ORDER The petitioner in this writ petition, filed as Public Interest Litigation assails the nomination of respondents 3 to 6 to the State Legislative-Council (respondent no. 6 has ceased to be a member Of the Council during the pendency of this writ petition and is therefore no longer in reckoning in this case). 2. According to the petitioner the impugned nominations are void, illegal and ultra vires Article 171 (3)(e) read with Article 171 (5) of the Constitution. It is because the nominations were made in a manner and for reasons not sanctioned by the aforesaid constitutional provisions; the nominations were made in complete disregard of the constitutional concept of representation from different fields as envisaged under Article 171 (5) and the persons nominated (respondents 3 to 5) did not possess the qualifications as mandated under Article 171 (5) for being nominated as members of the Council. According to the petitioner's case the impugned nominations also suffered from malafide and amounted to a fraud on Article 171 (3) of the Constitution. In this regard, however, it is necessary to state that some allegations of malafide (as contained in paragraph 5 of the writ petition) were later, deleted with the permission of the court and Shri Laloo Prasad Yadav, the Chief Minister of Bihar was taken out of the array of respondents. 3. At an early stage in the hearing of the case Mr. Additional Advocate General No. II indicated that he proposed to oppose the writ petition primarily on the basis of two earlier decisions; one by the Calcutta High Court in Biman Chandra Bose Vs. Dr. H.C. Mookerjee & Ors., 56 C.W.N. 651 and the other by a bench of our own Court in Vidyasagar Singh Vs. Krishna Ballabha Sahay & Ors., AIR 1965 Pat 321 . The Additional Advocate General No. II cited the Calcutta decision in support of the proposition that the validity or invalidity of the nominations made by the Governor for membership of the Council cannot be enquired into by a court. The Calcutta decision need not detain us for long as it is plain from the judgment that in that case the court had before it a lis in personem; the petitioner in that case claimed that he was better qualified for nomination than those nominated by the Governor as members of the Legislative Council and challenged their nominations on that ground. Further, the objection raised by the Additional Advocate General is fully answered by observations made in that decision itself as may be seen at page 658 of the report. 4. Coming now to the Patna decision we find that it would require examination in slightly greater detail. Mr. Addl. Advocate General No. II relied upon this decision for advancing two propositions; first, that the categories mentioned in Article 171 (5) were not exhaustive and it was not necessary that in every case a person from each of the categories should be nominated. Secondly, that this court could not examine whether or not the persons nominated as members of the Legislative Council possessed the required qualification as provided in Article 171 (5) of the Constitution. From a reading of the judgment in Vidyasagar's case it appears that the nominations to the legislative council were challenged mainly on the ground that the concerned persons were nominated directly by the Chief Minister acting at the behest of the Council of Ministers; they were neither the nominees of the Governor nor the recommendation/nomination made by the Chief Minister had received the approval of the Governor. In this regard it was further submitted by the petitioner that the power exercised by the Governor under Article 171 (3)(e) was not an exercise of the executive power of the State, but in acting under this provision of the Constitution the Governor exercised his special constitutional function, mentioned therein and this function was required to be performed by the Governor in his own discretion. From the judgment it appears that even this question raised on behalf of the• petitioner was not decided definitely or conclusively as the court, confining itself strictly to the pleadings made by the parties, found that it was not possible to conclude that the petitioner had proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the Governor had not nominated the concerned persons. 5. The other two propositions, relied upon by the Additional Advocate General No. II to oppose this application, seem to have been dealt with by the court only in passing. It is true that in paragraph 6 of the judgment it was held that it was not necessary that each of the subjects mentioned in Article 171 (5) must be represented in every case. It is true that in paragraph 6 of the judgment it was held that it was not necessary that each of the subjects mentioned in Article 171 (5) must be represented in every case. But with utmost respect we feel that their Lordships examined the question only in isolation and did not consider whether nominations could be made repeatedly to pack the council with persons from any single category enumerated in Article 171 (5) or whether even in a case of one set of nomination(s) the existing composition of the council could be completely disregarded with the result that the nomination(s) would lead to an unbalanced composition in favour of one and against the other categories. At this stage we would hasten to add that it may not always be possible or necessary to maintain an arithmetically correct proportion among the different categories but it hardly needs be emphasised that the idea of representation as contemplated under Article 171 (5) cannot be allowed to be made otiose or redundant. 6. In so far as the qualifications of the nominees are concerned that decision declined to entertain any challenge to the nominations on that ground as in view of their Lordships it involved question of facts. It is understandable to us that a writ court may not enter into a disputed question of facts and may not undertake an appraisal, based on facts, of the relative merits and demerits of the nominees vis-a-vis some other claimants but if it is shown to the court that the work performed and the activities undertaken by the nominees which had admittedly formed the basis of their nominations do not qualify as special knowledge or practical experience either in Literature, Science, Art, Co-operative movement or Social service then there would be no question of disputed facts and in such a situation a writ court may legitimately intervene. 7. In view of the aforesaid questions of constitutional importance arising in this case it would be appropriate that this case should be listed before a Full Bench. We accordingly, direct it to be listed before a Full Bench. 8. The Full Bench may also consider the desirability of examining the petitioner's allegation of malafide and may afford an opportunity to the parties to complete their pleadings on this aspect of the matter. 9. We accordingly, direct it to be listed before a Full Bench. 8. The Full Bench may also consider the desirability of examining the petitioner's allegation of malafide and may afford an opportunity to the parties to complete their pleadings on this aspect of the matter. 9. The petitioner is directed to file an additional complete brief of the case by March 3, 1997 for the use of Hon'ble the Third Judge forming the Full Bench.