ANIL KUMAR SINGH v. COMMISSIONER ENTERTAINMENT TAX LUCKNOW
1997-07-30
MARKANDEY KATJU, P.K.JAIN
body1997
DigiLaw.ai
M. KATJU AND P. K. JAIN, JJ. Heard Sri Shashi Nandan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Mool Behari Saxena, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 5 to 10. 2. This writ petition has been filed against the order dated 30- 6-97 passed by the Commissioner, Entertainment Tax, U. P. and for commanding the respondent Nos. 2 to 4 not to forcibly evict the petitioner from the premises of the Cinema hall in question on the basis of the aforesaid order. 3. It appears that there is a cinema hall known as kamla talkies in the city of Jaun-pur in respect of which a licence was issued to respondent No. 5 under the U. P. Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1955. Both the petitioner as well as respondent No. 5 had applied for a licence for running the cinema, but the ap plication of respondent No. 5 was allowed and that of the petitioner was dismissed. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner filed writ petition No. 12865 of 1997 Anil Kumar Singh v. District Magistrate/licensing Authority, Jaunpur and others which was dis missed by a division bench of this Court on 15-4-1997, copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-io to the writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner can not be dispossessed as he has entered into an agreement dated 28-1-97 with respondent No. 5, copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. In the said agreement it is stated that since the licensee is unable to look after the premises she had asked the other party in the agreement (the present petitioner) to run the cinema as a Managing agent. On the basis of this agree ment the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is a lessee and he can not be evicted from the said premises. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited our attention to Section 2 (b) and (c) of the U. P. Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1955. Section 2 (b) states:- "occupier" includes a managing agent or other person authorised to represent the occupier or having charge, management or control of the place on his behalf. " 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is an occupier in view of the above provision.
Section 2 (b) states:- "occupier" includes a managing agent or other person authorised to represent the occupier or having charge, management or control of the place on his behalf. " 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is an occupier in view of the above provision. This defini tion itself indicates that the petitioner being a managing agent, is not a person having charge, management or control of the cinema on his own behalf, rather it is on behalf of his principal (the licensee ). Sec tion 2 (c) states as follows:- "owner" used with reference to any place includes any persons receiving or entitled to receive the rent from the occupier. " The above definition indicates that the owner of the building in which a cinema is being run may be different from a licensee. A licensee may be the tenant of the building, and he may be paying rent to the owner of the building. The cinema is run by the licen see, and not necessarily by the owner of the building. 7. We are not in agreement with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner thait the petitioner is a lessee, in the sense of a lessee of a residential building. The scheme of the Act indicates that a per son must have a licence to run a cinema under Section 3 of the Act. Of course, if a licensee for some reasons can not or does not wish to run the cinema himself he can appoint an agent to run the cinema. 8. In this connection reference may be made to Rule 2 (vi) of the U. P. Cinematograph Rules, 1951 which states:- "licensee means a person who has been granted a licence and includes his agent appointed for the purpose under a power-of- attorney and whose appointment has been intimated in writing to the licensing authority. " By virtue of Section 12 (2) of the 1955 Act the aforesaid rule is still continuing in force. 9. Rule 2 (vi) indicates that a licence can not be transferred but only an agent can be appointed under a power of attorney. Thus, there can not be a lessee of a licensee but only an agent, and in our opinion an agency can be terminated at any time. The only remedy of the agent whose agency is terminated is a suit for damages.
Thus, there can not be a lessee of a licensee but only an agent, and in our opinion an agency can be terminated at any time. The only remedy of the agent whose agency is terminated is a suit for damages. 10. In our opinion, it is really not necessary to go into the question whether there was a valid contract between the petitioner and respondent No. 5 or not be cause we are of the opinion that even if there was a valid contract, no contract can over ride the statute. Under the Scheme of the 1955 Act read with the U. P. Cinematograph Rules, 1951 only a licensee or his agent can run the cinema, but the licensee can at any time terminate the agency of the agent. And agent, like the petitioner, has no inde pendent status at all. 11. Moreover, this is a point which might and ought to have been taken in Writ petition No. 12865 of 1997, decided on 15-4-97, and since it was not the petitioner is barred from raising it by the principle of constructive resjudicata. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in this case the agency has not been terminated. In our opinion, there is no force in this submission because there is no particular form for terminating the agency, and it can be terminated orally or by conduct, as has been done in this case. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Samir Sobhan Sanyal v. Hacks Hade Pvt. Ltd. and others AIR 1996 SC 2102 . This decision has no relevance to the facts of the present case as it is not a case of a cinema hall. He also relied upon a decision Behari Lal Kapoor v. State of U. P. andothers. 1980 All. L. J. 530. This decision has not gone into the question which we have con sidered, and hence it is distinguishable and has no bearing to the present case. Since respondent No. 5 does not want to keep the petitioner as her agent to run the cinema Hall, the petitioner has no right to continue in possession. This is not a case of a house lease but of a cinema hall, and we should not confuse the two.
Since respondent No. 5 does not want to keep the petitioner as her agent to run the cinema Hall, the petitioner has no right to continue in possession. This is not a case of a house lease but of a cinema hall, and we should not confuse the two. As already observed above, since respondent No. 5 does not want to keep the petitioner as her agent the petitioner has no right to continue in pos session. Moreover, Clause 15 of the agree ment dated 28-1-97 states that the building can only be used for running the cinema, and not for any other commercial purpose. Since the petitioner can not run the cinema (as he is neither a licensee nor her agent) we fail to understand for what purpose he wishes to retain possession of the building. Thus, there is no force in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. A certified copy of this order be sup plied to the learned counsel for the petitioner on payment of usual charges within two days. Petition dismissed. .