S. K. MOOKHERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THESE two appeals are directed against the same order, passed by a learned single Judge of this court, dated 2nd July, 1992 in C. O. No. 6261 (W) of 1992. The two appeals are at the instances of the respondents to the main writ application. The appellants in FMAT 2453 of 1992 were impleaded as parties to the writ application and the appellant in FMAT No. 2285 of 1992 had been added as party on the date the impugned order had been passed, on the basis of an application preferred on behalf of the appellant for such addition on 18th of June, 1992. ( 2 ) THE subject matter of challenge before the learned trial Judge was a notice, issued by the Burdwan Municipality, asking the writ petitioner to stop the work of construction in terms of a plan sanctioned by the said Municipality on the ground that there was scope for some doubt about leasehold right of the land and/or as regards validity of the grant. ( 3 ) AS we have already indicated, the learned trial Judge disposed of the Writ application by setting aside and quashing the impugned notice on the same date the appellant in FMAT No. 2285 of 1992 had been added as a party, obviously without any opportunity being granted to it to canvass its case through affidavit. While doing so the learned trial Judge construed the provisions of sections 324 and 333 of the Bengal Municipal Act and came to a factual finding that the required criteria in terms of the said statutory provision being absent in the case, the notice issued by the Municipality was untenable and illegal. ( 4 ) WHILE arguing the appeals, detailed submissions had been made on behalf of the appellants as also on behalf of the contesting respondent writ petitioner. To be precise, written submissions also were filed. ( 4 ) WHILE arguing the appeals, detailed submissions had been made on behalf of the appellants as also on behalf of the contesting respondent writ petitioner. To be precise, written submissions also were filed. The scrutiny of the submissions made on behalf of the contesting parties unequivocally indicates that there is substantial factual controversy regarding the authority of Reverend S. K. Kisku, who on the strength of power of attorney, purported to grant the lease deed in question in favour of the respondent, apart from the legal enforceability of the grant due to the absence of prior permission in writing of the parent body and express prohibition of the said Reverend Kisku from dealing with the matter. Indeed, it has been very strongly contended that at the time the building plan in question was signed by Reverned Kisku, his power of attorney stood revoked the fact which had been allegedly withheld from the Municipality, the sanctioning authority. As against such submission, on behalf of the writ petitioner/contesting respondent, it was, inter alia, pleaded that in terms of the deed, dated 4th July, 1987, and in view of the receipt and appropriation of money paid by the writ petitioner/respondent, Kisku was under an obligation and legal liability to append his signature for sanction of the building plan. II was further pleaded that the appellant's endeavour to get injunction before the Civil Courts also proved abortive and lastly the criteria required by the statutory provisions of the Bengal Municipal Act, which vested authority in the Municipality ill take steps as were under challenge in the writ proceeding, not being fulfilled the said sections could not be said to have been attracted. ( 5 ) WE have bestowed our anxious consideration on the aforesaid materials. Admittedly the added respondent, one of the appellants before us, which was the owner of the property in question, had no opportunity to place on record the factual contentions, which cannot be said to be absolutely irrelevant or deserving no consideration in the context of the dispute or controversy involved. The impugned order of the learned trial Judge does not also reflect that he had occasion to advert to such factual aspects. The impugned order of the learned trial Judge does not also reflect that he had occasion to advert to such factual aspects. Following the dictum or principle laid down by the apex court in the case of S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and Other reported in AIR 1981, Supreme Court, page 136 (para 19) we are not inclined to presume that the case of the said appellant is a 'shut case'. The apex court observed, on this point, as follows: 19. Megarry J. discussed the question in Jon v. Rees, (1971) Ch 345, He said (at P. 402):"it may be that there are some who would decry the importance which the courts attach to the observance of the rules of natural justice. 'when something is obvious', they may say, 'why force everybody to go through the tiresome waste of time involved in framing charges and giving an opportunity to be heard? The result is obvious from the start'. Those who take this view do not think, do themselves justice. As everybody who has anything to do with the law well knows the path of the law is strewn with examples of open and shut cases which, somehow, were not of unanswerable charges which, in the event, were completely answered; of inexplicable conduct which was fully explained; of fixed and unalterable determinations that, by discussion, suffered a change. Nor are those with any knowledge of human nature who pause to think for a moment likely to underestimate the feelings of resentment of those who find that a decision against them has been made without their being afforded any opportunity to influence the course of events". ( 6 ) WE, therefore, feel that to meet out justice between the parties it is necessary that the added appellant is given an opportunity of bringing materials, as it may be advised, on records legally through its affidavit before the writ application can be allowed to be disposed of. We cannot overlook the prejudice that has been caused by the impugned order because of no such opportunity having been afforded to the appellant/added respondent by the impugned order having been passed in its presence having because binding on it. We cannot overlook the prejudice that has been caused by the impugned order because of no such opportunity having been afforded to the appellant/added respondent by the impugned order having been passed in its presence having because binding on it. We, accordingly, set aside the impugned order only on the ground as indicated above and remand the writ application to the appropriate court for being heard out on merit after affording appropriate opportunities to all the parties to bring relevant materials on record. In the special facts of this case, the interim order which we granted on 21st January, 1993 would remain operative till the disposal of writ application by the trial court. We keep on record that a contempt application had been filed on behalf of the appellant the same would stand disposed of in view of the disposal of the appeal by us subject to like liberty to the parties to pray for appropriate reliefs before the learned trial Judge abiding by the results of the writ application. There would be no order as to costs. N. K. Bhattacharyya, J: I agree. Appeal disposed of.