Judgment Radha Mohan Prasad, J. 1. These letters patent appeals are directed against the common judgment passed by the Learned single Judge in C. W. J. C. No.4511 of 19% allowing the writ-petition and quashing the appointment of the appellants herein as Principals in different Constituent Colleges of B. R. Ambedkar Bihar University, issued by the Vice-Chancellor of the said university on 16th January, 19% (Annexure 1 ). 2. The contesting respondents challenged the aforementioned appointment mainly on the ground that the recommendation made by the Bihar state Universities (Constituent Colleges) Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission)was invalid as two Members of the Commission, namely, S/shri B. P. Yadav and S. P. Singh, were not eligible as was held by this Court in its earlier judgment. 3. In short, the relevant facts are that on 15-3-1994 the Commission was constituted with five Members, namely, s/shri Syed Abdul Vaheb Asharfi as its chairman, Satya Narayan Prasad, B. P. Yadav, S. P. Singh and L. N. Sahu as its members. In between 19-9-1994 and 3-10-1994 interviews were held by the said five members of the Commission for appointment as Principals in the Constituent Colleges under the University two writ-petitions were filed in this court assailing the Constitution of the commission, vide notification dated 15/16-3-1994 as also the selection made by it for the posts of Principal. The said writ-petitions were finally heard by the division Bench and the same were allowed, vide judgment, dated 26th May, 1995. The Division Bench held that the two Members, namely, S/shri B. P. Yadav and Suresh Prasad Singh, were disqualified to hold the posts of University professor long before their appointment as members of the Commission. As uch, they did not have the requisite qualification far their appointment as members of the Commission and consequently, the Commission constituted by the impugned notification dated 16-3-1994 was held to be illegal and invalid and any selection of the Principal by the commission or any appointment made on the basis of such selection were equally held to be invalid, inoperative and void. The respondents were directed to reconstitute the Commission with qualified Members at an early date so that the vacant posts of the Principal in the Constituent Colleges may be filled up without further delay. 4. The respondents were directed to reconstitute the Commission with qualified Members at an early date so that the vacant posts of the Principal in the Constituent Colleges may be filled up without further delay. 4. The said two persons filed ap-peal in the Supreme Court against the said judgment, being Civil Appeal No.4284-85 of 1996 which were finally dismissed by the Apex Court, vide judgment dated 14th March, 1996 (Annexure 3 to the writ-petition ). However, in the meantime, vide notification dated 13-6-1995, the Commission was reconstituted with the three remaining members in the light of the said division Bench judgment. The Supreme court, on 17-7-1995, however, stayed the operation of the aforementioned division Bench Judgment of this Court and while stay was operative, the recommendations for appointment as Principal, including that of the appellants, were made on 15-1-1996. The appointments of the appellants are stated to have been made on 16-1-1996 on the basis of the said recommendation for which interviews were held in between 19-9-1994 and 3-10-1994. Thereafter the supreme Court finally dismissed the appeal on 14th March, 1996, as already mentioned above. The connected writ-petition assailing the appointment of the appellants was filed on 5-4-1996 after the said decision of the Supreme court. 5. Learned Counsel for the appellants in both the appeals, inter alia, con-tended that even assuming that the appointments of the appellants were based on the recommendation of the commission in which those two dis-qualified Members participated, their appointments cannot be held to be bad in the facts and circumstances of the present cases inasmuch as the said recommendations of the Commission would not be vitiated merely on account of those two disqualified Members being party to it, in the facts and circumstances aforementioned, in view of the law of de facto doctrine. According to the Learned Counsel, the policy/doctrine of de facto was introduced by the courts only to protect such actions, may be thousands in number which would not vitiate merely because of the defective title which was finally set at rest by the Apex Court could not be said to be totally invalid. According to the Learned Counsel, the policy/doctrine of de facto was introduced by the courts only to protect such actions, may be thousands in number which would not vitiate merely because of the defective title which was finally set at rest by the Apex Court could not be said to be totally invalid. The de facto doctrine is now well established principle where the acts of the officers, de facto performed by them within the scope of their assumed official authority in the interest of public or third person and not for their own benefit, are generally held to be valid and binding, as if they were the acts of officers de jure. It was submitted that the Learned single Judge has committed serious error in relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of central Bank of India V/s. C. Bernard, (1991) 1 SCC 319 which was a case where the person had ceased to be in office and thus, the Supreme Court held that the de facto doctrine would not apply. According to the learned Counsel, in the instant cases, the interviews of the appellants were held by five members of the Commission during the period till when the said two Members were not held disqualified and the recommendations were made while the order of the Supreme Court granting stay of the judgment of the High Court was in operation by virtue of which the said two Members continued to be in office as members of the Commission. As such, the action of the said two members in the present cases is protected by de facto doctrine. In this regard, Learned Counsel for the appellants placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Gokaraju rangaraju V/s. State of A. P, AIR 1981 SC 1473 and in the case of Pushpadevi V/s. M. L. Wadhavan, AIR 1987 SC 1748 and in the case of M/s. Beopar Sahayak (P)Ltd. V/s. Vishwa Nath, AIR 1987 S. C.2111. Learned Counsel for the appellants also ventured to submit that when the concerned respondents had participated in the interview conducted by the Commission, they acquired their right, even if any, to assail the action of the Commissioner and the writ-petition at their instance was/is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. Learned Counsel for the appellants also ventured to submit that when the concerned respondents had participated in the interview conducted by the Commission, they acquired their right, even if any, to assail the action of the Commissioner and the writ-petition at their instance was/is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. In this regard Learned Counsel placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court as well as of this Court in the case of madan Lal V/s. State of J and K. , (1995) 3 scc 486 and in the case of Vinod Kumar and others V/s. State of Bihar and others, 1996 (2) All PLJ 1114 6. However, Dr. S N. Jha, Learned counsel appearing for the concerned respondents, in reply, submitted that respondents Nc.1, 3 and 4, who were also writ-petitioners, had not appeared before the Commission and, thus, plea of acquiescence raised on behalf of the appellants is of no substance in the instam cases. Learned Counsel for the appellants, thus, could not pursue it any further. 7. On the question of application of de-facto doctrin Counsel lor the concerned respondents submitted that it has got no application to the facts of the present cases, inasmuch as after the Division Bench judgment of to. is Court delivered on 20-6-1995 whatever insignia was prevailing in the minds of the said two Members of the commission should have vanished and they should not have refrained from taking any such advantage of the stay order of the Supreme Court after the reconstitution of the Commission, vide notification dated 13.6.1995 with only three remaining Members, the operation of which was not stayed by the apex Court. It was also submitted by him that in fact, the selection itself was quashed by the Division Bench of this court in the earlier judgment and the same was also affirmed by the Supreme court by dismissing the appeals against the said judgment by a reasoned judgment. 8. In reply, Learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that the second notification reconstituting the commission with only three remaining members did not exist in view of the order dated 17-7-1995 of the Supreme court staying the operation of the judgment of the High Court as the said notification itself clearly mentioned that it was being issued in the light of the judgment of the High Court. However, it is not disputed that the three-Member. However, it is not disputed that the three-Member. Commission since its reconstitution on 13-6-1995 is still functioning. 9. The questions involved in these appeals mainly are as to what would be the effect of the order passed by the supreme Court over the operation of the earlier judgment of the High Court, particularly when finally the Supreme court on detailed consideration upheld the said judgment of the High Court by judgment dated 14th March, 1996 that the appointment of the said two Members in the Commission was invalid. The other question is as to whether in the facts and circumstances aforementioned, de facto doctrine will have any application and the appointments made on the basis of the recommendation by the Commission to which the said two members were also party can be held to be valid or not by following the de facto doctrine. 10. Mr. Singh, Learned Counsel appearing for the appellants in L. P. A. No.1160 of 19% contended that the cessation of the office of the two persons was by High Courts judgment and subsequently the Governor had simply issued the notification constituting the fresh commission which was eclipsed by the stay order passed by the Supreme court and by the disposal of the appeals by the Supreme Court, the said notification simply stood revived. Thus, according to him, any action taken by the said two Members either prior to the earlier judgment of the Division Bench such as interviewing the candidates as also the action taken by them during the period order of stay granted by the Supreme court staying the operation of the judgment of the High Court was in operation would be covered by de facto doctrine. 11. Mr. Jha, Learned Counsel appearing for the appellants in L. P. A. No.1157 of 1996 submitted that the stay order of the Supreme Court was unfettered and unrestricted. Thus, according to him, by virtue of the said order the said two Members resumed their office as members of the Commission and their participation in making recommendation of the cases of the appellants for appointment as Principals cannot be assailed inasmuch as in view of the order of stay passed by the Apex Court, the second notification reconstituting the Commission with three remaining members was void and inoperative during the period the Supreme Court order of stay was in operation. 12. In reply, Dr. 12. In reply, Dr. Jha, Learned counsel for the concerned respondents submitted that even assuming that the notification reconstituting the Commission with only three members was void still it remained effective inasmuch as the void order remains effective so long it is not declared so or quashed by the competent court. As such, according to him, the second notification reconstituting the Commission which did not include the said two Members was very much effective and the said two Members could not have participated in the deliberations of the Commission as its members until either the second notification would have been revoked or the operation of the same would have been stayed by the competent Court or finally declared void. In this regard he referred to the decisions of the Supreme court in the case of Shiv Chander kapoor V/s. Amor Base, (1990) 1 SCC 234 and in the case of State of Punjab V/s. Gurdev singh, (1991) 4 SCC 1 . According to him, by the second notification, in fact, the commission has been reconstituted in the light of the judgment of this court by following the provisions contained in Sec.4 (c) of the Bihar State universities (Constituent Colleges)Service Commission Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). Further, he submitted that the scope of ad interim stay is only to aid and auxiliary to the main relief and ultimate result cannot be deprived of by interim injunction. In this regard he placed reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of joynarain Sarogi V/s. Brojendra Nath Mishra, AIR 1951 Patna 546. 13. I find substance in the submission of Dr. Jha, learned Counsel for the concerned respondents that even assuming that in view of the interim order of stay passed by the Apex Court, the second notification reconstituting the commission might be ultra vires, the stay order of the Apex Court and as such void but in view of the law laid down by the apex court in the case of shiv Chander Kapoor V/s. Amar Bose (supra), such an order/notification would be presumed to be invalid, unless the presumption was rebutted in competent legal proceedings by a party entitled to sue. In the instant cases, the stay order passed by the Supreme Court, thus, cannot have any bearing over the second notification reconstituting the commission with only three remaining members, until and unless the said notification would have been revoked or declared void in competent legal proceedings on a challenge being made by any party entitled to do so. I wish to quote paragraph 23 of the judgment in shiv Chander Kapoor (supra) which is hereunder: "in Wades Administrative Law, 6th edn. at pp.351-53 there is an illuminating discussion of this topic. It has been pointed out that Void Is meaningless in an absolute sense; and unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most Impeccable of orders. In the words of Lord Diplock, the order would be presumed to be valid unless the presumption was rebutted in competent legal proceedings by a party entitled to sue. " 14. In the case of State of Punjab V/s. Gurdev Singh (supra) the Supreme court has considered the effect of ultra vires action which is void and held that even if an action, which is ultra vires, against the principles of natural justice and void remains operative unless and until it is declared to be so by court and consequent upon such declaration it automatically collapses and there is no need for the court to quash it. The supreme Court held that it is a declaration of the existing state of affairs and it does not effect quashing of the alleged action. 15. In view of the admitted fact that the second notification was neither revoked nor declared void by a competent court, the effect of the said notification cannot be held to be eclipsed during the interim order of stay passed by the Supreme Court. 15. In view of the admitted fact that the second notification was neither revoked nor declared void by a competent court, the effect of the said notification cannot be held to be eclipsed during the interim order of stay passed by the Supreme Court. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforementioned two cases, in my opinion, the said two Members ought to have taken proceedings before the court for declaration of the said notification as void in terms of the interim order passed by it but having not done so, the second notification remained enforceable and the said two members had no authority in the eye of law to participate in the deliberations of the Commission in making recommendations for appointment of the appellants as Principals. 16. It is true that the second notification is stated to have been issued in the light of the earlier judgment of this court whereby the appointment of the said two persons as Members of the commission was declared to be illegal and void. The notification appointing the appellants might have also been placed before the Supreme Court in the petition filed by the respondents in the appeal before it, seeking vacation of the stay order passed on 4-12-1995 and also declaration that the appointments made pursuant to the said notification were illegal and arbitrary, as has been contended, but the Supreme Court did not intervene. As such, it will not change the position in law inasmuch as in the absence of any finding with respect to the said notification or appointment of the appellants as Principals by the supreme Court, it cannot be held that the same was approved by the Supreme court. However, nothing has been pointed out to show that the second notification reconstituting the Commission with only three Members was ever even brought to the notice of the supreme Court. 17. In the earlier matter before the division Bench the question, inter alia, involved was whether the constitution of the Commission by the notification dated 15-3-1994 was invalid and, if so, whether the selection by the said Commission for the posts of Principal was illegal and void. 17. In the earlier matter before the division Bench the question, inter alia, involved was whether the constitution of the Commission by the notification dated 15-3-1994 was invalid and, if so, whether the selection by the said Commission for the posts of Principal was illegal and void. The Division Bench held the constitution of the Commission by the said notification to be illegal and invalid and, further, that any selection of the Principal by the Commission or any appointment made on the basis of such selection are equally invalid, inoperative and void. The Supreme Court in its order (Annexure 3) in appeal arising from the said Division Bench judgment considered the said question and found that this Court was justified in holding that the said two Members (appellants before the Supreme Court) not being Professors on the relevant date could not be nominated as members of the College Service Commission. That apart, the Supreme Court also did not accept the contention advanced on behalf of the said two Members that promotions given to them as Professors were not affected by Sec.58 (10) of the Bihar State Universities Act as they had been given time bound promotion for which recommendation of the commission was not required. It was held that in order to put an end to continuance of temporary promotion to the post in respect of which approval of the college Service Commission was necessary, sub-section (10) was added to Sec.58 of the said Act which makes it abundantly clear that promotion given on temporary basis shall not be valid for a period exceeding six months unless recommended by the College Service commission. Accordingly, the Apex court held that in their case the commission had not given approval within the lime frame indicated in Sec.58 (10) of the said Act, hence the provisional promotion has been held to have ceased to be operative under the said amendment Act. It was, thus, held by the apex court that a promotee whose promotion is only provisional and continuance in the post dependent on the approval of the College Service commission is ex facie disqualified to be a Member of the College Service Commission and that how the College Service Commission being constituted with such promotees can consider the case of the approval of the promotee. The supreme Court also expressed reasonable suspicion of undue favour being shown by such course of action. The supreme Court also expressed reasonable suspicion of undue favour being shown by such course of action. 18. Under such circumstances, I fail to appreciate as to how the appellants herein can take any advantage of the interim order of stay passed by the supreme Court staying the operation of the Division Bench judgment even if assuming in their favour that the said judgment of the Division Bench remained eclipsed by virtue of the interim order of the Apex Court. In fact, while the matter was subjudice before the apex Court, the said two members, in my opinion, could not have taken the advantage of the interim order passed by the apex Court by rushing in making recommendation, especially when, in the meantime, the Commission had been reconstituted by second notification. It appears that, the recommendation was made by the Commission with the said two Members in favour of the appellants on 15-1-1996 and the supreme Court finally decided the appeal filed by the said two Members on 14-8-1996 which obviously goes to show that it was quite within the knowledge of the said two members that their appeals were to be heard soon, yet they did not even wait for couple of months to get the final verdict from the Apex court with respect to their appointment/continuance as Members of the (commission. In my opinion, the participation of the two Members in the deliberations of the Commission since after the Division Bench judgment of this court and during the pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court cannot be held to be fair and proper as obviously their entire action during the said period as Members of the Commission would be subject to final verdict of the Apex Court with respect to their continuance as members of the Commission. 19. 19. Further, as regards the effect of the stay order passed by the Apex Court, i do not find any error in the view taken by the Learned single Judge inasmuch as the effect of the stay order of the supreme Court not being in the nature of prohibitory order could only stop further execution of the judgment but by the reconstitution of the Commission by the subsequent notification, the stay order passed by the Supreme Court cannot be interpreted to put the said two members back in the office despite the subsequent notification, particularly in the absence of any such order in the mandatory form. If the said two members were at all aggrieved by the subsequent notification in view of the interim order of the Supreme Court, they could have got the same stayed and/or got an order from the Supreme court, by bringing the said notification to its notice, in the form of mandatory injunction allowing the said two Members to participate in the deliberations of the Commission. But that having not been done, the appellants herein cannot take the advantage of the interim order of the Apex Court, especially when the appeals preferred by the said two members have been dismissed and the earlier division Bench judgment of this Court has been upheld by the Apex Court. 20. The Learned single Judge has noticed the principles for grant of stay/injunction in the mandatory form considered in Pomeroys Treatise on equity Jurisprudence, 5th Edition, volume IV, Halsburys Laws of England, 4th Edition and Snells equity (29th edition) as that an interim order of either stay or injunction in the mandatory form issued under exceptional circumstances where position is directed to be restored if the injury done is serious and material whereby justice can be adequately done and that in pomeroys Treatise on Equity jurisprudence, it has been observed at article 359 that it resembles in its effect the "restorative interdict of the roman Law. Similarly, from Halsburys laws of England, it has been stated that where the injury done to the plaintiff is so serious and material that "restoration of things to their former condition is the only method whereby justice can be adequately done" that the court will exercise its jurisdiction and grant a mandatory injunction. From Snells equity it has been pointed out that the court though has jurisdiction but will very seldom do so. From Snells equity it has been pointed out that the court though has jurisdiction but will very seldom do so. Before granting mandatory injunction the Court usually requires a high degree of assurance that at the trial it will appear that injunction was rightly granted. 21. By the said principles and keeping in mind the facts and circumstances of the present cases, it is difficult to hold that by the grant of ad interim stay of the operation of the judgment of the division Bench the Supreme Court decided to put those two Members back in the office despite reconslilution of the Commission by subsequent notification, specially when the Supreme Court in its final verdict affirmed the High court judgment. 22. Much arguments were advanced on the question of applicability of de facto doctrine. In this regard learned Counsel for the appellants placed reliance on a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly in the case of Gokaraju Bangaraju V/s. State of a. P, AIR 1981 SC 1473 Para 15, in the case of Pushpadevi V/s. M. L. Wadhavan, air 1987 S. C.1748 Para 21 and in the case of M/s. Beopcr Sahayak (P) Ltd. V/s. Vishwa Nath, AIR 1987 SC 2111 Para 12. 23. In my opinion, none of the said decisions is of any help to the appellants herein. It is true that the Supreme court in a case where incumbent is clothed with the insignia of the office and exercises its power and functions held that the official acts of such persons are recognised as valid under the de facto doctrine, born of necessity and public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless mischief. This doctrine was engrafted as a matter of policy and necessity to protect the interest of the public. In the quotation from the judgment of Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee, j. , in Pulin Behari V/s. King-Emperor, (1921) 15 Cal L. J. at p.574 in paragraph 21 of the judgment in Pushpadevis case, i find that the Court held that the doctrine, in fact, is necessary to maintain the supremacy of the law and to preserve peace and order in the community at large. But here is the case in which the question of maintaining the supremacy of the law and to preserve peace and order in the community at large will be frustrated if the said doctrine is applied. But here is the case in which the question of maintaining the supremacy of the law and to preserve peace and order in the community at large will be frustrated if the said doctrine is applied. Moreover, the insignia of the office in the said two Members should have vanished after the judgment of the Division Bench of this court and, at any rate, after the second notification was issued which throughout remained operative, as has been noticed above. In fact, the action of the said two Members in participation of the deliberation of the commission and making recommendation just two months before the final verdict of the Apex Court came with respect of their very appointment as Members of the Commission was, in my opinion, an attempt to over reach apex Courts verdict. 24. The Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank of India V/s. c. Bernard (Supra) though reiterated that the de facto doctrine can be invoked in cases where there is an appointment to office which is defective and notwithstanding the defect to the title of the office, the decisions made by such de facto Officer clothed with the powers and functions of the office would be as efficacious as those made by a de jure Officer, but it was also held by their Lordships that the de facto doctrine cannot apply to an usurper, an intruder or total stranger to the office. In the said case the question involved was whether the departmental enquiry entrusted to and conducted by a bank official stands vitiated if the said official proceeds with the enquiry and concludes the same after his superannuation during the pendency of the enquiry. Under such circumstances, it was held that it as a case more or less akin to a case tried by a court lacking in inherent jurisdiction and, therefore, the absence of bias, prejudice or mala fides is of no consequence so far as the question of competency is concerned. 25. Under such circumstances, it was held that it as a case more or less akin to a case tried by a court lacking in inherent jurisdiction and, therefore, the absence of bias, prejudice or mala fides is of no consequence so far as the question of competency is concerned. 25. In view of the subsequent notification issued by the Governor in exercise of the power under Sec.3 of the Act reconstituting the Commission with only three members which remained operative throughout, the action of the other so-called two Members can only be described in the capacity of intruder or usurper or a total stranger to the office as their appointment as members of the Commission stood terminated and they ceased to hold the office as members of the Commission at least from that date. Thus, it has rightly been held by the Learned singal Judge that in the light of the said decision of the Supreme Court, once the person concerned reared and ceased to hold the office the de facto doctrine can have non-application, particularly the action of the other two so-called members were obviously under eclipse since after the Division Bench judgment of this court till the final verdict of the supreme Court where they lost.26, Accordingly, I am of the view that the de facto doctrine can have no application to protect the interest of the appellants herein whose appointments on the face of the judgment of the supreme Court affirming the Division bench judgment of this Court itself cannot be sustained. In fact, the Division bench in its judgment has already held the appointment/continuance of the said Members as illegal and invalid and any selection of the Principal by the commission or any appointment made on the basis of such selection was also held to be equally invalid, inoperative and void. Thus, though even after the interim order of stay granted by the apex Court, in the appeal preferred by the said two Members, staying the operation of the judgment had at best eclipsed the said findings of the Division bench temporarily, yet the said two members proceeded to recommend the case of the appellants herein for appointment as Principal without waiting for the final verdict of the Apex Court in regard to their appointment as Members of the Commission. In the result, these two appeals fail and the same are, accordingly, dismissed, but without costs. In the result, these two appeals fail and the same are, accordingly, dismissed, but without costs. Appeals Dismissed.