JUDGMENT S.C. Pandey, J. 1. They are heard. This petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is directed against the order dated November 2, 1993, Annexure A-4, whereby the respondent No. 1 has refused to refer the matter to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal in exercise of its power under Section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner has passed intermediate examination. It is also claimed by the petitioner that he had also worked under PW. 1 (Railway) Bhopal in the Jhansi Division of the respondent No. 2. It is stated by the petitioner that he was given an employment card of a casual labour (Gangman). Subsequently, the petitioner worked under P.W. 1, Shankargarh and P.W. 1, Satna. According to the petitioner, he had worked more than 240 days and, therefore, he could not be retrenched without payment of retrenchment compensation under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is stated in the petition that the petitioner was not allowed to work from March 18, 1986, by P.W. 1 (Railway), Shri Siddiqui. Thereafter, he remained out of job. It is said by the petitioner that he has made several representations, but he was not given any charge-sheet nor any departmental enquiry was held against him. It is stated by the petitioner that after March 18, 1986, he was again allowed to work as a waterman between the period June 13, 1986 to July 6, 1986, under the Station Superintendent at Manikpur. Therefore, the petitioner was not given any employment whatsoever. It is the case of the petitioner that he was approaching the respondent No. 2 for giving him further opportunity to serve the respondent No. 2 but, he was not permitted to work. The petitioner claimed that he was holding a service card No. 136113 which was not returned to him. For this reason, the petitioner was not given any job. It is stated by the petitioner that this employment card was not with him and was kept with the respondent No.2 during the course of his employment. When he asked for this card, a letter was received by him ultimately marked as Annexure A-1 to the effect that this card is lying with F.D.R. Jabalpur and this information was already given to the petitioner on September 27, 1989. When he asked for this card, a letter was received by him ultimately marked as Annexure A-1 to the effect that this card is lying with F.D.R. Jabalpur and this information was already given to the petitioner on September 27, 1989. This is a document which was filed by the petitioner himself. In this document, it has also been stated that the petitioner left the job on January 20, 1986. 2. In this petition, the respondents, on the other hand, contended that the petitioner had himself left the job on January 20, 1986, and, therefore, there was no question of passing any order of termination. It was also claimed that the petitioner had not worked for 240 days as claimed by him. In paragraph 5.7 of the return, the respondents claimed that no card, was issued to the petitioner and the petitioner was using a fabricated and forged card. 3. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the opinion that neither the petitioner nor the respondents are entitled to be informed apart from the reason on which the impugned order was based. The petitioner cannot assail the order passed by the respondent No. 1 refusing to refer the matter on the grounds which are not before it. Similarly, the respondent No. 1 cannot justify the refusal of reference on the grounds which were not considered by the respondent No. 1. The controversy, therefore, is limited to whether the respondent No. 1 was entitled to refuse to refer the dispute on the ground of delay of five years as it has been mentioned in the order. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends while deciding the case the Central Government could not have dismissed the case of the petitioner on the ground of delay as there is no limitation under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It has no jurisdiction whatsoever to consider the question of delay. The second limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that without considering the merits of the case, the Central Government/ respondent No. 1 could not have refused to refer the case of the petitioner on the ground of delay. In other words, argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is to the effect that the question of delay cannot be isolated from the question of merits of a case. In other words, argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is to the effect that the question of delay cannot be isolated from the question of merits of a case. The two-line order passed by the respondent No. 1 without considering the case of the petitioner could be interfered with on the ground that the respondent No. 1 has not considered the material facts which were germane for consideration in refusing or granting a reference to the petitioner. The third limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that a number of cases has been referred by the respondent No. 1 to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contends that in such matters the discretion has already been exercised by the respondent No. 1 in exercising his administrative powers and this Court cannot interfere with the matter to refuse or not to refer the case of the petitioner to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal. 5. Having considered the rival contentions of the parties, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned order does not disclose if the respondent No. 1 has considered the merits of the case of the petitioner while deciding to refuse the reference on the ground of delay. The two-line order only says that since the dispute is raised after five years and, therefore, the reference shall not be made without any justifiable reasons. In the opinion of this Court, delay is a factor on which a reference could be rejected. But, it is not the sole factor for consideration on which the respondent No. 1 was entitled to reject the application for reference, it should have weighed the case of the petitioner on merits as well as on the point of delay in order to justify it to the petitioner. It is well established that no hard and fast rule can be laid down in the matter of exercise of powers under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is also well established that this order is not a judicial order but an administrative order. However, even in the case where an administrative authority is ordained to exercise statutory jurisdiction, it is required to exercise its discretion after consideration of the matters which are germane for passing the order. It is also well established that this order is not a judicial order but an administrative order. However, even in the case where an administrative authority is ordained to exercise statutory jurisdiction, it is required to exercise its discretion after consideration of the matters which are germane for passing the order. Therefore, the order dated November 2, 1993, is liable to be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that this petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated November 2, 1993, Annexure A-4 is quashed. It is directed that the respondent No. 1 shall examine the matter afresh and consider the case of the petitioner on the merits of delay for coming to the conclusion whether the dispute is liable to be referred to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal or reference has to be rejected on the ground that the petitioner was responsible for delay and because of his laches the respondent No. 2 would be prejudiced. The respondent No. 1, shall pass an order within two months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. No costs.