Judgment P.K.Deb, J. 1. This revision petition has been filed under Sec. 14 (8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (in short B.B.C. Act) against the judgment passed by the Subordinate Judge, 1st, Jamshedpur, in Eviction suit No. 1 of 1994. 2. The admitted position remains that the defendant-petitioner was inducted as tenant under the plaintiff in a portion of a building situated at Sakchi within the town of Jamshedpur, details of which have been given in the schedule of the plaint for a fixed period of lease for five years commencing from 1.1.88 to 31.12.92. The said lease was registered one, which was executed on 5.4.91. The defendant was to pay Rs. 6,000.00 per month as rent. There is a clause in the lease deed being clause No. 4 (ii) in the following wordings: If the lessee shall be desirous of renewing the terms and conditions hereby created on the expiration thereof and of its such desire shall give to the lesser at least six months notice in writing in that behalf before the expiration of the term hereby created then the lesser at the cost of the lessee and the lessor in equal grant to the lessee the lease of the demised premises for a further terms of five years at 25% increased on the present rent and subject to the same terms and agreement as are herein reserved and contained and a fresh lease deed will be executed and registered as per provision of law. 3. According to the plaintiff after the expiry of the period, the lessee i.e. defendant was found not desirous of renewal and did not exercise its option for renewal by giving notice six months prior to 31.12.92 then the plaintiff requested the defendant to vacate the suit premises on 5.3.93. The defendant lessee under a letter requested for renewal to which a reply was sent on behalf of the plaintiff on 12.4.93 informing the lessee that there was no scope of renewal as the defendant-lessee did not exercise its option before the expiry of the lease period and hence the suit was filed for eviction of the tenant on the ground of expiration of lease. 4. 4. The defendant after taking leave of the Court contested the suit by filing written statement and it is the case that on 16.10.92 before the expiration of the lease, the defendant sent a letter to the plaintiff under certificate of posting informing its desire for renewal of the lease but the plaintiff did not reply to that rather on a bill being presented by the plaintiff, the defendant paid rent for the month of January, 1993, which revealed that the lease was being renewal from the side of the plaintiff. It is the further contention of the defendant that the suit premises was being occupied by the defendant since several years and on previous occasion also, there was lease being executed between the parties and always such lease was being executed on a belated date giving retrospective effect. The present lease deed although commenced from 1.1.88 but the lease deed was created on 5.4.91 which shows that as per the practice prevalent between the landlord and tenant only formalities were there regarding renewal of the lease which could have been done on subsequent dates also. In the alternative plea the defendant took the ground of holding over as contemplated under Sec. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act as on the plaintiffs consent (as the bill was being presented by the plaintiff) the defendant paid rent for the month of January, 1993 which legally meant that the lease became month to month tenant. 5. Both the parties adduced evidence and several issues were framed and the learned Court below came to the finding that as the lease was expired and as per the renewal clause of the lease option had not been exercised by the defendant and lease was not renewed and hence the plaintiff is entitled to get decree of eviction. Regarding holding over or month to month tenant under Sec. 116 of the T.P. Act, it has been held by the learned Court below that there was no scope of infering month to month tenancy of the defendant only because rent of one month had been accepted by the plaintiff. He has referred to the reported judgment of this Court in coming to such conclusion. 6. Only two points have been urged before this Court by Mr. Anil Kumar sinha, Sr. Advocate, appearing for and on behalf of the defendant-petitioner. He has referred to the reported judgment of this Court in coming to such conclusion. 6. Only two points have been urged before this Court by Mr. Anil Kumar sinha, Sr. Advocate, appearing for and on behalf of the defendant-petitioner. They are: (i) the option was exercised before the expiry of the lease by giving a notice under certificate of posting and the learned Court below committed error of law in not accepting the notice under certificate of posting and (ii) that under Sec. 18(2) of the B.B.C. Act, the petitioner-defendant had already become a month to month tenant as cntemplated under Sec. 116 of the T.P. Act. 7. Mr. Debi Prasad, appearing for and on behalf of the plaintiff-opposite party submitted that the notice sent on 16.10.92 as alleged from the side of the tenant under certificate of posting could not be proved by any cogent evidence and in that view of the matter, when the factual aspect has been decided and there being no error of law in deciding such fact, the revisional Court has got no jurisdiction to enter into it. His further submission is that if for arguments sake it is held that the notice was sent on 16.10.92 by the petitioner to the landlord under certificate of posting then also this notice does not suffice the provision of renewal clause as per the lease deed (Exhibit-2). 8. On the contention of both the parties, I have gone through the records of the case and I find that the learned Court below has rightly held that this notice dated 16.10.92 under certificate of posting could not be proved by cogent evidence from the side of the tenant. Moreover, even if that notice is said to be sent from he side of the tenant then also it is not in confirmity with the renewal clause as stated above in the lease deed. The option for exercising renewal must be done six months prior to the expiry date of the lease. The expiry date is the last date of December, 1992 and in that view of the matter, the option must have been exercised before July, 1992, but such option admittedly being exercised not before 16.10.92. Hence, that option is not the option as per the renewal clause contained in the lease deed itself. The expiry date is the last date of December, 1992 and in that view of the matter, the option must have been exercised before July, 1992, but such option admittedly being exercised not before 16.10.92. Hence, that option is not the option as per the renewal clause contained in the lease deed itself. Hence, there is no illegality in holding by the learned Court below that the option had not been legally exercised by the tenant as per the renewal clause. 9. The submission of Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, regarding practice prevalent between the parties cannot be construed in the present facts and circumstances of the case. There might be execution of the lease deed on a belated dated but the parties had agreed for renewal on previous occasion. But here there was no agreement arrived at between the parties for the purpose of renewal rather after the expiry the landlord in the reply to the notice given had categorically stated their intention not to renew. The prevalent customs or system cannot be taken recourse to in view of the written agreement between the parties, that too, under registered deed and hence this contention of Mr. Sinha has got no force. 10. Regarding the second point, the law has become settled by this time, Unless option has been given as per the written agreement, the lease deed cannot be said to be renewed. Moreover, even given gobye to the renewal clause of the registered document and if Sec. 18 of the B.B.C. it is applied then also initiative step is required to be done from the side of the tenant as contemplated under the provision of the said section, but no option, no petition had been filed by the tenant. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that the petitioner is protected under Sec. 18 of the Act as rent of one month after the expiry of the lease had been accepted by the landlord. 11. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Digambar Narain Chaudhary V/s. Commissioner of Tirhut Division and Ors. -- (F.B.) has categorically held that acceptance of rent in all cases can not be sufficient to indicate creation of new tenancy as contemplated under Sec. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. 11. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Digambar Narain Chaudhary V/s. Commissioner of Tirhut Division and Ors. -- (F.B.) has categorically held that acceptance of rent in all cases can not be sufficient to indicate creation of new tenancy as contemplated under Sec. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. When there was an agreement as to how the option for renewal or for creation of new tenancy is to be created then if such option had not been exercised by the desirous party then implication or inference of law cannot be done only on the fact that rent was being accepted by the landlord. 12. The same view has been taken by single Judge of this Court in the case of Zenith Forge Ltd. Co. and Anr. V/s. Nilkanth Paul 1996 (1) BLJR page 614. 13. In the present case also, no notice was given under Sec. 18 of the Act for creation of new tenancy. The notice which has been given as stated above could not be proved before the expiry of the lease and even if that has been construed to be given then also the same is not in conformity with the renewal clause of the registered agreement. Hence, that notice dated 16.10.92 cannot be said to be a notice under Sec. 18 of the Act. 14. It is stated in the Bar by Mr. Debi Prasad that the rent accepted for the month of January, 1993 had already been returned by the plaintiff, although that is not there on record. But even if rent was accepted then also such acceptance of rent for one month after the expiry of the lease cannot be legally construed to create a new tenancy or a month to month tenancy after the expiry of the lease as contemplated under Sec. 116 of the T.P. Act. 15. I am totally agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge in the aforementioned case. The eviction decree granted by the Court below has got no legal lacuna and there is nothing to be interfered as discussed above in this revision petition. Hence, the same is rejected.