RANAJIT KUMAR MITRA, J. ( 1 ) TWO applications were made in Suit No. 308 of 1989. One. made by the plaintiff on June 25. 1996 for a judgment upon admission and the other made by the defendant on September 31j. 1996. for amendment of the Writtenstatement On the prayer made by both the parties the applications were directed to appear and today, the two applications did appear in the Day's Cause List. Again on the prayer of the parties, both the applications were heard analogously and are disposed of by this order. ( 2 ) THE facts, briefly would appear to be, that the defendant was a tenant in the suit premises under the plaintiff. By a notice dated January 20, 1989, which admittedly was also a notice under Section 13 (6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, served on the defendant, the plaintiff terminated the tenancy. ( 3 ) THIS suit being Suit No. 308 of 198 was instituted by the plaintiff on ,april 26, 1989, for eviction of the defendant and recovery of the suit-premises, and for other consequential reliefs. The plaintiff had alleged in the plaint. that the defendant was a monthly tenant, inducted by the plaintiff a defaulter in payment of rent, and had wrongfully sublet a portion of the suit-premises ( 4 ) ON May 18, 1989 the plaintiff' made an application, and prayed for a decree upon admission for a sum of Rs. 1,04,983,08 and an order of injunction to restrain the defendant from collecting rent from Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd. , the sub-tenants of the defendant. By an order dated June 6,1989 this Court confirmed the interim order made earlier in the application, and directed the Bank to keep the rent, payable, in a separate account, and the defendant was restrained from transferring or parting with possession of the suit-premises. The application was disposed of by recording in the order, that in spite of service of notice no one had appeared for the defendant. The defendant made an application for recalling of the Order dated June 6,1989 and that application was dismissed. The defendant preferred an appeal. The application as also the appeal were dismissed by an order dated August 21,1989 and time of file the Written-Statement was extended by three weeks from the date of the order. The defendant filed its Written-Statement on September 28,1989. The defendant preferred an appeal. The application as also the appeal were dismissed by an order dated August 21,1989 and time of file the Written-Statement was extended by three weeks from the date of the order. The defendant filed its Written-Statement on September 28,1989. ( 5 ) IN the Written-Statement the defendant has contended,"that the defendant, is holding the said premises under the lease for a period of twenty years. In view of the same the defendant contends that the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy act, 1956, other than the provisions relating to rent and the provisions of Sections 11 and 36 shall not apply to the said premises held under such lease. " ( 6 ) IT was submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that, on June 25, 1996, the plaintiff made this application, for judgment upon admission, and in that petition, the plaintiff had stated, that in all the affidavits filed by the defendant, in the several proceedings in the suit, and thereafter in the Written-Statement, the consistent defence of the defendant has been, that the defendant was holding the suit-premises under the lease, for a period of twenty years and that the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 were not applicable to such lease. It was contended by counsel on behalf of the plaintiff, that the defence taken by the defendant to oppose the case of the plaintiff, would but, certainly require the defendant to vacate and make over possession of the suit-premises to the plaintiff when the lease would come to an end. The lease, he submitted had admittedly ended by efflux of time on July 17,1995 and the defendant has since continued in wrongful occupation of the suit-premises and the plaintiff was entitled to a decree upon admission. According to him there was no denial by the defendant in its affidavit-in-opposition, that the lease had expired by efflux of time on July 17,1995 and such affidavit had been filed on December 10,1996, which was almost three months after the defendant had filed its application for amendment of the Written-Statement. He contended, that the application for amendment had been filed by the defendant on September 30, 1996 which would be almost after three months of the plaintiff filing its application for judgment upon admission. He contended, that the application for amendment had been filed by the defendant on September 30, 1996 which would be almost after three months of the plaintiff filing its application for judgment upon admission. He submitted, that a valuable right had been created in favour of the plaintiff, that is the right to a decree for recovery of possession of the suit premises, and that the plaintiff would be deprived of such right in the event the defendant was allowed to amend the Written-Statement and a defence, new 0 altogether, and the plaintiff would be made to suffer irreparable loss and injustice. Accordingly, he submitted, that the application for amendment should be dismissed and decree should be made in terms of the prayers contained in the plaint as had been prayed for in the plaintiff' s petition. In support of his submissions he cited and relied on FOA on Landlord and Tenant, pages 89, 90 and 91; Hill and Redman on Landlord and Tenant (8th Edition) pages 52, 53, 54 and 55; Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 27 pages 156 and 157; Stroud Vol. II ; AIR 1979 Cal 396 ; AIR 1986 Cal 279 ; AIR 1951 SC 177 : (1951 All LJ 64); AIR 1977 SC 680 ; AIR 1978 SC 798 ; (1987 2 Cal LJ 41: AIR 1988 SC 1362 ; AIR 1977 Cal 33; 1977 12) Cal LJ 310. ( 7 ) IN his arguments, Counsel for the defendant submitted that in the petition made in the application for amendment of the Writtenstatement the defendant had contended, that". . . admission was made under some misapprehension or mistake particularly by inadvertence or erroneously in ignorance of true fact that your petitioner entered into the suit premises as a lessee under registered Deed of Lease executed on January 5, 1976 for a period of twenty years commencing from July 18, 1975 ending on July 17, 1995 on the terms and conditions contained therein at a monthly rent of Rs. 4,200. 00". He argued, that the lease commenced from the date of its execution, that is January 5,1976, and not from the anterior date, as expressed in the Deed of Lease and therefore, it was a lease for less than twenty years. 4,200. 00". He argued, that the lease commenced from the date of its execution, that is January 5,1976, and not from the anterior date, as expressed in the Deed of Lease and therefore, it was a lease for less than twenty years. According to him, an admission made by reason of a mistake of law, could always be rectified by amendment of the pleadings, and that the mistake as pleaded in the petition, was a mistake in construing the lease which was a mistake of law, and that there were provisions in law for rectification of such mistakes. He submitted that no interest could be created in the lease before registration of the lease, and that it was apparent that upon a correct construction of the lease, the period of duration of the lease fell short of twenty years, and that consequently in terms of Section 3 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, the provisions of the Act would be applicable to the lease. In support of his submissions be cited and relied on the decisions reported in 1993 (1 ) CHN 88; AIR 1983 SC 462 ; AIR l984 Orissa 37; AIR 1979 Cal 396 ; AIR 1953 Cal 15 ; AIR 1987 SC 357 : (1987 Lab IC 466); AIR 1957 SC 363 , ( 8 ) I have considered the submissions as also the authorities and decisions which were cited and relied on by counsels for the parties. I shall presently express the substance of my considerations. The guiding principle, in deciding an application for amendment would however, appear to me to follow naturally from ascertaining the "real questions in controversy'' as mentioned in Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Of course, I hasten to add, the question of bona fide of the petitioner, in making the application and the question of the injustice that may be fall the respondent in allowing an application for amendment, must surely be of paramount importance while ascertaining the real controversy between the parties and applying the rule in the facts and circumstances before the Court. ( 9 ) I would now take are a resume of those portions from the authorities and decisions which were cited and relied on by counsels for the parties, which appeared to me, relevant for the purpose of deciding the present case. ( 9 ) I would now take are a resume of those portions from the authorities and decisions which were cited and relied on by counsels for the parties, which appeared to me, relevant for the purpose of deciding the present case. ( 10 ) FOA, Hill and Redman and Halsbury, all acclaimed authorities on the laws of landlord and tenant, in no uncertain terms have, with unanimity, have expressed, that a lease may commence from a day which is past, though in that case it relates back to such day for the purpose of computation only, and that the habendum in a lease would only mark the duration of the tenants interest and its operation, as a grant would take effect only from the time of delivery. ( 11 ) IT would appear from the decisions reported in AIR 1979 Cal 396 , and a Bench reported in AIR 1986 Cal 279 , that this Court also was of similar view as those expressed by the authorities referred by me earlier. The Hon'ble Judges, held, that an anterior date appearing in a lease would be material for the purpose of calculating the period of duration of the lease which would be that past date, but the lease would operate as an effective lease from the date of execution. ( 12 ) AMENDMENT of the Written-Statement was allowed by this Court in its decision reported in AIR 1993 CHN 88 ; on the ground that since there was no question of withdrawal of any statement, which had been made in the original 1 pleadings nor would the amendment in effect make out a new case or a new claim as against any admission which had already been made. The Orissa High Court allowed statement made in the Written-Statement to be corrected by way of amendment on similar grounds in the decision reported in AIR 1984 Orissa 37; and particularly emphasised on the bona fide of the petitioner. In its decision report in AIR 1983 SC 462 the Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff to amend the plaint, and withdraw an admission of fact, on the ground that in order to effectively adjudicate' upon the dispute between the parties, amendment of the pleading was necessary. In its decision report in AIR 1983 SC 462 the Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff to amend the plaint, and withdraw an admission of fact, on the ground that in order to effectively adjudicate' upon the dispute between the parties, amendment of the pleading was necessary. The other decisions, which were cited and relied on by counsels for the parties, were decisions where the Courts had rejected the prayer for withdrawal of admission made in the Written-Statement, by way of amendment. The settled principles of law with regard to withdrawal of an admission by way of amendment as enunciated by the Courts would appear to be strictly in accordance with the provisions contained in Order VI, Rule 17 of the C. P. C. , that is the amendment sought must be, necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties; bona fide; and in the interest of justice. Bona fides in those circumstances would of course mean, that the amendments would not provide the petitioner an opportunity to take an altogether new plea or make out a new case. Amendments would be in the interest of justice, where any valuable right which an admission by the petitioner may have created in favour of the respondent, would not be taken away. Counsel for the plaintiff also cited AIR l951 SC 171, where the Supreme Court held, that when the alternative case which the plaintiff could have, was not only admitted by the defendant in his Written-Statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plaintiff made in the suit, there would be nothing improper in granting the plaintiff a decree upon the case which the defendant himself makes. Those briefly were, in my view, portions relevant for the purpose of this case, in the judicial pronouncements made in the decisions which were cited and relied on by counsels for the parties. ( 13 ) THE '' real question in controversy" would appear to me to be, the question as to the possession of the suit-premises. The answer to this question must of course lie in the terms of the lease, which was after all what the parties had agreed, that is the period for which the defendant would enjoy possession of the suit premises. The answer to this question must of course lie in the terms of the lease, which was after all what the parties had agreed, that is the period for which the defendant would enjoy possession of the suit premises. Of course, thereafter law would take its course as to under what circumstances the defendant would or would not relinquish, and the plaintiff may or may not recover possession. This present lease in its habendum, has clearly mentioned an anterior date from which the lease would commence. In view of the settled legal proposition, which the counsels for the parties have placed before me, this lease must be considered to have commenced from the anterior date that is July 18, 1975, for the purpose of computation of the period of duration of the lease. That was precisely what the parties had agreed, and the defendant cannot be allowed to explain it away. Consequently, the lease had expired by efflux of time on July 17, 1995 again as the parties had agreed in the lease, and the defendant would be required to surrender possession in favour of the plaintiff. ( 14 ) I am of the view that there was no mistake on the part of the defendant in understanding or construing the language of the lease and the defendant had accordingly prepared and filed its Written-Statement, after more than five months of the institution of the suit. The Writtenstatement was not therefore filed in a hurry. The defendant had sufficient time to consider. The defence sought to be amended and withdraw was the defence taken by the defendant in several proceedings that had been taken in the suit by the parties. It was after the plaintiff had made this present application for judgment upon admission that the defendant made its application for withdrawl of its admission in its Written- Statement. The application of the defendant for amendment of the Written-Statement was made on September 30, 1996 that is after more than three months of making the application of the plaintiff. It took almost eight years, for the defendant to realise that the defendant had made a " mistake" in construing the lease in completing the period of duration of the lease. No explanation was put forward in the petition as to the reason or cause for the inordinate delay. It took almost eight years, for the defendant to realise that the defendant had made a " mistake" in construing the lease in completing the period of duration of the lease. No explanation was put forward in the petition as to the reason or cause for the inordinate delay. The assertions, in paragraph 2 of the petition, that the defendant "was compelled to sign and execute the said document" or that it had been represented to the defendant, "by the plaintiff that the said document 2 would be of no effect" appear to be assertions never made by the defendant in any of its earlier pleadings. It is obviously an after thought, and mala fides. No explanation has been offered in the petition either as to how the mistake had occurred. It has been alleged in the petition that it was a mistake of "true facts", though counsel for the defendant argued that the mistake was one of law, that is in construing the lease the defendant had made a bona fides mistake in applying the correct principle of law. Whether the alleged mistake was one of fact or of law, ceases to deserve any consideration if the bona fides of the petitioner as in this case is in doubt. . ( 15 ) I am not inclined, in the circumstances, to accept the rather laboured explanations, to set up the plea of mistake in an attempt totally lacking in bona fides and justify amendment of the Written-Statement. I do not consider the amendments necessary in the interest of justice nor are the amendments required for the purpose of adjudication of the "real question in controversy" between the parties. I am satisfied, that the alternative case which the plaintiff could have, as was laid down by the Supreme Court, was not only admitted by the defendant. but was expressly put forward by the defendant as on answer to the claim which the plaintiff had made in the suit. and that it would not be improper to make a decree in favour of the plaintiff for recovery of possession of the suit-premises. . ( 16 ) FOR those reasons, therefore, the application for amendment of the Written-Statement fails. . ( 17 ) THE application of the plaintiff succeeds. There shall be a decree in terms of prayers (a ) and (b) of the plaint. . ( 16 ) FOR those reasons, therefore, the application for amendment of the Written-Statement fails. . ( 17 ) THE application of the plaintiff succeeds. There shall be a decree in terms of prayers (a ) and (b) of the plaint. The plaintiff shall be entitled to interim interest on arrears of rent at the rate of 6% per annum and interest on judgment at the rate of 4% per annum. The plaintiff shall be entitled to mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 1000. 00 per diem to be calculated from May, 1995 till possession is obtained, because no particulars have been pleaded in the plaint as to mesne profits. . ( 18 ) THE defendant shall pay to the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 5000. 00 as and by way of costs. . ( 19 ) THESE two applications and the suit which is appearing in the Day's Cause List are disposed of by this order. Order accordingly.