JUDGMENT J.G. Chitre, J. 1. Heard Mr. P.M. Bapna, counsel for the appellant. Mr. R.C. Chazed, counsel for the respondents with reference to evidence on record. The appellants are hereby assailing correctness, propriety and legality of the judgment which has been passed by IX th Addl. District Judge, Indore in Civil Suit No. 108-B/88 by which the learned trial Judge has dismissed the suit of the appellants. 2. Facts of the case need to be narrated for the purpose of unfolding the controversy. The appellants are running a firm in the name and style 'M/s Ganesh & Company' at Indore dealing in business of iron article including iron angles. In the plaint the appellants averred that on 1-12-1976 the appellants supplied two trucks load of the iron angles containing 90979 iron angles at the rate of Rs. 1900/- per tonne and were to recover Rs. 37960/- from the respondents as price of those angles supplied. They averred that in spite of delivery of those iron angles, the respondents did not pay its price and, therefore, the appellants were constrained to send a notice to them for demand of that amount. They further averred that in spite of receipt of such notice, on 15-11-1976, the respondents by their reply dt. 11-12-1977 refused to accept the liability of the said amount and to pay said amount demanded by the appellants. It appears from the evidence adduced that on account of that the appellants preferred a complaint to Indore Loha Mandi Vyapari Association which was dismissed by them in the year 1977. The plaint was filed on 15-10-1979. 3. After appreciating the evidence on record and in the light of the arguments advanced, learned trial Judge dismissed the suit. Learned trial Judge disbelieved the evidence of appellants (original plaintiffs) on following grounds : (i) The appellants did not examine material witnesses like Mohan Khandelwal Dalai, Tajasingh, the person who carried the goods to the godown of the respondents. (ii) No receipt have been obtained by the appellants from the deceased respondent 2 and respondent 3. (iii) There has been discrepancy in the contents of the documents P.9 and P.10 which has not been properly explained by the plaintiffs. (iv) There has been material discrepancy in the pleadings and evidence of the plaintiffs and their witnesses. (ii) No receipt have been obtained by the appellants from the deceased respondent 2 and respondent 3. (iii) There has been discrepancy in the contents of the documents P.9 and P.10 which has not been properly explained by the plaintiffs. (iv) There has been material discrepancy in the pleadings and evidence of the plaintiffs and their witnesses. (v) The plaintiffs waited for sufficiently long time for filing the suit though their complaint was dismissed by Loha Mandi Vyapari Association in the year 1977. 4. Mr. Bapna, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the appellants have produced the true copies of the accounts which have been regularly maintained by them during the course of the business and that has been corroborated by the accounts so maintained by the firm from which the said iron angles were purchased by the appellants. He pointed out the evidence of P.W.1 Brij Bihari and P.W.2 Nirmal Kumar. He submitted that the learned trial Judge should have believed the evidence of these two witnesses and should have come to the conclusion that the angles in question were sold to respondents when the evidence of these two witnesses was corroborating the evidence of Manjit P.W.3. Amriksingh P.W.4. Mr. R.C. Chazed, counsel appearing for respondents submitted that the evidence of these witnesses/does not support the cause of the appellants because it is totally insufficient to prove the liability on the respondents to pay money which the appellants demanded by the notice and claimed by filing suit against them. Mr. Chazed supported the finding recorded against the appellants by the trial Court. 5. Section 34 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as Evidence Act for convenience) provides that-- "Entries in books of accounts, regularly kept in the course of business, are relevant whenever they refer to a matter into which the Court has to inquire, but such statement shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability." 7. If at all the plaintiff or plaintiffs want to take advantage of the provisions of Section 34 of Evidence Act, they are obliged to adduce satisfactory evidence for the purpose of proving that the entries in the accounts books on which they are relying have been regularly kept by them in the course of business. If at all the plaintiff or plaintiffs want to take advantage of the provisions of Section 34 of Evidence Act, they are obliged to adduce satisfactory evidence for the purpose of proving that the entries in the accounts books on which they are relying have been regularly kept by them in the course of business. In the present case the witnesses of plaintiffs-P.W.1 Brij Bihari has stated only this much that the said accounts were kept in accordance with 'Mahajan System'. He has not stated anything more than that. This does not mean by itself that the accounts from which they have produced the entries were regularly kept in the course of business. If at all the appellants do depend on provisions of Section 34 of the Evidence Act, then their evidence should have been in detail to satisfy the law required by Section 34 of the Evidence Act. 8. Though the entries arc proved to be from the books of account which have been regularly kept in the course of business, by itself those entries would not be sufficient evidence to charge any person with the liability; at the most those entries would be relevant whenever they have been referred to a matter into which the Court has to enquire. The plaintiffs would be obliged to adduce more evidence in addition to those entries which would be satisfying the requirement of 'proved' as defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act. Those entries added with believable evidence should be sufficient enough for the Court to believe that such obligation exist making the defendants liable to make the payment to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are obliged to adduce such evidence which would make a prudent person to consider its existence so probable that under the circumstances of a particular case such prudent man would act upon the supposition that such obligation exists. In the present case the appellants have examined some more witnesses to prove their case apart from P.W.1 and P.W.2 and those two persons were P.W.3 and P.W.4 -- Manjit and Amrik Singh but their evidence is totally insufficient to prove the case of the appellants for getting a decree against the respondents. 9. P.W.3 Manjit Singh was the person who loaded those angles from Faridkot and unloaded them at Indore at Gadi Adda where one Navinchandra had got those angles unloaded. 9. P.W.3 Manjit Singh was the person who loaded those angles from Faridkot and unloaded them at Indore at Gadi Adda where one Navinchandra had got those angles unloaded. His evidence shows that at that time munim of his company was present and Ex.P.9, the builty was written by him. His evidence further showed that Ex.P.10 was also written by said Tejasingh. The appellants have not examined said Tejasingh for the reasons best known to them. They have also not adduced evidence for the purpose of proving that said Teja was not available for giving the evidence on account of his death. P.W.4 Amrik Singh who has been examined by the appellants stated in his evidence that in his presence those iron angles were loaded by Brij Mohan Bihari from a Rolling Mill of Faridkot on 1-12-1976. The truck in which the said angles were loaded was belonging to Amrik Singh. It is his evidence that said angles were unloaded at Indore at one godown. He also speaks that another truck was also unloaded at said godown but this Amrik Singh does not know to whom that godown was belonging. The evidence of Manjit Singh and Amrik Singh shows that Brij Mohan was present in the said truck at the time of loading and unloading of those angles. Manjit Singh says that the receipt was not taken for delivery of those angles from the person whom those angles were delivered by unloading Amrik Singh stated in his evidence that if the receipts are demanded, receipts of delivery are obtained and given but in the present case Brij Mohan was present, therefore, it was not for him to get receipts of delivery of those angles and to give it to Brij Mohan Neema. Brij Mohan Ncema P.W.1 has not given any acceptable reason as to why the receipt was not taken in respect of delivery of those angles. It is pertinent to note at this juncture that the said consignment was of two trucks full load but no receipt was either demanded or obtained from person whom those angles were delivered by Brij Mohan Neema, Amrik Singh and Manjit Singh. For no reasons Tejasingh, the person who was the scribe of Ex.P.9 and Ex. P.10, has been examined. 10. Mr. For no reasons Tejasingh, the person who was the scribe of Ex.P.9 and Ex. P.10, has been examined. 10. Mr. Bapna submitted that said receipt was not obtained as it was in accordance with custom prevalent in the market at that time. I am not at all impressed with this submission, because there is no satisfactory evidence on record in that context to show that it is a custom prevalant to that effect continuously for a very long time which has resulted in a commercial customs or tradition. It is very difficult to digest that for delivery of such costly consignment, the consignor would not obtain the receipt for delivery from the consignee. Had that been a matter of transfer of paltry quantum of merchandise, one would have thought of believing such contention of the appellant. Learned trial Court has rightly pointed out it to be a material factor for discarding the case of the appellants. 11. Learned trial Court has pointed out in the judgment that the complaint was made to Loha Vyapari Association prior to year 1977, and said complaint of appellant was made in the year 1977. In spite of that, the appellants did not proceed for taking any legal action against the respondents till 15-10-1979, when the said suit was filed. He has pointed out that in the mean while there was exchange of notices and reply between the parties. The trial Court has pointed out that after the exchange of notices and reply the appellants waited for two years to file the suit. This is totally unnatural behaviour of a consignor who is interested in recovering such a huge amount from the consignee when according to him the consignment was delivered to consignee well in time. 12. Learned counsel appearing for respondents pointed out that there has been variance in plaint and the evidence adduced by appellants. Trial Court has also pointed out in its judgment the fact that a complaint was made to Loha Vyapari Association. It has not been mentioned in the plaint that deal was finalised through Mohanlal Dalai. It has also not been mentioned in the plaint that there was a custom prevalant in the said market of not obtaining the receipt of the delivery of consignment. Had there been the truth in the allegation of the appellants those things would have been mentioned in the plaint. It has also not been mentioned in the plaint that there was a custom prevalant in the said market of not obtaining the receipt of the delivery of consignment. Had there been the truth in the allegation of the appellants those things would have been mentioned in the plaint. The appellants are approaching the Court by suppressing those material facts. When questions on those points were asked in the cross-examination, the witnesses of the appellants gave evasive answers to escape. This attitude creates adverse impact on the truthfulness of the case of the appellants. 13. Thus, examining the impugned judgment in view of the evidence, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that learned Judge has committed no error either on facts or law. While dismissing the suit of the appellants (original plaintiffs), I endorse the judgment and decree impugned as correct, proper and legal. Appeal stands dismissed with cost.