Judgment P.K.Sarin, J. 1. By this application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) the petitioner, who is a retired Deputy Collector, Birpur, District-Saharsa, seeks quashing of order dated 4.5.1990 passed by Judicial Magistrate, first class, Birpur at Supaul in Case No. 3080 of 1988 by which the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance for the offences punishable under Sections 218 and 465 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. It appears that the opposite party No. 2 filed a complaint (copy at Annexure-1) against the present petitioner alleging that Revenue Case No. 1 of 1986-87 relating to annulment of Jamabandi No. 460 in the name of the father of the complainant-opposite party No. 2, on one hand, and Sri Shanker Prasad Mahaseth, on the other hand, was pending before the petitioner in the capacity of Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Birpur at Supaul. The father of the complainant was opposite party in the said case. It is alleged that the petitioner of the said case, Rama Kant Jha, was a Homoeopathic Doctor and the petitioner was under his treatment and Rama Kant Jha was on visiting terms with the petitioner. The father of the complainant moved a transfer application on 12.4.1988 before the Collector, Saharsa, for the transfer of the said Revenue Case No. 1 of 1986-87 from the court of the petitioner. The Collector, Saharsa, by his order dated 12.4.1988, stayed further proceedings pending in the court of the petitioner and called for the record of the case. It is alleged that the said stay order was communicated to the petitioner by Special Messenger on 13.4.1988 and the petitioner noted the order of stay in his court diary against serial No. 7 relating to the case in question. It is alleged that the record of the case was not sent to the Collector till 12.6.1988 and when father of the complainant went on 20.6.1988 for making Pairvi in another case he heard rumour that final orders have been passed in Revenue Case No. 1 of 1986-87 inspire of the stay order passed by the Collector, Saharsa. Thereupon the father of the complainant obtained the certified copy of the court diary and also the certified copy of the order passed by petitioner on 14.4.1988 which was against the father of the complainant-opposite party No. 2. Thereupon the father of the complainant obtained the certified copy of the court diary and also the certified copy of the order passed by petitioner on 14.4.1988 which was against the father of the complainant-opposite party No. 2. It is alleged that the petitioner committed the offence punishable under Sections 218 and 465 of the Indian Penal Code by playing fraud in order to illegally help Rama Kant Jha, the petitioner of the Revenue Case. 3. It is alleged that the Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate, Birpur, after examining the complainant, transferred the case under Section 192 of the Code to the Court of Judicial Magistrate, first class, Birpur at Supaul, without taking cognizance of the offence and the Judicial Magistrate, first class, Birpur, (Saharsa), has taken cognizance of the offences against the petitioner. The petitioner challenges the cognizance order to be illegal. It is also alleged that the cognizance could not have been taken without previous sanction from the appropriate authority for the prosecution of the petitioner as the petitioner was a Public Servant at the time of commission of the offence. It is further stated that no offence under Sections 218 and 465 of the Indian Penal Code are made out against the petitioner. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Birpur, after examining the complainant, had transferred the case to Judicial Magistrate, Birpur, under Section 192 of the Code which was not in accordance with law as under Section 192 of the Code a case can be transferred to another Magistrate only after taking cognizance. 5. The order sheet of the case shows that the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, on receiving the complaint, ordered on 30.6.1988 to register the same. Thereafter, he examined the complainant and ordered for holding enquiry (under Section 202 of the Code). Thereafter, the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate examined two witnesses on 6.7.1988 and also ordered the complainant to produce documents. The third witness was examined by the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate on 6.1.1989. On 30th January, 1989, the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate transferred the case to the court of Judicial Magistrate under Section 192 (2) of the Code for enquiry and trial and directed the complainant to produce remaining witnesses in the said court. The third witness was examined by the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate on 6.1.1989. On 30th January, 1989, the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate transferred the case to the court of Judicial Magistrate under Section 192 (2) of the Code for enquiry and trial and directed the complainant to produce remaining witnesses in the said court. Learned Judicial Magistrate, after receipt of the case by transfer, completed the enquiry under Section 202 of the Code and feeling satisfied that prima facie a case for the offences punishable under Sections 218 and 465 of the Indian Penal Code is made out against the petitioner, passed the impugned order issuing summons against the petitioner to face trial. 6. Sub-section (2) of Section 192 of the Code empowers a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence to make over a case for enquiry or trial to the other competent Magistrate. The learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, on receiving the complaint, ordered for registering it and he himself proceeded to hold enquiry under Section 202 of the Code and examined three witnesses also. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate has proceeded without taking cognizance of the offences. It is not necessary that it should be expressly mentioned that the cognizance has been taken. When a Magistrate receives a complaint and orders it to be registered it shows that the learned Magistrate has applied his mind and has taken cognizance of the offences on the complaint in order to proceed further in the case. The contention of the learned counsel for-the petitioner that the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate had not taken cognizance and has transferred the case to Judicial Magistrate, first class, without taking cognizance does not appear to be tenable. Even if the transfer order under Section 192 of the Code be taken to be illegal it would not affect the jurisdiction of the transferee court to take cognizance and proceed in the matter in accordance with law. It has been held in the case of Anil Saran V/s. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 204. Even if the transfer order under Section 192 of the Code be taken to be illegal it would not affect the jurisdiction of the transferee court to take cognizance and proceed in the matter in accordance with law. It has been held in the case of Anil Saran V/s. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 204. that the power to take cognizance has been conferred on Magistrate by Section 190 (1) of the Code and he would not be denuded of this power because the case has to come to his file pursuant to some illegal order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate and such Magistrate (who receives the case by transfer) would be exercising his power of taking cognizance even in such a case because of his having received a complaint constituting the offences and it would not be material, for this purpose, as to how he came to receive the complaint - directly or on transfer from the Chief Judicial Magistrate. It may be pointed out that under sub-section (1) of Section 192 of the Code the power to make over a case for enquiry or trial has been conferred to the Chief Judicial Magistrate and the same power is conferred to any other Magistrate, who is empowered in this behalf by the Chief Judicial Magistrate to make over the case for enquiry or trial to any other competent Magistrate. The transfer of the case by Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate to Judicial Magistrate is covered by subsection (2) of Section 192 of the Code. In view of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Anil Saran (supra) the enquiry and order of issuing process against the petitioner by the transferee Magistrate cannot be said to be illegal on the ground that the transfer by Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate was not in accordance with law. 7. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the acts complained of are said to have been done by the petitioner while he was discharging his duties as public servant as such sanction under Section 197 of the Code was necessary before taking of cognizance by the Court. 8. 7. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the acts complained of are said to have been done by the petitioner while he was discharging his duties as public servant as such sanction under Section 197 of the Code was necessary before taking of cognizance by the Court. 8. Section 197 of the Code lays down that no court shall take cognizance of an offence which is said to have been committed by a person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or Public Servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government, without previous sanction of the State Government if such person is or was employed in connection with the affairs of State if the offence alleged is said to have been committed by him while acting or purported to act in the discharge of his official duty. In the present case, the petitioner is said to have removed the original page of the order sheet of 13.5.1986 which contained noting of stay order against the concerned Revenue Case relating to the father of the complainant and substituting the same with another incorrect order sheet. The act complained of is said to have been done by the petitioner as Deputy Collector, Land Reforms. 9. The learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2 has contended that removal of a page of order sheet and substituting the same with incorrect order sheet was no part of the duty of the petitioner as such the act complained of cannot be said to have been done by the petitioner in the discharge or purported act of his duties. 10. Reliance has been placed on a decision of Apex Court in the case of Prabaker V. Simari V/s. Shanker Anant Verlekar, AIR 1969 SC 686 , wherein it has been held on the facts of the said case that previous sanction under Section 197 of the Code for prosecuting Deputy Superintendent of Police of various charges in respect of offences committed by him was not required. In the said case it has been held that what has to be found out is whether the act and the official duty were so inter related that one could postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of the official duty though possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation. It is further observed that if the act complained of was directly concerned with his official duty so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by the virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary and that would be so, irrespective of whether it was in fact, a proper discharge of his duties or not. 11. Similar principle of law has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Amrik Singh V/s. State of Pepsu, AIR 1955 SC 309 . It has been further observed in the said case that if acts complained of are so integrally connected with the duties attaching to the office as to be inseparable from them then sanction under Section 197 (1) of the Code would be necessary but if there was no necessary connection between them and the performance of those duties, the official status furnishing only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then no sanction would be required. 12. The Apex Court in the case of P. Arulswamy V/s. State of Madras, AIR 1967 SC 776 , has held that the sanction under Section 197 (1) is not necessary to prosecute public servant if act of which complaint is, entirely unconnected with the official duty. It has been further observed in the said case where the act complained of is either within the scope of official duty or in excess of it that the protection under Section 197 (1) of the Code is available. 13. The Supreme Court in the case of K. Satwant Singh V/s. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 266 , has considered the provision of Section 197 of the Code and has held that the act must bear such relation to the duty that the public servant could lay a reasonable but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty. It was further observed that the offence of cheating or abatement thereof cannot be said to be one for which one could claim that he did the act complained of while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. 14. The Apex Court in a recent judgment in the case of Shambhu Nath Mishra V/s. State of U. P., JT 1997 (4) SC 203, again considered scope of Section 197 (1) of the Code. It held that the essential requirement postulated for sanction to prosecute the public servant is that the offence alleged against the public servant must have been done while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties and in such a situation it postulates that the public servants act is in furtherance of his performance or his official duties. It was observed that if the act/omission is integral to the performance of the public duty the public servant is entitled to the protection under Section 197 (1) of the Code. It was further observed that performance of public duty under colour of public duty cannot be camouflaged to commit crime. Public duty may provide him an opportunity to commit crime. The court held that it is not the official duty of the public servant to fabricate the false record and misappropriate the public fund etc. in furtherance of or in the discharge of his official duties. The official capacity only enables him to fabricate the record or misappropriate the public fund etc. and it does not mean that it is integrally con-nected or inseparably interlinked with the crime committed in the course of same transaction. The Court held that sanction under Section 197 (1) of the Code was not necessary in such a case. In the present case the allegation is that the petitioner fabricated the record by replacing a page of the order sheet with another incorrect order sheet. Thus, according to the allegations the petitioner fabricated false record. In view of the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Shambhu Nath Mishra v. State of U. P., (supra) fabricating false record cannot be said to be in furtherance of or in the discharge of the official duties. The official capacity of the petitioner only enabled him to fabricate the record. In view of the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Shambhu Nath Mishra v. State of U. P., (supra) fabricating false record cannot be said to be in furtherance of or in the discharge of the official duties. The official capacity of the petitioner only enabled him to fabricate the record. It was none of the duties of the petitioner to fabricate false record by substituting an order sheet with another incorrect.order sheet. It cannot be said that petitioner, if questioned, could claim to have substituted the order sheet in the discharge or purported act of his duties. In this view, provisions of Section 197 (1) of the Code are not attracted in the present case and the learned Magistrate has rightly observed that the sanction under Section 197 of the Code was not necessary in this case. 15. As regards the cognizance of the offences under Sections 465 and 218 of the Indian Penal Code, the learned Magistrate has observed that prima facie a case is made out for summoning the accused to face trial under those sections on the basis of materials on record. The order to summon the accused-petitioner is based on consideration of the materials on the record and there appears to be no infirmity or illegality in the same. However, the petitioner will have the right to make his submission before the trial court at the time of framing of charge that no charge is made out or that charge is made out under any other section and it will be for the trial court to consider the same at the stage of framing of the charge. At present there does not appear to be a ground to quash the impugned order. 16. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the application lacks merit and is dismissed accordingly.