S. R. SINGH, J. Petitioner was com missioned by the President of India in the Rank of 2nd Lieutenant in the Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Corps and was appointed as such in Short Service Commission (SSC for brief), initially on contract for a period of five years on March 8, 1986. The present petition has been filed for the relief of a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus com manding the respondents to consider the petitioner for grant of permanent commis sion de novo on or before 30th April, 1994 and also for issue of a writ order or direc tion in the nature of certiorari, summoning the records of his A. C. R. and those of other officers of his batch, who were al legedly offered crucial favour of being in sidiously granted permanent commission and quashing the selection process includ ing Annexure-4, by which the petitioners statutory complaint dated 27-8-1991 met the fate of rejection and Annexure-6, which is the record of interview in respect of the petitioner, held on 15-10-92, inter alia, on the ground that the petitioner has been singled out for the hostile dis crimination in the matter of grant of per manent commission and his statutory complaint against denial of permanent commission has been illegally rejected by a cryptic order. 2. In substance, what is sought to be judicially reviewed herein, is the non-selection of the petitioner for grant of per manent commission and rejection of his statutory complaint under Section 27 of the Army Act, 1950. The first contention advanced by the learned Counsel appear ing for the petitioner is that the petitioner was illegally and arbitrarily denied being granted permanent commission. It is al leged in the petition that the petitioner was due for being granted permanent com mission around March 8, 1990, but the same was procrastinated by Army Head quarters, Military Secretary Branch vide their communication dated 11th October, 1990 and subsequently, when the matter came to be considered, he was denied per manent commission and instead, be stowed extension of five years in short ser vice category. It is alleged that over-all average profile of the petitioner had not been correctly fed into the computer maintained in the Army Headquarter, Military Secretary Branch in that; (a) his over-all average profile had been fed with the date that he had been awarded severe reprinmand in the year 1986, whereas the fact remained that the award of severe reprinmand was pared down to reprinmand by the G. O. C. in-chief and, (b) over-all average profile did not record the fact that he had achieved excellence and had played games at the divisional level and instead, it was shown that he had obtained proficiency in the unit level only. It is also alleged that the award of reprin mand for the year 1986 lost its sting after one year but the said fact was blinked back from the over-all average profile of the petitioner. It is further alleged that Lt. Col. V. J. S. Gill arrayed as a party- respon dent No. 5, who was the initiating officer of the petitioner during the year 1990, resorted to the use of blade eraser in gross violation of para 11 of SAO 3/5/89 to reduce the petitioners grading in A. C. R. It is also alleged that Capt. Rajendra Prasad was granted extension of five years service vide Army Headquarter MS Branch Letter No. 05492/extn/115/ms-R and C dated 8th Oct. , 1990, but later on, granted permanent commission vide Military Secretary Branch letter No. 05493/ms-R and C of 4th June, 1991 and similarly, Capt. Tarun Madan was granted extension vide MS Branch letter No. 05492/139/prov/entry-R and C dated 16th Oct. , 1990 and later on, this short service officer was also bestowed permanent com mission, while the petitioner has been denied grants of permanent commission Sans any rhyme or reason. Likewise, Capt. Man Mohan Chamola belonging to 13, Mech. Inf. was neither granted permanent commission, nor granted extension of ser vice and Army Headquarter had ordered his release, but he was by a quick of fate recalled from his home and granted per manent commission vide Army Head quarter Military Secretary Branch Signal No. 383814/ms/sp dated 24th Nov. , 1988. 3. A perusal of the counter-affidavit would be speak that Lt. Col. , 1988. 3. A perusal of the counter-affidavit would be speak that Lt. Col. V. J. S. Gill had graded the petitioner in A. C. R. for 1990 "above average" and there was no tamper ing in the grading awarded against column of integrity and quality. The counter-af fidavit further reveals that the petitioner, who belonged to short service commis sion, 41 Course, was screened for grant of permanent commission in Sept. , 1990 as he was completing initial contractual period of five years in 1991 but he was chucked back from the Board as per policy in vogue that a short service commissioned officer would be eligible for con sideration of grant of permanent commis sion only after he has earned three reports whereas the petitioner had earned only two reports till September, 1990. How ever, he was considered for grant of per manent commission alongwith the next batch i. e. SSC 42 Course by which time he had earned the requisite three reports. It is also revealed from para 17 of the counter-affidavit filed by Lt. Col. Laxmi Chand that as per policy in vogue, only those officers, who were in the top 50% of the batch, would be granted permanent commission and the petitioner could not secure per manent commission since he did not merit in the first 50% in his batch. It is also stated in paragraph 20 of the counter- affidavit that Capt. Rajendra Prasad was initially granted extension for five years as he did not merit amongst top 50% of his batch but due to setting aside of his adverse A. C. R. for 1989, he was reconsidered by No. 5, Selection Board in April 1991 as per the provisions of para 35 of A. O. 18 of 1988 and found qualified for the same and similarly Capt. Tarun Madan was also reconsidered by No. 5, Selection Board in April 1992, due to setting aside of his ad verse A. C. R. 87 and was found qualified for grant of permanent commission, being amongst top 50% of his batch. So far as Capt. Tarun Madan was also reconsidered by No. 5, Selection Board in April 1992, due to setting aside of his ad verse A. C. R. 87 and was found qualified for grant of permanent commission, being amongst top 50% of his batch. So far as Capt. M. M. Chamola is concerned, it is stated in para 21 of the counter-affidavit that he was considered for grant of per manent commission by No. 5 Selection Board in April 1988, but did not merit in the top 50% of his batch and was there fore, released on completion of his con tractual period since he did not opt for extension of service, but it so happened that in the meanwhile one officer of the same batch, who was approved for per manent commission sought his being released owing to familial problems and his request was acceded to by the Govt. and Capt. M. M. Chamola, who was the next in succession in order of merit, was called against the vacancy so created in accordance with the procedure in vogue. These facts clearly manifest that the cases of Capt. Rajendra Prasad, Capt. Tarun Madan and Capt. M. M. Chamola flowed from different perspective and the allega tions that the petitioner was made a victim of hostile discrimination, do not commend for acceptance. The facts stated in the counter- affidavit clearly demonstrate that non-selection of the petitioner was predi cated on merit and not born of any hostile discrimination. The petitioner did not romp home to secure a position amongst the first 50% of the officers of his batch and therefore, he could not be granted permanent commission as per procedure in vogue. Such an administrative decision taken by the appropriate authority on the recommendation of the duly constituted Selection Board, cannot be characterised as illegal, arbitrary or capricious or dis criminatory and is not liable to be inter fered with under Art. 226 of the Constitu tion. "judicial review", under Art. 226 of the Constitution, "is concerned not with the merits of a decision but with the man ner in which the decision was made. . . . . . . . Judicial review is entirely dif ferent from an ordinary appeal. "judicial review", under Art. 226 of the Constitution, "is concerned not with the merits of a decision but with the man ner in which the decision was made. . . . . . . . Judicial review is entirely dif ferent from an ordinary appeal. It is made effective by the Court quashing an ad ministrative decision without substituting its own decision and is to be contrasted with an appeal with the appellate Tribunal substituting its own decision on the merit for that of the administrative officer" as per Lord Fraser in Re- Amin vide quotes in Tata Celluler v. Union of India, JT 1994 (4) SC 532. 4. In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, (1982) 3 All ER 141, it was observed by Lord Hailsham as under: "purpose of judicial review is to ensure that individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment reaches on a matter which it is authorised by law to decide with its conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court. " In the same case, Lord Brightman observed that "judicial review as the words imply is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which a decision was made," and held, that "it would be an error to think that the Court sits in judg ment not only on the correctness of the decision making- process but also on the correctness of the decision itself. " 5. The aforesaid observations made by the Lord Hailsham and Lord Brightman were quoted with approval by their Lordships of Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. Dharmendar Prasad Singh, AIR 1989 SC 997 and while upholding that the judicial review is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examina tion of the decision making process, it was held by the Supreme Court as under: "when the issue raised in judicial review is whether a decision is vitiated by taking into ac count irrelevant, or neglecting to take into ac count, relevant factors or is so manifestly un reasonable that no reasonable authority entrusted with the power in question could reasonable have made such a decision, the judi cial review of the decision-making process in cludes examination, as a matter of law, of the relevance of the factors. " In the case of Tata Cellular (supra), the Supreme Court while reiterating the principles aforestated held that "judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application for judicial review is made but the decision-making process itself," and enumerated some broad grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review and classified them under the heading of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. In their supervisory jurisdic tion as distinguished from the appellate one, the Courts do not themselves embark upon rehearing of the matter but never theless courts will, if called upon, act in a supervisory capacity and see that the decision making body acts fairly. If the decision making body is influenced by con siderations which ought not to influence or fails to take into account the matters which ought to have been taken into ac count the Courts will interfere. If the decision making body comes to its decision on no evidence or comes to a finding so unreasonable that a reasonable man could not have come to it then again the Courts will interfere. Further if the decision making body goes outside its power or misconstrues the extent of its power, then too the Courts can interfere and if the decision making body acts in a bad faith or with ulterior object which it is not authorised by law, its decision will be set aside, in supervisory jurisdiction. A decision of a public authority will be liable to be quashed or otherwise dealt with by appropriate order in judicial review proceedings, where the Courts concludes that the decision is such that no authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and fact acting reasonably could have reached it. 6. A decision of a public authority will be liable to be quashed or otherwise dealt with by appropriate order in judicial review proceedings, where the Courts concludes that the decision is such that no authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and fact acting reasonably could have reached it. 6. The decision by the appropriate authority to grant or not to grant per manent commission to an officer though administrative in character, is fraught with civil consequence and is, therefore, open to judicial review by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution but the power of judicial review is circumscribed to scrutiny of the decision-making process only and is to be exercised in the light of the principles laid down above and apply ing the principles to the facts of the present case, we find that the appropriate authority did not take recourse to any hos tile or discriminatory procedure in the matter of consideration for the grant of permanent commission in relation to the petitioner. His case was considered as per policy in vogue alongwith other eligible officers of his batch on the basis of "reprinmand" on record and not on the alleged report of severe reprimand and we have no reason to disbelieve the averment made in this restart in para 12 of the counter-affidavit. The petitioner could not secure a place within the top 50% of the officers of the batch and therefore, he could not be granted permanent commission. The legality of the policy in vogue is not under challenge and there is no allegation of mala fides against the members of the Selection Board which considered the petitioners case for grant of permanent commission. It is riot for this Court to supplant the expertise conclusion of the Selection Board by its own in the matter of selection of qualified officers in respect of grant of permanent commission. Non-selection of the petitioner for grant of per manent commission, therefore, cannot be branded as illegal, arbitrary or dis criminatory. 7. The next contention is that the statutory complaint of the petitioner under Section 27 of the Army Act, 1950 has been rejected by cryptic order which cannot be sustained. Non-selection of the petitioner for grant of per manent commission, therefore, cannot be branded as illegal, arbitrary or dis criminatory. 7. The next contention is that the statutory complaint of the petitioner under Section 27 of the Army Act, 1950 has been rejected by cryptic order which cannot be sustained. Section 27 is a remedial provision in that, it provides that any officer, who deems himself wronged by his commanding officer or any superior officer and who, on due application made to his commanding officer, does not receive redress to which he considers him-self entitled, may complain to the Central Govt. in such manner as may, from time to time, be specified by the proper authority. It is implicit in Sec. 27 of the Army Act, 1950 that the Central Govt. is under an obligation to address itself to the statutory complaint and dispose it of in accordance with law for making a complaint to the Central Govt. under Sec. 27 of the Army Act, 1950, is not an empty formality. Central Govt. has to address itself to the grievances raised in the complaint and redress the same in accordance with law. This necessarily implies that the Central Govt. while disposing of the repre sentation, shall act in a fair and reasonable manner and not arbitrarily and capricious ly and it would be in consonance with the principle of natural justice that reasons in support of order are disclosed therein for that would ensure compliance of rules of natural justice. It would serve yet another purpose. Reasons, if recorded in the order, would serve to reinforce the confidence of the complaint that justice has been done to him and it also enables the higher courts to see whether decision-making authority has acted on relevant consideration. In S. N. Mukherjees case (supra), it has been emphasised that "except in cases, where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judi cial or quasi-judicial function, is required to record the reasons for its decision. " However, it has been held by the Apex Court in the said decision that reasons are not required to be "recorded for an order passed by the Confirming Authority con firming the findings and sentence recorded by the Court Martial as well as for the order passed by the Central Govt. dismissing the post- confirmation peti tion. " However, it has been held by the Apex Court in the said decision that reasons are not required to be "recorded for an order passed by the Confirming Authority con firming the findings and sentence recorded by the Court Martial as well as for the order passed by the Central Govt. dismissing the post- confirmation peti tion. " In the present case, the Central Govt. has rejected the statutory complaint preferred by the petitioner against his non-selection for grant of permanent commission. The Central Govt. by reject ing the representation, has, in fact, con firmed the decision taken by the Selection Board. Therefore, no exception can be taken to the order dated 1st July, 1992, rejecting the petitioners statutory com plaint under Section 27 merely because, it contains no reason. 8. That apart, in the instant case, on the reasons disclosed in the counter-af fidavit, we are satisfied that the selection proceedings were not vitiated by the vice of mala fides or arbitrariness and there fore, the Central Govt. cannot be said to have acted illegally in rejecting statutory complaint filed by the petitioner under Section 27 of the Army Act. The view that we are taking, finds support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. E. G. Namboodari, AIR 1991 SC 1216 , wherein it has been held as under: "if the order as communicated to the Govt. servant rejecting the representation does not contain any reasons, the order cannot be held to be bad in law. If such an order is chal lenged in a court of law, it is always open to the competent authority to place the reasons before the Court which may have led to the rejection of the representation. It is always open to an ad ministrative authority to produce evidence aliunde before the Court to justify its action. " The decision by the Division Bench in K. Ramesh Singh, Rathore v. Union of India and another, 1996 (3) ESC 493 (Alld) is unavailing to the petitioner, inasmuch as the only reason assigned in the order rejecting the statutory complaint in that case was that "no injustice has been done" which reason was found by the Division Bench to be a conclusion as distinguished from reasons and even before the Court, nothing had been placed byway of reasons for rejecting the statutory complaint. In the present case, on the facts stated hereinabove, we are satisfied that the Central Govt. had good and valid reasons for rejecting the statutory complaint and upholding the non-selection of the petitioner for grant of permanent commis sion. 9. No other points have been pressed into service. 10. As a result of the foregoing dis cussion, the petition fails and is according ly dismissed with cost on parties. Petition dismissed. .