Judgment S.N.JHA, J. 1. This civil revision by the plaintiff is directed against the order dated 26-8-94 passed by the Vth Subordinate Judge, Siwan in Title Partition Suit No. 160 of 1981 allowing the petition of defendants Ist party under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short, the Code) for inclusion of certain items of property in the written statement and the preliminary decree. The defendants by the same very petition had also prayed for deletion of certain other items of property from the preliminary decree. The Court below, however, did not accede to that prayer. 2. It is not necessary to set out the facts of the case for the purpose of disposal of this revision. In fact, no argument on the factual aspect of the case was made by the counsel for either party. Arguments were made on a question of law, whether in a partition suit, after preliminary decree is passed, addition of further items of property for partition by metes and bounds is permissible or not. 3. Mr. Manan Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the Court has no jurisdiction to add to the schedule of the properties which are subject-matter of the partition suit as mentioned in the preliminary decree. According to him, it would require a full-fledged adjudication which is not possible at the stage of preparation of the final decree. He placed reliance on Muthangi Ayyana V/s. Muthangi Jaggarao, AIR 1977 SC 292 ; Awadhendra Prasad Narayan Singh V/s. Raghubansmani Prasad Narayan Singh, AIR 1979 Patna 50 and Sajani Bewa V/s. Kartik Sahu, AIR 1981 Orissa 157. 4. Mr. Shashi Shekher Dwivedi, learned counsel for the defendants-opposite party submitted that the suit for partition remains pending even after passing of the preliminary decree and it is open to the Court to include further items of property and divide them by metes and bounds in course of preparation of final decree in the same proceeding without compelling the parties to file fresh suit for partition with respect to these items of property. He submitted that the law contemplates and permits more than one preliminary decree in suits for partition. He submitted that the law contemplates and permits more than one preliminary decree in suits for partition. He placed reliance on Lachmi Narayan Marwari V/s. Balmakund Marwary, AIR 1942 Privy Council 198; L. Guran Ditta V/s. T. R. Ditta, AIR 1935 Privy Council 12; Gopal Krishna Pillai V/s. Meenakshi Ayal, AIR 1967 SC 155 ; Phoolchand V/s. Gopal Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1470 ; Syed Ekramuddin V/s. Syed Mahamed Ali, AIR 1986 Andhra Pradesh 267; B. N. Thiagarajan V/s. B. N. Sundaravelu, AIR 1972 Madras 216; Ghanashyam Martha V/s. Brundaban Pradhan, AIR 1977 Orissa 154; Polireddi Rama Subbareddi V/s. Polireddi Naga Krishna Reddy, AIR 1982 NOC 197 (AP) and Bhagabati Sahu V/s. Trilochan Sahu, AIR 1990 NOC 21 (Orissa). 5. The decision in Muthangi Ayyana V/s. Muthangi Jaggarao, AIR 1977 SC 292 , relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner, has no application in this case. In that case the point for consideration was whether the Court can amend or go behind the preliminary decree in partition suit. The Supreme Court held that it is not open to the Court to amend the preliminary decree on a matter already concluded by the preliminary decree. In other words, if an issue between the parties has been decided by a preliminary decree such decision cannot be amended later in the course of preparation of final decree. The decision in Sajani Bewa V/s. Kartik Sahu, AIR 1981 Orissa 157, is also of little help. In that case the Court rejected the prayer for inclusion of further items of property on the ground of delay. 6. The decision in Awadhendra Prasad Narayan Singh V/s. Raghubansmani Prasad Narayan Singh, AIR 1979 Patna 50, however, appears to be relevant to the point at issue in the present case. In that case the defendants wanted to include a house situate at Rajgir within the purview of the final decree proceeding which was opposed by the plaintiff. This Court held,"No authority has been placed before me to show that even without the plaintiff asking for such an amendment the Court of its own or on the request of the defendants can include a property for partition which was not included in the plaint. This Court held,"No authority has been placed before me to show that even without the plaintiff asking for such an amendment the Court of its own or on the request of the defendants can include a property for partition which was not included in the plaint. However unreasonable the attitude of the plaintiff may be when the Court is not invested with any such power, a direction cannot be given to include the Rajgir property for partition in the present suit. The defendants will have to seek their remedy elsewhere."I shall refer to this decision later again in this judgment. 7. As regards the case cited by the counsel for the opposite party, the decision in Lachmi Narayan Marwari V/s. Balmakund Marwary, AIR 1924 Privy Council 198, has no relevance in the present case. In that case the trial Court had dismissed the suit for partition. The High Court in appeal passed a consent decree and remitted the case to the trial Court for division of the property by metes and bounds. The trial Court, however, dismissed the suit in default. The Judicial Committee held that after preliminary decree, suit cannot be dismissed except on appeal, if any. In that connection it was observed that after preliminary decree it is open to any party in whose interest it is that further proceedings be taken to initiate the supplementary proceedings. These observations were made in an entirely different context. 8. The decision in Gopalkrishnan Pillai V/s. Meenakshi Ayal, AIR 1967 SC 155 and B. N. Thiagarajan V/s. B. N. Sundaravelu, AIR 1972 Madras 216 also are not relevant in this case. In the former case the Supreme Court observed that while it is necessary for the plaintiff to plead a cause of action for seeking relief of past mesne profits, it is not necessary for him to do so for seeking future mesne profits, for at the time of institution of the suit it is not possible to ascertain the future damages, value the same approximately and pay the Court-fee thereon. It was accordingly held that the Court pass a decree for future mesne profits. In the latter case the Madras High Court held that mesne profits accruing from the property is not a separate item of property and in view of an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Md. It was accordingly held that the Court pass a decree for future mesne profits. In the latter case the Madras High Court held that mesne profits accruing from the property is not a separate item of property and in view of an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Md. Amin V/s. Vakil Ahmad, AIR 1952 SC 358 , where the plaintiff has not prayed for mesne profits in the plaint, the Court cannot make an enquiry after final decree is prepared. 9. In Phoolchand V/s. Gopal Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1470 , the Supreme Court held that there is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure which prohibits passing more than one decree if circumstances justify the same and it may be necessary to do so particularly in partition suits when after the preliminary decree some parties die and share of other parties are thereby augmented. It was observed that it would be only convenient to the Court and advantageous to the parties, specially in partition suits, to have disputed rights finally settled and specification of shares in preliminary decree varied before a final decree is prepared. In Ghanshyam Martha V/s. Brundaban Pradhan, AIR 1977 Orissa 154, the Orissa High Court reiterated the same principle. It observed that as the partition suit is deemed to be pending till final decree is actually passed, the Court may give such direction as may be necessary from time to time to adjust the equities between the parties as regards the valuation of the properties and the allotment to individual shares and decide all other incidental matters that may arise. 10. The present case is not one where the question of re-specification of shares on account of death of a party or any other subsequent events is to be considered. There is also no dispute regarding adjustment of equities between the parties either. The question for consideration is whether other properties which are not subject-matter of the plaint or written statement and preliminary decree can be added to the subject-matter of the final decree proceeding. Nevertheless the abovementioned two decisions are relevant as laying down the principle that partition suit remains pending till the stage of final decree and more than one preliminary decree can be passed. 11. Nevertheless the abovementioned two decisions are relevant as laying down the principle that partition suit remains pending till the stage of final decree and more than one preliminary decree can be passed. 11. The decision in Polireddi Rama Subbareddi V/s. Polireddi Naga Krishna Reddy, AIR 1982 NOC 197 and Syed Ekramuddin V/s. Syed Mahamed Ali, AIR 1986 Andhra Pradesh 267 seem to be nearer to the point in issue in this case. They lay down that other properties can also be subjected to partition at the stage of preparation of final decree. In the former case, in a suit for partition of joint family property and accounts a compromise decree was passed as final decree, although no partition of immovable property by metes and bounds was made. The plaintiff was given liberty to get the property divided by metes and bounds either through the Court or by private arrangement. In the proceeding for final decree, in terms of compromise, other properties said to be subsequent acquisitions out of the joint family properties after compromise were sought to be included. The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the order of the Court below allowing the amendment in the preliminary decree under Order VI, Rule 17 was not sustainable nor such correction could be made u/S. 152 or Sec. 153 of the Code because once preliminary decree is passed its correctness is not open to dispute, but the Court has power to include other properties in the proceeding under Order XX, Rule 18 of the Code and also to decide the dispute regarding nature of properties. In the latter case, that is, Syed Ekramuddin V/s. Syed. Mahamed Ali, AIR 1986 Andhra Pradesh 267 the property in question was Matruka property (mother property). The Court held that inclusion of other items of property in the Schedule of properties for partition is permissible "provided the property belongs to the joint family or the matruka or the co-ownership". Since the property in question was found to be matruka property (mother property) its inclusion in the proceeding was upheld. 12. The Court held that inclusion of other items of property in the Schedule of properties for partition is permissible "provided the property belongs to the joint family or the matruka or the co-ownership". Since the property in question was found to be matruka property (mother property) its inclusion in the proceeding was upheld. 12. In Bhagabati Sahu V/s. Trilochan Sah, AIR 1990 NOC 21, and other case relied upon by the counsel for the opposite party, the Orissa High Court after stating the principle that on account of subsequent events more than one preliminary decree can be passed, observed that "in furtherance of such principle, it would be reasonable to hold that parties may be permitted, if the facts otherwise justify, to bring to notice properties left out from determination though liable to be included" . 13 Polireddy Rama Subbareddi V/s. Polireddi Naga Krishna Reddy, AIR 1982 NOC 197 is the only case, cited at the Bar, in which it has been held that it is also open to the Court to decide the nature of the property in final decree proceeding and make partition. Full facts of the case have not been mentioned in the Report. In the event, there was no such dispute between the parties, the observation is to be regarded as mere obiter. If, however, the High Court intended to lay down a principle in that regard, I would find myself unable to accept the same as laying down the correct law. In suit for partition the dispute usually centres round the controversy as to whether the property is joint or not, that is to say, unity of title or possession between the parties. The Court decides the dispute on the basis of evidence. Decision as to the nature of the property at the stage of preparation of final decree may necessitate full-fledged adjudication on the basis of fresh evidence. In Syed Ekramuddin V/s. Syed Mahamed Ali, AIR 1986 Andhra Pradesh 267, the property was found to be a matruka property amenable to partition. It was on that premise that the inclusion of the property was found to be justified. In Bhagabati Sahu V/s. Trilochan Sahu, AIR 1990 NOC 21 (Orissa) inclusion of other properties was held to be permissible "if the facts otherwise justify" and if it is found that the property was liable to be included. 14. It was on that premise that the inclusion of the property was found to be justified. In Bhagabati Sahu V/s. Trilochan Sahu, AIR 1990 NOC 21 (Orissa) inclusion of other properties was held to be permissible "if the facts otherwise justify" and if it is found that the property was liable to be included. 14. In view of the above-cited decisions, it can be said that where the property in question is joint family property left out in the plaint or written statement and, consequently, the preliminary decree, or is subsequently acquired from the joint family funds in which the parties have interest, on the principle that the suit for partition remains pending until final decree is prepared and more than one preliminary decree can be passed, as may be warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court has power to make partition of other properties in the same litigation at the stage of final decree proceeding under Order XX, Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 15. The decision of this Court in Awadhendra Prasad Narayan Singh V/s. Raghubansmani Prasad Narayan Singh, AIR 1979 Patna 50 was rendered in the facts of that case. There was a serious dispute as to whether the property in question was a joint family property or not. In this background it was held that the Court cannot include a property for partition which was not included in the plaint. The observations in this regard, quoted above, cannot be construed as complete injunction on the power of the Court to include items of property which are not the subject-matter of plaint or the written statement and therefore the preliminary decree from before. The principle that such suit for partition does not come to an end with the passing of preliminary decree and it continues up to stage the final decree is prepared is well established. It is also well established that in such suit more than one preliminary decree can be passed. It is further well established that the Court should, as far as may be, avoid multiplicity of suits by compelling the party to go in for fresh with respect to the property in question. It is also well established that in such suit more than one preliminary decree can be passed. It is further well established that the Court should, as far as may be, avoid multiplicity of suits by compelling the party to go in for fresh with respect to the property in question. On the basis of these principles it can be said that where there is no dispute as to the nature of the property being joint family property, it is not only open to the party and permissible to the Court to include such property within the ambit of the final decree proceeding and divide the same between the parties, but also expedient and in the ends of justice to do so. But where either party objects to such addition, meaning thereby, where there is dispute as to the nature of the property being joint family property or not, such a course is not possible. 16. In the present case the plaintiff opposed the prayer for addition in the Court below and also in this High Court. The case therefore prima facie, appears to be covered by the decision of this Court in Awadhendra Prasad Narayan Singh V/s. Raghubansmani Prasad Narayan Singh, AIR 1979 Patna 50. There are no clear averments nor there is any clear finding that the property (Schedule-Kha to the petition) is joint family property. In this situation I am unable to sustain the order. However, I may observe, if a fresh petition is filed and a proper case is made out, the Court may consider the matter again in accordance with law keeping in view the observations made above. 17. In these premises, the impugned order dated 26-8-94 is set aside and the civil revision is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.Revision allowed.