JUDGMENT 1. This appeal u/s. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is directed against the judgment and decree dated 21.1.88 passed by the Addl. Judge to the Court of Distt. Judge, Indore, at Mhow, in Civil First Appeal No. 23-A/83, affirming the judgment and decree dated 30.7.83 passed by the Civil Judge, Class II, Mhow, in Civil Original Suit No. 65-A/78 decreeing suit of plaintiff-respondent No.1 for declaration and permanent injunction. 2. The respondent No.1, Shreeram Chaudhary was appointed as Secretary by the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Mhow, on 1.1.73. His appointment was approved by the Dy. Director, Mandis on 25.5.74. Later on, the Director, Mandis, Govt. of M.P., Bhopal, by his order dated 16.2.76 approved the name of the respondent-plaintiff for being sent to Lukhnow for some departmental training and also required him to execute a bond that he after completion of the training shall serve the market committee for 5 years. It is no more in dispute that the plaintiff-respondent had executed the requisite bond and also undergone the said training. However, the Director by his subsequent order dated 27.9.77 directed for cancellation of the appointment order of the plaintiff-respondent on the ground that the appointment was made without seeking his approval as-required by Rule 38 of the M.P. Agriculture Produce Market Rules, 1962 (for short, 'the Rules 1962'), framed u/S. 38 of the M.P. Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1960 (for short, 'the Act, 1960'). In pursuance of this order of the Director, the appellant Mandi Samiti passed order dated 1.12.77 cancelling the order of appointment of plaintiff-respondent and discharging him from service. 3. The plaintiff-respondent No. 1 filed suit against the appellant and the respondents No.2 to 6 challenging the said order of cancellation and discharge as contrary to law. He contended that the approval by the Dy. Director should be construed as the approval by the Director and in any case the Director having allowed the plaintiff to continue in service sent him to training and obtained bond for 5 years service, is now estopped from challenging the appointment order. The plaintiff sought declaration to the effect that the order of cancellation of his service is void and that he still continues to be in service and is entitled to draw salary and other allowances. 4. The suit was resisted by the appellant and the respondents No.2 to 6. The plaintiff sought declaration to the effect that the order of cancellation of his service is void and that he still continues to be in service and is entitled to draw salary and other allowances. 4. The suit was resisted by the appellant and the respondents No.2 to 6. They maintained that the order of appointment was void ab-initio as no approval of - the Director in terms of Rule 38 was obtained. They further contended that the suit for declaration simplicitor was not maintainable. 5. The trial Court decreed the suit. The first appeal preferred by the appellant herein was also dismissed vide judgment and decree impugned. During first appeal an amendment was also moved by the appellant seeking incorporation of a plea that the jurisdiction of Civil Court in the matter was ousted as the dispute was cognizable exclusively by Labour Court under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, 'I.D. Act'). The appellate Court has also dismissed this amendment application holding that the jurisdiction of civil Court was not barred in the matter. 6. Admission of this appeal has been secured on following substantial questions of law : (1) Whether the civil Courts have jurisdiction to decide a service matter between an employee of the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti and the Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti? (2) Whether the suit for a mere declaration was maintainable in the circumstances of this case? (3) Whether the lower appellate Court erred in rejecting the application for amendment, merely on the ground of delay? (4) Whether the approval by the Deputy Director was equivalent to approval by the Director? (5) Whether a presumption under section 114 of the Evidence Act could be drawn for holding that approval of the appointment by the Deputy Director was proper and valid? and (6)Whether the appointment is in violation of sections 27 and 29 of the M.P. Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1973? 7. I have heard Shri A.K. Sethi, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri T.S. Bhatia, learned counsel for the respondent. 8. Questions No.1 and 3: Shri A.K. Sethi, learned counsel for the appellant has argued in support of the ouster of the jurisdiction of civil Court. 7. I have heard Shri A.K. Sethi, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri T.S. Bhatia, learned counsel for the respondent. 8. Questions No.1 and 3: Shri A.K. Sethi, learned counsel for the appellant has argued in support of the ouster of the jurisdiction of civil Court. He relying on two decisions of this Court in Administrator Krishi Upaj Mandi, Sagar and Dhanikram ( 1982 JLJ 258 = 1982 MPLJ 161 ) and (1982 MPLJ S. Note 8), respectively, has contended that the appellant Samiti is an industry and the dispute between the parties is an industrial dispute within the meaning of Clauses (1) and (K) of Sec. 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and, therefore, the jurisdiction of civil Court is ousted in the matter. Shri T.S. Bhatia, learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand, vehemently opposed the proposition. He contended that the dispute arose out of a right or liability under the general common law and not under the I.D. Act of 1947 and as such the respondent-employee has right to approach the civil Court whose jurisdiction is not barred under the Act even otherwise. It is further contended that the objection was not taken in the trial Court and since the question is a mixed question of facts and law requiring recording of evidence, the appellant cannot be allowed to raise the question at the appellate stage: 9. Sec. 2 (k) of the I.D. Act reads as follows : (k) "industrial dispute" means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workman and workman, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, or any person; 10. So, in the contest of the present case, in order to attract the provisions of the I.D. Act, it must be shown that the respondent is a 'workman'. The term 'workman' has been defined in clause (s) as follows: 2. So, in the contest of the present case, in order to attract the provisions of the I.D. Act, it must be shown that the respondent is a 'workman'. The term 'workman' has been defined in clause (s) as follows: 2. (s) "workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceedings under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person. (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950) or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature. 11. It will be thus seen that every employee of an industry is not a 'workman' and every dispute between employer and employee of such an industry is not an 'industrial dispute' under the I.D. Act. An employee who falls within any of the categories specified in sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of clause (s) will not be a workman and a dispute with him would fall outside the preview of the I.D. Act. 12. Whether or not the respondent Secretary is a workman, is obviously a mixed question of fact and law requiring some evidence so as to find out the nature of his duties and functions. The question ought to have been raised at the trial itself. The amendment application moved in this behalf by the appellant belatedly before the first appellate Court, was incomplete even otherwise. The question ought to have been raised at the trial itself. The amendment application moved in this behalf by the appellant belatedly before the first appellate Court, was incomplete even otherwise. It lacked in necessary particulars inasmuch as the facts necessary to show that the respondent is a 'workman' within the meaning of Sec. 2 (s) were not pleaded. Bare averment that the jurisdiction of civil Court is barred, was wholly insufficient and the appellate Court below was, therefore, right in rejecting such a belated and incomplete amendment. 13. Functions and duties of the Secretary of a market committee are indicated in Sec. 27 of the M.P. Krishi Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972 which provides that 'the Secretary shall be the principal executive officer of the market committee and other officers and servants of the market committee shall be subordinate to him. Obviously, the Secretary is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity. By the very nature of the duties attached to his office and by reason of the powers vested in him, as is evident from Sec. 27 and the Schedule of the Adhiniyam, 1972, there can be no manner of doubt that his functions are mainly of an administration and managerial nature. He cannot be, therefore, termed as 'workman' and the dispute regarding his discharge from the service was not an ‘industrial dispute' under the I.D. Act. The dispute arose out of the rights and liabilities under the general common law and was cognizable by the civil Court. The decision in Administrator Krishi Upaj Mandi, Sagar and Dhanikram (supra), are clearly distinguishable on facts inasmuch as the employees in those cases were only clerks. 14. I, thus hold that civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit and the first appellate Court below was justified in dismissing the application for amendment. Both the questions No. (1) and (3) are accordingly answered against the appellant. 15. Question No. (2) : As regards question No. (2), the point projected stands resolved by this Court's decisionsin J.G. Dhopte v. State (1962 JLJ S. No. 228) and Pannalal v. State of M.P. ( 1975 JLJ 637 = AIR 1976 MP 48 ) wherein it is held :- "Such a suit for mere declaration is maintainable. 15. Question No. (2) : As regards question No. (2), the point projected stands resolved by this Court's decisionsin J.G. Dhopte v. State (1962 JLJ S. No. 228) and Pannalal v. State of M.P. ( 1975 JLJ 637 = AIR 1976 MP 48 ) wherein it is held :- "Such a suit for mere declaration is maintainable. The expression "further relief" in section 42 of the Specific Relief Act does not refer to any relief which is not necessary when the declaratory relief itself will serve the purpose quite well. It is implicit in the declaratory relief claimed by the plaintiff that he should be treated to be in service in all respects". In the instant case also, the further reliefs regarding payment of salary etc., were implicit in the relief of declaration claimed by the plaintiff-respondent. The suit as filed, I find, was maintainable. Question No. (2) is accordingly answered against the appellant. 16. Questions No. (4) to (6) : They are connected questions and what is to be seen is that whether the appointment of the respondent was void for want of approval by the Director and the same is validly terminated. 17. At the outset and without entering into the question of validity of the appointment, it may be noted here that admittedly the respondent-employee was never given any opportunity to show-cause or hearing before terminating his services on the ground of invalidity of his appointment. The order of discharge was thus violative of principle of natural justice. An important concept in administrative law or service law is that of natural justice or right to fair hearing. This Court in Surendra Kumar v. State of M.P. [ 1994 (II) MPWN 125 ], has reiterated this principle, and held : "Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties, in our opinion, the petition deserves to succeed on the short ground that before terminating the services of the petitioner on the alleged ground of invalidity of his appointment, the petitioner was never given any opportunity' to show-cause or hearing. The impugned order is in breach of the principles of natural justice." 18. In the instant case also, no opportunity to show-cause or hearing was given to the respondent before discharging him from service. On this short ground alone, therefore; order of discharge was liable to be and rightly quashed by the trial Court. 19. The impugned order is in breach of the principles of natural justice." 18. In the instant case also, no opportunity to show-cause or hearing was given to the respondent before discharging him from service. On this short ground alone, therefore; order of discharge was liable to be and rightly quashed by the trial Court. 19. Adverting to the question of approval, the approval to the appointment of the respondent was accorded by the Dy. Director Agriculture. No doubt, under Rule 38 of the Rules, 1962, the approval of the Director was required. But, this was an internal matter between, the market committee and the Director; or between the Director and the Dy. director. It may be noted here that under clause (IV) of Sec. 2 (1) of the Act of 1960, the Director includes any officer appointed by the State Government to perform all or any of the functions of the Director under the Act. Needless to add that the Dy. Director is an Officer appointed by the State Government to perform all or any of the functions of the Director under the Act of 1960. It is true, that the function of according approval under Rule 38 has not been assigned to the Dy. Director under the Notification No. 74-8167-XIV (I), Bhopal, dated 4. 1.1966. But, this was again a matter of internal functioning of the Directorate and certainly the respondent employee cannot be blamed for it. Certain other features stare in the eyes. Not only the Director took no timely action to rescind the order of approval accorded by the Dr. Director but he by his subsequent actions be seens to have ratified the order. On 16.2.76 i.e., after 2 years of the order of approval of the Dy. Director issued another order (Ex. D3) approving respondent's name for some training as Secretary to the market committee. In pursuance to this order of the Directorate the respondent was required to furnish and he did furnish a bond that on completion of training he would serve the committee for 5 years. Director by issuing this order and accepting the bond furnished by the respondent clearly approved the appointment and the approval accorded thereto by the Dy. Director. The appointment was made as back as on 1.1.73, while the order of discharge was passed as late as on 1.12.77. Director by issuing this order and accepting the bond furnished by the respondent clearly approved the appointment and the approval accorded thereto by the Dy. Director. The appointment was made as back as on 1.1.73, while the order of discharge was passed as late as on 1.12.77. Under the circumstances, the Director having acquitted in the appointment and having allowed the respondent to work for 5 years, it was not open to him to set-aside the appointment on the ground that his approval was not obtained for the same. The doctrine of promissory estoppel operates both against the market committee and the Director. (See: Narayan Nath AIR 1977 SC 112 ). 20. The learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously contended that the appointment was void ab-initio for want of requisite approval by the Director and as such the question of subsequent ratification or validity of the dismissal order does not arise. He has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Dhyan Singh (1979 MPLJ S. Note 1). He has also placed full text of the judgment for the Court's perusal. As per the judgment it would appear that in that case the approval was not accorded even by the Dy. Director and there was nothing on the record to show that there was implied approval of the Director. In the instant case, as already pointed out, the approval was initially accorded by the Dy. Director which was subsequently ratified if not expressly then at least impliedly by the Director himself. The ratio of Dhyan Singh (supra) is, therefore, not available to the appellant. As noted in the beginning the order of discharge is bad on the short ground of not giving opportunity to show-cause or hearing to the respondent. 21. I, thus answer questions No. (4) to (6) against the appellant and dismiss the appeal with costs throughout.