JUDGMENT A.K. Ganguly, J. A departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner on the following charges which are set out below:- "1. He recommended release of Rs. 4.33 lakhs to M/s. Koshi Jute Mill Pvt. Ltd., Supaul against purchased machines without deducting the stipulated promotor's margin money, which is evident from the fact that the promotor's margin money was deducted in totality at the time of subsequent release of Rs. 7.80 lakhs to the concern on 19.12.90. 2. He intentionally and in utter violence of delegated powers released Rs. 7.80 lakhs to the concern (M/s. Koshi Jute Mill Pvt. Ltd., Supaul) on 19.12.90 at his own for which he was not the competent authority for disbursing such amount at his own. This irregular act of his is a grave misconduct for his wrongful gain. 3. While making release of Rs. 7.80 lakhs to the concern (M/s. Koshi Jute Mill Pvt. Ltd., Supaul) in utter violation of delegated powers, he did not retain the 15% of retention money according to stipulated conditions in the Sanction Order and mutual agreement between the promoter and the machine supplier. 4. While making release to the aforesaid concern he deliberately suppressed the facts regarding observations of the Vigilance and Grievance Cell dated 22.12.89 and mentioned that the dealing of machine supplier is genuine whereas observations of Vigilance and Grievance Cell duly approved by the M.D. available in the loan file shows that the machine supplier is not reputed and its connivance with the promotor. 5. He deliberately ignored the further observations of the Vigilance & Grievance Cell duly approved by M.D. to inspect the site of the machine supplier immediately and made release to the aforesaid concern. 6. He deliberately received the payment of Car Allowance for the period from 9.3.88 to 1.10.88 without having a Car in his name during aforesaid period. 7. He purchased land at Patliputra Colony, Patna from Dr. Bindeshwari Prasad Singh through three different absolute sale deeds (Registered at Calcutta) showing himself as false profession without disclosing the source of fund arranged." After serving the aforesaid memorandum of charges upon the petitioners there were subsequently some additional charges also. 7. He purchased land at Patliputra Colony, Patna from Dr. Bindeshwari Prasad Singh through three different absolute sale deeds (Registered at Calcutta) showing himself as false profession without disclosing the source of fund arranged." After serving the aforesaid memorandum of charges upon the petitioners there were subsequently some additional charges also. Those additional charges are also set out below :- "He himself examined the proposal of Delhi based fake promoter of M/s. Divine Cycle (P) Ltd., Industrial Area, Fatwah on promotor's personal guarantee and placed the proposal with recommendation before the Board for sanction of loan to the Company when the residential addresses of promoters were incomplete and official address was subsequently found fake. He should have examined the proposal before recommending the case to the Board which he did not do so as a result the promoter managed to grab the fund from the Corporation and left the unit abandoned. Thus due to his negligence of duties in processing of the loan proposal the Corporation has been put to a huge financial loss. He, with an ulterior motive did not inform H.O. after getting the site jointly inspected with BICICO representative in Feb. 83 that the unit was running in a rented premises other than that of mortgaged to the Corporation and deliberately did not take any action against the promoter which proves his connivance with the promoter of the company to cause wrongful loss to the Corporation." 2. An enquiry was held against the petitioner in respect of the said charges and the enquiry report was submitted against the petitioner holding majority of the charges to be proved. Thereafter a second show cause notice was also given to him to show cause against the proposed charges and such opportunities were availed of by him and he gave his explanation. Then the petitioner was personally heard and ultimately an order of dismissal was passed against the petitioner by the Board of Directors of the Bihar State Financial Corporation (hereinafter called the said Corporation). 3. The present writ petition was filed by the petitioner on various grounds including the ground relating to incompetence of the Enquiry Officer to hold enquiry against the petitioner. 3. The present writ petition was filed by the petitioner on various grounds including the ground relating to incompetence of the Enquiry Officer to hold enquiry against the petitioner. A learned Judge of this Court by a judgment dated 14.2.1996 allowed the writ petition and set aside the resolution for dismissing the writ petitioner from service inter alia, on the ground that pay scale of the Enquiry Officer Dr. Vidyarthi was lower than the pay scale of the petitioner. It may be stated that the learned Judge held that the pay scale of the Assistant General Manager being higher than the scale held by the Officer on Special Duty Dr. Vidyarthi, the post of Assistant General Manager held by the petitioner must be higher in rank and status than the Officer on Special duty Sri Vidyarthi. That being the position the learned Judge held that the Enquiry Officer was incompetent to hold the enquiry against the petitioner and the entire finding given by the enquiry officer was without jurisdiction and the order of dismissal being based on such finding is also illegal and cannot be sustained. No other point taken in the writ petition was decided. 4. Against the said judgment an appeal was filed by the said Corporation. The said appeal was numbered as L.P.A. No. 349 of 1996. The appellate Court, however, by judgment dated 28.6.1996 allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and posted the writ petition for further hearing on other points before an appropriate Bench. Against the said judgment of the appeal court, the petitioner filed a Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court by its order dated 30.9.1996 dismissed the said Special Leave Petition. Therefore, the judgment of the appeal court in L.P.A. No. 349 of 1996 has become final and pursuant to the direction contained in the said judgment, this Writ petition was heard by this Court. 5. In the course of argument before this Court several points were raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and those were contested by the learned counsel for the said Corporation. 6. It is well known that over a disciplinary proceeding the writ Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction can interfere on certain well defined grounds. The first of such ground is whether the procedural safeguards in favour of the delinquent employee have been substantially complied with. 6. It is well known that over a disciplinary proceeding the writ Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction can interfere on certain well defined grounds. The first of such ground is whether the procedural safeguards in favour of the delinquent employee have been substantially complied with. The next broad ground is whether the principles of natural justice have been substantially complied with and the ancilliary ground on which also interference may be warranted is also arising out of a facet of the natural justice, namely, whether the holding of the enquiry has been vitiated by any malice or any bias on the part of the authorities holding the same. 7. Keeping in mind those well defined areas of interference with a disciplinary proceeding, this Court on examining the facts of this case finds that there has been a proper enquiry and in the enquiry the report which has been submitted by the Enquiry Officer shows that the enquiry officer has dealt with each and every charge separately and in coming to the findings on each and every charge, the enquiry officer has discussed the materials by application of mind. 8. This Court on an overall view of the enquiry report is satisfied that the enquiry was conducted properly and the report submitted by the authority is not vitiated by any perversity nor it can be said that the said enquiry report is one which is based on no evidence. 9. It is well settled that standard of proof in a departmental enquiry is not the same as in a criminal trial. In the departmental enquiry, if there is some plausible evidence and some material to reach a conclusion, in that case the conclusion reached cannot be assailed on the ground that on the same materials a different conclusion is possible. The test of perversity or of a case of no evidence in a departmental enquiry can be satisfied only when on the availability of the materials before the enquiry authority no person acting reasonably and with due application of mind can come to the conclusion reached. The test is not otherwise satisfied. In other words the adequacy or sufficiency of materials is not normally a ground in the absence of bias of the enquiry officer or of the disciplinary authority. The test is not otherwise satisfied. In other words the adequacy or sufficiency of materials is not normally a ground in the absence of bias of the enquiry officer or of the disciplinary authority. Therefore, going by the aforesaid test, this Court cannot hold that in this case the findings of the enquiry officer are perverse or based on no evidence. 10. Now the next stage in such proceeding evolve round the action taken upon the enquiry report. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was furnished a copy of the enquiry report and he was asked to submit his representation against the same and this was done by the petitioner. The said representation of the petitioner dated 24.3.1994 is addressed to the Managing Director of the• said Corporation. Thereafter what followed would show that the said Corporation gave the petitioner opportunities much in excess than what has been provided under the Bihar State Financial Corporation (Staff) Regulation, 1965 (hereinafter called the said Regulation). 11. The petitioner's representation was placed in the meeting of the Board of Directors on 18.4.1994 and the petitioner was informed to be personally present before the said Board and to give his views. The petitioner, however, declined to be present before the Board, inter alia, on the ground that he filed this writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 3528 of 1994 and as such he would not appear before the Board of Directors. 12. The Board thereafter by its resolution dated 18.4.1994 directed the Managing Director to examine the case and send his views before the Board. Thereafter the Managing Director by his letter dated 18.4.1994 informed the petitioner that he would like to hear the petitioner on 25.4.1994 at 3.00 p.m. and the petitioner was asked to appear either personally or through his Advocate or his representative before the Managing Director of the said Corporation but the petitioner again failed to appear before the Managing Director and the Managing Director, in the absence of the petitioner, considered the report of the enquiry officer and the materials and after a detailed consideration recorded his finding in respect of the charges against the petitioner. In such finding the Managing Director concurred with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. In such finding the Managing Director concurred with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. The said report of the Managing Director was again placed in the meting of the Board on 2.6.1994 and the Board of Directors did not act on the said report of the Managing Director but decided to give one more opportunity to the petitioner for being present before the Managing Director and avail of the opportunity of personal hearing. Thereafter the Managing Director informed the petitioner to appear before him on 10.6.1994 either personally or with a lawyer. So this opportunity of personal hearing was given to the petitioner for the 3rd time and this time the petitioner availed of the same and appeared before the Managing Director on 10.6.1994 along with his Advocate. In the said hearing before the Managing Director, the matter was discussed again at length and the Managing Director discussed each and every charge after hearing the petitioner and gave his report and the entire matter was sent before the Board of Directors including the charges, the enquiry report, the representation filed by the petitioner and the findings of the Managing Director which were given after giving the petitioner a hearing and such findings of the Managing Director were submitted to the Board of the said Corporation. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner very much relied on the previous report of the Managing Director which was dated 25.4.1994 where the petitioner despite opportunity refused to appear and the learned counsel wanted to contend that the Board by acting on this report has acted in breach of the principles of natural justice. This criticism of the learned counsel for the petitioner is not acceptable inasmuch as the Board did not act on the said report but acted on the subsequent report of the Managing Director which was submitted after hearing the petitioner. Thereafter on considering all the matters, the Board decided to award to the petitioner the punishment of dismissal and the said order of the Board was communicated to the petitioner by the Managing Director by the office order dated 28.6.1994. 14. Having regard to the aforesaid sequence of events this Court cannot hold that there has been any procedural irregularity or that the departmental proceeding was conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice. 14. Having regard to the aforesaid sequence of events this Court cannot hold that there has been any procedural irregularity or that the departmental proceeding was conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice. This court on the other hand holds that normally the delinquent employee is entitled only to an opportunity of making a representation after the enquiry is held and the enquiry report is served upon him. He is not granted repeated opportunity of personal hearing as has been offered to him in the instant case. But, however, since the said opportunity of personal hearing was given to the petitioner and in that hearing the petitioner was allowed to appear with the help of a lawyer, it cannot be said that by adopting a more generous procedure than what is required, the Board has offended principles of natural justice. This court, therefore, does not find any error in the decision making process in passing the order of dismissal against the petitioner. 14. One of the controversies in this matter is that the learned counsel for the petitioner urges that this case is covered by a single Bench judgment of this Court dated 28.2.1996 delivered in C.W.J.C. No. 9676 of 1994. In the facts of that case it was urged that the Managing Director of the Board who passed the order of dismissal was not competent to do so. That controversy was decided in the judgment by holding that the Managing Director is competent to pass the order of dismissal. Thereafter the said order was affirmed by the Board of Directors which is the appellate authority even when no appeal was preferred to the Board by the dismissed employee. In the background of these facts the learned Single judge held that by the action of the appellate authority, the petitioner in that case has been deprived of any opportunity of filing an appeal and, therefore, the learned single Judge while delivering the said judgment by relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Surjit Ghosh vs. Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and others reported in 1995 AIR S.C. 1060 held that the order of dismissal suffers from some defects and has to be set aside and on that ground the said order was set aside. This Court has been informed by the learned counsel for the said Corporation that on an appeal from the said judgment of the learned Single Judge, the L.P.A. Bench has not, in view of the facts that the writ petitioner had already retired, reversed or modified the said judgment but merely observed that the questions decided in the said judgment may be probed subsequently in a more appropriate case. 15. Now coming to the facts of this case, this Court observes that there are factual differences between the facts in CW.J.C. No. 9676 of 1994 and the present case. In the present case the most distinguishing factual feature in this aspect is that the order of dismissal has been passed by the Board itself. It is not a case of the same being passed by the Managing Director. This is clear from the impugned order of dismissal dated 28.6.1994. Therefore, it is not a case of the initial order of dismissal having been passed by the Managing Director and the same having been ratified by the Board without any appeal to it. In this case this is the vital factual difference. For this vital factual distinction, the ratio of the decision of this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 9676 of 1994 cann0t be applied to this case. 16. Apart from that this Court has also noticed that while delivering the judgment in C.W.J.C. No. 9676 of 1994 the learned single judge did not notice the provisions of Regulation 41 (ii) of the said Staff Regulations which is set out below:- "An application for revision or review of an original order passed by the Board shall be submitted to the Board within sixty days from the date of receipt of such order." 17. Thus it is clear that in a case where the Board passes the original order, there is a statutory remedy given to the employee concerned by the Board. But the said remedy has not been exhausted here. Therefore, it is not a case where this Court can come to the conclusion that the petitioner has no remedy. The petitioner has a remedy but the same has not been exhausted here and without exhausting the same this writ petition has been filed. But since the writ petition after admission has been kept pending for years this Court is not dismissing the same on that ground. 18. The petitioner has a remedy but the same has not been exhausted here and without exhausting the same this writ petition has been filed. But since the writ petition after admission has been kept pending for years this Court is not dismissing the same on that ground. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner has criticised the disciplinary enquiry as having been vitiated on various grounds. The first submission has been that the consideration of the report submitted by M/s. Price Water House, a Chartered Accountant firm of considerable repute, has vitiated the enquiry proceeding. It appears that the said firm submitted its report about the cost of machinery installed at M/s. Kosi Jute Mills Private Limited, Supaul. The said report is in the nature of report submitted by an expert body. It is nobody's case that the petitioner had any 'lis' with the said firm. 19. This submission has obviously been made on the principle that no material can be relied against a person without giving the person concerned the opportunity to know the same. The said principle is certainly a facet of the principles of natural justice and its application to the departmental proceeding cannot be disputed but here the factual position is somewhat different. The said firm is certainly not the disciplinary or the enquiry authority of the petitioner and the report on which reliance was placed by the Enquiry Officer has been made available to the petitioner for inspection by the disciplinary authority when the petitioner demanded it. It appears that a letter was addressed on 23.2.1994 by the Managing Director of the said Corporation to the petitioner stating therein that the copy of the relevant portion of the report of the said firm is annexed with the Enquiry Officer's report and if the petitioner feels, he may peruse the entire report of the said firm on any working day in the Grievance and Vigilance Section of the said Corporation. Therefore, it cannot be said that the said report was withheld from the petitioner and the petitioner was not given any opportunity to look into the said report before making a representation on the Enquiry report. Reference in this connection may be made to a judgment of the Supreme court in the case of Jankinath Sarangi vs. State of Orissa reported in (1969) 3 SCC page 392. Reference in this connection may be made to a judgment of the Supreme court in the case of Jankinath Sarangi vs. State of Orissa reported in (1969) 3 SCC page 392. In that decision the complaint was of violation of the principles of natural justice and one of the grievances of the employee was that the report of the Chief Engineer was not given to him. In paragraph 4 of the said judgment the following factual observation has been made:- "The replies of the Chief Engineer do not appear to have been shown to the appellant in the first instance although he admits that they were placed in his hands at the time when the second notice was issued to him." 20. In Janakinath (supra) it was argued by the appellant that the materials which were gathered behind his back were used for determining his guilt. 21. In the 'background of this factual' context the learned judges of the Supreme Court observed as follows:- "There is no doubt that if the principles of natural justice are violated and there is a gross case this Court would interfere by striking down the order of dismissal; but there are cases and cases. We have to look to what actual prejudice has been caused to a person by the supposed denial to him of a particular right." (Emphasis added) The learned Judges held after posing the aforesaid question that there was no denial of natural justice to the petitioner by observing as follows in paragraph 5 at page 395 of the report : "No doubt the replies were not put in the hands of the appellant but he saw then at the time when he was making the representations and curiously enough he used those replies in his defence." 21. Therefore, the learned Judges held that no prejudice was caused to the appellant. In this case also the factual position is the same. The petitioner was given extract of the said report along with the report of the enquiry officer. Apart from that he was offered, as would appear from the letter referred to above, an opportunity to inspect the entire report on any working day in the Grievance and Vigilance Section of the said Corporation. Therefore, there is no question of any prejudice to the petitioner and the arguments made to the contrary cannot be upheld by this Court. 22. Therefore, there is no question of any prejudice to the petitioner and the arguments made to the contrary cannot be upheld by this Court. 22. The next point on which argument has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there has been government interference in the matter of holding of the enquiry in the sense that the petitioner was suspended at the instance of the Government. The suspension order which is disclosed in this proceeding would show that the same was passed by the Managing Director of the said Corporation in exercise of power under Regulation 39(iii) of the Staff Regulations. It may be that the Government has issued some instruction about passing of an order of suspension but an order of suspension loses its significance after the dismissal order is passed. Apart from that it has not been and cannot be contended by the petitioner that he was suspended by any incompetent authority or that there was no case for suspending him. The order of suspension also does not show that the suspension order was at the dictate of the Government. The suspension order was passed in exercise of power under relevant Regulation framed under Section 48 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 read with Section 23 of the Act and the said Regulations have been framed after consultation with the Reserve Bank of India and with the previous sanction of the State Government. Therefore, the order of suspension has been passed in exercise of power vested in the appropriate authority under the Staff Regulation which is statutory in character. This Court, therefore, does find any merit in this argument. 23. The question of bias of the Enquiry Officer has been argued rather vaguely by the learned counsel and this Court does not think that there is any material for holding that there was any bias of the Enquiry Officer vitiating the enquiry. The allegation of bias against the authorities holding quasi judicial enquiry must be made with sufficient particulars and in absence of the sufficient particulars it is well known that the allegation of bias and malafide cannot be considered by the Court. The allegation of bias against the authorities holding quasi judicial enquiry must be made with sufficient particulars and in absence of the sufficient particulars it is well known that the allegation of bias and malafide cannot be considered by the Court. The petitioner has also stated that in this case no Presenting Officer has been appointed and the Enquiry Officer himself did the job of the Presenting Officer as well and this is one of the grounds on which the case of alleged bias against an enquiry officer has been made out. But this Court finds that one P.K. Jha, Deputy Manager, Vigilance and Grievance Cell of the said Corporation has been appointed the Presenting Officer. Therefore, the criticism that there is no Presenting Officer in this departmental proceeding is not correct. 24. The next grounds of attack against the disciplinary proceeding levelled by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the charges are stale and in support of this contention learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the apex Court in this case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Bani Singh and others reported in AIR 1990 SC page 1308. In that judgment the learned Judges of the Supreme Court held that where the disciplinary proceeding is initiated against a person after more than 12 years, the same is liable to be quashed on the ground of the charges being stale and especially when there is no satisfactory explanation for the delay in issuing the charges but the ratio of the said judgment in the State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) cannot be attracted to the facts of this case. Hence the facts alleged in the charge memo are spread over 1988, 1989 and 1990 and the charge memo was issued in 1993. Apart from that in the counter affidavit some explanation has been offered as to why the initiation of the proceeding against the petitioner was delayed. Therefore, this Court cannot hold that the charges against the petitioner are stale in nature. 25. Another criticism has also been made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the charges do not make out any case of any misconduct against the petitioner and it is not the case of the respondent Corporation that the Corporation has sustained any financial loss in view of the alleged charges against the petitioner. 26. 25. Another criticism has also been made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the charges do not make out any case of any misconduct against the petitioner and it is not the case of the respondent Corporation that the Corporation has sustained any financial loss in view of the alleged charges against the petitioner. 26. This Court is unable to accept the aforesaid contention. The charges against the petitioner do make out a case of misconduct and the charges do show that financial loss has been occasioned to the said Corporation. Apart from that the learned counsel has also urged that the enquiry report was not made available to the petitioner. This argument is wholly untenable. It will appear from Annexure-3 to the writ petition that the enquiry report was made available to the petitioner as early as on 18.12.1994 and by a letter of the Managing Director of the same date, the petitioner was asked to submit his representation against the enquiry report. The learned counsel sought to create a confusion between the said report of the Enquiry Officer Sri Vidyarthi and the report of the Managing Director which has submitted after giving the petitioner an additional opportunity of appearing before the Managing Director on 3.6.1994 when the petitioner appeared before the Managing Director along with his counsel and availed of the opportunity of personal hearing. The letter, by which the petitioner was given the said opportunity for the third time as noted above and which opportunity the petitioner did avail is dated 3.6.1994. The said letter is set out below :- "You have already been given a copy of the enquiry report on the charges levelled against you in the departmental proceeding which is being conducted by the Bihar State Financial Corporation against you. As per the decision of the Board of Directors of Bihar State Financial Corporation taken in its meeting dated 2.6.94, you are being given one more opportunity of presenting your case before the Managing Director. This can be done either by appearing personally before or presenting your case through your Counsel or authorised representative. This must be done within one week from the date of the receipt of this letter. Your personal appearance of representation through Counselor authorized representative must be made before the Managing Director in his office chamber during regular office hours. This can be done either by appearing personally before or presenting your case through your Counsel or authorised representative. This must be done within one week from the date of the receipt of this letter. Your personal appearance of representation through Counselor authorized representative must be made before the Managing Director in his office chamber during regular office hours. If you so like you may fix up a prior appointment for the presentation of your case either by talking to me personally or to my P.A." 27. The said letter makes it very clear that the copy of the report was served upon the petitioner in due time. 28. Learned counsel for the petitioner was also not correct in submitting that while passing the final order of dismissal against the petitioner, the Board did not act on the Enquiry Officer's report but only acted on the report of the Managing Director. This criticism is also not correct inasmuch as it appears from page 2 of the dismissal order that the Board has considered all the materials on record including the written representation which was filed by the petitioner on 30.5.1994 as also the report of the enquiry/ conducting officer as also the finding of the Managing Director after hearing representation of the petitioner and on consideration of all these materials the Board has taken the decision of dismissing the petitioner from service. So it is not correct to state that the report of the Enquiry/Conducting Officer was not taken into account by the Board of Directors of the said Corporation. It also appears that the petitioner's appearance before the Managing Director was not an exercise in empty formality. As a result of the petitioner's personal appearance before the Managing Director on 10.6.1994, in the report which the Managing Director submitted, two charges against the petitioner were held not to have been proved. So the hearing given by the Managing Director to the petitioner and his learned counsel was in the nature of additional hearing given to him which is not contemplated under the said Regulation. So the grievance on the score of non-observance of the principles of natural justice cannot possibly be advanced in this case. 29. So the hearing given by the Managing Director to the petitioner and his learned counsel was in the nature of additional hearing given to him which is not contemplated under the said Regulation. So the grievance on the score of non-observance of the principles of natural justice cannot possibly be advanced in this case. 29. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Patiala and others vs. S.K. Sharma reported in AIR 1996 SC page 1669 the principles of natural justice which are to be observed in a disciplinary proceeding have been very elaborately discussed after noting both the English and Indian authorities on the subject. In an elaborate discussion the learned Judges of the Supreme Court came to the following conclusion at paragraph 27 page 1681 of the said report : "a distinction ought to be made between violation of the principles of natural justice audi alteram partem, as such and violation of a facet of the said principle. In other words, distinction is between "no notice", "no hearing" and "no adequate hearing" or to put it in different words, "no opportunity" and "no adequate opportunity." To illustrate take a case where the person is dismissed from service without hearing him altogether (as in Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964/C A 40). It would be a case falling under the first category and the order of dismissal would be invalid or void, if one chooses to use that expression (Calvin V. Carr 1980 AC 574). But where the person is dismissed from service, say, without supplying him a copy of the enquiry officer's report (Managing Director, B.C.I.L. V. S. Karunakar (1994 AIR SCW 1050) or without affording him a due opportunity of cross examining a witness (K.L. Tripathi, AIR 1984 SC 273 ), it would be a case falling in the latter category violation of a facet of the said rule of natural justice - in which case, the validity of the order has to be tested on the touch stone of prejudice, i.e. whether, all in all, the person concerned did or did not have a fair hearing. It would not be correct - in the light of the above decisions to say that for any and every violation of a facet of natural justice or of a rule incorporating such facet, the order passed is altogether void and ought to be set aside without further enquiry. In our opinion, the approach and test adopted in B. Karunakar should govern all cases where the complaint is not that there was no hearing (no notice, no opportunity and no hearing) but one of not affording a proper hearing (i.e. adequate or a full hearing) or of violation of a procedural rule or requirement governing the enquiry; the complaint should be examined on the touch stone of prejudice as aforesaid." 30. Elaborating the said aspect of the matter further the learned judges came to the following conclusion in paragraph 31 at page 1683 of the report : "Justice means justice between both the parties. The interests of justice equally demand that the guilty should be punished and that technicalities and irregularities which do not occasion failure of justice are not allowed to defeat the ends of justice. Principles of natural justice are but the means to achieve the ends of justice. They cannot be perverted to achieve the very opposite end. That would be a counter productive exercise." 31. Judging the case from the stand point of the aforesaid ratio in State Bank of Patiala (supra) and with which this Court is in respectful agreement, this Court finds that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner in the holding of the said enquiry. It cannot be said that there is no evidence against the petitioner nor can it be said that there was no proper enquiry against the petitioner or proper opportunity was not given to the petitioner. 32. So taking an over all view of the matter, this Court cannot persuade itself to hold that reasonable opportunity of defence has been denied to the petitioner or there is any fundamental flaw in the decision making process. As such the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be upheld and the writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to cost.