Judgment S. K. CHATTOPADHYAYA and M. Y. EQBAL, JJ. 1. The petitioner has impugned the revised assessment order for the period 1982-83 as contained in annexure 6 (wrongly mentioned as annexure 3) and consequential notice of demand (annexure 4 ). It has also prayed for restraining the respondents from recovering the demand as made in annexure 4. 2. 2. The petitioner is a public limited company which manufactures vehicles, excavators and their spare parts and sells the same throughout India, Nepal and Bhutan. It also exports to other countries both directly as also through its agent Telco Exports Limited, Bombay. 3. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that during the year 1982-83 an assessment was made by the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Jamsedpur (respondent No.4) on March 23, 1991 in which deduction on the basis of "d" form filed by the petitioner was allowed in respect of sales to Sikkim National Transport and to Government departments. As some claims were disallowed the petitioner filed statutory appeal which was disposed of on January 11, 1995 and the petitioner filed another revision petition before the Tribunal, which is pending. Subsequently, during the course of routine audit of the assessment records of the petitioner it was found that the petitioner was liable to pay taxes on the sales effected to Sikkim Nationalised Transport amounting to Rs.28,71,413 and in respect of sales to Government departments amounting to Rs.4,69,96,103. During pendency of the appeal preferred by the petitioner it is stated, that on the basis of the said audit report the assessing officer reviewed the assessment order dated March 23, 1991 and included the aforesaid two turnovers and levied tax thereon. A grievance has been made that said revised assessment order dated March 23, 1991 has been passed merely on the basis of the audit report and without making further enquiry. The petitioner again preferred an appeal against the said revised order and appellate authority on December 28, 1994 disposed of the same directing the assessing officer to pass a fresh order by January 15, 1995. A copy of the said order of the appellate authority is annexure 4. In revision the Tribunal, by its order dated April 20, 1995 allowed the revision application by setting aside the judgment dated December 8, 1994 passed by the Joint Commissioner of commercial Taxes (Administration), respondent No.3. The said order is contained in annexure 5. A copy of the said order of the appellate authority is annexure 4. In revision the Tribunal, by its order dated April 20, 1995 allowed the revision application by setting aside the judgment dated December 8, 1994 passed by the Joint Commissioner of commercial Taxes (Administration), respondent No.3. The said order is contained in annexure 5. After receipt of the Tribunals order, the assessing officer by his letter dated June 6, 1995 to respondent No.3 requested him to accord sanction to review the order of assessment dated March 23, 1991. Sanction was accorded by the respondent No.3 on June 6, 1995 itself. The assessing officer, on getting such sanction, it is asserted, issued notice to the petitioner for hearing and the same was served on June 10, 1995, but as the company did not take any action on the date fixed, the assessing authority passed impugned order of assessment on June 15, 1995, by reason of which he reviewed the original assessment order dated March 23, 1991. The said assessment order is annexure 6 to this writ application. 4. 4. Mr. Jain, learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, referring to the order of assessment dated March 23, 1991 (annexure 1), strongly contended that the assessing officer completely erred in law in not taking note of the relief already allowed by the respondent No.3 in his order dated January 11, 1995, by reason of which he modified the assessment order dated March 23, 1991. According to him, due to relief granted by the superior authority the demand comes to Rs.47,58,139 whereas by reason of the impugned order dated June 15, 1995 the demand comes to Rs.50,29,237 which is apparently wrong because the assessing officer proceeded on the basis of the order dated March 23, 1991 completely ignoring the fact that the appellate authority modified the said order on January 11, 1995. The learned counsel further contended that the order impugned is liable to be set aside solely on the ground of violation of principle of natural justice inasmuch as the notice of hearing dated June 7, 1995 was served on the petitioner on June 10, 1995 fixing June 15, 1995 for compliance but on the same date the impugned order was passed. According to him, section 47 of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 provides that a reasonable opportunity of being heard should be given to the assessee and the impugned order does not show that any such opportunity was given to the petitioner. The learned counsel further submitted that the order dated March 23, 1991 would not have been reviewed by the assessing authority merely on the basis of sanction given by the respondent No.3 inasmuch as the said order had already merged in the appellate order dated January 11, 1995 which could not have been reviewed by the assessing officer thereafter. 5. 5. Mrs. Indrani Sen Choudhary, learned Standing Counsel I, however, has tried to justify the impugned order by submitting that the petitioner has moved this Court by suppressing material facts and without exhausting internal statutory remedy available to it. Her contention is that the impugned order is dated June 15, 1995 which has been challenged by the petitioner in the instant writ application by filing the same on March 12, 1997, i. e. , about after two years and as such, on the ground of laches the writ application should be dismissed. 6. 6. The respondents in their counter-affidavit have given some facts which are required to be mentioned hereinafter. According to them, for the assessment year 1982 the assessment order was passed on March 23, 1991, the same order was impugned before the appellate authority in JRCSTA-8/91-92 and the appellate authority on January 10, 1995 remanded the case to the assessing officer directing him to pass fresh order by February 15, 1995. This order of the appellate authority is annexure A to the counter-affidavit. However, subsequently, on objection raised by the Accountant General of Bihar, the earlier assessment order dated March 23, 1991 was reviewed and fresh assessment order, which is called revised assessment order, has been passed on August 5, 1992. The same revised assessment order dated August 5, 1992 again impugned by the petitioner in appeal being Appeal No. JRCSTA-8/92-93 and again appellate authority by its order dated December 28, 1994 remanded the case to the assessing officer with a direction to pass a fresh assessment order in the light of the observation made by it. The assessing officer was directed to pass fresh order by January 15, 1995. The assessing officer was directed to pass fresh order by January 15, 1995. On the basis of the order of the appellate authority dated December 28, 1994, the revised assessment order has been passed on January 11, 1995 which is contained in annexure B to the counter-affidavit. The petitioner moved the Tribunal in revision against the appellate order dated December 28, 1994 by reason of which the appellate authority demanded the matter to the assessing officer for passing a fresh assessment order and the Tribunal by its order dated May 3, 1995 set aside the order of the appellate court dated December 28, 1994. It is stated that against the earlier assessment order dated March 23, 1991 the petitioner moved two appeals being JRCSTA-8/91-92 and JRCSTA-23/91-92 both under Bihar Sales Tax Act and Central Sales Tax Act respectively before the respondent No.3. The appellate authority after hearing the petitioner passed final order on January 10, 1995 in both the appeals respectively making certain modification in the assessment order and remanded the same to the assessing authority. This remand order is annexure A. It is specific stand of the respondents that this order of the appellate authority dated January 10, 1995 has not been impugned by the petitioner before any authority and as such, the same has become final. According to the respondents, the Tribunal set aside the order of the appellate authority dated December 28, 1994 and revised assessment order dated August 5, 1992 merely on the ground that after expiry of 12 months from the date of passing of the original assessment order dated March 23, 1991 the assessing officer did not take any sanction from the commissioner of Commercial Taxes or any other authority before reviewing revising his earlier assessment order. However, subsequently sanction was accorded by the respondent No.3 for reviewing of assessment order dated March 23, 1991 and thus the assessing authority has revised the same. This order of the respondent No.3 is dated June 6, 1995 which has been passed under rule 32 of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules, 1983 . This order has been annexed as annexure D to the counter-affidavit. This order of the respondent No.3 is dated June 6, 1995 which has been passed under rule 32 of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules, 1983 . This order has been annexed as annexure D to the counter-affidavit. It is the stand of the respondents that after receiving the sanction order from the respondent No.3, notice was issued to the company on June 7, 1995 directing it to appear on June 15, 1995 but in spite of receiving the notice on June 10, 1995 as the petitioner did not care to appear on June 15, 1995, the assessing officer revised the assessment order on June 15, 1995 in the interest of State revenue. A copy of the order sheet from June 7, 1995 to February 11, 1997 has been annexed as annexure E to the counter-affidavit. 7. 7. It appears that after filing of the counter-affidavit by the respondents, petitioner filed a supplementary affidavit annexing a copy of the petition alleged to have been filed by it before the concerned authority on receiving the demand notice. This petition has been marked as annexure 7. It is pertinent to mention here that in the main writ application, there is no averment as such that on receiving the said notice on June 10, 1995 the petitioner had taken any step before the concerned authority much less filing of any petition as stated in the supplementary affidavit. 8. 8. There is no dispute that before passing of the impugned order the respondent No.3 issued a notice to the petitioner informing the date of hearing as June 15, 1995. It is also not in controversy that on June 15, 1995 neither any representative appeared before the respondent No.3 nor any petition was filed. Thus, it is futile for the petitioner to urge that the impugned order was passed in violation of the principle of natural justice. 9. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner does not dispute the fact that against the impugned order statutory appeal could have been filed but his argument is that when the said order was passed in violation of principle of natural justice, this Court, in exercising its power under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, can set aside the same. In our considered opinion, the argument of Mr. Jain is not sustainable in law. 10. 10. In our considered opinion, the argument of Mr. Jain is not sustainable in law. 10. 10. As discussed above, the petitioner in spite of receiving the notice did not appear before the authority on the date fixed for hearing and as such, when the impugned order was passed, the same cannot be challenged on the ground of violation of principle of natural justice. It is now well-settled that the writ court will not allow the aggrieved person to bypass the statutory remedies by entertaining the writ application. Reference, if any, may be made to the case of State of Goa V/s. Leukoplast (India) Ltd. reported in [1997] 105 STC 318 (SC); AIR 1997 SC 1875 . 11. 11. In the result, this writ application is dismissed, however, without any cost. 12. Writ application dismissed.