ORDER: 1. The four before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Coimbatore, in C.C.No. 986 of 1989, facing the charges framed against them, for the offences under Secs.120(B) read with 468 , 193 , 468 and 193 , I.P.C. are the revision petitioners herein, canvassing the legality and propriety of the impugned order passed in Crl.M.P.No.572 of 1995 in the above calendar case dated 17.7.1995, which was one, filed under Sec.204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to drop the proceedings against the accused, which was dismissed by the above impugned order. 2. Petitioners are brothers among themselves and the first accused was working as an Assistant Engineer, Southern Railways. Dindigul, at the relevant time. On 28.5.1986, a case in R.C.No.33 of 1986 under Sec.5(2) read with 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. was registered against him by the respondent herein which was the resultant aspect of an investigation done consequent upon obtaining a search warrant and his residential premises was searched on 29.5.1996 by the respondent and in the said search, a sum of Rs.2,94, 615 was recovered from the premises along with some incriminating documents and after the due investigation, a final report was filed against him before the learned Special Judge, Madurai, for the offences above referred to. 3. Upon the said final report in R.C.No.33 of 1986, a case in C.C.No.2 of 1987 was taken to file by the learned Special Judge, Madurai, and in the said case it appears that one Chandiran and Chatram Das Godya were examined as P.Ws.11 and 15 respectively and the documents marked by the prosecution through them as Exs.P-64 to P-69 were alleged to have been fabricated by the first petitioner/accused with the help of the said witnesses, before the learned Special Judge, at the time when this case was taken on file by the said court. 4. While being so, during the course of investigation of the said case, it was also alleged that the first petitioner herein along with the other accused, who are admittedly his brothers, fabricated certain documents and created false entries, fake promissory notes, guarantee letters, mortgage deed etc. With the help of P.Ws.11 and 15, namely, who are the approvers treated in the abovesaid case, as if a sum of Rs.2,50,000 was advanced to the first accused herein by the said approvers on 25.4.1986. With the help of P.Ws.11 and 15, namely, who are the approvers treated in the abovesaid case, as if a sum of Rs.2,50,000 was advanced to the first accused herein by the said approvers on 25.4.1986. It is also stated that the respondent while the case in C.C.No.2 of 1987 was pending on the file of the Special Judge, Madurai, registered this case in R.C.No.41 of 1986 against the accused herein and filed a final report on 4.12.1989 before the lower court for the alleged offences under Secs.120-B , 193 and 468, I.P.C. which was taken on file by the learned trial Magistrate as C.C.No.986 of 1989. The allegations made therein, are that the first accused/first petitioner along with his brothers, who are accused 2 to 4/petitioners 2 to 4 herein, and the approvers, namely Chandiram and Chatramdas Godya examined as P.W.s 11 and 15 in C.C.No.2 of 1987 on the file of the Special Judge, Madurai, have created false and forged documents and fabricated entries in the books of accounts of the approvers and thus fabricated false evidence with the sole purpose of explaining away the cash seized from the premises of the first accused on 29.5.1986, which was the subject matter of C.C.No.2 of 1987 on the file of the Special Judge, Madurai, Accordingly, charges above referred to against the accused/petitioners 1 to 4 herein, were framed by the learned trial Magistrate on 27.12.1989. 5. After taking cognizance of the offences referred to above in the final report by the learned trial Magistrate, process were issued to all the petitioners herein and consequently on their appearance, a petition under Sec.204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was filed on behalf of the petitioners, praying for the dropping of the entire proceedings on the ground that in view of the specific bar provided under Sec.195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the trial court ought not to have taken cognizance of the offences alleged against all the accused and that the very absence of any written complaint by a court or a competent authority as provided in the above section of law is necessarily fatal to the prosecution and it clearly amounts to a chronic illegality vitiating the entire proceedings and as such the whole proceedings initiated by the respondent has become void ab initio and for the said reasoning, the trail court assumes no competent legal jurisdiction. It was also contended that the offence under Sec.468 of the Indian Penal Code alleged against the accused is an aggravated form of forgery and that therefore, it fails within the ambit of Sec.463, I.P.C. Which has been clearly spelt out in Sec.195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 6. The said petition was resisted before the trial court by filing a counter statement on behalf of the respondent, contending inter alia, that the first petitioner was convicted by the learned Special Judge, Madurai, in C.C.No.2 of 1987 for the offences under Secs.5(2) read with 5(1)(e), Prevention of Corruption Act and that after the registration of the case against him, a search of the house of the first petitioner was conducted and a sum of Rs.2,94,615 was seized from his house, under proper house search warrant issued by the competent court, and that while the investigation in the above case against the first petitioner was in progress, it came to light that the petitioners along with approvers Chandiram and Chatramdas Godya entered into a criminal conspiracy and thereby created fabricated evidence to show that the approvers had given a sum of Rs.2,50,000 to the first petitioner in order to show that the seized amount of Rs.2,94,615 was the loan amount, and that when the above said fact came to be known to the respondent, while the investigation was in progress in R.C.No.33 of 1986 the respondent registered another case on 8.7.1986 against these petitioners as well as approvers in R.C.No.41 of 1986 and subsequently filed final report on 6.12.1989 before the trial court for the offences under Sec,120-B read with 468 and 193, I.P.C. It was also contended that both R.C.Nos.33 and 41 of 1986 were investigated by the respondent and the persons who actually fabricated the records and committed the offence of criminal conspiracy with the petitioners were legally pardoned by the competent court and subsequently taken as approvers in the abovesaid case by examining them as approvers, who accordingly were examined also as witness in R.C.No.33 of 1996 in C.C.No.2 of 1987 as P.Ws.l1 and 15 and that in the said case. (C.C.No.986 of 1989) petitioners appeared on 20.12.1989. Copies were furnished and on 27.12.1989 charges were framed against the petitioners under Sec.120-B read with 468 , 193, I.P.C. 7. (C.C.No.986 of 1989) petitioners appeared on 20.12.1989. Copies were furnished and on 27.12.1989 charges were framed against the petitioners under Sec.120-B read with 468 , 193, I.P.C. 7. It was therefore contended that the actual persons who fabricated the records in pursuance to their conspiracy with the petitioners were tendered pardon by the competent court and besides, they were examined as prosecution witnesses and the fabricated documents were not at all either produced or given in court and that in other words, the said fabricated documents were not at all used by the petitioners in any court of law and before using the same, the respondent, a lawful authority, registered a case against the petitioners and thereby established that the said documents are the fabricated one, as held by the learned Special Judge, Madurai, after examining all the persons as prosecution witnesses and hence, the said fabricated records were not at all produced or given in evidence in any court of law. 8. It was the specific contention of the respondent made in paragraph 10 of his counter statement, that as per Sec. 195(1)(b)(ii) , Crl.P.C. the fabricated documents were never produced or given in any proceedings in any court of law and that since it was not produced in any court of law, the sanction under Sec.195 , Crl.P.C. is not at all necessary and that since this respondent, before using, prevented the same by registering another case and as public servant the respondent filed this complaint against the accused in the court for the offences committed under Sec.193, I.P.C. and for the said reasoning, the sanction is not necessary. 9. On hearing the rival contentions, the learned trial Magistrate, declined to accept the contentions projected on behalf of the petitioners and dismissed the petition by observing the following in the finality: “It is no doubt true that the provisions of Sec.195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be evaded by resort to devices or camouflage merely by changing the label of an offence, which essentially falls within its scope. Where an offence falls within the provision of the section, it cannot be taken cognizance of unless it be at the instance of the concerned officer. Where an offence falls within the provision of the section, it cannot be taken cognizance of unless it be at the instance of the concerned officer. But it is equally settled that Sec.195 of the Code cannot bar the trial of an accused for distinct offences disclosed by the same facts which is not within the ambit of the said section. Since the offence in C.C.No.2 of 1987 is under Sec.5(1)(e) read with 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act for the offence committed by the 1st accused that he had been in possession of pecuniary resources or property in his name and in the name of his wife to the extent of Rs.4,63,551 which were disproportionate to his known sources of Income for which he could not satisfactorily account and the offences in this case C.C.No.986 of 1989 are under Sec.120-B read with 468 , 193 , I.P.C., 468 and 193 , I.P.C. for the offences committed by A1-A4 Chandiram and Chatramdas Godya subsequent to the criminal conspiracy held on 30.5.1986 by creating forged documents by putting anti-dates i.e., 24.5.1986 since the High Court of Madras has categorically held that Sec.195 , Crl.P.C. cannot bar the trial of a case of the distinct offences disclosed by the same facts which is not within the ambit of the said section, the subsequent offence cannot be confined within the ambit of such offences as contemplated in Sec.l95(i)(b)(ii) of Crl.P.C. Thus it becomes so clear that Sec.195(1)(b)(ii), Crl.P.C. is not attracted to this case, Hence the petition is dismissed.” It is this impugned order being challenged in this revision for its propriety and legality by and on behalf of the petitioners. 10. I have heard the arguments advanced by the bar assailing the impugned order on behalf of the revision petitioners and the contra by and on behalf of the respondent justifying and supporting the same. 11. 10. I have heard the arguments advanced by the bar assailing the impugned order on behalf of the revision petitioners and the contra by and on behalf of the respondent justifying and supporting the same. 11. The main plank of attack targeted by Mr.N.T.Vanamamalai, the learned Senior Counsel for and on behalf of the revision petitioners is that the proceedings initiated before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Coimbatore in C.C.No.986 of 1989 for the offences under Secs.120-B read with 468 ,193 , 468 and 193 , I.P.C. against the petitioners herein, is clearly in the teeth of the legal bar provided by Sec.195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as it was based on no written complaint by a competent court, who had enabled the alleged forged documents produced in evidence or trial or such court had not preferred any complaint to proceed against the revision petitioners for the offences and that therefore, he would contend that on this ground alone, the whole proceedings has become void for want of legal competency. The learned senior counsel would further submit that the factual aspects alleged to have been proved by the respondent was against the first petitioner in the previous case, which was legally disposed of by a court of competent jurisdiction and while being so, the trial court never observed nor was inclined to authorise the respondent to initiate the present proceedings and that therefore, registering the complaint by the respondent sua motu against the same accused and the others in the subsequent complaint would become incompatible and clearly amounts to the concept of double jeopardy. At any rate, the learned senior counsel would submit that the alleged offences in the impugned proceedings would clearly fall within the ambit of Sec.195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that therefore, the learned trial court ought not to have taken cognizance of the offences without any complaint from the competent authority as provided. To substantiate the above of his contentions, a plethora of case-laws have been relied on. 12. To substantiate the above of his contentions, a plethora of case-laws have been relied on. 12. Counteracting every of the contentions treated against, learned counsel Mr.P.Rajamanickam, appearing for the respondent, would contend, that Sec. 195(1)(b)(ii) , Crl.P.C. or other sections would have no application to the facts of the instant case, for the simple reasoning that the respondent while investigating the case registered against the first petitioner/accused in R.C.No.33 of 1986, came to know on 30.5.1986 that the first accused along with his three brothers and in conspiracy with the witnesses P.W.11 and P.W.15, the financiers, created false promissory notes, fake documents, mortgage deed which were subsequently marked as Ex.P-64 to Ex.P-69 and that during the course of the said investigation, when the respondent came to know the commission of the distinct and different offences by all the revision petitioners herein along with the said financiers, for the offences under Secs.120-B , 468 and 193, I.P.C, the respondent had registered the F.I.R. against all the four on 8.7.1986 and that therefore, the investigation done in the subsequent First Information Report is a continuatuion of the investigation done in the earlier First Information Report by the same respondent for the distinct and different offences. It is for the said reasonings and the two final reports for the two distinct and separate offences were filed and that though the factual aspects assume similarity, they lead to distinct and different offences and that the bar provided under Sec.195 of the Code has no application at all and that the present attempt made by the petitioners before the learned trial Magistrate would certainly be a device to have a clear escape from the clutches of law and in support of his contentions, learned counsel also relied on a number of case laws held by the Apex Court as well as the other High Courts. 13. It is in this context of the rival position, the relevant point that arises for consideration is whether the impugned order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Coimbatore, in the instant case, has become vitiated for any illegality or improprietye 14. 13. It is in this context of the rival position, the relevant point that arises for consideration is whether the impugned order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Coimbatore, in the instant case, has become vitiated for any illegality or improprietye 14. Before proceeding to analyse the factual aspects of the instant case, let me prefer the legal aspects involved in this case for its due application and for the said purpose, adverting of Sec.195(1)(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has become relevant to be taken note of which read as hereunder: “No court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal code namely, Secs.193 to 196 (both inclusive) 199 , 200 , 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any court, or (ii) of any offence described in Sec.463 , or punishable under Sec.471 , Sec.475 or Sec.476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court, or (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or the abetment of any offence specified in Sub-clause (i) or Sub-clause (ii), except in the complaint in writing of that court, or of some other court which that court is subordinate”. The offences claimed to have been involved in the instant case are under Secs.120(B) 468 and 193, I.P.C. against all the revision petitioners. Sec.463 of the Indian Penal Code defines the concept of ‘Forgery’ in providing that, whoever makes any false document or part of a document, with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery. Sec.468 of the Indian Penal Code runs as stated hereunder: “Whoever commits forgery, intending that the document forged shall be used for the purpose of cheating, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.” A minimum understanding of the wordings employed in the above two sections of law would demonstrably reveal that the offence provided under Sec.468 of the Indian Penal Code is the penal provision for having committed the offence of forgery as defined under Sec.463, I.P.C. and that further the latter section is clearly indicative of the aggravated form of of the former section. It also cannot be disputed that Sec. 120-B or 120-A and Sec. 193 of the Indian Penal Code would clearly come within the frame of Sec. 195(1)(b)(ii) and (iii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 15. Sec.195(1)(a)(iii) also refers to of any criminal conspiracy to commit such offence, not to be taken cognizance of except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servants whom he is administratively subordinate. The two limitations spelt out by the statute one in Sec.195(1) (a)(iii) and another in Sec.195(a)(b)(ii) and (iii) with the exception would clearly emphasize the fact that taking cognizance of the offence referred to therein is barred by any court unless it is specifically alleged in a complaint in writing of a public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate and so also, on a complaint in writing of that court or of some other court to which that court is subordinate and it is also made clear that except on the complaint made in writing either by the complaint public servant or of his subordinate or on the complaint in writing of a court or of some other court with regard to the offences referred to therein, no court shall be empowered to take cognizance of the offences. 16. 16. The Supreme Court in Patel Laljibhai v. State of Gujarat Patel Laljibhai v. State of Gujarat , A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1935: 1971 Crl.L.J. 1457 has in this regard ruled the following: “The offences about which the court alone, to the exclusion of the aggrieved private parties is clothed with the right to complain may, therefore, be appropriately considered to be only those offences committed by a party to a proceeding in that court, the commission of which has a reasonably close nexus with the proceedings in that court so that it can, without embarkingn upon a completely in dependant and fresh inquiry satisfactorily consider by reference principally to its records the expediency of prosecuting the delinquent party. The purpose and object of the Legislature in creating the bar against cognizance of private complaints in regard to the offences maintained in Sec. 195(1)(b) and (c) is both to save the accused person from vexatious or baseless prosecutions spited by feelings of vindictiveness on the part of the private complainants to harass their opponents and also to avoid confusion which is likely to arise on account of conflicts between findings of the courts in which forged documents are produced or false evidence is led and the conclusions of the criminal courts dealing with the private complaint. It is for this reason that the legislature has entrusted the court, whose proceedings had been the target of the offence of perjury to consider the expediency in the larger public interest, of a criminal trial of the guilty party.” 17. Again the Supreme Court in Gopalakrishna Menon v. D.Raja Reddy Gopalakrishna Menon v. D.Raja Reddy A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 1053: 1983 Crl.L.J. 1599: (1983)4 S.C.C. 240 :1983 S.C.C. (Crl.) 822 while dealing with similar position had the occasion to rule the following: “The offence which is made punishable under Sec.467 is in respect of an offence described in Sec.463. Once it is accepted that Sec.463 defines forgery and Sec.467 , punishes forgery of a particular category, the provision in Sec.195(1) (b)(ii) of Criminal Procedure Code would immediately be attracted and on the basis that the offence punishable under Sec.467 is an offence described in Sec.463, in the absence of a complaint by the court the prosecution would not be maintainable. Consequently the prosecution of the persons who alleged to have produced the forged money receipt in civil court, for offences punishable under Secs.467 and 471 read with Sec.34 on the basis of a private complaint and in the absence of a complaint from the appropriate civil court where the alleged fraudulent money receipt has been produced, would not be sustainable because if the prosecution is allowed to continue serious prejudice would be caused to them and they would be called upon to face a trial which would not be sustainable.” 18. To spell out that for a court or a Magistrate while dealing with a document of forgery in nature, it is deemed the function cast upon a Magistrate or court is a judicial one, it has become relevant to quoe the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kamalapathi v. State of W.B. Kamalapathi v. State of W.B. A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 777: 1979 Crl.L.J. 879 in the following words: “Magistrates are specifically labelled as courts by the statutory provisions of Sec.6 and therefore have to be regarded as such. It is no doubt true that the Code assigns to a Magistrate various functions which do not fall within the sphere of judicial duties and are, on the other hand, functions of an an executive nature such as the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction in relation to investigation carried out by the police or work done on the administrative side; and it may plausibly be argued that in the discharge of such functions a Magistrate does not act as a court. But then a Magistrate cannot but be regarded as a court when he acts judicially. While deciding the question of bail, therefore, a Magistrate must be held to be acting as a court and not in any other capacity irrespective of the stage which the case has reached by then, that is whether it is till under investigation by the police or has progressed to the stage of an inquiry or trial by the Magistrate. The taking of a cognizance of any offence by a Magistrate under Sec.190 is not a condition precedent for him to be regarded as a court. The taking of a cognizance of any offence by a Magistrate under Sec.190 is not a condition precedent for him to be regarded as a court. An order of bail passed by a Magistrate also decides the rights of the state and the accused and is made by the Magistrate after the application of his mind and therefore in the discharge of his judicial duties, which factor constitutes it an act of a court.” 19. However the Supreme Court in Legal Remembrancer, Government of West Bengal v. Haridas Legal Remembrancer, Government of West Bengal v. Haridas 1976 Crl.L.J. 1732: A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2225 has held as follows: “The words of Sec.195(1)(c) clearly mean that the offence should be alleged to have been committed by the party to the proceeding in his character as such party, that is, after having become a party to the proceeding. Secs. 195(1)(c) , 476 and 476-A read together indicate beyond doubt that the Legislature could not have intended to extend the prohibition contained in Sec.195(1)(c) to the offence mentioned therein when committed by a party to a proceeding prior to his becoming such party. Thus the scope of Sec.195 (1) (c) is restricted to cases where the offence is alleged to have been comitted by the party to a proceeding after he became such party and not before.” 20. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court as stated above, though it was prior to the amendment of Sec. 195 of the Code, the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Harban Singh v. State of Punjab Harban Singh v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1987 P. & H. 19: 1986 Crl.L.J. 1834 (KB.) held that the procedure contemplated under Sec.195(1) (b)(ii) need not be followed in cases where the offence alleged to have been committed is prior to the initiation of the proceedings in a court. 21. 21. A learned single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in Govindarajulu v. State of Karnataka Govindarajulu v. State of Karnataka 1995 Crl.L.J. 1491 has followed the view expressed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court and also the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Legal Remembrancer, Government of West Bengal v. Haridas Mundra Legal Remembrancer, Government of West Bengal v. Haridas Mundra 1976 Crl.L.J. 1732: A.I.R. 1976 S.C 225 and held as follows: “A plain reading of Sec.195 would show that for offences mentioned in Clause (b) (ii) and (iii) of Sec.195 (1) of the Code the court can take cognizance of those offences only when the complaint is in writing filed by the court of some other court to which that court is subordinate, before which the document in question is found to be forged one and the accused before that court are found to have committed any offence. If the section is strictly construed the bar would operate only if the offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of document which is produced or given in evidence and not to the offence committed earlier to the proceedings in court. Thus, where the cognizance of offence of forgery was taken and the said offences were committed before the forged document was produced in pending suit before civil court, the bar of Sec.195(1) (b) would not be attracted and, therefore, complaint in writing of civil court for “taking cognizance of offence was not necessary”. However, there was a little bit of legal speculation among the higher hierarchy of the courts in the country subsequently. 22. It is worthwhile to advert to the observation made by the Supreme Court in Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 299: 1974 Crl.L.J. 220 for the following: “In order to attract Sec. 195(1)(c)the offence should be alleged to have been committed by the party to the proceeding in his character as such party i.e., after having become a party to the proceeding. Therefore, where in a private complaint under Secs. Therefore, where in a private complaint under Secs. 464 , 467 , 468 and 471 , I.P.C. the allegations of the complainant is that the accused forged will in the name of one K and there after produced it before the Parwari or the Tahsildar in the mutation proceedings commenced by them on the strength of the will; Held, that the forgery was alleged to have been committed by the accused prior to the commencement of the mutation proceedings and not after they become parties to those proceedings and hence Sec.195(1)(c) was not applicabe atleast in regard to the offences is under Secs.464 , 467 and 468 and the Magistrate could take cognizance of the offences”. 23. With regard to the applicability and the scope of Sec. 195, Crl.P.C, a learned single Judge of this Court in Rakkammal v. Irulappa Konar Rakkammal v. Irulappa Konar 1988 L.W. (Crl.) 225 had the occasion to observe the following: “The offence committed by accused before they become parties to the proceedings and which are complete by themselves, would not come under the purview of Sec.195, Crl.P.C. In this case, we find that the offences of conspiracy, forgery, impersonation have been committed prior to and on 24th July, 1974 and 25th July, 1974. The offence under Sec.471, had been committed on 28th July, 1974, when the fourth respondent facilitated patta transfer, on the basis of the forged sale deeds. It is only on 8.8.1974 and 9.8.1974, that the civil suits have been instituted by the petitioner and it is much later that the forged sale deeds themselves have been produced before the civil court by respondents 1 to 3. The offences for which (respondents 1 to 10) were tried, having been committed long prior to the commencement to the civil proceedings and prior to the documents having been produced in the civil proceedings, would not come within the purview if Sec.195(1)(b)(ii), Crl.P.C. The fact that a fresh offence under Sec.471 ,I.P.C. by the above documents being used in the civil court, where they were produced, as an answer to the prayer for redemption would be a fresh offence regarding which the civil court if satisfied about the expediency of the prosecution, could act under Sec.340, Crl.P.C. That would not in any way alter the fact that the offences had already been committed, long before civil proceedings were even contemplated. The mere fact that some evidence collected by the civil court had been let in as additional evidence in the criminal court, would not change the legal position. Sec.195(1)(b)(ii), Crl.P.C. would not apply to the facts of the case and a complaint by the District Munsif, is not necessary, to enable the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offences. Acquittal of respondents 1 to 10 merely on that ground cannot be sustained. However, in view of the fact that this is a revision by a private party, the only course open to this Court on the basis of the above findings, is to order a retrial. It is unfortunate that the State has not chosen to prefer an appeal, atleast to set right the legal issues involved. Unlike a civil wrong arising out of a tortious liability or the infringement of a right of particular individuals who have to seek their remedies on their own, a crime is primarily considered, as an offence against society, thereby making the State machinery the investigation and prosecuting agency. Therefore, it is, that the language of Sec.190, Crl.P.C, is very wide, so as to enable a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence, whether in a complaint or on a police report or on information received from any person or upon his own knowledge, that the offence has been committed. Any one could set the criminal law in motion. The concept of locus standi in criminal proceedings, subject to certain statutory exceptions is alien to criminal law. However, certain types of offences, which are mentioned in Secs.195 , 198 , 198-A and 199, Crl.P.C. are considered as offences primarily directed against certain authorities or certain individuals, thereby requiring a complaint to be instituted, by that person aggrieved. Similarly, the offences mentioned in Secs.196 and 197, Crl.P.C. require sanction from certain authorities, before the criminal court can take cognizance of them. These section therefore, being exceptions to the general Sec.190 , Crl.P.C. have to be interpreted strictly, The general right to set the law in motion, available under Sec.190, Crl.P.C, could not be lightly taken away, by too liberal an interpretation of the section dealing with exceptions to what general rule. Adopting the narrow view therefore, would also be in consonance with the general principle of Criminal Jurisprudence. Adopting the narrow view therefore, would also be in consonance with the general principle of Criminal Jurisprudence. The question that arises for consideration is whether the amendment introduced to Sec.195, Crl.P.C. would unsettle the law laid down in Patel Laljibhai v. State of Gujarat Patel Laljibhai v. State of Gujarat A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1935: 1971 Crl.L.J. 1457 and affirmed in Raghunath and others v. State of U.P Raghunath and others v. State of U.P A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1100: “1973”1 S.C.C. 564:1973 S.C.C. (Crl.) 448: 1973 Crl.L.J. 858 and State of Karnataka v. Hemareddi State of Karnataka v. Hemareddi A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1417: (1981)1 S.C.C. 185: 1981 Crl.L.J. 1019. The only object behind the amendment to Sec.195(a), (b) , Crl.P.C. in 1974 was to extend the protection under Sec.195, Crl.P.C. then given to parties to proceedings, also to witness, scribes, attestors, etc., and thereby enlarge the protection envisaged by the section. They too, had to be safeguarded against frivolous and vexatious Proceedings. The omission of the words by a party to any proceeding in any court, therefore, has no bearing on the law laid down by the Supreme Court. The pre-amendment decisions would apply with equal force, to Secs.195 (1) (b) (ii) as it stands, after the amendment. The Supreme Court, had consistently adopted the narrower view, restricting the scope of Sec.195(1)(b)(ii) and (iii) only to offences committed, after the proceedings had started before the concerned court. Wherever the offences had been committed prior to the commencement of the civil proceedings and were complete by themselves, the bar under Sec.195(1)(b)(ii) would not apply and it would be open to the private individual to set the law in motion. It is significant that the only change that has been brought a bout by the amendment to Sec.195 in 1974, is the omission of the words by a party to any proceeding in any court. It has therefore to be seen as to whether by deleting the above words, the Legislature intended to bring about change in the law, as settled by the Supreme Court prior to the amendment. It has therefore to be seen as to whether by deleting the above words, the Legislature intended to bring about change in the law, as settled by the Supreme Court prior to the amendment. “The question as to whether the omission of the words by party to any proceedings in any court’ in Sec.195(1) (b)(ii) is intended to change the position of law, will have to be decided on a combined reading of Secs.195 and 340, Crl.P.C. as also the rationale as behind the decision of the Supreme Court in Patel Laljibhai v. State of Gujarat Patel Laljibhai v. State of Gujarat A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1935: 1971 Crl.L.J. 1457.” 24. In the light of the above observations and as I have already adverted to, the concept of forgery is seen to have been described and defined in Sec.463 , I.P.C. and 465 to 469 provide for punishment of forgery of the various documents under different circumstances and in view of the decisions referred to above, it has to be taken as totally safe to hold that the offence under Sec.468 , I.P.C. is the one described under Sec.463 , I.P.C. and as such, it is attracted by the provisions of Sec.195, Crl.P.C. It is no doubt true that in the instant case, the question that arose for consideration is whether the provisions of Sec.195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable to a proceeding under Sec.468, I.P.C. Though the rulings held by the Supreme Court and the observations made by the learned single Judge of this Court, took a view that when the offence alleged to have been committed is prior to initiation of proceedings in a court of law, the procedure contemplated under Sec.195, Crl.P.C. is inapplicable, where, the High Courts of various States took the different view. 25. 25. In the light of Sec.195(1)(b)(ii) , for the phraseology that “no court shall take cognizance of any offence described in Sec.465 , or punishable under Sec.471 , Sec.475 or 476 of the Indian Penal Code when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court” in the context of the language used, ‘when such offence is alleged to have been committed only in respect of a document produced thereby, would mean the offence already committed in respect of a document which is produced in any court and is such, the language and phraseology used in Sec.195(1)(b)(ii) makes it abundantly clear that it covers an offence alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced in any court even prior to the initiation of the proceedings in a court. 26. In Andhra Bank v. S.H.Parrabhipuram Crime Police Station Andhra Bank v. S.H.Parrabhipuram Crime Police Station 1996 Crl.L.J. 277at 279 a learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held the following: “Therefore, I am of the view that Sec.l95(b)(ii) applies to the offences alleged to have been committed even prior to the initiation of the proceedings in a court. If the interpretation placed by the Punjab and Haryana and Kerala High Court is to be accepted it would amount to introducing words in the section i.e., alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced in any court while the document is in the custody of the court which is not within the real of the judicial interpretation. Therefore, with great respect the view expressed by the Punjab and Haryana, Kerala, Karnataka High Courts is not acceptable”. 27. In the light of the evolution of the case laws above referred and adverted to the facts of the instant case, I am in entire agreement with the views of the learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the view expressed by the learned single judge of this Court, in the above referred citation Rakkammal v. Irulappa Konar Rakkammal v. Irulappa Konar 1988 L.W. (Crl.) 225 is not acceptable to me. 28. 28. Mr.P.Rajamanickam, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the respondent, besides, referring the case laws in Registrar, High Court v. Kodangi Registrar, High Court v. Kodangi 1930 M.W.N. 258 (F.B.), Legal Remembrancer, Government of West Bengal also relied upon the decision held by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Karnail Singh v. State of Punjab Karnail Singh v. State of Punjab 1983 Crl.L.J. 713 for the following observations: “The statutory power of the police to investigate cognizable offences under Sec.471 , 475 or 476 , I.P.C. is in no way barred by virtue of the provisions of Sec.195(1)(b)(ii). The binding precedent applicable to earlier provisions of Sec.195(1)(c) of the 1898 Code would be equally attracted in the case of the present provision subject to the marginal change in the Sec.195(1)(b)(ii). Sec.195(1)(ii) confines to forgeries committed in respect of a document during its custody by the court or its fabrication in the course of the proceedings itself. Thus wherein a suit for declaration of possession, the claim was primarily rested on the will allegedly executed by the father of the plaintiff, petitioner and during its pendency the defendant had made an application alleging that the Will was forged and thereby the petitioner had committed the offence under Secs.420 , 467 and 471 , I.P.C. and the investigation thereof was commenced after the registration of the case in police station the F.I.R. and the investigation started thereunder could not be quashed in view of Sec.95(1)(b)(ii)”. 29. He also relied on a case held in Harban Singh v. State of Punjab Harban Singh v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1987 P. & H. 19: 1986 Crl.L.J. 1834 (F.B.) for the following position: “Sec.195(1) (b)(ii) of the new Code envisaging bar against prosecution except on complaint of the civil court is limited in its operation only to the offences mentioned in that section if committed in regard to a document produced or given in evidence in such proceedings, while the documents is in the custody of the court. It has no application to a case in which such a document is fabricated prior to its production or given in evidence. The deletion of the words”by a party to any proceedings in court“from Sec.l95(1)(c) of the old Code which was the section corresponding to Sec.195(2)(b)(ii) does not go in favour of taking a wider view of Sec.195(1)(b)(ii) of the new Code. The deletion of the words”by a party to any proceedings in court“from Sec.l95(1)(c) of the old Code which was the section corresponding to Sec.195(2)(b)(ii) does not go in favour of taking a wider view of Sec.195(1)(b)(ii) of the new Code. The restricted view is more in consonance with the scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure to provide harmonious interpretation and will not defeat or frustrate any other relevant provision of the Code. Sec.195 and 340 of the new Code form part of statutory scheme dealing with the subject of prosecution for offences against the administration of justice and things have to be read together to ascertain the intention of the legislature. The offences about which the court alone to the exclusion of the aggrieved party has jurisdiction to file complainant in respect of an offence should have a reasonably close nexus with the proceedings in court, so that it can satisfactorily consider by reference principally to its record the expediency of prosecuting the delinquent person. The court while embarking upon an enquiry under Sec.340 should not act as an investigating agency as it would be impractiable for the court to decide about the expediency of launching of prosecution in respect of forgeries committed earlier to the proceedings initiated in that court.” 30. Reliance was also placed by the learned Special Public Prosecutor in Nirmalji v. State of W.R Nirmalji v. State of W.R A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2639, Rakkammal On a careful consideration of the legal ratios upon which reliance was placed by the learned Special Public Prosecutor to the facts of the instant case, in my considered view, they do not render any help or aid to substantiate or support the case of the respondent herein. Most of the case laws held by the Apex Court as well as other High Courts above referred to were relied on by both parties in support of their position for the indication of identical facts between the case laws cited above and the facts of the instant one. 31. In the light of the legal principles enunciated by the Apex Court and the other High Courts as adverted to above, I have to analyse the factual aspects of the instant case. A case in R.C.No.33 of 1986 by the respondent was registered against the first revision petitioner/accused for the offences under Sec.5(2) read with 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. A case in R.C.No.33 of 1986 by the respondent was registered against the first revision petitioner/accused for the offences under Sec.5(2) read with 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 1947, which after the full investigation, a final report seems to have been filed before the learned Special Judge, Madurai, against the first accused/revision petitioner along and the cognizance of the same was taken by the learned Special Judge in C.C.No.2 of 1987. The case records also would reveal that P.W.11 and P.W.15 by name Chandiram and Chatram Das Godya respectively turned approvers after given the pardon to them on their disclosing the facts with regard to the fabrication of Ex.P-64 to Ex.P-69 marked by the prosecution during the trial of the above case. Consequently, it appears further the trial went on and the learned Special Judge has found the first accused guilty for the offences charged and tried accepting the plea that the said documents Ex.P-64 to Ex.P-69 were fabricated and falsely created by P.W.11 and P.W.15 with the connivance of the accused/revision petitioners. Ex.P-1 marked is the copy of the judgment rendered by the learned Special Judge, Madurai, in C.C.No.2 of 1987 dated 25.1.1993 before the court below. Quite apparently and obviously, though a finding was given by the learned Special Judge, that the first accused, revision petitioner was guilty for the offences under Sec.5(1)(e) read with 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act on the basis that Ex.P-64 to Ex.P-69, the promissory notes, title deeds and the connected mortgage deed and the relevant entry were all bogus and falsely created by P.W.11 and P.W.15 in connivance with the accused, he has neither directed nor lodged any complaint to be registered by the respondent with regard to the above crime and the culpability of the persons concerned and consequently no observation with regard to the direction given by the learned Special Judge in the earlier proceedings is available. Thus, it is seen incontrovertibly, in respect of the fake documents as observed by the learned Special Judge in the earlier proceedings were bogus creations of the revision petitioners/accused in connivance with P.W.ll and P.W.15, there was no complaint nor any direction howsoever given by the learned Special Judge while delivering the judgment or during the pendency of the proceedings. 32. 32. Nevertheless a case against these four revision petitioners/accused appears to have been registered in R.C.No.41 of 1986 by the respondent herein and after the investigation by the respondent, a final report was filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Coimbatore on 6.12.1989 for the offences under Secs.l20-B read with 468 and 193, I.P.C. the cognizance of which was taken by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in C.C.No.986 of 1989, citing almost the same set of witnesses, namely, the approvers and the documents marked as Ex.P-64 to Ex.P-69 in the earlier proceedings as the main basis for the subsequent trial for the above offences alleged to have been committed adding more accused, the revision petitioners 2, 3 and 4 who are also the Government servants but happened to be the brothers of the first accused in the earlier proceedings. 33. While looking into the nature of offences alleged to have been involved in the present case, that is the commission of offences punishable under Secs.120B , 468 and 193 , I.P.C., there cannot be any dispute that the said offences clearly come within the limb of Secs.195 and 195(1)(b)(ii), Crl.P.C. Be that as it may, as the Legislature has enacted the above section, a clear bar is provided for the court to take cognizance of the above offences in the absence of any written complaint either by the person referred to therein or by a court and this fact concedingly remains unassailed for there was no complaint at all by the court which tried the prior case and before whom the alleged documents, namely, Ex.P-64 to Ex.P-69 were produced as fake ones or forged ones warranting the above sections of the Indian Penal Code. This was perhaps the reason the revision petitioners seem to have taken advantage of and filed the impugned petition before the learned trial Magistrate praying to drop the proceedings for the illegality committed above. 34. One another circumstance, which is very much gave in nature and character, has arisen out of the inconsistent plea and the defence taken on behalf of the respondent, which I am bound to take note of while adjudicating the present matter in its proper legal perspective. 34. One another circumstance, which is very much gave in nature and character, has arisen out of the inconsistent plea and the defence taken on behalf of the respondent, which I am bound to take note of while adjudicating the present matter in its proper legal perspective. In the counter statement filed by and on behalf of the respondent in the court below a specific plea and stand was taken to the extent, that during the course of the trial of the earlier proceedings, the fabricated documents were not at all used by the petitioners in any court of law and before using the same, the respondent being a lawful authority registered a case against the petitioners and thereby established that the said documents are fabricated ones as held by the learned Special Judge, Madurai, after examining all the persons as prosecution witnesses and hence, the said fabricated records were not at all produced or given in evidence in any court of law. The above stand in particular was reiterated again in the counter in paragraph 10 stating that as per Sec.195(1)(b)(ii) , Crl.P.C. the fabricated documents were never produced nor given in evidence in any court of law and that since it was not produced in any court of law, the sanction under Sec.195 , Crl.P.C. is not at all necessary and since this respondent before using, prevented the same by registering another case and as public servant the respondent filed this complaint against the accused in the court for the offence committed under Sec.193, I.PC. and for the said reasoning, the sanction is not necessary. In short to say, if I am given to understand that the argument advanced by Mr.P.Rajamanickam, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the respondent C.B.I, that the fake or forged documents were never produced before any court of law previously nor exhibited nor relied on but the registering of the case in R.C.No.41 of 1986 by the respondent is to be deemed to be a complaint given by a public servant even prior to the starting of the earlier proceedings and whatever it may be, the investigation of the subsequent case registered against all the revision petitioner/accused is a continuation of the earlier investigation and that therefore the bar provided under Sec.195(1)(b)(ii) does not apply, cannot have any interaction or nexus to the facts of the instant case. The reason being that the offences alleged against all the petitioners are punishable under Secs.120-B , 468 and 193, I.P.C. and the very basis and foundation for the registering of the above case was fake or forged documents, created by these four petitioners and the said documents were marked as Ex.P-64 to Ex.P-69 in the earlier proceedings before the learned Special Judge, Madurai, and P.W.11 and P.W.15 who are the approvers also gave evidence with regard to the said documents exhibited and consequently, findings were given by the learned Special Judge accepting the same to be forged documents but however, he did not give any direction or complaint or recommendation to proceed further against the other three petitioners or against all the four for separate offences. It is not the case of the respondent before the learned Special Judge or subsequently that in so far as the above aspects are subsequently that in so far as the above aspects are concerned, the learned Special Judge has omitted to do so, inadvertently but strangely enough, it is noticed that the respondent has taken a specific plea that no forged or fake documents had been produced before the previous proceedings and though produced the respondents never utilised the same and the court has not adjudicated upon it. The inconsistent stand taken by the respondent in the instant case seems to have no bearing with or any interaction to the judgment delivered by the learned Special Judge in the earlier proceedings as evident from Ex.P-1. It is all well to note that the learned Special Judge had given a total and complete adjudication about the documents Ex.P-64 to Ex.P-69 and the evidence of P.Ws.11 and 15 in the earlier proceedings. It is all well to note that the learned Special Judge had given a total and complete adjudication about the documents Ex.P-64 to Ex.P-69 and the evidence of P.Ws.11 and 15 in the earlier proceedings. If that being so, in the absence of any complaint or direction or any observation with regard to the further probe on the basis of Ex.P-64 to Ex.P-69 after having thus considered the whole gamut of the matter, I have no hesitation to hold that the arguments and stand projected before me by the learned Special Public Prosecutor for the respondent/C.B.I, can have no legs to stand and in this regard, I am of the constrained view that to the facts of the instant case the bar provided under Sec.195, Crl.P.C. is totally applicable and operative for the specific words and phraseology spelt out in the above section, viz., “No court shall take cognizance” and the question of continuation of the investigation and during the course of the investigation, the investigating authorities came out with the forged documents and so on is purely out of point and do not have any merit for consideration. 35. Of course, it was true, that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate while rejecting the petition by passing the impugned order has done so obviously for he found that the offences alleged to have been committed in the instant case is totally different and distinct from the offences for which the earlier proceedings were conducted by the learned Special Judge and that therefore, the present application and the reliefs claimed therein, is not available to the petitioners herein. But this finding, in my respectful view, is nothing but erroneous for the reason that Sec.195 , Crl.P.C. provides the bar for the court from taking cognizance of the offences against a public servant for the offences mentioned therein, which is inclusive of Secs.120 (b) , 468 and 193, I.P.C. Having thus considered the factual and legal aspects above referred to and the circumstances under which the revision came into offing, I am of the firm view that the statutory bar provided under Sec.195(1)(b)(ii) and all the more Sec.195 , Crl.P.C. cannot be avoided for the facts of the instant case and it has come clearly within the teeth of Sec.195(1)(b)(ii) Crl.P.C. specifically in the absence of any written complaint by the concerned person or by the court in any manner whatsoever and howsoever. It is for the abovesaid reasonings and my findings, with respect to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, I am constrained to hold that the findings given by him and basis upon which he has declined to look into the legal ambit of the matter involved, is not proper but highly erroneous and to this extent, I am able to identify the illegality and the impropriety in the impugned order, which for the reasoning given above is liable to be set aside. 36. In the result, for all the foregoing findings and reasonings, the revision succeeds and accordingly it is allowed. Consequently, the impugned order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Coimbatore, in Crl.M.P.No.572 of 1995, dated 17.7.1995 is set aside and the prayer asked for before him to drop the proceedings is allowed. Revision allowed.