M. SENGUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal against the judgment and decree passed on 31-7-1996 by Shri T. D. Rinzing, District Judge, South and West in Civil 1st Appeal No. 2 of 1993 arising out (of) judgment and decree passed on 4-9-1993 by Mrs. M. Rai, Civil Judge, East in Civil Suit No. 9 of 1985. ( 2 ) THE fact, in short, is that the Plaintiff gave a loan of Rs. 5,000/- on 12-2-1981 to the Defendant. A document was signed by the Defendant to that effect and it was agreed upon that the Defendant would reply the amount within a month therefrom. As the Defendant neglected to repay any amount within the stipulated period in spite of repeated verbal requests the plaintiff sent a letter of request or demand by registered post. This also could not fetch any result and, therefore, the Plaintiff sent a notice through his lawyer on 7-11-1984 demanding principal amount with interest thereon. ( 3 ) IN the written statement the Defendant refuted the contention of the plaintiff. The case of the Defendant is that the Plaintiff himself took a loan of Rs. 7,000/- on 11-6-1980 from the Defendant. Out of the said amount a sum of Rs. 5000/- was repaid on 12-2-1981 leaving a balance of Rs. 2000/ -. As the plaintiff insisted upon, the Defendant executed a receipt acknowledging receipt of Rs. 5000/- to the Plaintiff. ( 4 ) THE learned Civil Judge did not accept the Plaintiff's version of the case and held that the document in question could not be treated as promissory note and, therefore, could not be acted upon. Learned District Judge dealing with the case as the First Appellate Court could not agree with the views of the learned trial Court and decreed the suit for the principal amount, costs and interest pendente lite and for future period @ 6% per annum with effect from 1-5-1985 as the suit was filed on 30-4-1985. ( 5 ) BEING aggrieved by the aforesaid decision of the learned First Appellate Court the Defendant has come up before this Court with this second appeal. ( 6 ) IT should be noted at the outset that the scope of the Second Appellate Court is very limited and the Second Appellate Court should confine itself within the points of laws involved. ( 6 ) IT should be noted at the outset that the scope of the Second Appellate Court is very limited and the Second Appellate Court should confine itself within the points of laws involved. Normally the Second Appellate Court should not intrude into the question of facts. Though this is a basic principle of law, there is or cannot be any rigid rule in this respect. In deciding a second appeal in proper perspective, the Second Appellate Court may have to enter into the questions of facts. A few decisions were submitted from the Bar which are AIR 1992 All 174, Nathu Singh Hariya v. Jagdish Singh Thumman; AIR 1986 MP 53, Jernail Singh v. Kanhaiyalal and AIR 1994 Bom 293, Amruta Babaji Mozaz v. Kondabai. It may be noted that these decisions do not help to arrive at a conclusion on the above point. In all these decisions it has been noted that the Second Appellate Court in exercising jurisdiction u/s. 100, CPC would not interfere on the questions of fact when there are concurrent findings of the two lower Courts on the points of facts. The case under our study is not of such nature. Here the two Courts below had contrary findings on the points of fact. Another decision reported in AIR 1990 SC 1973, Ram Chandra Pandurang v. Murlidhar Ramchandra, has also been cited. This case too comes to no assistance. In that case the High Court interfered with the findings on grounds which were not made out even by the Plaintiff in his plaint or evidence. Supreme Court held that High Court was not justified in doing so. ( 7 ) IN the instant case we may safely hold that the Court below differed widely on factual points which are to be looked into to come to a definite finding. ( 8 ) LEARNED Trial Court held that the document in question cannot be said to be a promissory note as defined u/s. 4 of Negotiable Instruments Act. It is apparent that the impugned document is simply a receipt acknowledging receipt of Rs. 5000/- by the Defendant from the Plaintiff. In this receipt there is no indication of any promise to repay the amount. Mere acknowledgment of receipt cannot constitute a document as promissory note. It is apparent that the impugned document is simply a receipt acknowledging receipt of Rs. 5000/- by the Defendant from the Plaintiff. In this receipt there is no indication of any promise to repay the amount. Mere acknowledgment of receipt cannot constitute a document as promissory note. Shortly speaking promissory note should contain acknowledgment of receipt of a specified sum by the receiver with an unconditional undertaking to repay the same. In the instant case, as we have already stated there is no undertaking of repayment though the rest of the ingredients are there. Learned First Appellate Court appears to be of the view that the nature of the document, though not strictly in the form, should be decifered from other relevant facts, circumstances and evidence. ( 9 ) WE are in complete agreement with the learned First Appellate Court on the point that the connected evidence should be gone into to make out the real nature of the document in question. Proviso (2) to S. 92 of the Evidence Act authorises the Court to admit and to go into oral or other evidence for the purpose of explaining the real intention of the parties to the documents. The documents need not always be formal in nature. On the point of admissibility of oral evidence to find out the real nature of the transaction made by informal documents, decisions reported in AIR 1959 Tripura 40, Asad Ali v. Anwar Ali; AIR 1960 Mad 314, N. Chellaperumal v. N. M. Jayarathnam and AIR 1978 All 314, Brij Kishore v. Lakhan Tewari, may be referred to. Therefore, the learned First Appeal Court was quite justified in interpreting the document in the light of probability and with the help of the evidence on record. ( 10 ) EXECUTION of the receipt in question is admitted by the Defendant together with the fact of receipt of Rs. 5000/- on 12-2-1981. The Plaintiff as we have already noted, stated that this receipt represents receipt of loan of Rs. 5000/ -. Defendant says it to be a receipt acknowledging part repayment of a total loan of Rs. 7000/- taken by the Plaintiff from the Defendant sometime before execution of the impugned receipt dated 12-2-1981. Let us see the probability behind the defence version. It is not understood why no receipt for Rs. 7000/- was taken from the Plaintiff when the Defendant advanced the loan of Rs. 7000/- taken by the Plaintiff from the Defendant sometime before execution of the impugned receipt dated 12-2-1981. Let us see the probability behind the defence version. It is not understood why no receipt for Rs. 7000/- was taken from the Plaintiff when the Defendant advanced the loan of Rs. 7000/- to him. It has been pleaded that the parties being in good terms no receipt was insisted upon. If that be so why a receipt for Rs. 5000/- had to be granted by the Defendant on 12-2-1981. Even if we accept that the Plaintiff insisted on a receipt from the Defendant while making the part payment we would have expected a line in the receipt that it was in the form of part repayment and that some amount was still outstanding. When the Defendant admittedly granted the receipt on 12-2-1982, the onus definitely lies on him to explain the circumstances under which the receipt was granted. It is surprising that though Rs. 2000/- was outstanding the Defendant did not raise any voice of protest or counter, claim when the Plaintiff demanded repayment of the amount alleged to have been advanced by the Plaintiff. Not even in the suit any counter-claim has been made out. ( 11 ) THE learned trial Court was very much impressed with the fact that while the Plaintiff only examined himself in support of his claim, the Defendant brought a witness beside himself to prove his counter-claim. The DW 2 (Gokul Singh Cintury) stated that he was present when Rs. 7000/- was given by the Defendant to the Plaintiff as loan. Much has been said about the independence of this witness. It has been contended on behalf of the Plaintiff that the Defendant and DW 2 belong to the same political party and, therefore, it was easy for the Defendant to procure the service of his party man (DW 2) to lend support towards his claim. Without entering into that proposition we may indicate that this DW 2 deposed about a fact which was 11 years old and gave out the date of transaction quite accurately. It is only unnatural on the part of someone to remember a date which is of not much significance to him. It should be noted that DW 2 deposed from memory and not with reference to any document. His evidence cannot inspire any judicial mind. It is only unnatural on the part of someone to remember a date which is of not much significance to him. It should be noted that DW 2 deposed from memory and not with reference to any document. His evidence cannot inspire any judicial mind. ( 12 ) FROM these we hold that the learned First Appeal (Appellate) Court very rightly drew the conclusion in this case and very rightly decreed the suit for principal amount, cost and interest. The same should be confirmed. ( 13 ) IT is, hence,orderedthat the present Second Appeal be and the same is dismissed on contest with costs. The judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appeal (Appellate) Court is affirmed. Cost of appeal is assessed grossly as Rs. 750/ -. Appeal dismissed. --- *** --- .