C. K. PRASAD, J. ( 1 ) SAGAR Electricity Supply Company and Jabalpur Electricity Supply Company were the licensees under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. Before the expiry of the period of their licence, the State Legislature enacted M. P. Vidyut Pradaya Upakaran (Arjan) Adhiniyam, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which came into force on 10-9-1974. The Act provided for the acquisition of the Jabalpur Elecricity Supply Companylimited and Sagar Electricity Supply Companylimited (hereinafter referred to as the Company' Jesu and Sesu' respectively ). Section 5 of the Act provides for vesting of the undertaking to the State Government. Undetaking has been defined under Section 3 (j) of the Act which means an electricity supply undertaking owned and managed by licensee and specified in schedule 1 of the Act, JESU and SESU figure in schedule 1 of the Act and by force of the said provision same stood transferred to and vested in the State Government. Section 9 of the Act confers powers on the State Govt. to direct that the undertaking of the licensee together with all its properties and fixed assets specified in Section 5 (1) of the Act, shall instead of contining to vest on the State Government, vest in the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board ). In the present case the State Govt. has passed such an order and the undertakings have vested in the Board. ( 2 ) CHAPTER III of the Act deals with the payment of amount to the licensee in lieu of undertaking vesting in the State. Section 10 of the Act provides for payment of amount to the licensees which reads as follows :section 10 payment of amount - (1) The licensee of every undertaking shall be given by the State Government an amount determined in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, for vesting in it, under Section 5 of the undertaking of the licensee. (2) The amount payable to the licensee of the undertaking under sub-section (1) shall be the amount arrived at in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter after deduction from the gross amount specified in Section 11, the deductions specified in Section 12. (2) The amount payable to the licensee of the undertaking under sub-section (1) shall be the amount arrived at in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter after deduction from the gross amount specified in Section 11, the deductions specified in Section 12. (3) Subject to the provisions of Section 14, the amount payable under sub-section (1) shall be payable in cash either in lump sum or in annual instalments as the State Government may fix or in bonds or partly in cash and partly in bonds or in such other manner as may be prescribed. (4) Where any amount is payable in instalments or otherwise under the provisions of this section the unpaid amount where its payment has become due, shall carry interest at the current Reserve Bank rate plus one per cent from the vesting date. A plain reading of Section 10 (2) of the Act makes it clear that the amount payable to the licensee of the undertaking shall be the amount arrived at in accordance with the provision of Chapter III after deducting from the gross amount deductions specified in Section 12 of the Act. Section 11 of the Act enumerates the method of arrving at gross amount whereas as Section 12 explains the meaning of the expression deduction used in Section 10 (2) of the Act. Thus, Section 11 of the Act sets out the various amounts the aggregate value of which will make the gross amount. Section 12 of the Act specifies the deductions. The amount remaining after making deductions from the gross amount is payable to the licensee. ( 3 ) SECTION 13 of the Act provided for appointment of a Special Officer, to assess the amount payable to the licensee under Section 10 of the Act. Section 13 (2) of the Act requires the Special Officer to determine and assess the gross amount and deductions as specified in Sec- tions 11 and 12 of the Act respectively and to determine and assess the amount payable to the licensee by deducting the amount from the gross amount. ( 4 ) SPECIAL Officer was appointed as contemplated under the Act on 30-12-1975 and claims were laid before him by the company as also by the Board. Witnesses were examined before him. ( 4 ) SPECIAL Officer was appointed as contemplated under the Act on 30-12-1975 and claims were laid before him by the company as also by the Board. Witnesses were examined before him. The Special Officer by separate orders held that nothing was payable to the company as the deductions under Section 12 exceeded the gross amount assessed under Section 11 of the Act. ( 5 ) AGGRIEVED by the assessment of the gross amount and deductions, as contemplated under Sections 11 and 12 of the Act, the Board as also the Company preferred appeal before the Board of Revenue, the appellate forum, as provided under Section 13 (7) of the Act. The appeal preferred by JESU was registered as Appeal Number 67/80 whereas appeal preferred by the Board against the aforesaid company was registered as Appeal No. 58/90. By common order dated 13th Jan. 1984 both the appeals have been dismissed. JESU assails the order of the Special Officer as also the appellate order in Misc. Petition No. 2510/84 in the present writ petition filed under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. Appeal preferred by the SESU was registered as Appeal No. 31/80 and that of the Board against the said company as Appeal No. 59/80. The Board of Revenue by its common order dated 13th Jan. 1984 dismissed both the appeals. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, Board has preferred Misc. Petition No. 2091/84 where as M. P. No. 2509/84 has been preferred by SESU under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 6 ) IN all these writ petitions common questions of law and fact arise and therefore, they are being disposed of by this common order. ( 7 ) IT is relevant here to state that Section 12 (c) of the Act provides that the amount due, if any, including interest thereon, from the licensee to the Board for energy supplied by the Board before the vesting date and any other charges due from the licensee shall be deducted from the amount payable to the licensee. The Board claimed huge amount under the said head which was disputed by the company and it further, took the plea that the claim laid by the Board being barred by limitation, cannot be recovered. The Board claimed huge amount under the said head which was disputed by the company and it further, took the plea that the claim laid by the Board being barred by limitation, cannot be recovered. Another objection of the company was that no interest can be charged in the absence of an agreement on the part of the company to pay interest. Special Officer as also the Board of Revenue held that the Special Officer appointed under the Act is not a Court, and therefore, provision of Limitation Act shall not apply. However, the company's contention that it is not liable to pay interest on arrears of energy charges, has been upheld. ( 8 ) SHRI Abhay Sapre, appearing on behalf of the company submits that the conclusion of the Special Officer as affirmed by the Board of Revenue that Special Officer is not a court is erroneous. He submits that Special Officer has all the attributes of a Court and in this connection he has drawn by attention to Section 13 of the Act which provides for assessment of the amount by the Special Officer, payable to the licensee under Section 10 of the Act. He has further drawn by attention that Special Officer has been conferred with the power to determine and assess the gross amount and deductions and for that purpose he has been conferred with the power to regulate its own procedure. He has been further conferred with the power of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, in respect of summoning and enforcing the attendance of any witness and examining him on oath, discovery and production of any document or other material, reseption of evidence on affidavits and issuing of any commission for the examination of witnesses. ( 9 ) IT has been further brought to my notice that Section 13 (4) of the Act, declares that the investigation before the Special Officer to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code and the Special Officer to be a Civil Court for the purpose of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Mr. Mr. Abhay Sapre in support of his submission has drawn my attention to the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Balkrishna Daji Gupta v. Collector, Bombay, AIR 1923 Bom 298, wherein it is observed :"the word "court" has not been defined in any Act of the Legislature but it may be presumed that an officer, to be a Court must be competent to make a judicial decision. "shri Sapre has brought to my notice the meaning of the word Court given in Law Lexicon of British India by Aiyers, which reads as follows :"court is a tribunal empowered to hear and determine issues between parties. Upon pleadings either oral or written, and upon evidence to be adduced under well defined and established rules, according to settled principles of Law. " ( 10 ) SHRI Jaiswal appearing on behalf of the Board submits that in view of the judgment rendered by this Court dated 22-6-87 passed in C. R. No. 97/85, Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, Rampur, Jabalpur v. M/s. United Collierieslimited and C. R. No. 262/81 decided on 8-8-83, M/s. J. A. Trivedi Brothers, Balaghat v. District Judge, Chhindwara as also in C. R. No. 1534/89, M. P. Electricity Board, Jabalpur v. M/s. Newton Chickli Collieries,limited, Dhanbad decided on 2-1-84, have squarely answered this question and in view of those judgments nothing further required to be examined. In fairness to Shri Sapre I must state that he has conceded that the judgments, referred to above, holds against the stand which he has taken in the case, but he contends that the aforesaid judgments does not lay down the correct principle. In the case of M. P. E. B. , Rampur, Jabalpur (supra) it was held as follows :"it is now settled that all Tribunals are not Courts. Full Bench of this Court in Yashwant Rao v. Sampat, AIR 1979 MP 21 : (1979 Lab IC 176) pointing out the distinction between the "court" and the "tribunal" observed that a Tribunal is constituted by the State as a part of the ordinary heirarchy of Courts while a Tribunal on the other hand, is constituted under Special Act to exercise some special jurisdiction. In that case the Commissioner appointed under the Workmen Compensation Act was held to be a Tribunal and not a Civil Court. In that case the Commissioner appointed under the Workmen Compensation Act was held to be a Tribunal and not a Civil Court. Applying these principles this Court in Civil Revision No. 262/81 decided on 8-8-83 (M/s. J. A. Trivedi Brothers, Balaghat v. District Judge, Chhindwara) and yet in another Civil Revision No. 1534/88, (M. P. Electricity Board, Jabalpur v. M/s. Newton Chickli Collierieslimited, Dhanbad) decided on 2-1-1984 held that the Commissioner of payment appointed under the Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1973 is a Tribunal and not a Court. All these aforesaid decisions also take a view that the Limitation Act applies to Courts and not to Tribunals and consequently in the aforesaid two decisions it has been specifically held that the Limitation Act would not apply to the proceedings before the Commissioner of payments. Since the claim was laid before the Commissioner within the period prescribed under Section 20, the claim cannot be held to be barred by time. This contention raised on behalf of the respondent is, therefore, rejected and no past of the petitioners' claim can be dismissed as barred by limitation. "further in the case of M/s. J. A. Trivedi Brothers v. District Judge, Chhindwara, this Court held as follows :-"it is now settled by two decisions of the Supreme Court that the Limitation Act applies only to proceedings before a Civil Court. (See Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Labour Court, Hubli, AIR 1969 SC 1335 : (1969 Lab IC 1538) and Kerala S. E. Board v. T. P. Kunhaliumma, AIR 1977 SC 282 . The Commissioner for payments appointed under the Nationalisation Act is not a Civil Court and the Limitation Act is not applicable to proceedings before him. Section 20 of the Nationalisation Act under which the claims were made itself provides the period of limitations. Sub-section (1) of Section 20 says that every person having a claim against the owner of a Coal Mine shall prefer such claim before the Commissioner within 30 days from the specified date. It is not in dispute that the claims that were laid by the Coal Mines Provident Fund Commissioner before the Commissioner were preferred within 30 days from the specified date. The claims were thus within time under S. 20 (1 ). It is not in dispute that the claims that were laid by the Coal Mines Provident Fund Commissioner before the Commissioner were preferred within 30 days from the specified date. The claims were thus within time under S. 20 (1 ). It may also be mentioned that the claims under the P. F. Act are recoverable u/s. 10a of the Act, as arrears of land revenue for which there is no limitation. The Asstt. Commissioner for payments therefore could not reject the claims as barred by limitation. "the judgment of this Court in M. P. E. B. Jabalpur v. Newton Chickli Collierieslimited, Dhanbad (supra) has also taken the same view. ( 11 ) AS stated earlier, Shri Sapre has conceded that applying the principles laid down in aforesaid judgment, special officer appointed under the Act does not come within the expression "court" so as to attract the provision of the Limitation Act, but he submits that the aforesaid judgment does not lay down correct law. I am afraid the submission is devoid of any substance. The judgments referred to above have been rendered after considering the governing principles and I do not find anything on principle to take a contrary view. Thus, I negative the submission of Shri Sapre that the special officer is a Court. ( 12 ) IN the alternative, in support of the writ petition, Shri Sapre submits that even if it is held that special officer is not a Court, even then, Limitation Act will have its application. It is relevant here to state that Section 12 (c) provides for deduction of the 'amount due' to the Board and according to the learned counsel amount due would mean amount legally due. It is submitted that electricity being goods, its price and recovery shall be governed by Art. 14/15 of the Limitation Act. Accordingly, it is contended that claim have to be, therefore, confined for 3 years prior to the date of vesting i. e. 10-9-74 and claim prior to 10-9-71 shall barred. It is submitted that electricity being goods, its price and recovery shall be governed by Art. 14/15 of the Limitation Act. Accordingly, it is contended that claim have to be, therefore, confined for 3 years prior to the date of vesting i. e. 10-9-74 and claim prior to 10-9-71 shall barred. In this connection Shri Sapre has drawn by attention to Section 20 (3) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 which reads as follows :-"20 (3) where any claim, not being a claim which was time barred on 31st day of January, 1973, was preferred under sub-section (1) within the period specified therefore and was rejected merely on the ground that such claim was time barred, such claim shall be deemed not to have been rejected and the Commissioner shall restore on his file such claim and shall deal with it is the manner specified in Section 23. " ( 13 ) WHILE buttressing the aforesaid submission, Shri Sapre submits that when the Legislature has not stated the energy charge payable to the Board under Section 12 (c) of the Act from the rigor of the Limitation Act as was done under Section 20 (3) of the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, deductions under the aforesaid head beyond the period of limitation cannot be made. In Khadi Gram Udyog Trust v. Shri Ram Chandra Ji Virajman Mandir, AIR 1978 SC 287 : (1978 All LJ 7), the Supreme Court has laid down the law as follows :-"there is ample authority for the proposition that though a debt is time barred, it will be a debt due though not recoverable, the relief being barred by limitation. In Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.) Vol. 24 Art. 369, it is stated 'except in the cases previously mentioned, the Limitation Act, 1939 only takes away the remedies by action or by set off, it leaves the right otherwise untouched and if a creditor whose debt is statute barred has any means of enforcing his claim other than by action or set off, the Act does not prevent him from recovering by those means. " ( 14 ) IN Curwen v. Milburn, (1889) 42 Ch D 424 the Court of Appeal said, "statute barred debts are dues, though payment of them cannot be enforced by action. The aforesaid view was expressed by the Supreme Court in Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. " ( 14 ) IN Curwen v. Milburn, (1889) 42 Ch D 424 the Court of Appeal said, "statute barred debts are dues, though payment of them cannot be enforced by action. The aforesaid view was expressed by the Supreme Court in Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Limited v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 328 wherein it has been held as follows :-"23. It has been already mentioned that when a debt becomes time-barred, it does not become extinguished but only unenforceable in a Court of law. Indeed, it is on that footing that there can be a statutory transfer of the debts due to the employees, and that is how the Board gets title to them. If then a debt subsists even after it is barred by limitation, the employer does not get, in law a discharge therefrom. " ( 15 ) IN view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court, I have no hesitation in holding that the deduction claimed by the Board under Section 12 (c) of the Act is not barred by limitation and accordingly, I negative the submission of Shri Sapre. ( 16 ) AS a last straw Shri Sapre submits that the finding recorded by the Special Officer as affirmed by the Board of Revenue in relation to assessment of the gross amount as also the deductions are erroneous and the same needs to be corrected by this Court in exercise of its power under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 17 ) SHRI Sapre as also Shri Jaiswal assail the finding against the Board and submit that this Court does not lack jurisdiction in upsetting the finding of the authority in case, the same has been rendered without considering the legal issues or is perverse. ( 18 ) IT is well settled that this Court, while exercising its power under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India, does not act as a Court of appeal against the finding recorded by the subordinate Courts or the Tribunals and interferes only when it is found that the finding is perverse. True it is, that at some places the Special Officer has stated its difficulty to give an accurate valuation which might be regarded as a mathemetical correct valuation in consonance will all the requirements of exact accounting. True it is, that at some places the Special Officer has stated its difficulty to give an accurate valuation which might be regarded as a mathemetical correct valuation in consonance will all the requirements of exact accounting. Nonetheless he was under an obligation to adjudicate the gross amount and the deduction and while doing so, he after considering and meticulously examined the relevant material he arrived at the finding. It is to be borne in mind that before the Special Officer the respective parties are not required to prove their case beyond all reasonable doubt but the Special Officer was required to record the finding on preponderance of materials laid before it. He has taken great pains to refer, digest and record the finding. No exceptional case has been made out for interference with the finding of fact arrived at by the Special Officer as also affirmed by the Board of Revenue under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 19 ) IN the result, I do not find any merit in any of the writ petitions. They are dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to cost. Security amount if deposited be refunded to the petitioners. Petition dismissed. .