ORDER 1. This revision is directed against the order dated 30.8.97 passed by the 11th Civil Judge, Class I, Indore, in Execution Case No. 61/92 allowing application of the respondent No.1 made u/s. 47 C.P.C. and directing re-delivery of possession of the house. 2. The facts material for the purpose of this revision are these :- The applicant herein filed a suit (No. 61-A/92) in the Court of IXth Civil Judge, Class I, Indore, for ejectment against one Smt. Kantaben who was carrying business in the name and style "Mahesh Brothers". In the suit the defendant was described as "Mahesh Brothers through proprietor Kantaben". The suit was decreed ex-parte on 21.2.94. In execution of the said decree the applicant has also obtained possession of the suit accommodation on 26.10.95. It is no more in dispute that on the date when the suit was filed Smt. Kantaben was already dead The respondent No. 2 Mahesh Kumar the son of late Kantaben made an application u/s. 47/151 C.P.C. contending that the decree having been passed against a dead person is a nullity and the same could not be, therefore, put to execution and the possession of the suit accommodation could not be obtained from him in execution of the said decree. He prayed for restoration of possession to him. The application was resisted by the applicant decree holder. The Court below after hearing both the parties passed the order impugned directing for re-delivery of possession of the suit accommodation to the respondent No.2. 3. I have heard Shri A.K. Sethi, learned counsel for applicant and Shri B.N. Baraniya, learned counsel for respondent No.2. 4. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant decree holder is that the suit was filed not against Smt. Kantaben but against the proprietor firm and so the decree for ejectment passed in the suit is not only valid but the same could be executed against the respondent No.2 the LR of deceased Kantaben. it is further contended that the application u/s. 47 C.P.C. did not lie inasmuch as the decree stood fully satisfied by the time the application was made by the respondent No.2. Resort should have been made to the provisions of Rule 98 to 102 of O. 21 CPC. it is further contended. I am not impressed by the arguments. 5. it is further contended that the application u/s. 47 C.P.C. did not lie inasmuch as the decree stood fully satisfied by the time the application was made by the respondent No.2. Resort should have been made to the provisions of Rule 98 to 102 of O. 21 CPC. it is further contended. I am not impressed by the arguments. 5. O. 30 R. 10 CPC applies to a person or persons carrying on business under an assumed or trading name, which may be the name of a firm or an individual or anything else. It enables the plaintiff to sue a person concerned in such name or style. Nevertheless, the suit remains against the person who carries on business in such name or style. So, if such person dies before filing of the suit, the suit must be brought against his legal representatives for it, after his death, the suit is brought in his trade name, it being a suit against a dead person the decree will be a nullity. 6. In Rampratap v. Gavrishankar (AIR 1924 Bombay 109) it is held :-- "When a suit is brought against a person in the name in which he carries on business, the suit is essentially one against him and he is the sole defendant in the suit. If he dies before suit, and a suit is brought against him in the name in which he carried on business the suit is against a dead man and it is a nullity from its inception. The suit being a nullity, the writ of summons issued in the suit, by whomsoever accepted, is also a nullity. Similarly, any order made in the suit allowing amendment of the plaint by substituting the legal representative of the deceased as defendant and allowing the suit to proceed against him is also a nullity. It is immaterial that the suit was brought bona-fide and in ignorance of the death of such person". 7. In the instant case, the suit was brought against Smt. Kantaben after her death. Her LRs were not joined in the suit. Under the circumstance, as held in Rampratap (supra), the decree passed in the suit was a nullity incapable of being put to execution. 8. 7. In the instant case, the suit was brought against Smt. Kantaben after her death. Her LRs were not joined in the suit. Under the circumstance, as held in Rampratap (supra), the decree passed in the suit was a nullity incapable of being put to execution. 8. As regards tenability of the application u/s. 47 CPC, the point projected stands resolved by a Supreme Court decision in B.V Patankar v. C.G. Sastry ( AIR 1961 SC 272 ) wherein it is held :-- "Where the executing Court ignores the provisions of the Rent Control Order prohibiting eviction of tenants, and passes an order of delivery of possession in execution of a decree, the order can be set-aside and an order of redelivery to the tenant can be passed on an application under S. 47 read with S. 151 Civil P.C." 9. It will be thus seen that the application filed by respondent No.2 Mahesh Kumar u/s. 47 r/w. Sec. 151 CPC was maintainable and the Court below has rightly ordered for redelivery of possession of the suit accommodation to him. 10. In the result, this revision fails and is dismissed but without any order as to costs.