ORDER R.S. Garg, J. 1. By this petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India, the petitioners seek to challenge notification dated 30-11-1965 (Annexure-P/1) issued under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act, notification dated 21-2-1966 (Annexure P/2) issued under Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act and the award made by the Land Acquisition Officer on 14-2-1972 (Annexure P/8). 2. Brief facts leading to the petition are that the State Government to construct a weir to raise water storage capacity of Upper Lake, Bhopal up to contour level R. L. 1666-80, issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. Thereafter notification under Section 6 was also issued. During the proceedings of making the award, the petitioners and many others approached the State Government with a submission that part of the land would not be submerged for whole of the year, therefore, those persons were ready and willing to forego their claim of compensation, if they were permitted to occupy the land for rest of the period when the land was not under submergence. On 7th/26th April, 1968, the State Government by its letter No. 1240/600/XVI1-PH. II, Bhopal, directed the Public Health Engineering, M.P., Bhopal that after taking the undertakings from the affected persons that they would not claim any damage if and when the land would be submerged, the acquisition proceedings may be dropped. By that time the compensation proceedings had already started. In view of the State letter dated 7/26-4-1968 (Annexure P/5), the Land Acquisition Officer stayed the proceedings, as is clear from the recorded proceedings dated 25-6-1968 (Annexure P/9). Certain dates were adjourned to await the form of the said undertaking, but after some time the State issued another letter (Annexure P/7) no. 587/17/Medi-2-Bhopal on 9-3-1971 in the name of the Governor that the land acquisition proceedings/award proceedings which were stayed be continued and final award be passed. Thereafter, the proceedings continued and a final award happened to be passed on 14-2-1972. It appears that the petitioners, being dissatisfied by the said award, filed a civil suit in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Bhopal, who by his judgment and decree dated 17-1-1996 (C.S. No. 34-A/1978), in the matter of Ranchoddas and Ors. v. State of M. P., dismissed the suit. A regular first appeal was filed before the High Court, which as submitted by the counsel for the petitioners, was later on withdrawn. v. State of M. P., dismissed the suit. A regular first appeal was filed before the High Court, which as submitted by the counsel for the petitioners, was later on withdrawn. The present petition has been filed after withdrawal of the said first appeal. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that Annexure P/5, letter dated 7th/26th April, 1968 virtually is an order under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act and as the Government has already withdrawn the acquisition proceedings, passing of the award subsequent to the withdrawal would not affect petitioners right nor would affect their title. Explaining the delay, he submits that under some ill advice, a civil suit was filed in the year 1975 which remained pending before the Court which had no jurisdiction up to 1995 and ultimately the appeal had to be withdrawn in the year 1996. He submits that the delay is properly explained and it should not come in the way of the petitioners in view of Annexure P/5. 4. On the other hand, learned Government Advocate submits that Annexure P/5, for its proper appreciation, has to be read in juxta position with Annexure P/7 and a conjoint reading of these two documents would clearly show the intention of the State. According to him, the proceedings were never dropped, but in fact were stayed for sometime and later on were resumed. He also submits that the delay has not been properly explained and after passing of the award, a party would not be permitted to challenge the acquisition notifications. 5. Annexure P/5, the sheet anchor of the petitioners case provides that the Government was of the opinion that the acquisition proceedings which were pending about the disputed land be dropped after taking a written undertaking from the persons concerned that they will not claim any damage if and when the lands would go under submergence. This order issued by the Government, by no stretch of imagination, can be said to be an order of withdrawal. This order issued by the Government, by no stretch of imagination, can be said to be an order of withdrawal. Placing reliance on the judgment in the matter of Vidyasagar v. Union of India, AIR 1980 Delhi 73, learned counsel contended that the law does not provide any particular form or words for withdrawing from the acquisition, therefore, the Court must look into the real intention and if the Court is satisfied that the document clearly evinces the true intention of withdrawal from the notification, then nothing should come in the way of the petitioner. Counsel also placed reliance on the judgment of Gujrat High Court, in the matter of M/s. Doongarsee & Sons v. State of Gujrat, AIR 1971 Gujrat 46, to contend that Section 48(1) does not require any particular formula to be adopted for the purpose of withdrawing from the acquisition and no specific words are required to be used in order to effectively exercise the powers of withdrawal. 6. Section 48 of Land Acquisition Act provides that except in the case provided for in Section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. According to very language of Section 48, no specific words are required nor any formula is needed. Even without a notification, the State can withdraw from the acquisition proceedings, but the State must express its intention clearly and in unambiguous words. Though particular words are not required, but the intention which can be gathered from the words must be absolutely clear. It must lead unfailingly to the only conclusion that the State wanted to withdraw from the acquisition. If the language employed in some letter, correspondence, order or notification is not ambiguous and clearly shows that the intention of the State Government is translated into words and the said words lead to the only conclusion that the State wanted to withdraw from the acquisition, then the Court or any other authority can unhesitatingly held that the State had withdrawn from the acquisition. In the present case, the State, in Annexure P/5, has not said that it wanted to withdraw from the acquisition. In the present case, the State, in Annexure P/5, has not said that it wanted to withdraw from the acquisition. The intention which can be gathered from Annexure P/5 is only that the State wanted some undertaking from the owners of the land that they would not claim any compensation for the temporary submergence of their land and if such undertaking was furnished then the proceedings against them can be dropped. Undisputedly, no undertakings were taken by the State nor were submitted by the owners of the land. Shri Hundikar submits that the form of the undertaking was to be provided by the State Government and for that purpose alone, the acquisition proceedings were adjourned on five different occasions, therefore, there were no lapses on the part of the petitioners. In the opinion of this Court, the petitioners did not pursue the matter further. The petitioners did not appear before the Acquisition Officer after the proceedings were stayed. It was for the petitioners to submit an undertaking to the effect that in case the land was permitted to remain with them, they would not claim any compensation for temporary submergence. The intention of the State Government from Annexure P/5 can only be that the State was trying to give some concession to those persons, but was not withdrawing from the acquisition proceedings. Annexure P/7, letter dated 9-3-71 clearly shows, referring to Annexure P/5, that the proceedings were stayed, but those were required to be resumed and compensation proceedings were required to be brought to an end at its earliest. Annexure P/5 and P/7 read together would clearly show that the intention of the State was not to withdraw from the acquisition. The submission of the learned counsel that as the State has withdrawn from the acquisition, the further proceedings relating to compensation would not affect their propriety rights, is based on a foundation which is not available to the petitioners. Even otherwise, this petition can be dismissed on the grounds of delay and laches. Learned Government Advocate submits that the land acquisition notifications of the year 1966-68 and the award passed in the year 1972 are sought to be challenged by petition in the year 1997 i.e. after a long lapse of more than 25 years. Even otherwise, this petition can be dismissed on the grounds of delay and laches. Learned Government Advocate submits that the land acquisition notifications of the year 1966-68 and the award passed in the year 1972 are sought to be challenged by petition in the year 1997 i.e. after a long lapse of more than 25 years. To this learned counsel for the petitioners submits that under ill advice, the petitioners have filed a civil suit which remained pending right from 1975 to 1996, therefore, that period deserves to be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. 7. Copy of the judgment delivered in the suit does nowhere say that the suit was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. There the Civil Court found that the petitioners were not the owners of the property. That was not a dismissal on ground of non-availability of the jurisdiction. Even otherwise, the acquisition proceedings are sought to be challenged after 31 years because the first notification was issued in the year 1966. The Supreme Court in the matter of Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Ors., (1996) 11 SCC 698 , has clearly observed that a writ petition challenging acquisition proceedings long after passing of the award and vesting of the land in the State, would not be maintainable. Similarly in the matter of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development & Investment Co. P. Ltd., (1996) 11 SCC 501 , the Supreme Court has held that once the acquisition proceedings are complete and the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances, the proceedings become final and are not open to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on ground of non-compliance with any statutory requirement, etc. The Supreme Court has further observed that when an acquisition proceeding completed long back and the award was also passed, then the High Court should be loath to quash the notification, if the notification/award is challenged after a long delay. Considering the case from any angle, no relief can be granted in favour of the petitioners. The petition deserves to and is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Security amount, if any deposited by the petitioners, be refunded after due verification.