JUDGMENT 1. This is a second appeal by the plaintiff/landlord against the judgment and decree dated 31.8.89 in civil appeal No.8 of 1989 by IIIrd Additional District Judge, Bilaspur, whereby the appeal was allowed and the judgment and decree dated 31.1.87 in civil suit No.42-A/81 by Civil Judge Class X., Mungeli was set aside and the suit of the landlord plaintiff/appellant for ejectment of respondent was dismissed. 2. The plaintiff/appellant filed a suit on the allegation that, the defendant/respondent is the tenant in the suit shop situated at House No. 32, Mahamai para ward, Mungeli, Distt. Bilaspur, at the monthly rent of Rs. 30/-. It has been alleged that the suit accommodation had fallen in the share of plaintiff/appellant, in the partition of family property in the year 1978 and his name has also been recorded thereon in the Municipal records. The plaintiff/appellant is carrying on his cycle shop in the tenanted premises of his father and requires the suit premises for carrying on the said business and that he had no other suitable accomodation in Mungeli for the above purpose. 3. The defendant/respondent resisted the suit and alleged that the partition was fictitious and that the father of plaintiff/appellant is the owner of the suit premises. He also denied that the plaintiff/appellant required the suit shop for carrying on his business and also alleged that the plaintiff/appellant had other accommodation at Mungeli, in which he could carry on his business. 4. The learned trial Court held that the plaintiff/appellant bonafide required the suit premises and that he had no other accommodation for the purpose at Mungeli and accordingly decreed his suit for ejectment under section 12 (1) (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. However, in appeal filed by the respondent/tenant the learned lower appellate Court found that the plaintiff/appellant does not require the suit accommodation bona fide and that he had other suitable accommodation for the purpose. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the suit of the plaintiff/appellant was dismissed. This appeal has been admitted on the following substantial question of law: "Whether the Court below was right in holding that the plaintiff has not succeeded in proving his bonafide need, as there are other non-residential accommodations available to him?" 5. In this appeal, it has been mainly urged that the finding of lower appellate Court is illegal and is not supported by the evidence on record. In this appeal, it has been mainly urged that the finding of lower appellate Court is illegal and is not supported by the evidence on record. It has also been urged that, there is no material to infer that the plaintiff/appellant had no other suitable non-residential accommodation for carrying on his business. 6. It is noticed in the above connection that the plaintiff/appellant Vikas Kumar (examined as PW 1) has admitted in his cross-examination that he had a house bearing H. No. 33, which is adjoining the suit shop, and is situated on the main road 'and is much bigger than the suit accommodation. However, he has termed the same to be residential house and has stated that it is meant for his residence. It appears from his statement in para 12 that the house was vacated in the year 1980-81 when the suit was filed and he let it out to Sub-Registrar, Tiwari. It then again fell vacant and he again let it out to one Gaur, who is the friend of plaintiff/appellant. Therefore, it is clear that House No. 33, which is adjoining the suit premises and was on the road side was available to the plaintiff/appellant at the time of filing of the present suit against the defendant/respondent for ejectment. However, the appellant let it out. Thereafter, subsequently also when it fell vacant in the year 1985-86, it was again let out by plaintiff/appellant. There appears to be no pleading of the plaintiff/appellant that the suit House No. 33 though available was not suitable for his business. Though, he has termed the house as non-residential, but it is clear that in the absence of his pleading, he cannot do so. He should infact have pleaded that the house, though available, is not suitable and in the absence of any such pleading, he cannot be heard to say that either the house was residential or that it was not suitable. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Hakimuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha [1997 (2) MPU 360], wherein a similar question arose and it was observed as below : "His claim would not be bonafide if he does not plead the fact regarding vacant accommodation. It is for the Court to determine as a question of fact if the alternative accommodation could reasonably be used for non-residential purpose. It is for the Court to determine as a question of fact if the alternative accommodation could reasonably be used for non-residential purpose. The landlord himself cannot be arbiter of his own case to the effect to a particular vacant accommodation is not reasonably suitable for the business for which the accommodation is sought to be vacated from the custody of tenant. This is the function of the Court to determine it objectively from evidence on record." 7. In the instant case also the plaintiff/appellant having failed to make necessary averments cannot be heard to say that the suit house was unsuitable. His conduct in not occupying the suit house, even when the suit was filed and also thereafter, in the year 1985-86 for the purpose of business, belies his averment and assertion of bona fide need of the suit premises. It is also found that the plaintiff/appellant is carrying his business in a shop of his father, which he is alleged to have taken on rent, but as the learned lower appellate Court has rightly held that the above plea and evidence in that regard is not' acceptable. Accordingly, the lower appellate Court had rightly concluded that the plaintiff did not succeed in establishing his bonafide need and was also right in holding that there was other suitable accommodation available to the plaintiff/appellant. 8. The appeal therefore, has no merit and is accordingly dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs. Counsel fee; Rs. 1,000/-.