Honble MADAN, J.–Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and also perused the impugned order dated 18.1.1993 passed by Munsif & Judicial Magistrate, Bandikui as well as the order dated 19.11.1994 passed by District Judge, Dausa in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 6/1994 (39 of 1993) whereby the trial Court had passed the order striking-off the defence by the petitioner tenant to the suit pending before the trial Court and which was affirmed in Appeal by the Appellate Court. (2). The facts relevant for deciding the controversy between the parties, briefly stated are that the petitioner is tenant in shop premises named as Jain Bungalow in Bandikui District Dausa on a monthly rent of Rs. 125/- since the year 1979. (3). During the course of hearing it has transpired that two rent notes were executed in favour of the petitioner, one dated 5.2.1979 by Smt. Kailashi Devi respondent No.2 and the other by Santosh Kumar son of land lady of the suit premises Smt. Kailashi Devi, Respondent No.1. Suit for ejectment of the petitioner- tenant from shop premises in question was filed by respondent No.1 on 1.8.1988 in the Court of Addl. Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Bandikui on the grounds of default in payment of rent for continuous period of more than six months as well as non-user of the shop premises in question by the petitioner-tenant for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of filing of the suit u/Ss. 13(1)(a) & 13(1)(i) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 for short ``the Act. The petitioner contested the said suit by filing his written state- ment controverting the aforesaid grounds of eviction on the ground that he was not defaulter as alleged by the plaintiff in the suit for more than six months nor the shop premises in question were in use and occupation of the petitioner-tenant as alleged in the suit. (4). Since the dispute was raised by the petitioner-tenant regarding the amount of rent actually payable by him to the plaintiff-landlord, the trial Court passed the order provisionally determining the rent of the shop premises in question @ Rs. 125/- p.m. payable w.e.f. 1.11.1987 to 31.3.1989 i.e. for a period of 17 months. (4). Since the dispute was raised by the petitioner-tenant regarding the amount of rent actually payable by him to the plaintiff-landlord, the trial Court passed the order provisionally determining the rent of the shop premises in question @ Rs. 125/- p.m. payable w.e.f. 1.11.1987 to 31.3.1989 i.e. for a period of 17 months. The learned trial Court directed the petitioner to either pay to the plaintiff or deposit with the Court the disputed amount of rent for the aforesaid period @ 125/- p.m. with interest @6% p.a. from due date till full realisation. Aggrieved by the impugned order of the trial Court provisionally determining the rent for the aforesaid period, the petitioner had preferred an appeal to the learned District Judge, Dausa and the said appeal was rejected on merits vide order dated 22.1.1990 passed by the said Court. Thereafter the petitioner kept quite and did not challenge the said order either by way of appeal or revision before this Court and consequently the said order attained finality. (5). Subsequently an application was filed u/s. 13(5) of the Act by the original plaintiff/respondent No.1 for striking of the defence against eviction of the tenant in the trial Court and the trial Court after hearing the parties directed the defence against eviction to be struck off vide order dated 8.1.1993 passed by learned Addl. Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Bandikui. An appeal was preferred before the learned District Judge, Dausa against the said order and the same came to be finality rejected by the appellate Court vide impugned order dated 19.11.1994 which has been challenged before this Court in the present revision petition. (6). During the course of hearing learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended at the bar that the rent deed was originally executed between the mother of respondent No.1 and the petitioner and not with the said respondent who is the son of land-lady. This fact has been controverted by learned counsel for respondent No.1 on the ground that if the rent deed had not been executed between Santosh Kumar, respondent No.1, the original plaintiff in the suit and the petitioner, then the said respondent would not have acquired a right of filing a suit. Learned counsel for respondents has further stated that the said rent deed executed between the parties has duly been incorporated as a part of the plaint before the trial Court. (7). Learned counsel for respondents has further stated that the said rent deed executed between the parties has duly been incorporated as a part of the plaint before the trial Court. (7). During the course of hearing learned counsel for the petitioner has however, not disputed this fact that he has been in possession of the shop premises in question as a tenant w.e.f. 5.2.1979 on the basis of rent deed executed by Smt. Kailashi Devi who is mother of respondent No.1 Santosh Kumar and he has also not disputed this fact that he had paid rent to Santosh Kumar for some period and thereafter he received a letter from Smt. Kailashi Devi directing him to not to pay the rent in the future to Santosh Kumar as a dispute was raised in this Court. Thereafter the petitioner started paying the rent directly to land-lady Smt. Kailashi Devi. (8). Prima facie I am of the opinion that once the rent had been paid by the petitioner to Santosh Kumar son of the land-lady for a particular period, he had in fact the authority to receive the rent in his own individual capacity as a landlord having the implied authority on behalf of respondent No.2. If the petitioner entertained a bona fide doubt or dispute with regard to the person or persons to whom he should have tendered or paid the rent, then nothing prevented the petitioner from seeking a clarification by moving an appropriate application before the trial Court and should have in fact sought a direction from the trial Court as to whom he should pay or tender the rent. Alternatively the petitioner had also the option to deposit the rent for the disputed period with the trial Court and the trial Court in that event would have issued notice to the concerned parties calling upon them to furnish positive evidence on the record regarding their authorisation to receive the rent from the tenant on behalf of the owner of the suit premises which admittedly has not been done by the petitioner in the instant case. (9). (9). On perusal of the impugned order of the appellate Court, I am of the view that it is not open to the petitioner to assail the findings of the trial Court, since he had himself forgone his remedy available under the law by preferring a revision in this Court u/s. 115 CPC against the order determining the provisional rent, particularly when the appeal preferred earlier by the petitioner-tenant against the provisional determination of rent stood rejected by the appellate Court as on 22.1.1990. Consequently the said order had attained finality. the learned trial Court has given very cogent findings in this regard which have been affirmed in appeal by the appellate Court. (10). I am further of the view that it is not open to the petitioner to agitate this question as per the contentions advanced by him by way of revision before this Court u/s. 115 CPC since the entire gamut of controversy stands concluded by well reasoned order passed by the trial Court which has been affirmed in appeal by the appellate Court. (11). I am fortified in my observations from the judgments of this Court in the matter of Ganesh Narain vs. Ramchor Das & Anr. (1) and Ramjilal vs. Shyama & Anr. (2). (12). In the matter of Ganesh Narain vs. Ranchor Das (supra) this Court while dealing with the similar controversy which had arisen before this Court held that for determination of the amount of rent and interest u/S. 13(3) of the Act the only condition contemplated is that the ``suit of eviction should be based on the ground set forth in Cl.(a) of sub-sec (1) of Sec. 13 with or without any of the other grounds referred to in that sub-sec. Once this averment in the plaint is there that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for past six months or more preceding the date of presentation of suit, in my opinion, Sec. 13(3) of the Act will come into play immediately and it is incumbent on the said Court to determine the amount of provisional rent and interest thereon either on the first date of hearing or on any other date soon thereafter which the Court may consider fit to fix in this behalf which of course shall not be more than 3 months after filing of the written statement and is to be determined before the framing of the issues. This Court further held that before making an order for determination of the amount of rent and interest thereon for a direction to deposit in Court or for paying directly to the land- lord, it is not necessary that the Court should first determine the question of relationship of land-lord and tenant between the parties by holding an enquiry into the matter. (13). In the matter of Ramji Lal vs Shyama & Anr. (supra) this Court while taking into consideration strict compliance of the provisions of Secs. 13(4) & (5) of the Act of 1950 in a case where the trial Court had directed striking off the defence of the petitioner-tenant passed on account of default in payment of rent and which order was affirmed by the appellate Court in appeal and on being challenged before this Court it was held by this Court that the provisions of Sec. 13(4) & (5) of the Act, 1950 casts two imperative duties on the tenant, the first is to deposit the rent determined by the Court under sub-sec.(3) of Sec. 13 within the prescribed time and the second is to continue to deposit in Court or to pay to the landlord month by month, the only rent subsequent to the period up to which determination has been made, by the 15th of each succeeding month or within such further time, not exceeding 15 days, as may be extended by the Court. If the tenant failed to fulfil any of these two conditions, he cannot escape the penal consequences of his defence against eviction, being struck-off under sub-sec. (5). The provisions of sub-sec. If the tenant failed to fulfil any of these two conditions, he cannot escape the penal consequences of his defence against eviction, being struck-off under sub-sec. (5). The provisions of sub-sec. (5) are again imperative and of binding nature and admit of no scope for relaxation. If the tenant fails to make a compliance of the provisions of sub-sec. (4), the Court has no option except to order the defence against eviction to be struck-off. The Court has no discretion to condone the default in the matter. (14). Since the tenants had committed the default under sub-sec. (4) in notdepositing the monthly rent in the Court within the prescribed period, there defence against eviction was rightly struck out by the learned Munsiff. (15). I am further of the view that since the petitioner had failed to perform the imperative duties cast upon him by not depositing rent for the period in dispute by not complying with the provisions Sec. 13(4) & (5) of the Act, 1950, as a result of which his defence against eviction was rightly struck-off by the trial Court had which has been affirmed in appeal by the appellate Court. I find no justification to take contrary view of the matter. In fact it was open to the petitioner to have raised dispute regarding relationship of land-lord and tenant between the parties at a later stage by first discharging his obligations as a tenant under the Act which admittedly he has failed to perform. The obvious consequence which follows as a result of non-compliance of the provisions of Sec. 13(4) of the Act is the striking off his defence is that the Court concerned is left with no option except to pass the order by striking the defence against eviction to be struck-off and thereafter to proceed with the hearing of the suit as contemplated by sub-sec. (5) of Sec. 13 of the Act. (16). It will however be open to the petitioner to advance any other grounds which are available to him under the law while conducting the suit pending before the trial Court. The petitioner however, shall not be permitted to raise any extraneous grounds which are not subject matter of eviction suit pending between the parties. (17). As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in this revision petition and the same is dismissed with no order as to cost. The petitioner however, shall not be permitted to raise any extraneous grounds which are not subject matter of eviction suit pending between the parties. (17). As a result of the above discussion, I find no merit in this revision petition and the same is dismissed with no order as to cost. the trial Court directed to expeditiously deal with and decide the suit pending before it in accordance with law and in any case not later than six months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.