Judgment : 1. Aggrieved against the order of dismissal dismissing the petitioner from first respondents service, he has filed the present writ petition to quash the said order. 2. The case of the petitioner is briefly stated hereunder: The petitioner joined the service of the first respondent bank on 17.1.1958 as cashier. He was promoted as Head Cashier in the year 1974 and subsequently promoted as Chief Cashier on 26.12.1979. While he was discharging his duties, he received a show cause notice from the first respondent why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for certain alleged acts of commissions and omissions. He has submitted his explanation denying all the charges levelled against him and requested personal hearing. As per the Service Rules, the petitioner is entitled to have the assistance of a defence representative in the domestic enquiry. Hence he authorised one S.Kaliappan, J.M.C. Madurai Kamaraj University Branch of State Bank of India to be his representative to conduct the enquiry on his behalf. His representative asked for certain documents. The first respondent bank refused to furnish some of the relevant documents asked by his representative in the course of enquiry on 19.11.1982. The enquiry was commenced only after two years which itself will vitiate the entire proceedings. When the enquiry was posted for regular hearing on 13.12.1982, the petitioner wanted an adjournment on the ground that the defence representative was sick and laid up with Typhoid. His representative also sent a telegram requesting for adjournment. The enquiry officer unreasonably refused his request. After refusing the request of the petitioner for adjournment, the enquiry officer set the petitioner ex parte and ultimately found him guilty of all the charges. The first respondent has also accepted the findings of the enquiry officer and dismissed the petitioner from service by an order, dated 11.5.1983. Against the order of termination, he filed an appeal under Sec.41 of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act before the competent authority. The said authority by order dated 21.3.1984 in TSE Appeal No.54 of 1983 set aside the order of termination passed against him. The first respondent instead of reinstating the petitioner filed W.P.No.6103 of 1984 challenging the order of the authority under the Shops and Establishments Act. The said authority by order dated 21.3.1984 in TSE Appeal No.54 of 1983 set aside the order of termination passed against him. The first respondent instead of reinstating the petitioner filed W.P.No.6103 of 1984 challenging the order of the authority under the Shops and Establishments Act. In view of he decisions of the Supreme Court taking the view that Shop Act appeal is not maintainable against Nationalised Bank, this Court allowed W.P.No.6103 of 1984. In such circumstances, the petitioner approached this Court by way of the present writ petition challenging the order of dismissal. 3. The first respondent filed a counter affidavit disputing all the averments made by the petitioner. The counter affidavit runs as follows: It is contended that the dismissal order was issued by the first respondent after duly constituted and proper disciplinary proceedings and a domestic enquiry were conducted in respect of certain very serious acts of misconduct while the petitioner was in the service of the Bank and on his being found guilty thereunder. The said disciplinary proceedings were conducted in accordance with the service rules applicable to the officers of the bank and observing all the principles of natural justice. The enquiry officer appointed to conduct the domestic enquiry found the petitioner guilty under the charges covered by the charge-sheet issued to him. The Chief General Manager after considering the report of the enquiry officer accepted the findings recorded by him and imposed the punishment of dismissal from service. The dismissal order is valid and binding on the petitioner. Since the dismissal order is based on oral and documentary evidence, this Court exercising the power under Art.226 of the Constitution of India may not re-appraise the same. It is also submitted that the appeal filed by the petitioner has also been considered and rejected. In such circumstances, according to the first respondent, there is no merit in the writ petition and prayed for dismissal of the same. 4. In the light of the above pleadings, I have heard Mr.S.Elamurugan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.R.Sri Krishnan, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the first respondent has no jurisdiction and the enquiry was not in accordance with the Service Rules applicable to the petitioner. 4. In the light of the above pleadings, I have heard Mr.S.Elamurugan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.R.Sri Krishnan, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the first respondent has no jurisdiction and the enquiry was not in accordance with the Service Rules applicable to the petitioner. He also contended that neither the Enquiry Officer, nor the Disciplinary Authority followed the principle of natural justice, hence the entire proceedings ending with the order of dismissal are liable to be set aside. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents after taking me through the counter affidavit as well as the service Rules, submitted that the first respondent is competent authority to pass the impugned order, hence the order of dismissal is perfectly valid. He also submitted that the petitioner was given ample opportunity and after considering the report of the Enquiry Officer, the first respondent has passed the impugned order of dismissal. He further submitted that respondents have fully complied with the principles of natural justice, and there is absolutely no merit in the writ petition. 7. I have considered the rival submissions. 8. The writ petition is filed against the order of dismissal. Now I have to find out whether the authority who has passed the dismissal order is competent to do so and whether the petitioner was given proper and reasonable opportunity to defend his case. The following charges have been framed against the petitioner by the first respondent: “(1) the petitioner issued 6 Banks Rupee Travellers’ cheque of Rs. 1,000 denomination each to one notorious Ramesh (from out of 100 Rupees Travellers’ cheques which were not in use at the material time and which were found missing from the stock of Rupee Travellers cheque held in the joint custody of himself and the Branch Accountant, but failed to account to the bank for the sum of Rs.6,000 tendered by the purchaser thereby misappropriating, the said sum: (ii) he misappropriated a sum of Rs. 14,000 out of a sum of Rs.27,000 tendered to him by one Shri G.W.Paramanandh being the value of Banks Rupee Travellers’ cheque issued by him; (iii) he issued 80 Banks Rupee Travellers’ cheques of Rs. 14,000 out of a sum of Rs.27,000 tendered to him by one Shri G.W.Paramanandh being the value of Banks Rupee Travellers’ cheque issued by him; (iii) he issued 80 Banks Rupee Travellers’ cheques of Rs. 1,000 each out of a series of 100 cheques found missing at the branch and against them unauthorisedly received 80 Rupees Travellers cheques from out of another series which were at the branch and had also falsified the branch records in the process; (iv) he temporarily misappropriated a sum of Rs.2’0,000 tendered to him by one Shri J.Govindaraj being the value of 20 bank Travellers’ cheques of Rs. 1,000 denomination and accounted for the said amount only 2 days later.” Since the explanation offered by the petitioner was not satisfactory with reference to the charges, the Chief General Manager, the disciplinary authority has directed a domestic enquiry to be conducted. The second respondent was appointed as Enquiry Officer. In this case the charges were initiated by the Chief General Manage, and after considering the report of the Enquiry Officer, he has passed the order of dismissal. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the appointing authority to the petitioner, who is a Grade I Officer, is the Board and in this case, since action was initiated and order of termination passed by the Chief General Manager is bad. The State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules which came into force with effect from 1.7.1975 contained various Rules with regard to appointment, service conditions, disciplinary proceedings etc. Rule 3(f) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”) defines the words “Appointing Authority’ ‘as follows: “in the case of Officers Grade II and Grade 1 and of other employees to whom the salary scales applicable to Officers Grade 11 and Grade 1 generally apply with or without modification, the Chief General Manager concerned or the Managing Director according as the employee is serving in the circle or in or under Central Office”. A reading of the above rule makes the position clear that since the petitioner was a Grade I Officer, the Chief General Manager concerned is the Appointing Authority. If that is so, inasmuch as the proceedings were initiated by the Chief General Manager and ultimate order of dismissal passed by him, it cannot be said that the order of dismissal is either illegal or improper. If that is so, inasmuch as the proceedings were initiated by the Chief General Manager and ultimate order of dismissal passed by him, it cannot be said that the order of dismissal is either illegal or improper. The above Rule makes it clear that Chief General Manager is the competent authority for a person like petitioner. In such a circumstance. I am unable to accept the first objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 9. The other two objections of the learned counsel for the petitioner relate to violation of natural justice and not providing necessary documents to the petitioner. It is seen that on 5.1.1982 the first respondent has framed a charge memo and the same has been forwarded to the petitioner on 10.2.1982. The petitioner has acknowledged the charge memo and requested 10 days time in order to offer explanation. He also submitted his representation on 20.2.1982 requesting some more information and documents. On 4.3.1982 the first respondent bank permitted the petitioner to peruse any bank record/register relevant to the act of misconduct irregularities. They also made it clear that the petitioner is permitted to peruse the required Bank document in the disciplinary proceedings’ department, at local Head Office, after fixing a date for the purpose in advance with the officer-in-charge of that Department. In the very same letter the management has also made it clear that the defence should reach them before 15th March, 1982. The petitioner has made another letter on 20.3.1982 informing that on 19.4.1982 between 12 noon and 5 p.m. he has decided to go over to local head office for perusal of the records. In pursuance of the said letter the first respondent-Bank in their reply dated 13.4.1982 accepted the request of the petitioner for perusal of the documents on 19th April, 1982. It is also made clear that the petitioner had to submit his statement of defence finally on or before 26th April, 1992. Again, the petitioner made a request on 23.4.1982 seeking further time for perusal of the documents. As requested, the first respondent sent a telegram directed the petitioner to come and peruse the records before 20th May, 1982. On 17.9.1982, the first respondent decided to conduct an enquiry into the charges framed against the petitioner. Again, the petitioner made a request on 23.4.1982 seeking further time for perusal of the documents. As requested, the first respondent sent a telegram directed the petitioner to come and peruse the records before 20th May, 1982. On 17.9.1982, the first respondent decided to conduct an enquiry into the charges framed against the petitioner. It is also informed that one J.K.V. Paul, Officer, SM IV care of State Bank of India has been appointed as Enquiry Officer. They also informed that sufficient opportunity will be given to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses on behalf of the management and also permitted to examine any one in order to support his defence. By letter dated 22.9.1982 the first respondent after referring the letter of the disciplinary authority informed the petitioner that the preliminary hearing of the case will be held at Circle Top House on 1.10.1982 at 10 a.m. and also requested the petitioner to attend the same along with the defence representative if any. It is seen that on 19.10.1982 the petitioner has informed about his defence representative. By letter dated 29.10.1982 the Enquiry Officer has informed the petitioner that regular hearing of the case will be conducted at the second floor of the Circle Top House, No.21, Rajaji Salai, Madras-1 commencing from 4th November, 1982 at 10 a.m. He has also requested the petitioner to attend the said enquiry along with the defence representative if any. The letter dated. 4.11.1982 shows that State Bank of India, Madurai Kamaraj University has permitted S.Kaliappan, Officer, J.M.G. S.I, State Bank of India, Madurai Kamaraj University to attend the enquiry to be held at Madras on 5.11.1982 as defence representative. On 4.11.1982 the defence representative, namely, S.Kaliappan sent a letter requesting the Enquiry Officer to have the enquiry on some other date preferably after 15th November, 1982. He also sent a telegram for the same. On 5.11.1982 the Enquiry officer as requested by the defence representative of the petitioner, adjourned and posted the case to 17th November, 1982 at 10 a.m. This letter was communicated to the petitioner. This was also acknowledged by the petitioner. The very same letter has also been sent to the defence representative of the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer has also sent telegram informing the petitioner that regular hearing of his case will start from 17th November, 1982. This is found in page 51 of the typed-set of papers. This was also acknowledged by the petitioner. The very same letter has also been sent to the defence representative of the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer has also sent telegram informing the petitioner that regular hearing of his case will start from 17th November, 1982. This is found in page 51 of the typed-set of papers. It is further seen that by letter dated 6.12.1982 the Enquiry Officer has informed the defence representative that regular hearing will be commenced at 10 a.m., on 13.12.1982. In the same letter the Enquiry officer has made it clear that if the petitioner of his defence representative failed to attend the enquiry, the enquiry will be held ex parte. The said letter has also been sent to petitioner as well as his defence representative. Inspite of specific information and granting adjournments on earlier occasions, neither the petitioner nor the defence representative appeared for the enquiry dated 13.12.1982. No doubt, the petitioner informed the Enquiry Officer and requested him further time to enable his defence representative to attend. Inasmuch as the Enquiry officer has granted sufficient adjournment at the request of the petitioner as well as his defence representative, the Enquiry Officer refused to grant further time. Moreover, on that date management witnesses have come from various places in order to give evidence. In such circumstances, the Enquiry Officer set the petitioner ex parte and proceeded with the enquiry. A perusal of the records relating to 13.12.1982 shows that only the petitioners defence representative was absent and if the petitioner is very well interested in prosecuting his case, he could have participated and taken note at least since the Management witnesses have come from various places. I am unable to accept the attitude of the petitioner for not participating the enquiry which took place on 13.12.1982. No doubt, he has made request requesting the Enquiry Officer to postpone the enquiry to another date in view of the absence of his defence representative. It is not his case that he was not given proper opportunity all along. I am unable to accept the attitude of the petitioner for not participating the enquiry which took place on 13.12.1982. No doubt, he has made request requesting the Enquiry Officer to postpone the enquiry to another date in view of the absence of his defence representative. It is not his case that he was not given proper opportunity all along. As a matter of fact, the documents filed by the petitioner as well as the second respondent in the typed-set of papers clearly show that from the date of commencement of show cause notice and the date on which the petitioner was set ex parte namely 13.12.1982 the Enquiry officer has accepted the request of the petitioner as well as his defence representative. In such circumstance, it cannot be said that the petitioner was not given proper opportunity. 10. I have already referred to the various correspondence between the first respondent Bank and the petitioner with regard to supply of certain documents as claimed by the petitioner. As requested by the petitioner, the first respondent management permitted the petitioner to verify the documents which he required and the petitioner had also perused these documents. All these correspondences have been included even in the typed-set of papers filed by the petitioner. Hence, there is no truth in the complaint that the petitioner was not given relevant documents, nor put-forth his defence. Even in the absence of the petitioner for the subsequent hearing dates 10 and 13.12.1982, the Enquiry Officer recorded the evidence adduced on the side of the management. After considering the entire evidence in the light of the charges, the explanation offered by the petitioner as well as the evidence recorded on the side of the management, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report holding that all the charges levelled against the petitioner were proved. On receipt of the copy of the Enquiry report, the competent authority, namely, Chief General Manager considered the same in detail. He accepted the finding of the Enquiry Officer in their entirety and found guilty of all the charges framed against the petitioner. Since the charges are of very grave nature, the disciplinary authority decided to impose a penalty of dismissal in terms of Rule 49(h) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules. Accordingly, by Order, dated 11.5.1983 the petitioner was dismissed from the Banks Service with immediate effect. 11. Since the charges are of very grave nature, the disciplinary authority decided to impose a penalty of dismissal in terms of Rule 49(h) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules. Accordingly, by Order, dated 11.5.1983 the petitioner was dismissed from the Banks Service with immediate effect. 11. I have already held that as per Rule 5(f) of the Rules, the Chief General Manager is the Competent Authority and he alone has passed the impugned order of dismissal. Likewise the various documents and correspondences found in both the typed-set of papers filed by the petitioner and the first respondent disprove the case of the petitioner that he was not given proper opportunity, nor he was not furnished with relevant documents. I am satisfied that petitioner was given an opportunity to offer his explanation, he was given necessary documents and he was also permitted to peruse the documents which he required, he was permitted to have his defence representative of his choice. At his request as well as the request of his representative the Enquiry Officer had adjourned the hearings on several dates. In those circumstances, I do not find any merit in the contentions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the contention that the petitioner was not given proper opportunity before passing the impugned order of dismissal. 12. No doubt, the learned counsel for the petitioner relying on the representation of the petitioner dated 22.2.1983 addressed to the first respondent as well as the Enquiry Officer submitted that the Enquiry Officer ought to have considered his claim in the light of the said representation. He further submitted that the same representations have been addressed to first respondent, hence while taking a decision the first respondent ought to have sent copy of the enquiry report and further opportunity to put-forth his case. I am unable to accept even this argument, since after setting the petitioner ex parte on 13.12.1982 after recording the witnesses, examined on the side of the management, the Enquiry officer has submitted his report to the first respondent. In such circumstances there is no need to consider the claim of the petitioner by the Enquiry Officer and as a matter of fact, after submitting his report absolutely he has no role to play or act in pursuance of the representation dated 22.2.1983. In such circumstances there is no need to consider the claim of the petitioner by the Enquiry Officer and as a matter of fact, after submitting his report absolutely he has no role to play or act in pursuance of the representation dated 22.2.1983. No doubt, before Imposition of punishment, the delinquent is entitled to a copy of the enquiry report and also entitled to make a representation before passing any order of punishment by the original authority and non-furnishing of enquiry report would amount to violation of Rules of natural justice as per the decision of the Apex Court reported in Mohamed Ramzan Khans case, (1991)1 L.L.J. 29 . TheirLordships after holding the above proposition made it clear that the same is applicable prospectively only. Admittedly, in our case, the impugned order was passed by the first respondent on 11.5.1983 that is well prior to the decision of the Apex Court referred to above. Hence, even the said contention that petitioner was not given copy of the report prior to passing an order cannot be sustained. Even otherwise along with the impugned order the first respondent has forwarded copy of the enquiry proceedings and the findings of the Enquiry Officer along with his order dated 11.5.1983. 13. To sum up as stated earlier, the Authority who has imposed the punishment is competent under the Rules, petitioner was given proper and sufficient opportunity to put-forth his case and in view of the grave charges, namely, falsification of accounts and misappropriation of money from the first respondent Bank, I am in entire agreement with the order passed by the first respondent dated 11.5.1983. The learned counsel for the respondents has also brought to my notice that against the order of the first respondent, the petitioner has preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority and the Appellate Authority, after considering the case of the petitioner in detail rejected the appeal and confirmed the order of dismissal. 14. Under these circumstances, I do not find any merit in any one of the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Consequently the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.