Judgment :- 1. This appeal has been preferred by the Insurance Company, challenging the Award and decree of the District Court (Motor Accident Claims Tribunal), Tuticorin, dated 30.3.1995, made in M.C.O.P. No. 303 of 1992. 2. In this appeal, the appellant has not challenged the finding of the Tribunal below that the accident was caused by the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle involved in the accident and also the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal. 3. The only contention that has been raised by the appellant-Insurance Company is that it is not liable to pay the compensation as on the relevant date and time of the accident, the vehicle was not covered by the policy issued by the appellant-Insurance Company. 4. In the present case, the accident occurred on 30.11.1992 around 5.00 P.M. and the cyclist Samuel died on the spot. The claimants are his widow and son respectively. The vehicle involved in the accident is admittedly the van TN-74.1274, owned by the 3rd respondent in this appeal, who is the first defendant in the M.C.O.P. 5. The Tribunal, while holding that the said van was driven rashly and negligently held that the owner of the vehicle, the 1st respondent before it, is liable vicariously, and awarded a total compensation of Rs. 40,000/- with interest at 12% per annum from the date of petition. The Tribunal below has held that the insurer of the vehicle, the 2nd respondent before it, is liable to pay the compensation. 6. The only question that has been raised in this appeal is, as to the liability of the insurer of the vehicle. The vehicle in question owned by Jesiah, the 1st respondent in the original petition, was initially insured with the 2nd respondent-Insurance company as seen from Exs. R.1 and R.2. Ex. R.1, insurance policy was for the period 29.11.1991 to 28.11.1992. Ex. R. 2 also was for the period 1.12.1992 (11.10 A.M.)to 30.11.1993. 7. The Assistant Divisional Manager of the Insurance Company, who was examined as R.W. 1, deposed that the policy Ex. R.1 would cover the period 29.11.1991 to 28.11.1992 and the policy Ex. R.2 would cover the period commencing from 11.10 A.M. on 1.12.1992 to 30.11.1993. According to R.W.1, on 30.11.1992, the date of accident, the vehicle in question was not covered by a policy and the vehicle was not insured at all. R.1 would cover the period 29.11.1991 to 28.11.1992 and the policy Ex. R.2 would cover the period commencing from 11.10 A.M. on 1.12.1992 to 30.11.1993. According to R.W.1, on 30.11.1992, the date of accident, the vehicle in question was not covered by a policy and the vehicle was not insured at all. As deposed by R.W.1, the vehicle was not covered by the Insurance policy for two days, viz., 29.11.1992 and 30.11.1992. Ex. R.3 would show that on 1.12.1992 alone premium has been paid by the owner of the vehicle. Basing upon such payment. Ex. R.2 policy had been issued for the period commencing from 11.10 A.M. on (sic) 30.11.1993(?). These facts, as deposed by R.W.I, had not been challenged and the Tribunal below also had recorded the same. Thus, at the material point of time, viz., on 30.11.1992 at 5.00 P.M., the vehicle in question was not covered by an insurance policy. The Tribunal took the view that there is a gap of two days and though the policy has been renewed on 1.12.1992 by the same Insurance Company, it is a continuation of the previous policy and being a renewal, the Insurance Company is liable and the liability of the Insurance Company in no way ceases even though the policy issued expired on 28.11.1992. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that in the absence of a valid insurance at the relevant point of time, the appellant-Insurance Company is not liable at all and the Tribunal below ought to have exonerated the Insurance Company from payment of the compensation. 9. There is force in the contention raised by learned Counsel for the appellant. This Court heard learned counsel for the appellant in detail. Learned Counsel for the respondents claimants, despite opportunity being given, have failed to appear on more than three occasions and in the circumstances, this Court reserved judgment. 10. Learned Counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the decisions in Asma Begum and Others v. Nisar Ahmed and others ( 1990 ACJ 832 (FB) (Karnataka), New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Ram Dayal (1990 ACJ 545 (SC), National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jikubhai Nathuji Dabhi (1997 ACJ 351 (SC) and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Veerammal (1996) I MLJ 303 (DB). 11. Ltd. v. Ram Dayal (1990 ACJ 545 (SC), National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jikubhai Nathuji Dabhi (1997 ACJ 351 (SC) and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Veerammal (1996) I MLJ 303 (DB). 11. In 1990 ACJ 832 (Supra) Rama Jois, J., speaking for the Bench, held that renewal of insurance policy would only indicate that the vehicle was insured with the same company on the earlier occasion and for the purpose of giving rebate in the amount of premium and that by itself would not have the effect of the policy being effective from the date of expiry of the previous policy and of filling up the gap and foisting the liability arising out of an accident which had taken place at a time when the policy was not in existence. The Bench has I held thus:— “As regards the principle of renewal of a permit of licence taking effect from an earlier date, it appears to us that it would be applicable to a case where under the scheme a permit or licence issued is permanent and requires periodical renewal on payment of prescribed fee and satisfying the prescribed terms and conditions subject to which it had been issued. Examples of such licences are the permanent” driving licence, a permanent cinema licence or a permanent stage carriage permit. As far as motor vehicle insurance is concerned, there is nothing like issuing of permanent policy, subject to periodical renewal. It is an insurance only for the period specified in the policy. There is no question of renewal of that policy. It is true that if during any particular period for which the vehicle insurance policy was taken there had been no claim in respect of the vehicle concerned, some reduction is given in the amount of premium in the form of no claim bonus. That is only an incentive given to the customers to take the insurance policy for the succeeding years from the same company, but the allowing of no claim bonus is no ground to hold that the policy, whenever it is issued, had continued from the date of expiry of the previous policy. There is no continuation in the case of motor vehicle insurance. Each policy is separate and independent and holds good only for the period mentioned in the policy. The words ‘renewal policy’ used both in Tippannas case 1982. There is no continuation in the case of motor vehicle insurance. Each policy is separate and independent and holds good only for the period mentioned in the policy. The words ‘renewal policy’ used both in Tippannas case 1982. ACJ (Supp.) 102 (Karnataka) and in this ca se on the receipt, as submitted by the learned counsel for the 3rd respondent, were only to indicate that the vehicle was insured earlier with the same company and for the purpose of giving rebate in the amount of premium and that by itself would not have the effect of the policy being effective from the date of expiry of the previous policy and of filling up the gap and foisting the liability arising out of an accident which had taken place at a time when the policy was not in existence, on the insurance company. In Tippannas case, 1982 ACJ (Supp.) 192 (Karnataka) because the insurance company, for whatever be the reason, had issued a policy to be effective from 10.2.1978, a date earlier to the accident, this court held that risk arising out of an accident which had taken place on 11.2.1978 was covered. But in this case it is clear that the period commencing from 4.11.1983 till 17.11.1983 is not covered by the policy. The premium was paid only on 17.11.1983 for a period of one year and on the payment of premium the policy was issued on Therefore, there can be no doubt that it covers the risk arising after the date and time specified on the policy 10. To sum up, our conclusions are: (i) A Motor vehicle insurance policy is effective only for the period specified in the policy and not from the date of expiry of an earlier policy if any, in respect of the same vehicle, issued by the same insurer. (ii) In view of Section 64-V(b) of the Insurance Act the risk on the part of the insurer commences only on the payment of the premium by the insured. (iii) In the present case the premium was paid at 11 a.m. on 17.11.1983 and the policy was also issued to be effective from 11 a.m. on 17.11.1983 till 16.11.1984 and therefore it did not cover the risk arising out of the accident which took place at 10 a.m. on 17.11.1983.” I am in respectful agreement with the law laid down by the said Division Bench. 12. The Supreme Court in 1990 ACJ 545 (supra) held that when a policy is taken on a particular date, its effectiveness is from the commencement of the date and the insurer is liable in terms of the Act to meet the liability of the owner under the Award, if any that may be passed. In the present case, the accident took place on 30.11.1992 around 5.00 P.M. and the policy had already expired on 28.11.1992 and only on 1.12.1992 the owner of the vehicle had paid the premium. As such, it cannot be said that the policy, which had been issued on 1.12.1992 would also cover the date of accident, viz., 30.11.1992, nor it could be deemed that a renewal of the insurance cover dates back to the expiry of the earlier policy. 13. In 1997 ACJ 351 (supra), the earlier decision in 1990 ACJ 545 (supra), was distinguished by a Full Bench of the Supreme Court and it was held that in view of the special contract mentioned in the insurance policy, viz., it would be operative from 4.00 P.M. on 25.10.1983 and in view of the fact that the accident had occurred earlier thereto, the insurance coverage would not entitle the claimant to seek recovery of the amount from the insurer of the vehicle. 14. This Court, on a consideration of Ex. R.1, R.2 and R.3 as well as the evidence of R.W.1, holds that on the date of accident, viz., 30.11.1992, there was no policy of insurance, covering the vehicle and the earlier policy ceased to be operative on and from 28.11.1992. The vehicle was not covered by a policy for two days, viz., 29.11.1992 and 30.11.1992, the date of accident. Ex. R.2 Policy discloses the effective date of commencement of insurance for the purpose of the Act as from 11.10 A.M. on 1.12.1992 to 30.11.1993. Following the Full Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in 1997 ACJ 351 (supra) this Court holds that being a special contract, as mentioned in Ex. R.2 insurance policy, it would be operative from 11.10. A.M. on 1.12.1992 and the accident occurred earlier thereto, viz., on 30.11.1992 at 5.00 P.M., the insurance coverage though it is a renewal, would not entitle the claimants to seek recovery of the amount from the appellant-Insurance company. R.2 insurance policy, it would be operative from 11.10. A.M. on 1.12.1992 and the accident occurred earlier thereto, viz., on 30.11.1992 at 5.00 P.M., the insurance coverage though it is a renewal, would not entitle the claimants to seek recovery of the amount from the appellant-Insurance company. In 1997 ACJ 351 (supra) it has been held thus :— “The Tribunal also had recorded, as a fact that on 25.10.1983 at 4.00 P.M. the contract of renewal had come into force and it would be operative upto 24.10.1984. The Tribunal also recorded, as a fact, that the accident had occurred on 25.10.1983 at 11.14 A.M., that is before the renewal of the contract. Under these circumstances, it would be clear that the accident had occurred when the renewal had not taken effect. 3. This Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Ram Dayal , 1990 ACJ 545 (SC) had held that in the absence of any specific time mentioned in that behalf, the contract would be operative from the mid-night of the day by operation of provisions of the General Clauses Act 1897. But in view of the special contract mentioned in the insurance policy, namely, it would be operative from 4.00 P.M. on 25.10.1983 and the accident had occurred earlier thereto, the insurance coverage would not enable the claimant to seek recovery of the amount from the appellant company.” 15. Thus, on a consideration, this Court holds that the appellant-Insurance Company is not liable at all for the accident that occurred on 30.11.1992 at 5.00 P.M. and the award and decree of the Tribunal below against the appellant-Insurance company have to be set aside and the appeal has to be allowed. However, it is made clear that the owner of the vehicle, viz., the 1st respondent before the Tribunal below, is liable to pay the compensation and the insurer of the vehicle is (exonerated. 16. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, but without costs and the Award and decree of the Tribunal below is modified holding that the owner of the vehicle, viz., the 1st respondent in M.C.O.P. No. 303 of 1992 alone is liable to pay the compensation. 16. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, but without costs and the Award and decree of the Tribunal below is modified holding that the owner of the vehicle, viz., the 1st respondent in M.C.O.P. No. 303 of 1992 alone is liable to pay the compensation. The amount, if any, deposited by the appellant-Insurance Company to the credit of M.C.O.P. No. 303 of 1992 consequent to the interim order passed by this Court shall be refunded to the Insurance Company, C.M.P. No. 11531 of 1995 is consequently dismissed.