ORDER 1. This petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 30.3.1996, Annexure A-3 passed by the Chief Municipal Officer, Nagar Panchayat, Sakti, District Bilaspur. The disposal of this petition shall also govern the disposal of writ petition No. 1569 of 1996 whereby identical order has been passed in respect of the petitioner Hemchand Yadav. 2. The facts of this case are that the petitioner was appointed on probation by the order dated 28.10.1994 Annexure A-1 as a Peon. After expiry of the period of probation, the petitioner was liable to be made permanent. However, by order dated 30.3.1996, Annexure A-3, the respondent No. 4/Chief Municipal Officer, Nagar Panchayat, Sakti, District Bilaspur terminated the services of the petitioner saying that the senior auditor of the local funds audit, Bilaspur had raised an objection regarding compassionate appointment of the petitioner saying that he could not be appointed. The Chief Municipal Officer further said that after going through the resolution of the Panchayat dated 25.3.1996 and also in accordance with objection of the senior auditor, the services of the petitioner are terminated. This order also governs the case of the petitioner Hemchand Yadav in writ petition No. 1569 of 1996. 3. It is clear from the order that the services of the petitioner have not been terminated on the ground that the respondent No. 4/Chief Municipal Officer found the services of the petitioner-unsatisfactory. The termination of the services of the petitioner shows that there was the •resolution of the Nagar Panchayat, Sakti, District Bilaspur as well as an objection of the senior auditor regarding the compassionate appointment of the petitioner. It is obvious that by the impugned order dated 30.3.1996, the Chief Municipal Officer sought to correct the mistake in the initial appointment order dated 28.10.1994. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner raised two serious objections to the passing of the order in this manner. Firstly, it is said that the Chief Municipal Officer was bound to apply his mind to the objection of the senior auditor and should not have passed the order on the basis of an objection of another authority. It was not given to that authority to consider the termination of the services of the petitioner. Firstly, it is said that the Chief Municipal Officer was bound to apply his mind to the objection of the senior auditor and should not have passed the order on the basis of an objection of another authority. It was not given to that authority to consider the termination of the services of the petitioner. Neither the Nagar Panchayat nor the senior auditor aforesaid had any power to direct the respondent No. 4/Chief Municipal Officer to dismiss the petitioner. Therefore, it appears that the respondent No.4 has not corrected his own mistake by the impugned order dated 30.3.1996. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argues that the order dated 30.3.1996 was passed without any notice to the petitioner on the objection raised by the senior auditor and further it was argued that this way of correcting the mistake would attract the principles of estoppel. The principles of equitable estoppel or promissory estoppel debarred the respondent No.4 from correcting the• mistake after almost two years of appointment. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1,2 and 3, however, argued that the initial compassionate appointment was bad because the petitioner had misrepresented to the respondent No.4 that he was entitled to compassionate appointment. He could not be so appointed. He was not entitled to compassionate appointment under the facts and circumstances of the case as he could be appointed only on the ground of death of his relative who was serving in the Nagar Panchayat. Therefore, the initial appointment order of the petitioner was void ab initio. 6. Having considered the rival contention of the parties, this Court is of the opinion that the order of termination of services of the petitioner dated 30.3.1996 passed by the respondent No.4 is liable to be quashed by issuance of a writ of certiorari. It is clear from the order that the petitioner was not discharged from the services on the ground of unsatisfactory work. The order itself shows that a mistake was pointed out to the appointing authority regarding appointment of the petitioner and, therefore, he had passed the order terminating the services of the petitioner. It is also not in dispute that no notice was issued to the petitioner, prior to the passing of the order. The order itself shows that a mistake was pointed out to the appointing authority regarding appointment of the petitioner and, therefore, he had passed the order terminating the services of the petitioner. It is also not in dispute that no notice was issued to the petitioner, prior to the passing of the order. Moreover the respondent No.4 has not shown in the order that he had applied his mind to the objection taken by the senior auditor aforesaid and to the resolution of the Nagar Panchayat. At best, this order could be said to be correction of the mistake on the part of the respondent No.4 at the behest of senior auditor and the Nagar Panchayat. The respondent No.4 was entitled to correct his own mistake within a reasonable time from the date of appointment of the petitioner. He could not have waited for almost two years -for discovering the mistake. 7. There was implied promise on the part of the Chief Municipal Officer that he shall continue the services of the petitioner. The principles of promissory estoppel or equitable estoppel would be attracted by lapse of long time on account of sheer in action on the part of the Chief Municipal Officer in discovering his mistake, if any. The concept of legitimate expectation of the petitioner, that he shall not be thrown out unceremoniously because there was some mistake on the part of the appointing authority, has also to be given due weight. The order of the appointing authority was likely to. affect the whole course of life of the petitioner. It was demand of fair-play-in-action that he should have been permitted to have his say. Did he not legitimately expect that his services shall continue? Did he not expect legitimately that his point of view shall be considered before making adverse decision against him? This expectation is apart from principles of natural justice. In the case of Council of Civil Service Unions and others v. Minister for the Civil Service, (1984) 3 All E.R. 935, at page 949, Lord Diplock made the following statement :- "To qualify as a subject for judicial review the decision must have consequences which affect some person (or body of persons) other than the decision-maker, although it may affect him too. It must affect such other person either (a) by altering rights or obligations of that person which are enforceable by or against him in private law or (b) by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either (i) he has in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there has been communicated to him some rational ground for with drawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn." 8. That apart there is nothing to indicate from the impugned order that there was any factual or legal mistake in giving appointment to the petitioner. No third party had challenged it. It is also possible that the respondent No. 4/ Chief Municipal Officer was acting on mistaken objection on the part of senior auditor and the Nagar Panchayat. In the case of Bal Krishna Tiwari v. Registrar of Awadhesh Pratap Singh University, Rewa and others, 1978 JLJ 182 = 1978 MPLJ 172 (FB), reported in, according to University authorities the petitioner was mistakenly permitted to appear in LL.B. Part I examination as an ex-student, which he was not, and, therefore, his admission was cancelled ex parte after he took the examination, and his result was withheld. Allowing the petition of the student/petitioner, this Court applied the principles of promissory estoppel and natural justice. Shiv Dayal, C.J. speaking for the Full Bench, applied the principles of promissory estoppel in paragraph 18 at page 179, as follows :- "The petitioner appeared in and took the entire examination. In these circumstances, the University could not turn round and say that there was a mistake in issuing the admission card on the other possible interpretation of the definitions. This is a case of promissory estoppel" It was further held in paragraph 26 at page 182, as follows :- "In the present case, we have no hesitation in holding that there was a breach of natural justice, when the University did not issue a show cause notice to the petitioner but cancelled his examination taking him unawares. This is a case of promissory estoppel" It was further held in paragraph 26 at page 182, as follows :- "In the present case, we have no hesitation in holding that there was a breach of natural justice, when the University did not issue a show cause notice to the petitioner but cancelled his examination taking him unawares. The only reason which has been placed before us at the hearing of this petition is that the petitioner could not be considered as an ex-student candidate on the true construction of the provisions which we have referred to above. Now, as soon as the University realised what it calls a "mistake", it was obligatory for the University to have called upon him to explain why his admission card be not cancelled. He could have placed before the University the other interpretation which was in his favour. It cannot be assumed that the University could not possibly accept that interpretation. It is not necessary for us to finally express our opinion on the two rival interpretations suggested above. It is sufficient to say that it was not impossible that the University would have accepted the interpretation in favour of the petitioner particularly in respect of the meaning of the expression "University established under this Act." Thus, there being also violation of natural justice, the petitioner is entitled to a suitable writ." The same principles would apply to the case of the petitioner. 9. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that this petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 30.3.1996, Annexure A-3 is quashed. No costs.