S. N. Kapoor ( 1 ) THE facts of all these above-mentioned revision petitions, being common, they are being disposed of by this common order. ( 2 ) IN all these above revisions the petitioner-Bank challenged the order of rejection of application under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code for restoration of the suits since the plaints in these cases had been rejected u/order 7 Rule II, Civil Procedure Code for non-filing of deficient Court fee. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner-Bank more than 2000 cases of New Bank of India were to be filed immediately on the opening of the Court after summer vacation in 1986, relating to grant of loans to masses. Huge amount of Court fee was involved. In order to manage the situation, the Counsel of the Bank were requested to file the cases with nominal Court fee and to request the Court for extension of time for payment of Court fees. Counsel in these cases received about 170 such cases which were to be filed by her on 30th June, 1986 and 1st July, 1986. These 170 cases were listed in seven Courts. Names of the defendants were common in many matters. Consequently, it became difficult to find out the Court to which all those 170 cases had been earmarked on account of confusion. Out of the said 170 cases these seven cases were listed before the learned Sub Judge on 3rd July, 1986. The Counsel for the petitioner could not appear on account of the said confusion. However, the Court granted time to make up the deficiency within two days and her presence was also marked in a routine manner. Thereafter, the case was adjourned to 9th July, 1986. As the Counsel for the petitioner was labouring under confusion due to common name of the defendants she neither knew the order nor the date fixed in these 7 matters. On 10th July, 1986 the Court dismissed the suit for non appearance as well as for not making good the deficiency in the Court fee. On coming to know about the dismissal, the plaintiff/petitioner filed applications for restoration of the plaints stating therein that the Counsel for the petitioner could not locate these cases earlier and they could be located only about two to three days before moving the applications for restoration in all the matters. On coming to know about the dismissal, the plaintiff/petitioner filed applications for restoration of the plaints stating therein that the Counsel for the petitioner could not locate these cases earlier and they could be located only about two to three days before moving the applications for restoration in all the matters. The said applications were dismissed by similar orders in all these matters. ( 4 ) THE impugned orders are being assailed by the petitioners inter alia on the ground that the learned Sub-Judge lost sight of the fact that the petitioner was not aware that these matters were also listed before the Court on 10th July, 1986. It is specifically stated that these cases were neither entered in her diary for 3rd July, 1986 nor for 10th July, 1986. The Counsel for the petitioner as well as her junior tried their level/best to find out whereabouts of the cases. She was depending on her junior for day to day work due to heavy rush of work. The learned Sub Judge also failed to give due weight to the fact that the Counsel for the petitioner had paid Court fee in all other matters except these few cases which could not be located. ( 5 ) IF about 2000 cases were to be filed and if the Counsel for the defendants has got only the nances of the defendants in her record, then obviously she could not properly orgainse and naturally it was difficult to locate all the cases. It is also apparent that the time was granted to make good the deficiency till 3rd July, 1990. The learned Sub Judge even did not pass order of rejection of plaints on 3rd July. He waited till 10th July, 1990. In this context the orders of rejection of plaints of appear to be justified. ( 6 ) BUT the orders not to restore the plaints in these matters and not to allow the plaintiff Bank to pay Court fee appears to be against the concept of substantial justice, and justice oriented approach. Besides, it is likely to result in loss of public money as in all these matters it was a public money which was given in mass loans. Negligence on the part of the Counsel or her junior or her clerk should not have been allowed to lead to miscarriage of justice by rejection of the application for restoration. Besides, it is likely to result in loss of public money as in all these matters it was a public money which was given in mass loans. Negligence on the part of the Counsel or her junior or her clerk should not have been allowed to lead to miscarriage of justice by rejection of the application for restoration. ( 7 ) I am not oblivious to the proposition that ordinarily the Court should be reluctant in interfering with such orders. But, one could also not be oblivious to the present situation. When the State or an institution like Bank is making such applications it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and indifferent approach, the massive filing of cases by the Bank and consequential confusion and non-appearance any officer or official of the Bank is least difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. One can also not be oblivious to the fact that the Bank represents interest of their customers collectively as well as cause of the community. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If numerous plaints of the Bank are rejected for non filing of deficient Court fee no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. It is settled law that the Courts should lean in favour of deciding the matters on merits instead of deciding on technicalities unless the case is hopelessly without merit. (see State of Haryana v. Chandramani and Ors.) (1996) 3 SCC page 132. ( 8 ) AS regards the maintainability of the revision petition, there is no doubt that rejection of the plaint on any of the grounds mentioned in Order 7 Rule II, shall not on its own force preclude the plaintiff/applicant from presenting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action. But in the present case, the plaints were filed within time and in case the suit is filed afresh, then the claim would be barred by time. Thus it is likely to lead to miscarriage of justice specifically in the circumstances which are obtained in these matters. ( 9 ) BEFORE proceeding further, does one must appreciate the duty cast on the Court before rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule II, Civil Procedure Code Order 7 Rule II, Civil Procedure Code reads as under "r. 11. Thus it is likely to lead to miscarriage of justice specifically in the circumstances which are obtained in these matters. ( 9 ) BEFORE proceeding further, does one must appreciate the duty cast on the Court before rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule II, Civil Procedure Code Order 7 Rule II, Civil Procedure Code reads as under "r. 11. Rejection of plaint.-The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases: (A) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (B) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (E) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaintiff is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (D) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law:[provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-papers, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff. ] ( 10 ) IN view of the language of Clause (e) of Order 7 Rule II, it is apparent that the clause lays down two conditions: firstly, it should be insufficiently stamped and secondly, the requisite stamp paper is not filed within the time granted by the Court. These conditions are conjunctive and not disconjunctive which must be satisfied before a plaint can be rejected. Consequently, before rejecting the plaint some reasonable time has to be given to the plaintiff to make up the deficiency and the Court cannot straightaway reject the plaint without giving such time. (see Baijnath Prasad and Ors. y. Umeshwar Singh and Ors. , (AIR 1937 Patna 550 S. B.) ( 11 ) THIS Order 7 Rule II, Civil Procedure Code has to be read alongwith Section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code, being a specific provision in this regard. (see Baijnath Prasad and Ors. y. Umeshwar Singh and Ors. , (AIR 1937 Patna 550 S. B.) ( 11 ) THIS Order 7 Rule II, Civil Procedure Code has to be read alongwith Section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code, being a specific provision in this regard. Section 149, Civil Procedure Code reads as under: "149. Where the whole or any part of any fee prescribed for any document by the law for the time being in force relating to Court-fees has not been paid, the Court may, in its discretion, at any stage, allow the person, by whom such fee is payable, to pay the whole or part, as the case may be, of such Court fee; and upon such payment the document, in respect of which such fee is payable, shall have the same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance. " ( 12 ) A conjunctive reading of Order 7 Rule II with Section 149 would also indicate that the insufficiently stamped plaint by itseif is not such a ground on which the plaintiff should be debarred from contesting the matter on merits, and it also indicates that when the petition is not properly stamped the Court has ample power to extend the time for affixing the Court fee. Section 149 confers ample power on the High Court to exercise its power in order to do justice to the litigant where the fault is not on part of the litigant (see Indian Statistical Institute v. Associated Builders and Ors. , AIR 1978 (SC) 335 . No hard and fast rule, however, could be laid down how the discretion is to be used under Section 149, Civil Procedure Code All that can be said how the discretion is to be used is that: (a) whether insufficiency in Court fee is due to bona fide mistake in calculating the amount payable, ought to circumstances beyond the control of the parties, for example robbery, non-availability of Court fee sum etc. The Court will no doubt use its discretion in favour of the litigant; (b) whether the litigant is able to pay full Court fee and at present documents, in either case he expects a promise in the case or he wants to await the result of some litigation, or because he negligently failed to being sufficient money with him or paying the Court fee or any similar reason where he is guilty of contumacy or malafide that he wants to harass the otherside by continuing a litigation time and should not be granted. According to the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in S. Wajid Ali v. Isar Bano, AIR (38) 1951 Allahabad 64 (F. B.) so far as the cases lying between the two extremes are concerned, they will have to be decided, according to their own circumstances, I need not unnecessarily burden this judgment with several other authorities for the similar matter came to be considered by this Court in Surajbhan Gupta v. Union of India and Ors. , AIR 1977 Delhi 158. In that case a similar question arose. A suit was filed on 10th July, 1970. There was deficiency of Rs. 170. 80. 00 and time and granted till 18th July, 1970. Counsel could not appear in that case due to illness of his son and application under Section 151 was moved. That application was rejected on the ground that the learned Court has no jurisdiction. On the basis of judgments in Damodar Prasad and Ors. v. Aditya Maharaj and Ors. , AIR 1972 Patna 289, Balram Naik and Ors. v. Krashna Kumari, AIR 1975 Ori 178 , it was held that where the plaint was rejected for non-payment of Court fee an application under Section 151 was maintainable. Nothing short of expressprovision limiting such powers under Section 151 could be permitted to whittle down the scope and amplitude of the inherent powers envisaged under Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure. Kunjbihari Das v. Chanchala Das, AIR 1966 Orissa 24. ( 13 ) CONSIDERING facts of these cases and the circumstances in which the Counsel for the plaintiff was placed, it appears necessary that this Court must rectify the situation by granting time to make good the deficiency and by restoring the plaints thereafter for numerous reasons. Firstly, the time granted in this case was too short to make good the deficiency. Firstly, the time granted in this case was too short to make good the deficiency. If the discretion was used properly then at least 15 days time should have been given to make good the deficiency. Secondly, in the present case it is stated that the Counsel could not appear in this case for 3rd July and 10th July the two dates, were not noted by her in her diary on account of confusion caused due to sudden institution of 170 cases and due to common names amongst the defendants in 170 cases. Thirdly, if a Counsel could make good the deficiency within the stipulated time in nearly over 150to 160 cases then it was reasonable to say that there was no reason for her not to make good the deficiency in these 7 cases except on account of the factors which were beyond her control. It is not a case of contumacy. It may further be mentioned that the discretion conferred on the Court by Section 149 is normally expected to exercised in favour of the litigant except in case of contumacy or positive malafide and reasons of similar kind. ( 14 ) THE question of bona fide in this connection is to be considered from the point of view of the definition as contained in the words "good faith" as used in he General Clauses Act and not as used in the Limitation Act. The things should be presumed to be done bonafide if it is done honestly whether it is done negligently or not. Therefore, liberal view in exercise of powers of Court under Section 149 has to be taken (Custodian Evacuee Property v. Rameshwardayal, AIR 1968 Delhi 183, Mahant Ram Das v. Gangaram Das, AIR 1961 S. C. 882 (see jagat Ram v. Misar Kharaiti Ram, AIR 1938 Lahore 361 (FB), State of Punjab v. Nand Kishore, AIR 1966 Punjab 332, Maltex Malsters Pvt. Ltd. v. Allied Engineers, AIR 1977 Delhi 123 ). ( 15 ) ONE incidental question also arises whether the Court should interfere in a case which would amount to extending the period of limitation. ( 15 ) ONE incidental question also arises whether the Court should interfere in a case which would amount to extending the period of limitation. In this regard it may be mentioned that since the very purpose of Section 149 is to provide protection from limitation in such like matters, grant of time for payment of deficient Court fee under Section 149 cannot be assailed by the other party on the ground that it takes away his right to plead the bar of limitation (see Ganesh Prasad v. Narender Nath, AIR 1953 S. C. 431), Maltex Malsters Pvt. Ltd. v. Allied Engineer (supra) ( 16 ) SEEING the circumstances in this case, in my considered opinion all the seven orders rejecting the applications under Section 151 and resulting in failure to restore the plaints /suits are infirm. The learned Sub-Judge has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him. Therefore, I am of the definite opinion that these revision petitions could be instituted and maintained. ( 17 ) CONSEQUENTLY, all these 7 revision petitions are allowed. The impugned orders of the Court below are set aside and time is granted to the petitioner to make good the deficiency within a period of one month from the date of this order. A copy of this order shall be placed on the files of Revision Nos. 524/87,525/87,526/87, 527/87,528/87,529/89. ( 18 ) A copy of the order in the 7 revision petitions shall be sent to the learned Trial Court (s) concerned through learned District Judge for information to proceed further in the matter in accordance with law.