agarwal, argued that the appellate Court is entitled to examine and appreciate the evidence in order to ascertain whether the finding of the trial Court in warranted, it will not interfere with it unless it is unsound, perverse or based on ground which are unsatisfactory by reason of material inconsistencies. The appellate Court should not lightly interfere with it merely because it takes a different view of the evidence. Learned counsel further submitted that mere delay extending upto period of limitation in filing suit for specific performance, is no ground to refuse relief. In support of this contention reliance was placed on Deena Nath vs. Chunni Lal (3), and M. Satya Narayan vs. Yellogi Rao (4). Regarding averments of readiness and williungness to perform the part of the contract in the written statement filed by the defendant Mr. Agarwal learned counsel cited Gulam Mohd. vs. Mst. Mariyam (5) and Mulk Raj Sethi vs. S.N. Khanna (6). Learned counsel also drawn my attention to Major Som Nath vs. U.O.I. (7), in respect of use of previous statements made by witness. (7). A perusal of the impugned judgment and decree demonstrates that the learned trial Court placed heavy reliance on the testimony of Anil Kumar PW 1. He is the only person who proved the execution of agreement to sell Ex. 1. (7). A perusal of the impugned judgment and decree demonstrates that the learned trial Court placed heavy reliance on the testimony of Anil Kumar PW 1. He is the only person who proved the execution of agreement to sell Ex. 1. Neither his wife Sarita Minocha plaintiff and co-signatory of the agreement appeared in the witness box nor witness Sultan Khan was examined. Anil Kumar Monicha who is the tenant in the disputed shop and who received back Rs. 12,000/- from the defen- dant Risal Singh on 15.8.1988 on the pretext that he would vacate the shop on or before 30.4.1989, is the only witness of the agreement to sell relied upon by the learned trial Judge? Why the affidavit was executed by Anil Kumar Minocha on 15.8.1988 in respect of shop in dispute and why he did make promise to vacate the shop for which the agreement of sell was executed by landlord Risal Singh in favour of his wife Sarita on the same day ? Why did he receive Rs. 12,000/- from Risal Singh when he had to make payment of sale price? The amount could have been adjusted and reference could have been made in the agreement itself? Why the columns of date were left blank ? Why the agreement of sell ``did not bear the date? These questions have been left unanswered by the learned trial Judge. (8). Stamp paper of Rs. 5/- on which agreement to sell (Ex. 1) said to have been executed was purchased on 7.7.1988 from Stamp Vendor Mohan Lal Agarwal. On the same day similar stamp was purchased by Anil Kumar from the same stamp vendor. The stamp vendor entered the sale of stamps in Stamp sale register at nos. 3906 & 3907. On stamp bearing No. 3906 alleged agreement to sell was executed and on stamp bearing No. 3907 affidavit of Anil Kumar was executed. Risal Singh DW 1 in his cross-examination stated :– ``7.7.1988 KO MAINE EK STAMP KHARID KAR LAYA THA. YEH GALAT HAI KI USI STAMP PER YEH IKRARNAMA LIKHA HO. YEH PANCHG RUPEEYE KA STAMP 12,000/- RUPEYE VAPSI KI RASI LIKHNE KO LAYA THA. (On 7.7.1988 I purchased a stamp. This is incorrect that agreement was written on the said stamp. The stamp of rupees five was purchased for writing the receipt of the amount of Rs. 12,000/- which was given back). YEH PANCHG RUPEEYE KA STAMP 12,000/- RUPEYE VAPSI KI RASI LIKHNE KO LAYA THA. (On 7.7.1988 I purchased a stamp. This is incorrect that agreement was written on the said stamp. The stamp of rupees five was purchased for writing the receipt of the amount of Rs. 12,000/- which was given back). Whereas Anil Kumar Minocha PW 1 stated in the cross-examination as under:- `Yeh galat hai ki dukan khali lene ke liye hi hamara 12,000/- rupeye hamare ko lotaya ho va isileye 30.4.1989 tak ka samaya hamne inse liya ho. (This is incorrect that in order to get vacant possession of the shop the amount of Rs. 12,000/- given by us was returned back and we sought time till 30.4.1989). It may be noted that in the earlier part of cross-examination Anil Kumar admitted the execution of affidavit (Ex. P/22) by him. Testimony of such witness needs cautious scanning. A bare look at the alleged agreement (Ex. 1) as well as the affidavit goes to show that at the time of execution of affidavit the alleged agreement was not in existence. Anil Kumar could not explain in his statement as to why the date was not mentioned in the agreement when it was executed on 15.8.1988. He could not explain as to why 31.4.1989 was mentioned in the said docu- ment when month of April ends on 30th and more so when in the affidavit 30.4.1989 was mentioned. He could not explain why he became witness of a document which was executed in his interest. A further look at the alleged agreement to sell (Ex.1) reveals that complete address of witness `Sultan Khan has been mentioned in it as under:- ``Sultan Khan House No. 2729 Ramganj Kanvton Ke Khurre Ke Nische, Jaipur. In order to testify whether the plaintiff bonafidely attempted to examine Sultan Khan, I scrutinized the record of the trial Court. On 24.1.194 the plaintiff filed an indication alongwith the list naming following witnesses :– (i) Pesumal (ii) Nathu Singh (iii) Chandra Prakash (iv) Rajeev Bindal (v) Krishna Chandra Name of Sultan Khan, the only independent witness is missing from the list. Thus it is apparent that the plaintiff intentionally withhold the examination of Sultan Khan and it can safely be inferred that Sultan Khan if produced would not have supported the case of the plaintiff. Thus it is apparent that the plaintiff intentionally withhold the examination of Sultan Khan and it can safely be inferred that Sultan Khan if produced would not have supported the case of the plaintiff. Adverse inference may also be drawn in respect of receipt of Rs. 5,000/- said to have been issued by the defendant Risal Singh, reference of which has been made in the alleged agreement. (10). The learned trial Court disbelieved the testimony of the defendant Risal Singh on the ground that in the ejectment suit he stated that he did not purchase stamp on 7.7.1988. At the fag end of the trial of the suit learned trial Court allowed the application of the plaintiff filed u/O. 13 R. 2 CPC and kept on record the certified copy of the statement of Risal Singh on Ex. 23. But Risal Singh was not confronted with his earlier statement. In Major Som Nath vs. U.O.I, (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court propounded that when a witness has admitted having signed his previous statement. Such statement can at best be used to contradict in the cross examination of such witness when he gives evidence at the trial in the manner provided u/s. 145 of the Evidence Act. When the witness is contradicted by his previous statement which has been put to the witness will be considered along with the evidence to assess the worth of the witness in determining his vera- city. The whole of the previous statement, however cannot be treated as substantive evidence. In the case on hand, learned trial Court has considered certified copy (Ex. 23) of the earlier statement of Risal Singh without confronting him with his earlier statement, in order to adjudge his veracity. Thus observations of the learned trial Court that testimony of Risal Singh is unreliable is based on unsound reasoning. (11). In Lourde Mari David vs. Lous Chinnya (8), their Lordships of the Supreme Court propounded thus :– ``It is settled law that the party who seeks to avail of the equitable juris- diction of a Court and specific performance being equitable relief, must come to the Court with clean hands. In other words the party who makes false allegations does not come with clean hands and is not entitled to the equitable relief. In other words the party who makes false allegations does not come with clean hands and is not entitled to the equitable relief. (12) Narainji Makanji vs. Bhagwanji Makanji (9), was the case where the Guja- rat High Court observed that :– ``An untrue assertion in his pleadings while approaching the Court would certainly amount to not approaching the Court with clean hands. In that view of the matter, the conduct of the plaintiff in that regard would certainly disentitle him from claiming the equitable relief of specific performance. (13). In His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji vs. Shri Sita Ram Thaper (10), the Apex Court held :- ``There is a distinction between readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. By readiness may be meant the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the purchase price. For determining his willingness to perform his part of the contract, the conduct has to be properly scrutinised. There is no documentary proof that the plaintiff had ever finds to pay the balance of consideration. (14). In the case on hand the plaintiff intentionally concealed that a suit for ejectment was pending against her husband Anil Kumar in respect of the disputed shop. She also did not mention in the plaint that her husband Anil Kumar executed an affidavit on 15.8.1988 in which he made promise to vacate the said shop on or before 30.4.1989. The plaintiff did not appear in the witness box. Independent wit- ness Sultan Singh was not examined. Receipt referred in the agreement was withheld. No date was mentioned on the agreement. Columns of date were left blank. Agreement was left unattested. `31.4.1989 was mentioned at four places. All these facts go to show that the plaintiff has not come before the Court with clean hands and that `Agreement to sell Ex. 1 is the highly suspicious document and no reliance can be placed on it. (15). As already stated testimony of Anil Kumar PW 1, is highly unreliable. The fact that signatures of Risal Singh on Ex. 1 were got examined by the Hand Writing Expert much before filing of the suit also supports this possibility that Anil Kumar had planned to create evidence in order to prevent his eviction from the disputed shop. (15). As already stated testimony of Anil Kumar PW 1, is highly unreliable. The fact that signatures of Risal Singh on Ex. 1 were got examined by the Hand Writing Expert much before filing of the suit also supports this possibility that Anil Kumar had planned to create evidence in order to prevent his eviction from the disputed shop. The learned trial Judge closed his eyes towards the aforesaid special features of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff. There is sufficient balance of improbability to dispute the finding arrived at by the learned trial Court in deciding all the three issues in favour of the plaintiff. I am of the considered opinion that finding of the learned trial Court is unsound, perverse and based on the testimony of a unreliable and untruthful witness as well as on highly suspicious document. (16). In the result I allow the appeal and set aside the impugned decree and judgment. The suit filed by the plaintiff stands dismissed with costs throughout. The record of the case to sent back forthwith.