JUDGMENT Bhagabati Prosad Banerjee, J. This is an application filed by M/s. Plastoman Private Limited and Macheff Machinery Private Limited, for review of the order dated January 16, 1997, disposing of the application for stay and the appeal finally together, as also for stay of the operation of the order and judgment dated January 16, 1997. 2. The case of the applicants, as made out in the application for review, is that the applicants had come to know for the first time on January 28, 1997, that the order and judgment dated January 16, 1997, has been obtained by the appellants who are the respondents in this application, behind the back of the applicants knowing fully well that the very vital right, title and interest of the applicants for review would be seriously affected. The applicants state that the applicants had been carrying on the business in the premises No. 38/1 Panditia Street, Calcutta, and that they were and still are lawful occupants in respect of the said premises. 3. This case had a chequered career, as would be evident from the judgment and order dated January 16, 1997. 4. Admittedly, the applicants, who are not parties in the writ application, had claimed that they were allowed by the Court below to intervene in the matter, but no order allowing intervention had been produced before us. In the application for review, there is no whisper that the applicants were allowed to intervene by the learned Trial Judge in the matter. This is an application for allowing an application for review to be filed by a stranger. At the very outset, it is necessary to examine whether the grounds of review in fact exist or not. 5. In Shivdeo Singh vs. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1909 , the Supreme Court had held that there is nothing in Art. 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. 6. An application for review of judgment may be made when new and important matters of evidence have been discovered or when there is a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for say other sufficient reason. 6. An application for review of judgment may be made when new and important matters of evidence have been discovered or when there is a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for say other sufficient reason. So the first ground of review is the discovery of new and important matters of evidence. This means that the person is considering himself aggrieved by the order or judgment on the discovery of new and important matter of evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the judgment was delivered, may apply for review of the judgment of the Court which passed the judgment or order. When the review is sought on the ground of discovery of new evidence, the evidence must be relevant, clear and conclusive. Further, when a judgment is passed, must not lightly be reopened. There must be strong evidence that the party when he brought the proceeding had been diligent and procured all evidence that were forthcoming and had taken care to put them before the court. 7. The second ground of review is the mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. The fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of each case. The word 'error' in this clause is not necessarily limited to errors of fact. Errors of law may also come within the meaning of the rule. Erroneous view of law on a controversial matter or a wrong exposition of law or a wrong application of law or failure to apply correct law has never been treated as a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. It is well-known that the court having jurisdiction to decide a matter may decide it either wrongly or rightly. Correction of such mistaken conclusion does not come within the ambit or purview of review. 8. The third ground is "for other sufficient ground". It is well-known that the court having jurisdiction to decide a matter may decide it either wrongly or rightly. Correction of such mistaken conclusion does not come within the ambit or purview of review. 8. The third ground is "for other sufficient ground". It is well settled that the expression "other sufficient cause" should be understood ejusdem generis with the two grounds immediately preceding them, namely it must have some connection or nexus with discovery of new and important matters of evidence and mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. 9. High Court being a court of plenary jurisdiction, has the inherent power of review to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct a grave and' palpable errors committed by it, such as when there has been noncompliance with the principles of natural justice, and there has been substantial failure of justice. It is the inherent power of the High Court to exercise the power of review for furthering the cause of justice. 10. Turning to the facts of this case, the person aggrieved for the purpose of invoking the power of review, means the party against whom decision has been pronounced, or who has suffered some actual loss or legal grievance or derogation of some right or who has failed to obtain some right, title or interest on which he is entitled to directly as a matter of legal right. It does not mean any person who is disappointed of benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. 11. Admittedly, the applicant was the sub-tenant in respect of the disputed premises and that against the landlord under whom he was claiming right or deriving interest, and the owner of the property filed two suits being Title Suit Nos. 30 and 31 of 1953, against M/s. Stewart & Company Limited, under whom they were claiming right, for eviction. The suits were decreed by the learned Second Subordinate Judge, Alipore, on September 15, 1955. On appeal, the decree was affirmed by the High Court. Ultimately, the matter had travelled before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, and the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India had also affirmed the decree of eviction on October 14, 1969. The suits were decreed by the learned Second Subordinate Judge, Alipore, on September 15, 1955. On appeal, the decree was affirmed by the High Court. Ultimately, the matter had travelled before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, and the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India had also affirmed the decree of eviction on October 14, 1969. It is not in dispute that the decree for eviction passed against M/s. Stewart & Company Limited was binding upon the applicants who were sub-tenants under M/s. Stewart & Company Limited. Then an execution proceeding was started by the owner decree-holder. But the decree of eviction affirmed by the Supreme Court on October 14, 1969, could not yet been executed, and the tenants and sub-tenants could not yet been evicted even though their right to continue there had been extinguished. The order passed in the execution proceedings also travelled from the Calcutta High Court to the Supreme Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court, before whom Special Leave Petition was filed, directed the execution proceedings to continue. The Supreme Court, in the proceeding, had occasion to pass as many as three orders directing the execution of the decree. But in spite thereof, the possession of the property could not be obtained by executing the decree. After the decree for eviction reached its finality and was binding on all the parties, it appears that in order to stall the execution proceedings at the instance and machination of the sub-tenants and/or the occupiers of the premises on whom the decrees were binding, moved the State Government for issue of a notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act alleging that the land was needed for a public purpose, namely for establishment of 100 SSI units on March 1, 1996, at public expense. It was alleged that the State Government, in order to make the decree passed by the Civil Court and directed the execution proceedings to continue by the order of the Supreme Court in fructuous and ineffective and resorted to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of acquiring the land. It was alleged that the State Government, in order to make the decree passed by the Civil Court and directed the execution proceedings to continue by the order of the Supreme Court in fructuous and ineffective and resorted to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of acquiring the land. This matter was considered by this Division Bench at length and considering the principle laid down in the case of Howrah Mill Limited vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 1988(1) CLJ 455 , the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Ganga Bishnu Swaika vs. Calcutta Pinjrapole Society, reported in AIR 1968 SC 615 , M.M. Pathak vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1978 SC 803 , State of Tamil Nadu vs. M. Rayappa, reported in AIR 1971 SC 231 , and Ahmedabad Corporation vs. New Shrock Spinning & Weaving Company Limited, reported in AIR 1970 SC 1292 , and after considering the merits of the case, the conveniences and inconveniences and other relevant factors, we were of the view that a case has been made out for stay of the operation of the notification under Ss. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act until disposal of the writ application. The appeal that was filed before us was against an order dated November 20, 1996, for not granting any injunction and on the contrary passing an order to the extent that the "land acquisition proceeding shall abide by the result of the writ application", or in other words, allowing the land acquisition proceedings to continue. 12. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the main ground of review is that the appellant has practised fraud upon this court in view of the fact that earlier by the order dated May 10, 1996, another learned Single Judge of this court had considered the prayer for interim order, but rejected the same and that by suppressing the fact of rejection of the interim order of injunction of another learned Single Judge of this Court, dated May 10, 1996, the said order has been obtained by this Division Bench. We have perused the order dated May 10, 1996, passed by another learned Judge of this Court, before whom the writ application was filed. We have perused the order dated May 10, 1996, passed by another learned Judge of this Court, before whom the writ application was filed. But the learned Judge had simply passed an order dispensing with the service of the writ application and directed the matter to come up as a contested application after some time. Thereafter, the learned Trial Judge had taken up the matter and considered the prayer for interim order and refused to pass an interim order as prayed for and on the contrary, passed an order to the effect that the land acquisition proceeding should continue subject to decisions in the writ application, or, in other words, allowed the land acquisition proceeding to continue in the facts and circumstances of the case. Surprisingly, it appears that the learned Judge, in the order dated May 10, 1996, did not consider and/or reject the prayer for interim order as alleged and as such the question of practising fraud upon this Court by the appellant did not and could not arise. 13. Fraud may be an independent ground for review, and if it appears that a party has committed fraud upon the court, in that event the court should immediately recall the order which was obtained by practising fraud. The essential requirements of fraud are-(a) a false representation of material facts; (b) knowledge of the falsity of the representation by the persons making them; (c) ignorance of the falsity on the part of the person to whom the representations were made. There is no fraud if the injured party knows the truth and sees the artifices or devices; (d) the intent or at lease reasons to expect that representations will be acted upon by the persons to whom they were made; (e) action of such person was to his detriment. What is essential is the absence of any genuine belief in the truth of the statement made, and he and he alone is guilty of fraud who makes a statement without believing it to be true. It is immaterial whether he knows it to be untrue or merely knows that he is ignorant or doubtful whether it is true or not. 14. Mistake is not a fraud. The perpetrator of alleged fraud must believe the statement to be untrue but willful ignorance has the same consequences as fraud. 15. It is immaterial whether he knows it to be untrue or merely knows that he is ignorant or doubtful whether it is true or not. 14. Mistake is not a fraud. The perpetrator of alleged fraud must believe the statement to be untrue but willful ignorance has the same consequences as fraud. 15. In the instant case, we do not find that the appellant had practised any fraud upon this court and/or guilty of suppression of any material fact and/or had obtained the order from this court by adopting any illegal device or means. The prayer for interim order was not at all considered and/or rejected by the order dated May 10, 1996, and accordingly, the order dated May 10, 1996 had no relevance whatsoever. The prayer for interim order was specifically considered by the learned Trial Judge in his order dated November 20, 1996, which was the subject matter of the appeal before us. Accordingly, we do not find that any fraud has been practised and that the order was obtained from this court on misrepresentation. 16. The applicants cannot be said to be persons aggrieved because of the fact that they had not suffered any actual loss or legal injury or grievance, as admittedly, the applicants had no right, title or interest in the land under the law. The rights extinguished by a decree affirmed by the Supreme Court could not be recognised or enforced in the writ jurisdiction. The order of eviction affirmed by the Supreme Court was binding upon the applicants. The eviction proceeding has been prolonged and that when the order of eviction was sought to be set aside, nullified and/or to make it ineffective, if a proceeding is sought to be initiated under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and that if that proceeding is stayed, in that event, a person or persons concerned on whom decree for eviction was passed and had become final and binding, could not come forward and say that the stay of the acquisition proceeding has resulted any loss, injury or deprivation of the right, title and interest in the property. 17. The matter can be looked into from a different angle. In the writ application pending before the learned Trial Judge, the subject matter was the validity of the order under Ss. 17. The matter can be looked into from a different angle. In the writ application pending before the learned Trial Judge, the subject matter was the validity of the order under Ss. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and not the validity of the order and the decree for eviction and/or execution thereof. The execution is pending before the Executing Court. The execution proceedings and the land acquisition proceedings are two distinct and different proceedings. The acquisition proceeding cannot operate as a stay of the execution proceeding pending before the executing court. If ultimately it is found that the property has been validly acquired by the State Government under Ss. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, in that event, the owner will be deprived and diverted of the property. But, so long as the owner is not deprived of the property in accordance with law, the party against whom a decree for eviction has been passed, which had reached in finality and affirmed by the highest court of the land and execution proceeding is pending, cannot have any right to apply for review of the order for allowing the land acquisition proceedings to continue. In this connection, it may be relevant to note the stand taken by the State Government on affidavit before the learned Trial Judge that the acquisition of the property had nothing to do with the protection of the rights of the persons in occupation of the property against whom the decree for eviction has been passed. On the face of the notification under Ss. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, it appears that the purpose for which the property had been requisitioned, is "for the establishment of 100 SSI units which means, and which term cannot be equated that it was for the purpose of protecting or continuing the occupation of 100 SSI units who were and still are in occupation of the property and against whom the order of eviction which was passed was binding and who were liable to be evicted by the Civil Court. 18. 18. We are clearly of the view that as the applicants are not and cannot be said to be persons aggrieved as they are not at all affected by the order passed by this court and none of the well-settled grounds of review exists in the instant case and that the stay of acquisition proceeding did not and could not have any effect of deprivation of the right, title and interest of the applicants, we are unable to invoke the power of review in the instant case. The power of review could not be invoked and/or exercised for the purpose of stalling a lawful proceeding pending before some other court of law. 19. In this case, the execution proceeding is pending before the executing court and that a party in the proceedings can only complain relying upon the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Shivdeo Singh (supra), that there had been miscarriage of justice and power of review is required to be exercised as to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable error committed by it. We have not passed any order for eviction or otherwise, of any person, but we have simply stayed the land acquisition proceedings. Further, the applicants are neither necessary nor proper parties for the purpose of adjudicating the validity or otherwise of the notifications issued under Ss. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, and accordingly, if the applicants could not be treated as proper and necessary party, in that event that party could not be held to be persons aggrieved for the purpose of invoking the power of review by this court in the facts and circumstances of this case. 20. Accordingly, we reject the prayer for grant of leave to file the review application as the same is misconceived. 21. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the application is rejected without any order as to costs. Vidya Nand, J.: I agree. Review application rejected.