JUDGMENT V.K. Agarwal, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dt. 22.12.86 in Civil Appeal No. 42-A of 1983 of the Court of IInd Additional District Judge, Raigarh reversing the judgment and Decree dt. 6.12.1978 in Civil Suit No. 3-A of 1976 by Civil Judge, Class II, Dharamjaigarh decreeing the suit of the plaintiff/respondent No. 1 and declaring him to be owner of the suit land bearing Khasra No. 310/3, area 1.67 acres, situate at village I (sic) Tehsil Dharamjaigarh, District Raigarh and also declaring that the appellant/defendant Sona does not acquires any title by virtue of Sale deed dt. 1.4.60 executed by respondent no. 3 Raturam. 2. The plaintiff/respondent no. 1 instituted suit for declaration of his title over Khasra No. 310/3, later on re-numbered as 307 in consolidation proceedings, on the ground that the suit land was purchased by him by registered sale deed dt. 11.12.1987 from defendant/respondent no. 2 Saturam, Plaintiff/ respondent further alleged that he was dis-possessed by appellant/defendant no. 1 from the suit land on the ground that he had purchased the suit land by sale deed dt 1.4.1969. 3. The defendant/respondent no. 2 remained absent and was proceeded against ex-parte in the suit by the trial court. The appellant/defendant no. 1 alleged that he had purchased the suit land from respondent/defendant no. 2 by registered sale deed dt 1.4.1969. It was alleged by him that plaintiff/respondent no. 1 was present at the time of execution of the sale deed and had also signed the same. He was therefore estopped from challenging the purchase of the suit land by appellant by sale deed dt. 1.4.1969. 4. The suit of plaintiff/respondent no. 1 was dismissed by the trial Court. However, the learned appellate Court by the impugned judgment allowed the appeal and decreed the suit of plaintiff/respondent no. 1. 5. This second appeal has been admitted only on the following substantial question of law; Whether the suit suffers from non-joinder of a necessary party by virtue of Rule 3-B of Order 1 as inserted by Code of Civil Procedure (M.P. Amendment) Act, 1984 (Act No. 29 of 1984) ? 6. It has been urged by learned counsel for appellant that in view of amendment in corporated in the Code of Civil Procedure under Order 1 Rule 3-B C.P.C. State Government was a necessary party and its non-joinder vitiates the trial. 7. 6. It has been urged by learned counsel for appellant that in view of amendment in corporated in the Code of Civil Procedure under Order 1 Rule 3-B C.P.C. State Government was a necessary party and its non-joinder vitiates the trial. 7. It appears that the amendment in the Civil Procedure Code under Order 1 Rule 3-B has come into force from 14.8.1984. It reads as under:- 3-B. Conditions for entertainment of suits (1) No suit or proceeding for - (a) declaration of title or any right over any agricultural land, with or without any other relief; or (b) specified performance of any contract for transfer of any agricultural land, with or without any other relief, shall be entertained by any Court, unless the plaintiff applicant, as the case may be, knowing or having reason to believe that a return under section 9 of the M.P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960 (No. 20 of 1960) relation to land aforesaid has been or is required to be filled by him or by any other person before competent authority appointed under that Act, has impleaded the State of M.P. as one of the defendants or non-applicants, as the case may be, to such suit or proceedings. (2) No court shall proceed with pending suit or proceeding referred to in sub-rule (1) unless, as soon as may be, the State Government is so impleaded as a defendant or non-applicant. Explanation - The expression "suit or proceeding" used in this sub-rule shall include appeal, reference or revision, but shall not include any proceeding for or connected with execution of any decree or final order passed in such suit or proceeding. 8. It is clear therefore that in a suit covered by the above provision Government should be impleaded as a party. It is also clear from above Rule 3-B (2) of the order 1 C.P.C. that the Court shall not proceed with the suit or proceedings pending before it unless the State Government is impleaded. 9. In the instant case the suit was instituted on 8.11.76 and the trial Court disposed of the suit by judgment dt 6.12.1978. Clearly, therefore, the above amendment was not incorporated at the time of institution or disposal of suit by the trial Court. Therefore, there was no question of the State Government being joined as party at the stage of trial. 10. Clearly, therefore, the above amendment was not incorporated at the time of institution or disposal of suit by the trial Court. Therefore, there was no question of the State Government being joined as party at the stage of trial. 10. The first appeal appears to have been filed in the lower appellate Court on 2.1.1979 and was decided on 22.12.1986. Therefore, though the above amendment was not in force when the first appeal was filed, but it had come into force before the decision of the appeal by the lower appellate Court. The State of Madhya Pradesh had not been impleaded in the first appeal, though in this second appeal it has been so impleaded as respondent no. 3. The question that arises is as to whether the judgment in first appeal by the lower appellate Court is vitiated on account of non-impleading of this State of Madhya Pradesh as party therein ? 11. It is clear that the State, which is being joined as the party under Order 1 Rule 3-B was not a necessary party to this suit, as no relief was claimed against it, and it was to be joined and made a party only in view of the above amendment incorporated in the Code of Civil Procedure as Order 1 Rule 3-B of C.P.C. In the circumstances, clearly non-joinder of the State of Madhya Pradesh as party would not vitiate the decision in appeal. 12. In a similar situation in Brijrajsingh and others vs. Bitto Devi (Snit.) and another 1994 M.P.L.J. 192, it has been laid down that; The party on whom did lay primarily the responsibility of joining the State as a party to the case, having failed in discharging its duty, the Court too having overlooked the omission, the opponent too having shared the blame for the omission, wittingly or unwittingly by failing in promptly pointing out to the omission, the ends of justice and the spirit of law would be satisfied by directing the Stale to be joined as a party to the case at that very stage and before that very Court when and where the defect is detected or pointed out. The State would then be noticed and afforded an opportunity of participation at the proceedings. The State would then be noticed and afforded an opportunity of participation at the proceedings. The State may then avail the opportunity to point out that merits of the case have been adversely affected on account of non-compliance with the provisions at an earlier stage. In that event if the matter be before the trial Court, it may exercise its jurisdiction to reopen the trial to the extent warranted so as to protect the interest of the State; if the Court be an appellate Court, it may exercise its jurisdiction conferred by Rules 23, 23-A and 25 or 27 or Order 41, Civil Procedure Code and may either proceed to frame an issue and try itself or may remit the case to the trial Court retaining raisin of appeal to itself or may if necessary make a remand of the case if satisfied that prejudice has resulted to the State affecting the merits of the case or jurisdiction of the Court on account of failure to join the Stale as party to the case at an earlier and appropriate stage of the proceedings. If the State having been noticed, fails to appear or having appeared refuses to participate at the proceedings or to claim a trial or re-trial qua itself, it will serve no purpose to dislodge the otherwise well merited decree of the Court below solely because the said provisions were not complied with before the Courts below. 13. It has further been laid down in Brijraj Singh's case (supra) that proviso to section 99 and proviso to Order 1 Rule 9 C.P.C. do not have any applicability to the case of non-joinder of State under Order 1 Rule 3-B of the C.P.C. Further, after referring to the cases of Muhammand Hussain Khan vs. Babu Kishva Babdab Sahai A.I.R. 1937 P.C. 233 and Kiran singh and others vs. Chaman Paswan and others A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 340 it has been laid clown that the efficacy of the decree between the parties would not be affected, it the State is not joined as a party, in compliance of Order 1 Rule 3-B C.P.C. and that such a decree would not be nullity or a decree passed without jurisdiction. 14. 14. So far as substantial question of law framed in this case, it is clear that the suit did not suffer from non-joinder of the State of Madhya Pradesh as a party under Order 1 Rule 3-B C.P.C. as the said provision was not in force at the time when the suit was disposed of. Further, in view of the above discussion and the proposition, of law as laid down in Brijraj Singh's (supra), since the State of M.P., has been joined as party in this appeal, the spirit of law stands satisfied. The State though noticed has not come forward to raise any plea regarding the merits of the case. Accordingly, in the circumstances no purpose would be served to dislodge the decree of the Court below. In view of above, it does not appear that the decision of the lower appellate Court suffers from any jurisdictional competence, on account of non-joinder of State of Madhya Pradesh as party in those proceedings. 15. Accordingly, the appeal does not deserve to be allowed and the same is dismissed. However, the parties shall bear their own costs. Appeal allowed