MANMOHAN SARIN ( 1 ) THIS is a revision petition filed against an order dated 9. 5. 1997, passed by the Civil Judge, in Suit No. 40/95/94, whereby the Civil Judge dismissed the petitioners application, moved under Section 15 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupant) Act, 1971 read with Section 9 of CPC. ( 2 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner submits that the trial court grievously erred in rejecting the petitioner s submissions that Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupant) Act, 1971 applied to the premises. Further, under Section 15 of the said Act, Civil Courts jurisdiction was ousted in respect of the premises where it is in occupation of an unauthorized occupant. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel further submits that the trial court acted illegally in exercising its Jurisdiction by not framing any issue with regard to whether the premises were public premises to which Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupant) Act, 1971 applied or not? The petitioner was denied an opportunity to prove the same by leading evidence. It was the petitioner s contention before the learned Civil Judge that the DSIDC was the owner of the premises and the petitioner had no power or authority from the DSIDC to collect any amount from him. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on Kimti Lal Rahi Vs. Union of India reported at 41 (1993) DLT 56, para 25 in particular, wherein the learned Single Judge of this Court took a prima facie view that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not barred in so far as it related to the question for determination of the prices of the sheds. Learned counsel wishes to draw support from this decision to argue that it is only in respect of such matters like the computation of prices that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts would not be barred but would be barred in all other matters, by virtue of Section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupant) Act, 1971. ( 4 ) FROM a perusal of the impugned order, it is seen that the learned Civil Judge has taken a view that the petitioner admits the relationship of the landlord and tenant with the respondent. ( 4 ) FROM a perusal of the impugned order, it is seen that the learned Civil Judge has taken a view that the petitioner admits the relationship of the landlord and tenant with the respondent. Even before me, learned counsel for the petitioner very fairly states that the petitioner had been inducted by the respondent in the premises and that the petitioner had been remitting rent/supervision charges to the respondent only. In these circumstances, the inference that the petitioner admitted the relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent and tenant cannot be faulted with. ( 5 ) THE next question that arises for consideration is whether in a suit filed by the respondent for possession against the petitioner, the plea of the premises being a public premises under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupant) Act, 1971, can be available to the petitioner. Having regard to the definition of the Public Premises as given in Section 2 (c) (e) of the Act, it would be seen that the premises in the hands of the petitioner or qua the petitioner would not fall within the said definition. The view taken by the learned Civil Judge is a plausible view. Further, the reliance on Kimti Lal Rahi Vs. Union of India (Supra) does not advance the petitioner s contention inasmuch as the court in that case only observed that for matters such as fixation/computation of prices of the sheds, on a prima facie view, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court could not be said to be barred. From this observation, it does not follow that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts would be barred in all other matters including a suit filed by the landlord against the tenant for possession. ( 6 ) I do not find any material irregularity in the impugned order or illegal exercise of jurisdiction by the Civil Judge, calling for interference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The revision petition has no merit and is dismissed.