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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

1997 DIGILAW 815 (MP)

KITCHEN AID v. STATE OF M. P.

1997-12-15

DEEPAK VERMA

body1997
ORDER DEEPAK VERMA, J. - By filing this petition under article 226 of the Constitution, petitioner is praying for quashment of the order dated February 2, 1996 (annexure P1), passed by State Level Committee, cancelling the petitioner's eligibility certificate with retrospective effect. 2. Brief facts, material for deciding the said petition are mentioned hereinbelow : Petitioner was granted an eligibility certificate which entitled it to enjoy the benefit of exemption from payment of sales tax for the period commencing from April 27, 1987 to April 26, 1990. The said certificate was issued in favour of the petitioner by District Level Committee, constituted under notification dated October 16, 1986, issued by State Government. Petitioner has actually enjoyed the said benefit for the period stated in the eligibility certificate, The said eligibility certificate was cancelled by State Level Committee with retrospective effect vide its order dated April 27, 1989. 3. The said order of cancellation of petitioner's eligibility certificate by State Level Committee, was, subject-matter of challenge in W.P. No. 719 of 1989. The said petition has now been disposed of with certain directions. The judgment of petitioner's earlier petition is reported in [1996] 102 STC 233 (Kitchen Aid v. General Manager, District Industries Centre). The petition was disposed with the following directions : "In view of the aforesaid position of facts and law I find that the order, annexure P8, is not sustainable in law. Accordingly I find it improper to go into the merits of the matter. Instead I direct the concerning authority to hear the petitioner in this regard and pass appropriate orders with reasons by February 28, 1995. Till fresh order, the interim order passed by this Court earlier, shall remain operative. This petition is thus disposed of finally in terms indicated above, but without any order as to costs." 4. Pursuant to the said order, passed by learned single Judge of this Court (Kitchen Aid v. General Manager, District Industries Centre [1996] 102 STC 233), petitioner was given an opportunity of hearing by the State Level Committee, but, the matter was not disposed of before the stipulated date. The final order by State Level Committee has been passed by the impugned order on February 2, 1996 (annexure P1), wherein, the petitioner's eligibility certificate has been cancelled once again, with retrospective effect and the earlier order, passed by State Level Committee in this regard, has been maintained. The final order by State Level Committee has been passed by the impugned order on February 2, 1996 (annexure P1), wherein, the petitioner's eligibility certificate has been cancelled once again, with retrospective effect and the earlier order, passed by State Level Committee in this regard, has been maintained. It is this order, which is, subject-matter of challenge in this petition. 5. Show cause notice against admission was issued to the respondents. Respondents have filed their reply in oppugnation. They have submitted, that State Level Committee has been constituted to supervise and, if there is any irregularity, or, breach of the rule, or, regulation, the committee is competent and empowered to set aside and quash the order passed by District Level Committee. Their contention is, that looking to the nature of business, carried on by the petitioner, the District Industries Centre should not have granted the eligibility certificate to the petitioner, as, it is not engaged in manufacturing process. They have also made a mention with regard to an opinion sought by State Government from the law department. 6. The delay in passing the order has been attributed to delaying and protraction attitude of the petitioner. According to the respondents, as per earlier order, passed by this Court, petitioner had been granted an opportunity of hearing and only, thereafter, this order has been passed, which now calls for interference. 7. I have heard the counsel for parties, perused the record. 8. Shri Chowdhary, appearing for petitioner, submitted, that the eligibility certificate was granted to the petitioner by District Level Committee, after holding an enquiry and due scrutiny of the nature of business which is being carried on by the petitioner. It has also been submitted, that in any case. State Level committee is not sitting as an appellate authority over the orders passed by District Level Committee and, therefor, the eligibility certificate, granted in favour of the petitioner could not have been cancelled or invoked by the State Level Committee. 9. It has also been contended, that petitioner acted on the said certificate and had carried on its business on the basis and strength of certificate, whereby, it had not charged any tax on the sales which were effected by it during the period of exemption. 10. He then, contended that the period having already elapsed, no recovery can now be directed to be made against the petitioner. 11. 10. He then, contended that the period having already elapsed, no recovery can now be directed to be made against the petitioner. 11. Lastly, he submitted, that in any case, the certificate could not have been cancelled with retrospective effect. Shri Chowdhary, then, submitted, that the point involved in this petition, has already been considered by two judgments of this Court, reported in (1994) 12 TLD (Steel Tubes of India Ltd. v. State of M.P.). In the said judgment, petitioner had challenged cancellation of eligibility certificate with retrospective effect. Even though, the petitioner had also questioned with regard to competence of respondents to cancel the same with retrospective effect, but, perusal of the judgment shows that petition was allowed, mainly, on the ground that order of cancellation of the certificate was passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Thus, on the principles of natural justice, the impugned order was directed to be quashed in the said petition. 12. Petitioner, then, placed reliance on a judgment reported in [1996] 102 STC 483 (K. P. Enterprises v. Divisional Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Raipur), wherein, the Division Bench was considering the question with regard to grant of exemption. However, the Division Bench has dismissed the said petition and the connected petitions. But, while doing so, in paras 21 and 22 of the said judgment, it has been held elegantly as under : "21. On the basis of appreciation of facts, the authority realised that grant of exemption in the present case was not warranted and hence, the same has been revoked and the principle of estoppel cannot operate in such a case. However, one thing is clear that the eligibility certificate foe exemption from tax was given by the committee on April 19, 1990 and the same has been withdrawn/revoked by order dated March 7, 1991 with effect from April 19, 1990. This cannot be permitted because it will amount to causing greater hardship to the assessee because the assessee has acted upon the eligibility certificate issued by the competent changed its opinion and wants to withdraw the certificate. If the authority wants to withdraw the eligibility certificate, then, the effectivity of withdrawal shall be with effect from the date of order and it cannot be made retrospective. If the authority wants to withdraw the eligibility certificate, then, the effectivity of withdrawal shall be with effect from the date of order and it cannot be made retrospective. To this extent submission of learned counsel is correct that the order of withdrawal of eligibility certificate cannot be given retrospective effect and the petitioner is entitled for the relief to this extent. 22. In the result, this writ petition and other writ petitions as per Schedule annexed herewith are dismissed except that the effectivity of withdrawal of eligibility certificate shall be from the date of issue of order and not from retrospective effect. There shall be no orders as to costs. Security, if any shall be refunded to the petitioner." 13. Thus the Division Bench is of the clear view that in any case, while cancelling the eligibility certificate, the same cannot be done with retrospective date. In fact, the said judgment clinches the issue involved in this petition. 14. Shri Piyush Mathur, learned Government Advocate for respondents, submitted, that this matter should be remitted to the State Level Committee once again for decision in accordance with law and all questions posed and opposed by the parties should be left open. It had already been sent to the State Level Committee once, but no useful purpose is going to be achieved by remanding it once again. 15. In view of the decision of Division Bench in K. P. Enterprises [1996] 102 STC 483 (MP), I find that no useful purpose is going to be served to remit the matter to State Level Committee. The Division Bench has held it in so many words, that in any case, the eligibility certificate cannot be cancelled with retrospective effect. Shri Piyush Mathur, was not able to show any authority, which has taken a contrary view. 16. There is, yet another aspect of the matter. There cannot be any denial of the fact that the petitioner had acted on the said eligibility certificate. It had carried on its business on the basis of the said certificate and did not charge any tax on the sales effected by it during the period of eligibility. Thus, it will be now too harsh for the respondents to ask for the payment of tax, even, for that period, for which under the grant of necessary certificate, it had carried on its business. Thus, it will be now too harsh for the respondents to ask for the payment of tax, even, for that period, for which under the grant of necessary certificate, it had carried on its business. Admittedly, the said period has now expired and no extension to the same has been granted. 17. For this reason also, I find that this is a fit case, in which, the impugned order deserves to be quashed. 18. In consequence, I hereby quash the order dated February 2, 1996 (annexure P1). On account of this, the necessary consequence is, that the petitioner would be deemed to have enjoyed the necessary exemption from payment of sales tax on the basis of the eligibility certificate, issued by the District Level Committee. 19. The petition is, thus, allowed. The impugned order (annexure P1) is hereby quashed, as mentioned above. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs. Petition allowed.