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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

1997 DIGILAW 828 (MP)

Bhagwati Prasad v. Chironjilal

1997-12-19

S.S.JHA

body1997
JUDGMENT S.S. Jha, J. 1. This second appeal is admitted on the following substantial question of law:- (1) Whether the Pujari has a right to execute a Patta in respect of a land which belongs to the Deity ? (2) Whether the judgment passed in C.S. No. 6-A/64 could be made a basis for deciding (his present suit? Was it admissible in evidence ? (3) Is the suit barred by limitation ? (4) Has the suit been properly valued ? 2. The first question of law relates to the right of Pujari to issue patta in respect of land which belongs of Deity. It is admitted position that the plaintiff claimed the right by virtue of perpetual lease executed by Pujari of temple known as "Murti Ramchandraji". These lands were dedicated to the temple by the erstwhile Rules of the Gwalior State under the provisions of Kawayad Muafidaran Jujbe Arazi. Riyasat Gwalior, Samvat 1991. The maufi was for a Devasthan. The grant was in favour of Deity "Murti Ramchandraji". The capacity of the Pujari was that Manager of the property belonged to Deity. The Daity is minor and Pujari being the Manager is custodian of the properties of the Deity. The Pujari is to look after the management of the properties of deity and the worship of the deity shall be from the usufruct of the property of the deity. The question whether the Pujari can aliente the property, the right of Pujari to execute lease is to be considered since the deity is minor and it cannot be divested of its property on the whims of Pujari/Manager. The deity being minor its property, can be leased out or alienated for the legal necessity of benefit of the estate. Pujari of a temple docs not acquire right to part away the property of the deity. From the averment in the plaint and evidence on record, it is not reflected that patta in favour of the plaintiff was for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate of deity. Since the property was not leased out for the benefit of the estate, the question regarding power of pujari in respect of grant of lease is required to be considered to determine the validly of such lease. 3. For determining the validly of lease, the nature of endowment is to be considered. Since the property was not leased out for the benefit of the estate, the question regarding power of pujari in respect of grant of lease is required to be considered to determine the validly of such lease. 3. For determining the validly of lease, the nature of endowment is to be considered. The grant was under the then Regulations of State of Gwalior. Regulations relating to grant in respect of Davasthan and conditions of the grant are referred in para 7 (a) and (b) of the Regulations. Para 7 (b) specifically provides that the grant in is alienable. 4. For the purpose of endowment, the nature of endowment is to be considered. As a general rule of Hindu Law, property given for religious purpose and for maintenance of religious worship and charities connected with it, is in alienable. Under the provisions the power of management vests with the Pujari. The power of Pujari to alienate the debulter property is analogous to that of a Manager for an infant heir. According to law Pujari or Manager has no power to alien tat the debutter property except in a case of need or for the benefit of the estate. That Pujari being Manager is not entitled to sell property or grant a permanent lease of debulter property. Pujari is to maintain the property as Manager of the property and he is not empowered to grant perpetual lease, which is not in the interest of debutter property until and unless the lease should be for the benefit of the estate. 5. In the case of Biram Prakash and others v. Narendra Dass and others reported in AIR 1966 SC 1011 considering the earlier judgment of Privy Council and Judicial Committee, the Lordships held that property devoted to religious propose is as a rule, inalienable, it is competent for a shebait to incur debts and borrow money for the service of the idol and preservation of its property, to the extent to which there is an existing necessity for so doing, his power in that respect being analogous to that possessed by the manager for an infant heir. In testing, therefore, the question of legal necessity for the impugned transaction regard must be paid to the actual pressure on the estate, the immediate danger to be averted or the benefit to be conferred upon the trust estate. In testing, therefore, the question of legal necessity for the impugned transaction regard must be paid to the actual pressure on the estate, the immediate danger to be averted or the benefit to be conferred upon the trust estate. The Apex Court also considered the earlier judgments of Privy Council and Allahabad High Court. 6. From going through the pleading in the case, there is no averment that perpetual lease was executed. The perpetual lease which was executed in favour of plaintiff was for the legal necessity. The plaintiff himself pleaded that the Pujari, who executed the lease, has expired. Considering this aspect the validity of perpetual lease created by Pujari in the capacity of Manager, the effect of lease can only be valid during the life time of the Sarbarakar/Manager of the property. In the case of Deosthan Math Alonya Baba through Sarbarakar Govindgir Guru Suratgir Gosai vs. Ramdayal Balgovind Kalwar and others, reported in AIR 1943 Nag 307, it was held that the lease by the Sarbarakar not for necessity endures only for his life-time. This question was also considered by the Judicial Committe in the as of Palaniappa Chetty and another vs. Deivasikamony Pandara, reported in XLIV Indian Appeals 147. In this case also, a she bait has granted a permanent lease at a fixed rent, and on payment of premium, of certain lands dedicated to worship of an idol. It was held that such lease was invalid against the successor, as the evidence did not establish that she bait was constrained by any necessity to make such lease or that any benefit accrued to the estate from it. The Privy Council reiterated the proposition of law "that it is breach of duty on the part of she bait, unless constrained by an unavoidable necessity, to grant a lease in perpetuity of debater lands at a fixed rent, however adequate that rent may be at the time of granting, by reason of the fact that by this means the debater estate is deprived of ins change it would have if the rents were variable, of deriving benefit from the enhancement in value, in the future of the lands leased". This principle, it was held by the Judicial Committee, applies as much to the agricultural lands as to non-agricultural lands of building sites. This principle, it was held by the Judicial Committee, applies as much to the agricultural lands as to non-agricultural lands of building sites. The fact that such transaction may be beneficial from the financial point of view and that it would bring in more income if the money obtained thereby was invested in other ways is not at all sufficient to validate the grant. 7. Going through the para 12 of the Kawayad Muafidaran Jujbe Arazi, Riyasat Gwalior, it is also provided that the property given on grant to Devasthan shall be recorded in the name of Devasthan and Pujari's name will be recorded as Muafidar. The condition is that Pujari shall be capable of holding the oilier of Pujari. If he is incompetent, then his near relations competent enough to worship and manage the property shall be nominated. Thereby the principle is clear that succession as the Pujari is not by inheritance but it is by the competence to worship and manage the property. Therefore, any lease by Pujari, if not for legal necessity of the institution or for the benefit of the estate, shall be coterminous with the life of the Manager/Pujari. 8. In the present case, the plaintiff has pleaded in para 1 of the plaint that the lease was granted to him by the-then Pujari Lal Kishan Brahmin. The plaintiff has further pleaded that Lal Kishan is dead. The lease was executed on 27.6.1953 for a period of Samvats 2010 to 2014 and then he executed a permanent lease on 9.9.1958 of the debater property. 9. Admittedly the temples are the public temples and they have been endowed for public at large, therefore, they acquire the status of a public trust. In the year 1958, Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act, 1951 was in force and, therefore, no lease could be executed without obtaining proper sanction from the Registrar of Public Trust. It is strange that once the property for religious endowment is granted, it has not been registered so far as a public trust, though the ruler has dedicated the property for the public worship. Therefore, this property as acquired the status of public trust and ought to have been registered as public trust. The provisions of M.P. Public Trust Act will be applicable to this property, as this property no longer remained as a public property of Government. 10. Therefore, this property as acquired the status of public trust and ought to have been registered as public trust. The provisions of M.P. Public Trust Act will be applicable to this property, as this property no longer remained as a public property of Government. 10. Since by virtue of amendment in the M.P. Public Trust Act the Collector of the district is the managing Trustee of all the public trusts in his district, the Collector should initiate steps to gel the property registered so that the property of the idol shall be saved from being waste. 11. From the aforesaid discussion, it is apparent that there was no valid lease in favour of plaintiff on the dale of tiling of the suit. Therefore, question of law no. (1) is answered in affirmative that the Pujari has no right to execute a Patta in respect of land, which belongs to deity. The execution of patta was contrary to the provision of section 14 of the M.P. Public Trust Act. Even otherwise lease of the suit lands, which belonged to deity, shall not enure beyond the life-time of the Pujari. 12. In the present case Shri R.D. Jain Senior Advocate for the respondents, admitted that the lands still belong to the deity and he is not claiming himself to be an owner but the is claiming his right as a lessee. 13. As regards second question of law, the judgment rendered in Civil Suit No. 6-A/64 was not between the plaintiff and defendant. The earlier suit was also not between the plaintiff and the predecessor of the defendant. As such, this judgment shall not operate as res judicata between the plaintiff and the defendant. However, from this judgment nature of the property can be determined. 14. As regards third question of law whether the suit is barred by limitation, the Court below has held that the suit is within limitation. That being finding of fact does not warrant interference in second appeal. 15. As regards the question regarding valuation of the property, since the property is assessed to land revenue, the valuation of the suit is proper and according to law. 16. In the result, since the plaintiff has failed to prove the validity of the lease, the suit as filed itself was not maintainable. Therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below is set aside. The suit is dismissed. 16. In the result, since the plaintiff has failed to prove the validity of the lease, the suit as filed itself was not maintainable. Therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below is set aside. The suit is dismissed. It is surprising that though the plaintiff is claiming himself a lessee of the temple, has not impleaded the temple, which is a necessary party to the suit. The property is a Government grant and the State has also right in the property. The State was also necessary party in the suit, which was also not impleaded. Therefore, the suit is also bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. 17. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree is set aside and plaintiff's suit is dismissed. However, there shall be no orders as to costs. Appeal allowed