JUDGMENT M. Srinivasan, C.J.(Oral): This case can be disposed of on two short grounds. The appellants herein are the plaintiffs in the suit, in which they challenged the validity of a gift deed executed by the second defendant in the suit, by name Kali Dass, on 8.7.1974 in favour of the first defendant Jagat Ram, who is respondent in this appeal. The ground, on which the challenge was made, was that the property was ancestral property in the hands of Kali bass and the appellants being collaterals are entitled to challenge the validity of the gift. It is to be noted that the suit was filed as one for possession. That was not maintainable on that date as such, because Kali Dass was alive on that date. He died only during the pungency of the suit, but we do not propose to dispose of the appeal on that ground, as both the Courts have gone into the questions raised in the suit and the appeal, without referring to that aspect of the matter. 2. The trial Court found that the property was not ancestral property in the hands of Kali Dass, as he was the last male holder and he was not a member of any co-parcenery. He had no son or grandson and his brothers children will not constitute a coparcenery. The trial Court also found that there was no proof of the custom alleged to prevail among the parties to the suit. 3. The Appellate Judge disposed of the appeal on the only ground that the property was not ancestral property in the hands of Kali Dass The Appellate Judge placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Smt. Dipo v. Wassan Singh AIR 1983 Supreme Court 846. In that view, the Appellate Court did not go into the other question relating to the custom. 4. In this appeal, it is argued that the judgment of the Supreme Court will not apply. The Supreme Court had no occasion to consider die existence or applicability of the custom to the parties. Learned counsel for the appellants has taken us through the judgment and contended that the Supreme Court did not take note of the custom prevailing in the area. We are unable to accept this contention. The Supreme Court had no occasion to consider die existence or applicability of the custom to the parties. Learned counsel for the appellants has taken us through the judgment and contended that the Supreme Court did not take note of the custom prevailing in the area. We are unable to accept this contention. While setting out the facts of the case, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that the plaintiff in that case claimed to be the sister of the deceased Bua Singh as an heir and she attacked die alienation effected by her brother. The trial Court dismissed the suit with regard to the properties which were ancestral, but granted decree with regard to non ancestral properties. That suit was contested by the defendants on the ground that they were preferential heirs being collaterals of Bua Singh under the custom which was applicable to them. The trial Court found that most of the properties were ancestral properties in the hands of Bua Singh, while a few were not ancestral. On that footing, this trial Court held that according to the custom, the sister was excluded by collaterals in the case of ancestral property, while she was entitled to succeed to non- ancestral property. Against the decree passed by the trial Court, the defendants did not file an appeal, but an appeal was filed by the plaintiff as she was aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit insofar as it .related to ancestral properties. The District Judge dismissed the appeal on a technical ground that the party did not present the appeal in person, as required by Order 33 Rule 3 CPC. On a further appeal, the High Court dismissed it as barred by limitation. When the matter went to the Supreme. Court, it was held that the High Court ought to have entertained the appeal, after condoning the delay. The Supreme Court went into the merits of the case and-thereafter held that Dipo was the sister of Bua Singh, was a concurrent finding and it was accepted.; The Court also said that they proceeded on the basis that according to the custom prevailing in the area, collaterals and not the sister, are the preferential heirs to the ancestral property in the hands of propositus while the sister and not the collaterals, is a preferential heir in regard to non ancestral property. Only after starting with that premise, the Court proceeded to hold that in the hands of last male holder, without any other member in the coparcenery, the property will be non-ancestral property, however, it had devolved upon him. In that connection, the Court referred to a passage in Mullas Principles of Hindu Law (15th Edition) 289, which read as follows: "... if a inherits property, whether moveable or immovable, from his father or fathers father, fathers father, it is ancestral property as regards his male issue. If A has no son, sons son, or sons son in existence at the time when he inherits the property, he holds the • property as absolute owner thereof and he can deal with it as he pleases .... A person inheriting property from his three immediate Paternal ancestors holds it, and must, hold it, in coparcenery with his sons, sons . sons and sons sons, but as regards their relations he holds it, and is entitled to hold it,-as his absolute property." Again at page 291, it is stated: "The share which a coparcener obtains on partition of ancestral property is ancestral property as regards his male issue. They take an interest in it by birth, whether they are in existence at the time of petition or are born subsequently. Such share, however, is ancestral property* only as regards his male issue. As regards his other relations, it is separate property, and if the coparcener dies without leaving male issue, it passes to his heirs by succession." 5. Thereafter, the Court accepted the proposition laid down in the Text Book of Mullas and held that the property in the hands of Bua Singh was not ancestral property as there was no coparcener to share it with him. Consequently, the Court upheld the claim of the plaintiff, namely, Dipo and granted a decree, as prayed for by her, after setting aside the concurrent decrees of the trial Court, District Court and the High Court. 6. There is no merit in the contention that the Supreme Court had no occasion to consider the existence or applicability of the custom and that they -ignored the same while referring to the passage in the Text Book of Mulla-s Principles of Hindu Law. The Supreme Court was very much conscious of the plea of custom in that case and the findings thereon. The Supreme Court was very much conscious of the plea of custom in that case and the findings thereon. Hence, the ruling of the Supreme Court will apply on all force in this case. The District Judge was right in applying that ruling and upholding the contention of the respondent herein. 7. The next question is as to whether the plaintiffs have proved the custom, as now contended by the learned counsel for the appellants. While the trial Court held that on the facts such a custom has not been proved, the Appellate Court did not go into that question. The trial Court has referred to the evidence on record. It is pointed out that the evidence of PW-1, the father of the first plaintiff, was self serving and the evidence of PW-2 was, in no way, helpful to the plaintiffs: On that footing, the trial Court held that the alleged custom was not proved. But the Appellate Court did not think it necessary to go into that question. 8. We have exercised our powers under Section 103 C PC and requested the learned counsel to canvass the evidence on record. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that there is absolutely no evidence or even pleading in support of the said custom. Even assuming that the vague pleadings are sufficient for the purpose of enabling the plaintiffs to prove custom, we are of the opinion that there is no acceptable evidence on record in support of the said custom. As pointed out already, PW-1 has merely stated vaguely that there is such a custom which is applicable to the plaintiffs. PW-2 has slated that he docs not know what exactly is the custom and he does not know whether a gift could be made by a person of the ancestral property. In such circumstances, this is a case of total want of evidence in support of the contention raised by the appellants. 9. Consequently, we uphold the finding of the trial Court that the plaintiffs have failed to prove the alleged custom. 10. In the result, the second appeal fails and is dismissed. There is no order as to costs. -