D. K. SETH, J. The petitioner was charged with the allegation of rape upon one Smt. Khema Devi who was taken to custody in the Police Station by the petitioner and others who were constables posted therein. Criminal case out of the said allegation ended on the submission of final report. In the disciplinary proceed ings proceeded against the petitioner, the charges were not proved, accordingly, the petitioner was exonerated. Subsequently, in exercise of para 511 of the police regula tion, the Inspector General of Police had passed an order directing taking of fresh evidence and reassessment of such evidence and giving of a fresh enquiry report. Pursuant to the said order, fresh enquiry was held and the petitioner was found guilty. On the basis whereof a punishment of reduction of pay was passed. Subsequently, a notice for enhan cement of punishment was issued and pur suant thereto petitioners services were terminated and he was dismissed from ser vice. Against the said order an appeal was preferred. The appeal having been dis missed, the petitioner preferred a dispute before the U. P. Public Service Tribunal being case No. 357/v/hm/1983 ). The said claim petition was dismissed by an order dated 8-9-89. It is this order which has since been challenged by means of this writ petition. Learned Counsel for the petitioner Shri B. P. Srivastava contends that paragraph 511 of the police regula tion provides for a period of limitation of six months. In the present case, the initial order was passed by the Superintendent of Police on 24-3-76 whereas the order passed under para 511 of the police regula tion was on 21-4-77. According to him after expiry of the period of six months from 24-3-76, the Inspector General of Police cease to have any power to call for the records and pass the order dated 21-4-77. Therefore, the entire process of en quiry and the punishment are vitiated be cause of the absence of jurisdiction on the Inspector General of Police to reopen the case. According to him, on expiry of the six months from 24-3-76, right has been ac crued to the petitioner and the same can not be taken away except in accordance with law. When the law does not empower the Inspector General of Police to exercise such power beyond six months. Therefore, the enquiry is void and ab initio. According to him, on expiry of the six months from 24-3-76, right has been ac crued to the petitioner and the same can not be taken away except in accordance with law. When the law does not empower the Inspector General of Police to exercise such power beyond six months. Therefore, the enquiry is void and ab initio. He con tends further that even on merit, the case could not be said to have been proved on the basis of the materials placed. The learned Tribunal had proceeded in biased and arbitrary manner and not considered the material placed before it. 2. Shri Sabajit Yadav, learned Stand ing Counsel, on the other hand contends that the expression used in para 511 that the Inspector General of Police shall not "ordinarily" call for the records after six months. The expression used ordinarily implies that the limitation of six months was not obsolete though it was a guide to use the power within six months out in deserving cases, it can be exercised there after. He further contends that 21-4-77 was the date on which the order dated 21-4-77 was passed since this point was not taken in the claim petition, therefore, it was possible for them to produce any record to show that the order dated 21-4-77 might have been passed after the records were called long before may be within six months. Since this point was not specifically taken, the petitioner cannot urge the same before this Court or in the Tribunal that without affording proper op portunity to the respondent. He contends further that even on merit, it appears that there is no pervisity and by reason of order passed by the disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority had assumed the character of concurrence finding of fact by reason of the seal of the tribunal. This court in exercise of writ jurisdiction, can not interfere with the finding of facts un less it is shown to be perverse. 3. I have heard Shri P. P. Srivastava, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri Sabajit Yadav, learned Standing Counsel. 4. The expression used in para 511 of the police regulation shows that the power shall be ordinarily exercised within six months. In fact the use of expression ordinarily clearly indicates that the time prescribed was not an absolute and con clusive. 4. The expression used in para 511 of the police regulation shows that the power shall be ordinarily exercised within six months. In fact the use of expression ordinarily clearly indicates that the time prescribed was not an absolute and con clusive. It was for guidance and for ad ministrative exigencies and not a limita tion as is understood under the legal par lance to be conclusive. The expression ordinarily implies that normally should be exercised within six months but in deserving case, it can even be exercised after six months. The use of the phrase "ordinarily" expressly implies the period to be directory and not mandatory. Had the legislature intended it to be mandatory it would not have used in word "ordinarily". 5. The rules of interpretation avoids rejection of words. As it is not permissible to add words or fill in a gap or lacuna, similarly effort should be made to give meaning to each and every word used. "it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have ap propriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute " (Aswini Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1957 SC 369 ). In the interpretation of statute the Courts al ways presume the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect" (J. K. Cotton and Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of UP. , AIR 1961 SC 1170 ). "the legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain (Quebec Railway, Light, Heat and Power Co. v. Vandry, AIR 120 PC 181 ). The words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed ac cording to their grammatical meaning, un less that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the con trary (State of U. P. v. Vtjay Anand Maharaj, AIR 1963 SC 946 ). The true way is to take the words as the legislature has given them and to take the meaning that the words given naturally imply, unless where the construction of the words is, either by the preamble or by the context of the words in question, controlled or altered (Crossford v. Spooner, 1846 (4) MIA 179 (PC ). If the language has a natural mean ing we cannot depart from the meaning unless, reading the statute as a whole, the context directs us to do so (Attorney General v. Milne, (1914-15) AUER Rep 1061 (HL)), There is a presumption that words are used in a statute correctly and exactly and not losely and inexactly (Prithipal Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC1413 ). 6. Applying the above test in the con text of paragraph 511 of the U. P. Police Regulation having used the word "or dinarily" it is not possible to ignore the same. Neither could the same be under stood to be meaningless. The same has to be understood in its natural meaning. The context in which it has been used does not permit departure from the plain simple and natural meaning. As we find from shorter Oxford Dictionary (1993) the word "ordinarily" means "in the ordinary course of events; in most cases; usually, commonly; to an ordinary degree; to the usual extent; in an ordinary or unexeceptional way as is normal or usual" in Lexcon Webster Encyclopaedic Edition 1986 its meaning has been given as "usual way in ordinary cases; usually; in an ordinary de gree; to the usual extent. " Thus if we take the natural meaning then it is to be under stood that normally the power is to be exercised within six months but in unusual or exceptional cases it can be exercised even beyond. 7. Attributing natural meaning to the expression the time prescribed clearly in dicates the time limit to be directory and not mandatory. Following earlier decisions Supreme Court in M. V. Vali Pero v. Fenandes Lopex, approved the following passage from Crauford ; Statutory Con struction p. 516 : viz : "the question as to whether a statute is mandatory or direc tory depends upon the language in which the intent is clothed. Following earlier decisions Supreme Court in M. V. Vali Pero v. Fenandes Lopex, approved the following passage from Crauford ; Statutory Con struction p. 516 : viz : "the question as to whether a statute is mandatory or direc tory depends upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the legislature must govern and these are to be ascertained not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design and the consequences which would follow from construing it one way or the other. " 8. In the context of the present case paragraph 611 was introduced to prevent abuse of discipline in the force itself. The higher authority is clothed with a revisional powers which is open to be exer cised at any time guided by a period in ordinary cases. In the context in which this power has been engrafted clearly shows that the intention of the legislature was to clothe the superior authority to examine the correctness of a decision or the process. If the legislature had intended to limit the power by time mandatorily there would not have been necessary to phrase the same with the word "ordinarily". As observed earlier the presence of the word "ordinarily" can neither be ignored nor the natural meaning can be departed from. An examination of the scheme context, nature and design shows that it was never in tended to be mandatory with regard to the point of time. There again the conse quence that would follow if it is held man datory would have undesirable effect in the discipline of a disciplined force meant for protecting the life and property, safety and security of the ordinary citizen, main taining law and order, peace and enforcing rule of law in the society. The process being departmentally processed may be handled inefficiently, biasedly or other wise. The provision is conceived for a check and balance. It may be used to recall a finding or decision either for or against. Therefore, it would cause hardship to a person who might have the feeling that he has been wronged and his remedy may not be closed for ever. Then again the matter may come to the notice of the authority late. The departmental movement of files may be delayed to exceed the time. Therefore, it would cause hardship to a person who might have the feeling that he has been wronged and his remedy may not be closed for ever. Then again the matter may come to the notice of the authority late. The departmental movement of files may be delayed to exceed the time. The object was to keep open a revising power to the authority, if it is held directory it would further the aim and object for which it is engrafted. If it is held otherwise, the object and purpose would defeated. 9. Now Mr. Srivastava, learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the power was exercised long after 11 months. According to him, there is no ex planation for this delay which neutralised the requirement of exercising such power. It is contended by Mr. Yadav that there being no ground taken in the writ petition it was not possible for them to meet the point and produce the relevant record to show that the records might have been called forwithin the period of sixmonths. 10. Be that as it may. It is a disputed question of fact. In the absence of material before this Court, it is not possible to decide the same. At the same time, the petitioner having not taken the point in the claim petition, he cannot now rely on the same without having taken the point though the same was decided by the tribunal. From the reason given by the learned Tribunal while upholding the con tention of the respondent and rejecting that of the petitioner, I do not find it to be irregular. I do not find any infirmity in the reasoning given in support of the con clusion that the order of the Inspector General of Police under paragraph 511 of the police Regulation on 21-4-77 is not vitiated or invalid. Therefore, I am not inclined to interfere with the said finding. 11. It appears that the learned Tribunal has dealt with all the questions raised including the question on merit and giving of an opportunity to the petitioner. The tribunal has given detail reason in support of its conclusion. 12. I have gone through the said order. I have not been able to find out any illegality or infirmity in the said order. There appears no perversity in the find ings given. The tribunal has given detail reason in support of its conclusion. 12. I have gone through the said order. I have not been able to find out any illegality or infirmity in the said order. There appears no perversity in the find ings given. In any event, the findings having assumed the character of concur rent finding of facts by reason of the con current finding of the appellate authority and the learned Tribunal, this Court is not empowered to interfere with the same. Inasmuch as while exercising writ jurisdic tion, this Court does not sit on appeal on the order impugned. It exercises only revisional jurisdiction. The revisional jurisdiction is not concerned with the cor rectness of the decision. It is rather con cerned with the decision making process. Even then it can interfere with the decision if it is shown to the Court that such decision suffers from perversity or that some material has not been taken into consideration. The present case is not one of such magnitude. In the decision making process, I do not find any irregularity, il legality or perversity. 13. For all these reasons, I am not inclined to interfere with the order impugned. The writ petition fails and is ac cordingly dismissed. 14. There will be no order as to cost. Petition dismissed. .