Judgment P.K.Deb, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred under Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and decree dated 18.5.1991 passed by the then IInd Additional Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi, in Title Appeal No. 42 of 1989 confirming the judgment and decree dated 29.4.1989 passed by the then VIth Additional Subordinate Judge, Ranchi, in Title Suit No. 134 of 1982 (343/87). 2. The respondent as plaintiff filed the abovementioned suit for specific performance of contract dated 29.9.1980 in respect of 25 Kathas of land appertaining to Plot No. 234, Khata No. 55 of Village Bariatu within the district of Ranchi. The details of the suit land have been given in the foot of the plaint itself. 3. The case of the plaintiff is that the defendants on 29.9.1980 entered into a parole agreement with the plaintiff through her husband for sale of the land as mentioned above at the rate of Rs. 1,000.00 per Katha and a sum of Rs. 5,000.00 was paid to the defendants through defendant No. 2 (Syed Abdul Alim) who was holding power of attorney for and on behalf of all the defendants. It was mutually agreed upon by the plaintiff through her husband and defendant No. 2 (Syed Abdul Alim) that the sale would be completed after obtaining permission to sell from the competent authority as required under Sec. 26 of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1978. It is the further case of the plaintiff that in pursuance of the said parole agreement, the defendant No. 2 for self and on behalf of the other defendants applied for permission to sell the lands in favour of the plaintiff before the competent authority on 30.9.1980 and also had sworn an affidavit as necessary under the provisions of law. The said petition for permission was registered as Permission Case No. 986 of 1980 and ultimately permission was granted by the Deputy Collector (Ceiling) Ranchi and the same was communicated vide Letter No. 562 dated 28.2.1981 and the said permission letter was made over by defendant No. 2 to the plaintiffs husband whereupon he offered to pay balance of the consideration amount and requested the defendants kept mum. The plaintiff, as per her case, kept on waiting for response from the defendants. The plaintiff, as per her case, kept on waiting for response from the defendants. Then a legal notice was issued to defendant No. 2 to execute and register the deed of sale on receipt of the balance of consideration money but the defendant No. 2 did not come forward for execution of the deed nor reply to the legal notice, but then the plaintiffs husband could learn through reliable sources that the defendants were not willing to perform their part of contract as they were negotiating to sell the land with some other person and then another legal notice was issued on 13.3.1982 to defendant No. 2 but when no reply was given then the suit was filed by the plaintiff with a plea that she was and is always willing and ready to perform her part of contract. 4. Originally there were nine defendants only. Defendant No. 1 (Syed Abdul Halim) and defendant No. 2 (Syed Abdul Alim) are the two brothers being sons of Abdul Hussain. The defendants No. 3 to 7 are the sons of Syed Abdul Halim i.e. defendant No. 1 while defendants No. 8 and 9 are the daughters of defendant No. 2, Syed Abdul Alim. Notices on the defendants could not be served through the process of the Court and then substituted service was ordered by publication in the English daily The Statesman published from Calcutta as the addresses of the defendants were of 4, Ustagar lane, Calcutta 14 except defendant No. 2 who was residing at Bariatu, Police Station Bariatu, District Ranchi. The defendant No. 2 (Syed Abdul Alim) appeared by filing vakalatnama and in the vakalatnama it could be found that by different hand after the signature of Syed Abdul Alim (defendant No. 2) it was mentioned that he was appearing as attorney of the other defendants but written statement was not filed. Then the defendant No. 2 was said to be died during the pendency of the suit in the year 1983 and as he was bachelor, other defendants were asked to disclose the names of heirs of defendant No. 2. It was mentioned in the petition filed by the plaintiff that Syed Abdul Alim died leaving behind his elder brother Syed Abul Halim, defendant No. 1, nephews and nices i.e. defendants No. 3 to 9. It was mentioned in the petition filed by the plaintiff that Syed Abdul Alim died leaving behind his elder brother Syed Abul Halim, defendant No. 1, nephews and nices i.e. defendants No. 3 to 9. As disclosure being made from the side of the defendants, the name of Syed Abdul Alim was struck off and in his place, defendants No. 2(a) to 2(d) were substituted vide order dated 23.5.1984. The defendant No. 2(d) Amatul Khadaija, happens to be the sister of defendants No. 1 and 2 and defendants No. 2(a) to 2(c) are the sons and daughter of defendant No. 2(d) through her husband Tufail Ahmad. The defendant No. 2(a) then only filed written statement denying all the allegations made in the plaint. It was denied that the defendant No. 2 was holding power of attorney for and on behalf of the defendants. Any agreement made by defendant No. 2 for sale of the land has also been denied and it was stated that if any such agreement was made by the defendant No. 2 that can be bound in respect of the share of defendant No. 2 alone. All the actions as stated in the plaint regarding notice being given to defendant No. 2 from the side of the lawyer of the plaintiff have also been denied. It was also stated that the agreement as alleged and the receipt thereof were only forged, fabricated and any such parole agreement, if made, suffers from uncertainty of land and as such void. 5. A petition was filed for amendment of the written statement which was objected to from the side of the plaintiff. In the amendment it was sought that the suit itself could be thrown out as the same has been filed against a dead person, namely, Syed Abdul Alim who died in the year 1972 itself. It was further alleged that the defendants No. 3, 5 and 6 are the residents of United States of America whereas the defendant No. 9 is the permanent resident of Bangla Desh and no summons had been served on them and any publication in the statesman regarding service of summons can be of no avail in respect of defendants No. 3, 5, 6 and 9. Although objections were raised in respect of the amendment but the said amendment in the written statement was allowed. 6. Although objections were raised in respect of the amendment but the said amendment in the written statement was allowed. 6. On the basis of the pleading of the parties, the following issues were framed: 1. Is the suit of the plaintiff as framed maintainable? 2. Has the plaintiff valid cause of action for the suit? 3. Whether the defendant No. entered into any such agreement dated 29.9.1980 with the plaintiff for self and on behalf of other defendants for sale of the land in suit? 4. Whether the defendant No. 2 was competent to enter into any such agreement for sale of the land in suit on behalf of the other defendants? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for specific performance of contract against the defendants? 6. Whether the plaintiff was willing and still ready to perform her own part of the contract? 7. To what relief of reliefs, the plaintiff is entitled to? 7. From the plaintiffs side, three witnesses have been examined in the case, namely, Sayed Anwar Alam, who was the employee of Sub-Registry Office within the district of Burdwan (West Bengal) who produced the volumes of register of power of attorneys which disclosed of registration made by defendant No. 1 in the year 1951 and defendant No. 2(d) in the year 1952. P.W. 2 Hatim Ali is the husband of the plaintiff who deposed in support of the plaintiff and practically he is pseudo-(sic) plaintiff in the suit. He was been cross-examined at length from the side of the defence. P.W. 3 is a formal witness who has proved a copy of the sale deed made by Syed Abdul Alim, for and on behalf of the other defendants as attorney holder in favour of some other persons in respect of some other lands within the area of Bariatu. Defendant No. 2(a) who had contested the suit made several prayers for adjournment on different grounds and adjournment were allowed but ultimately, the defendant No. 2(a) or any of the defendants did not turn up and the original Court closed the defence evidence and then heard the argument and then judgment was passed, decreeing the suit of the plaintiff. 8. In the original Court, the vital issue was Issue Nos. 8. In the original Court, the vital issue was Issue Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 and those wee decided analogously and on the basis of the decision of those issues, other issues were also decided in favour of the plaintiff and then the suit was decreed. The appeal was preferred not only by defendant No. 2(a) but also by other defendants except defendant No. 1 who was said to be died in the year 1972 itself as per the defence version. The main thrust in the appellate Court was with regard to the power of attorney of defendant No. 2 in entering into parole agreement with the plaintiff vis-a-vis her husband. The appellate Court also decided in the same line as that of the original Court and the appeal was dismissed and the decree of the suit was maintained. 9. The admitted position of the case remains that there were two power of attorneys of the years 1951 and 1952; one was executed by defendant No. 1 Abdul Halim and another by the sister of defendant No. 2 Amatul Khadaija (defendant No. 2(d) in favour of Syed Abdul Alim (defendant No. 2). The power of attorney of 1951 by Syed Abul Halim (defendant No. 1) was not in favour of Syed Abdul Alim (defendant No. 2) alone but in favour of four persons including Syed Abdul Alim and the powers were given jointly and severely to the attorney holders. The defendants No. 3 to 9 had given any power of attorney in favour of defendant No. 2. So the defendant No. 2 was not holding any power of attorney of defendants No. 3 to 9 but both the Courts below had taken the fact that as Abdul Alim (defendant No. 2) as attorney holder of defendants No. 2 to 4 also had sold lands of Bariatu in favour of others persons then the analogy goes that defendant No. 2 was also holding power of attorney of defendants No. 3 to 9. 10. At the time of admission of this second appeal vide order dated 27.1.1992, the following substantial questions of law were formulated: (i) Whether this appeal by the appellants except appellant No. 1 is maintainable because those appellants did not file written statement contesting the statement of facts made in the plaint? 10. At the time of admission of this second appeal vide order dated 27.1.1992, the following substantial questions of law were formulated: (i) Whether this appeal by the appellants except appellant No. 1 is maintainable because those appellants did not file written statement contesting the statement of facts made in the plaint? (ii) If it is held in favour of the appellants, whether the finding recorded by the Court below that the appellant entered into an agreement with the respondent to transfer the property is based on evidence? 11. At the time of argument Mr. Debi Prasad submitted that another substantial question of law is required to be framed in the following manner: Whether by Exts. 1 and 1/A, the attorney was legally authorised to enter into an agreement for sale? 12. Mr. Akhtar has opposed such framing of substantial question of law at this stage as no liberty was given vide order dated 27.1.1992 at the time of admission of the appeal regarding any other question of law to be raised at the time of hearing of the appeal but Mr. Akhtar had to admit that this question of law as submitted by Mr Debi Prasad is the main question involved in the suit and that was the question which was raised primarily before the first appellate Court. It is true that substantial question of law while framed by this Court then this Court is to hear on those questions of law only but proviso to Sub-section (5) of Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives ample authority and jurisdiciton to the Court if it could be found that any other substantial question of law not formulated is also essential to be raised and heard for substantial justice and also for ends of justice. The defendant No. 2 (Syed Abdul Alim) was authorised for and on behalf of the other defendants as per the plaintiffs case to enter into an agreement of sale in respect of the suit property and that has been challenged in the written statement vehemently and both the Courts below had found that at least the defendants No. 3 to 9 and not given any power of attorney to defendant No. 2. In that case both the Courts below had drawn an analogy from a private document between defendant No. 2 and some other persons as purchasers wherein Syed Abdul Alim and had described himself to be the attorney holder of other defendants also. Now whether the registered power of attorney, namely, Exts. 1 and 1/A had given any specific authority for entering into an agreement for sale or for sale is a moot question to be decided in the suit and hence that is the substantial question of law, but for some reason or other, that has not been formulated. Unless that question of law is not being taken, this Court cannot pass effective judgment and for the ends of justice, the said question of law is required to be formulated at the time of hearing also, hence the prayer made by Mr. Debi Prasad is hereby allowed. 13. The position remains as is revealed from the records of the lower Court and the first appellate Court that, the defendant No. 2 (Syed Abdul Alim) was an attorney of defendant No. 1 (Syed Abdul Halim), his own elder brother and of his sister Amatul Khadaija who has been arrayed as-defendant No. 2(d) on his death during the proceeding of the suit. It must be mentioned here that defendant No. 2(d) was never the original defendant in the suit and she was only substituted as heir of defendant No. 2 during the proceeding of the suit. In the plaint, except a vague statement made in the first line to the effect that the defendants are the owners of the landed property. In the suit, no title has been traced from the side of the plaintiff. On being questioned by this Court, Mr. Akhtar submitted that Syed Abdul Hussain was the original title holder and he died leaving behind two sons i.e. defendants No. 1 and 2 a daughter Amatul Khadaija and defendants No. 3 to 9 are the sons and daughters of defendant No. 1 Syed Abdul Halim. On being questioned by this Court, Mr. Akhtar submitted that Syed Abdul Hussain was the original title holder and he died leaving behind two sons i.e. defendants No. 1 and 2 a daughter Amatul Khadaija and defendants No. 3 to 9 are the sons and daughters of defendant No. 1 Syed Abdul Halim. Naturally unless it could be show that defendants No. 3 to 9 had acquired the property by their own right then they can be stated to be heirs on the death of defendant No. 1 Syed Abdul Halim and if Syed Abdul Halim is dead at least at the time of filing of the suit then arraying of defendants No. 3 to 9 as heirs of defendant No. 1 Syed Abdul Halim might be proper but then defendants No. 3 to 9 had never given any power of attorney to defendant No. 2 Syed Abdul Alim admittedly and on the death of defendant No. 1 even if any power of attorney is given by him to defendant No. 2 then the same became non-est in the eye of law. But there is no clarification to that effect either in the plaint or in the evidence of the plaintiffs husband Hatim Ali as P.W. 2 in the suit. Moreover, on going through the plaint, it appears that defendants No. 8 and 9 are shown to be the daughters of Syed Abdul Alim i.e. defendant No. 2, but afterwards it is said that the defendant No. 2 died as a bachelor and as such his heirs are nephews and nices namely defendants No. 3 to 9 and defendant Nos. 2(a) to 2(c). Those are all anamolous and nothing has been clarified. Those have not been clarified by any of the Courts below although there was averment in the written statement and also in the cross-examination that the oral agreement as alleged from the side of the plaintiff suffers from uncertainty. That uncertainty is not only in respect of the share holders but also in respect of the land. No where there is any statement to the effect as to how the lands were described in the oral agreement or money receipts in consequence of the oral agreement as described in the Schedule of the plaint. That uncertainty is not only in respect of the share holders but also in respect of the land. No where there is any statement to the effect as to how the lands were described in the oral agreement or money receipts in consequence of the oral agreement as described in the Schedule of the plaint. Even boundary which have been given in the Schedule of the plaint did not have any mention in the permission application under Sec. 26 of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act or permission granted thereof. 14. A suit for specified performance is definitely as equitable relief to be granted and a discretion is there of the Court even if such agreement is found to be proper but when uncertainty is there in respect of the share holders and in respect of the land when it is not known how a decree of specific performance has been granted by both the Courts. Only because the defendants could not avail the opportunity by adducing evidence but when the plaintiff had been cross-examined at length on that point then it becomes bounden duty of the Court to see whether specific performance can be granted in the circumstances of the suit or not. The defendant No. 2(d) Amatul Khadaija was definitely the owner of the suit land and the plaintiff has also pressed it by bringing the registered power of attorney from the Sub-Registry Office of Burdwan but this defendant No. 2(d) was never arrayed as original defendant but she was substituted as heirs of defendant No. 2 only In that view of the matter, Amatul Khadaija i.e. defendant No. 2(d) was not arrayed as owners of the suit land at the time of filing of the suit. This question has also not been explained either in the plaint or in evidence or in the judgment of both the Courts below. 15. This question has also not been explained either in the plaint or in evidence or in the judgment of both the Courts below. 15. Now let me come to the two power of attorneys proved in the case, if Syed Abdul Alim (defendant No. 2) was dead before filing of the suit then his power of attorney has got no effect, but let us take it for granted for arguments sake that the defendant No. 1 (Syed Abdul Halim) is still alive then by the power of attorney of 1951, he has authorised four persons including his brother defendant No. 2 (Syed Abdul Alim) as his attorney and power was given jointly and severelly to all the four attorneys for the management of his properties movable or immovable in the Indian domain but no specific power has been given for selling or entering into an agreement for sale of any of the immovable properties. Much stress has been given to the clause as mentioned below to the effect that power of sale had been given "to present documents in any registration office executed by the Principal and admit the execution thereof and to do all acts, existence, to such registration; to file appeal and applications against the refusal to the registration and to do so all acts thereof." This averment, on plain reading does not give any authority to the attorney to execute any document for and on behalf of the Principal rather the execution of the document was kept reserved by the Principal and for the registration purpose only the authorities had been given to the attorneys. The same and similar clause is there in respect of the power of attorney given by Amatul Khadaija in favour of her own brother i.e. defendant No. 2, Syed Abdul Alim solely. Thus the power of attorneys had never given any authority by the principal to their attorneys for sale of immovable property or for entering into an agreement for sale on behalf of the Principals. This aspect has not been considered by any of the Courts below. 16. Thus the power of attorneys had never given any authority by the principal to their attorneys for sale of immovable property or for entering into an agreement for sale on behalf of the Principals. This aspect has not been considered by any of the Courts below. 16. Again let us take for granted for the arguments sake that these power of attorneys have been authority to defendant No. 2 to enter into ah agreement of sale and also for sale of their immovable properties but then also the defendants No. 3 to 9 had never given any authority to defendant No. 2 to sell their properties. By analogy alone from a private document a Court of law cannot infer that there was power of attorney by other defendants also in favour of defendant No. 2 but the sale deed which has been accepted in the case as Ext. 7 does not mention about the name of any of these defendants i.e. defendant Nos. 3 to 9, That document was executed by defendant No. 2 for himself and on behalf of defendant No. 1 Syed Abdul Halim and defendant No. 2(d) and also for himself. Thus, when there is no power of attorney of defendants No. 3 to 9, there cannot be any decree for specific performance on the basis of the agreement being arrived at by defendant No. 2 if at all arrived at for and on behalf of the defendants No. 3 to 9. This approach of the Courts below are totally erroneous, wrong and illegal too on the face of it. Thus from the above discussions, it is clear that even if there is an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 that agreement must be an individualistic one and not on behalf of any of the owners of the land. 17. About parole agreement between defendant No. 2 and the plaintiff, there is not an iota of evidence except a money receipt alleged to be granted by defendant No. 2 on 29.9.1980 which has been marked as Ext. 2. The plaintiffs husband has admitted that this receipt has been written by him and signature was made by defendant No. 2. That receipt does not say anything about any agreement regarding other defendants nor it disclose the description of the property but in vague it has been stated as land of Bariatu. 2. The plaintiffs husband has admitted that this receipt has been written by him and signature was made by defendant No. 2. That receipt does not say anything about any agreement regarding other defendants nor it disclose the description of the property but in vague it has been stated as land of Bariatu. The parole agreement must have been reached and in presence of some witness but none has been examined except the plaintiffs husband. In the plaint it has been stated that the agreement was arrived at by the plaintiff Sakina Khatoon through her husband but in the evidence the plaintiffs husband stated that the agreement was arrived at between his wife directly and defendant No. 2. When such sort of variations are there and when the whole parole agreement suffers from not only certainty regarding description of land but also in respect of parties, the specific performance cannot be granted by a Court of law. 18. Regarding permission under Sec. 26 of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, the names of original defendants are there and not of defendant No. 2(d) who as is argued was also one of the owners of the suit property but no permission has been taken for and on her behalf. Moreover, the names of defendants No. 3 to 9 were mentioned by Syed Abdul Alim as attorney but as stated above, no power of attorney has been produced in favour of defendant No. 3 (Syed Abdul Alim) by defendants No. 3 to 9. So it can be found that the plaintiff had never come before the Court with clean hands. The parole agreement is definitely legal and binding if the same could be proved to the satisfaction of the Court. In respect of parole agreement, more vigorous evidence is necessary, but as discussed above, the whole claim of the plaintiff suspects of fraudulence. 19. In the back ground of the above position, let us now examine the substantial questions of law involved and the legality or otherwise of the maintainability of the second appeal which has been vehemently challenged by the respondents. Even at the time of admission also by filing caveat, the respondents had challenged the maintainability of the second appeal and after hearing both the parties, the appeal was admitted formulating the substantial questions of law as already mentioned. 20. Even at the time of admission also by filing caveat, the respondents had challenged the maintainability of the second appeal and after hearing both the parties, the appeal was admitted formulating the substantial questions of law as already mentioned. 20. Regarding the first substantial question of law, it should be decided in favour of the appellants. Only because some of the appellants had not contested the original suit, they are not debarred for filing appeal, the ex-parte decree passed can also be agitated by filing appeal by the defendants who had not contested the suit. In that view of the matter, the defendant No. 2(a) i.e. appellant No. 2 is not only competent but other appellants are also competent to prefer the appeal and they had also preferred so before the first appellate Court and no question had ever been raised before the first appellate Court in this respect and practically this is a settled principle of law that the appellants who have preferred first appeal are entitled to prefer second appeal also So the first substantial question of law is decided in favour of the appellants. 21. Regarding the second and third point, it has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Akhtar, learned Counsel for the respondent that this appeal is not maintainable as no question of law is involved and when the defendants had given up their claim in the suit, they are not entitled to raise question for the first time in appeal. He has referred to a Division Bench judgment of Andhra Piadesh in the case of Konakalla Venkata Satyanarayana and Ors. V/s. State Bank of India and Ors. -- . Here the appellant No. 1 had contested the suit but he could not adduce his evidence but the plaintiffs husband who deposed for and on behalf of plaintiff had been cross-examined at length and as such it cannot be said that the appellant No. 1 had given up his claim in the suit. So that judgment of Division Bench is of no value in the present appeal. 22. Regarding oral agreement, Mr. Akhtar has referred to a judgment of the Privy Council and of the Supreme Court in the case of Shankarlal Narayandas Mundade V/s. The New Mofussil Co. Ltd. and Ors. AIR 1946 PC 97 and K. Sriramulu V/s. Aswatha Narayana and Ors. -- . No where it was contended by Mr. 22. Regarding oral agreement, Mr. Akhtar has referred to a judgment of the Privy Council and of the Supreme Court in the case of Shankarlal Narayandas Mundade V/s. The New Mofussil Co. Ltd. and Ors. AIR 1946 PC 97 and K. Sriramulu V/s. Aswatha Narayana and Ors. -- . No where it was contended by Mr. Debi Prasad, Senior Counsel appearing for and on behalf of the appellants that oral agreement is not valid in the eye of law. if the oral agreement is found to be valid and proved then the same can be enforced legally also but here the oral agreement in question could not be proved by any evidence whatsoever except by that of the plaintiffs husband and even if that alleged oral agreement is said to be valid, the same can be valid in respect of the share of defendant No. 2 alone and not against others. But I have already held that he plaintiff is not coming with clean hands and the oral agreement alleged and the subsequent actions on the basis of the agreement could not be proved in their proper perspective. In that view of the matter, the oral agreement remains suspicious and questionable one and on such oral agreement, no enforcement can be made by a Court of law by way of specific performance. By referring to Laxmi and Co. V/s. Dr. AM. Deshpande and Anr. -- . Mr. Akhtar has stated that the subsequent events must be taken into consideration as according to the respondent, in Execution Case No. 9 (A) of 1989, already decree has been satisfied. In that view of the matter, this second appeal has already become infructuous and the decree passed by the two fact finding Courts cannot be questioned on some lacunas when the decree has been satisfied. 23. I do not think that the litigation has come to an end. The plaintiff taking advantage of no grant of stay order by the Court got the execution continued but the decree itself being not a legal and proper one even if the same has been executed, the execution becomes a nullity. The decree itself is bad in the eye of law. Strenuous arguments have been made by referring to various judgments of the Supreme Court in Kshitish Chandra Purkait V/s. Santosh Kumar Purkait and Ors. -- , Panchugopal Barua and Ors. The decree itself is bad in the eye of law. Strenuous arguments have been made by referring to various judgments of the Supreme Court in Kshitish Chandra Purkait V/s. Santosh Kumar Purkait and Ors. -- , Panchugopal Barua and Ors. V/s. Umesh Chandra Goswami and Ors. -- , Ramaniya Naidu V/s. V. Kanniah Naidu and Anr. -- , Paras Nath Thakur V/s. Smt. Mohani Dasi and Ors. AIR 1959 SC 1204 , and Corporation of the City of Bangalore V/s. M. Papaiah -- to the effect that when two fact finding Courts arrived into the concurrent finding and even if some technical flaw is there with such finding of facts then also under Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court is debarred in second appeal to enter into the facts even if some illegalities have been committed in arriving at the concurrent findings of both the Courts below. It has further been argued that no new issue can be raised in the second appeal when such issues were not there before the Court below. It is also the contention of Mr. Akhtar that the defendants had practically gave up their claim and now they are trying to take different plea only to frustrate the decree granted by two Courts of law but concurrently and the High Court must not entertain such sort of attitude of the defendants in the second appeal. He has also stated that the substantial question of" law framed can also be challenged at the time of hearing by the respondent to the effect that no substantial question of law framed can also be challenged at the time of hearing by the respondent to the effect that no substantial questions of law are involved. Legally perhaps as has been stated and contended by Mr. Akhtar cannot be denied in any way whatsoever because these are the settled principles of law but if in the concurrent findings by both the Courts below it could be found by the High Court in the second appeal that both the Courts below had not only approached the dispute on wrong notion but has misappreciated the materials on misconception and on wrong reading of the documents, then definitely the High Court can interfere with under Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 24. 24. As per the discussions made above, it could be found that the Courts below had wrongly appreciated Ext. 7 and mis-interpreted Exts. 1 and 1/A. the two power of attorney and did not consider the wrong framing of the suit, then definitely this Court in the second appeal must interfere with in the ends of justice. In this respect, reference may be made to a judgment of the SC in the case of Jagdish Singh V/s. Nathu Singh -- . 25. Regarding second substantial question of law as formulated by order dated 27.1.1992, it could be found that the Courts below on wrong approach and on wrong proceedings of the averments made in the plaint, documents and mis-appeciations of evidence on record, came to a finding that parole agreement was arrived at between the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 regarding the transfer of the suit property. No agreement could be proved and even if it is said that the agreement is proved that too may be binding on defendant No. 2 alone but as the said agreement suffers from uncertainty not only in respect of property but also in respect of ownership is hit by Sec. 29 of the Contract Act and hence the same cannot be specifically enforced under the Specific Relief Act. Moreover when the plaintiff is not coming with clean hands for getting equitable relief under the Specific Relief Act, then she cannot be granted any relief while to coming with clean hands because equity demands that he who seeks equity must also do equity. 26. About the third point, as formulated during the course of hearing, 1 have already held that Ext. 1 or Ext. 1/A had never given any authority for sale of any of the immovable property by the Principal defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2(d). Reliefs granted by the Courts below on the basis of those two documents are totally illegal, improper and unjustified. The analogy brought from Ext. 7 is of no avail when defendants No. 3 to 9 were not there having any authority given to defendant No. 2. Thus I find that all the substantial questions of law raised in the appeal go in favour of the defendants-appellants and the decree granted by the Courts below regarding specific performance in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property cannot be sustained in law. 27. Thus I find that all the substantial questions of law raised in the appeal go in favour of the defendants-appellants and the decree granted by the Courts below regarding specific performance in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property cannot be sustained in law. 27. In the suit, there is no specific prayer about recovery of money on the basis of receipt (Ext. 2) against defendant No. 2 and on his/death against the other defendants who are said to be the heirs of defendant No. 2, but in the prayer portion of the suit in Clause (c) under paragraph 11, there is relief claimed in the following manners- (c) Such other or further relief or reliefs to which the plaintiff found entitled be also awarded. 28. In a suit for specific performance, it remains the discretionary power of the Court to grant specific performance in the nature and circumstances of the case and if the main relief regarding specific performance cannot be granted then money which had been advanced for the purpose of specific performance can be allowed to be refunded with interest thereof. Such alternative prayer ought to have been made by the plaintiff but no such specific prayer is there but even then for the ends of justice under relief Clause (c), as mentioned above, such alternate relief may be granted. Regarding money receipt (Ext. 2), there is no specific denial and practically the same cannot be denied by the heirs, although defendant No. 2 appeared during his life time he did not file written statement and hence the money taken by defendant No. 2 as proved by the plaintiffs husband and accepted the receipt i.e. Ext. 2, the suit may be decreed to the extent of refund of Rs. 5000.00 against the defendants with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of receipt i.e. 29.9.1980 till realisation. 29. Thus the second appeal is partly allowed and the decree granted by the original Court affirmed by the first appellate Court is modified to the extent as mentioned above. The cost of the suit throughout upto this second appeal should be borne of the suit valuation to the extent of Rs. 5,000.00 only by the defendants.