Judgment Dharmpal Sinha, J. 1. This second appeal is directed against the judgment dated 11.3.1983 and the decree based thereon passed by Sri Aditya Saran, 2nd additional Subordinate Judge, Chapra in Title Appeal No.26/47 of 1977/1981, whereby the learned Subordinate Judge has reversed the decree dated 29.11.1976 passed in Title Suit No.81 of 1970 by Sri Brij Nandan Prasad Singh, munsif IVth Court, Chapra, who had decreed the suit. 2. The appellants herein and respondents second set, who are the descendants of Bipati, whose son had instituted the suit seeking the reliefs (with regard to 1 Bigha 9 kathas and 9 dhurs land appertaining to plot No.127 and 153 of khata No.48 of village narayan Palia), namely, that it be declared that they had got title over the land and the defendants (respondents here in) had no right in that land and that a sale deed, which had been executed by one Janki Devi (originally respondent No.12 in this appeal but now dead) in favour of defendant No.1 bibi Shamshun Nisha, whose heirs are respondents herein, was illegal and void conferring no title to the purchaser and that the defendants be directed to hand over the original mortgage deed, which had been executed on 7.8.1954 by Janki in favour of Shamshunnisha and hand over possession of the land in question after accepting the mortgage money. 3. It is not disputed that the land previously belonged to Janki Devi (defendant No.3 in the suit, who did not contest) and she had executed, on7.8.1954, a mortgage deed in favour of Bibi Shamshunnisha (Respondent no.1) and on the basis of the mortgage, which was a usufructuary mortgage, the contesting respondents had come in possession of the land in question. It seems that Most. Janki also executed a sale deed in favour of Bipati,mother of the plaintiffs, on 23.8.1957 marked as ext. A/1 and in that sale-deed it was stated that the consideration money of rupees two thousand (Rs.2,000/-) was kept in deposit by the purchaser for payment to the mortgagee. Subsequently, janki Devi executed a deed of cancellation (Ext. D) on 20.12.1957 and thereafter executed a sale-deed in favour of shamshunnisha. The case of the appellants in brief was that by virtue of the sale-deed (Ext. A/1) executed on 23.8.1957 by Most. Subsequently, janki Devi executed a deed of cancellation (Ext. D) on 20.12.1957 and thereafter executed a sale-deed in favour of shamshunnisha. The case of the appellants in brief was that by virtue of the sale-deed (Ext. A/1) executed on 23.8.1957 by Most. Janki, they acquired title over the land and right to equity of redemption and they had right to obtain possession of the land after tendering the mortgage money, which had been kept in deposit by them when the sale deed had been executed by Janki, and were entitled to the reliefs as claimed by them (already noticed above ). 4. On the other hand the stand of the respondents, who contested the suit was that the sale deed in favour of the appellants never became operative because the consideration money of the sale-deed was not paid and even the registration receipt was not handed over to them, nor did they get the original sale-deed. Janki Devi cancelled the sale deed because some terms which had been agreed upon between them had not been fulfilled and she, after cancelling the sale deed, executed another sale deed dated 23.12.1957 in favour of the mortgagee, Bibi Shamshunnisha, and the mortgagee thus became full owner of the land in question. After the sale deed executed on 23.12.1957 the possession over the land, which previously was in the capacity of mortgagee, became possession as owner. 5. It appears that the contesting respondents had further taken stand that Janki had executed a mahadnama (deed of agreement) in respect of the disputed land on 15.4.1957 in favour of defendants No.1 and had taken rupees 50/- as advance and thereafter the sale deed in favour of Shashunnisha was executed. Both the Courts below, however, came to the finding that no mahadnama had been executed on 15.4.1957. The respondents (plaintiffs)further placed reliance on a Ladavi deed executed by Bipati, mother of the plaintiff and this was executed on 17.1.1958. Both the learned Courts below came to the finding that this Ladavi deed, which has been marked as Ext. E was ineffective and could no: extinguish the title of bipati, who had executed this deed. The trial Court has also come to the finding that the plaintiffs mother Bipati had no knowledge of the Mahadnama when the sale deed dated 23.12.1957 had executed and she was bona fide purchaser. E was ineffective and could no: extinguish the title of bipati, who had executed this deed. The trial Court has also come to the finding that the plaintiffs mother Bipati had no knowledge of the Mahadnama when the sale deed dated 23.12.1957 had executed and she was bona fide purchaser. According to the finding of the Trial Court the plaintiff had derived title over the suit land and the deed of cancellation did not affect the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs. The Trial Court also concluded that the suit was within time, not barred by limitation and the case would be governed by Article 61 of the indian Limitation Act. On these findings, the Trial Court decreed the suit. 6. But the learned Appellate court came to the finding that the title did not pass under the sale deed (Ext. A/1)executed in favour of the Bipati. According to the learned Appellate court the suit was barred by the provision of Sec.12 of the Bihar money Lenders Ad and suit was also barred by time because it had been instituted more than 12 years after execution of the sale deed in favour of the defendants. On this finding the learned appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree Of the learned Trial Court which had decreed the suit and ordered that the suit be dismissed. The substantial questions of law, which was formulated at the time of admission of this appeal on 6.3.1984 reads as follows: whether the lower Appellate court was justified in reversing the findings of the Trial Court without considering the relevant materials in this case ? it may be noticed here and it has also been conceded by the learned counsel that the substantial question of law, that has been formulated has not been happily worded. No court of appeal can reverse a finding without considering the relevant materials and in its present frame the substantial question of law can readily be answered in negative without any reference to any material or argument. The proper formulation of the substantial question of law will be whether the lower Appellate court is justified in reversing the judgment and finding of the Trial Court and has given reasons, which are justified in law on the relevant materials on record? 7. The proper formulation of the substantial question of law will be whether the lower Appellate court is justified in reversing the judgment and finding of the Trial Court and has given reasons, which are justified in law on the relevant materials on record? 7. Learned Counsel for the appellants has strongly contended that the appellate Court has completely mis-appropriated the legal effect of the sale deed (Ext. A/1), which had been executed by Most. Janki in favour of bipati, the mother of the original appellant and it contents definitely and categorically go to show that the title over the land in question had definitely been transferred under it by Most. Janki to Bipati. He has pointed out that another sale deed on the same day had been executed by Most. Janki for a consideration of rupees 1,000/-, which related to 5 kathas and 2 dhurs land, and that sale deed too was brought on the record as Ext.3 and Rs.1,000/- was paid and with regard to the other sale deed (Ext. A/1) the consideration money of rs.2.000/- was kept in trust by the purchaser for payment to the mortgagee. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants is that title over the land in question did pass under the saledeeds and once it is held that the purchaser bipati became the title owner by execution of the sale deed by Janki, who was admittedly the previous owner of the land and who had mortgaged the same, the subsequent action of Janki in cancelling the sale-deed in favour of bipati or in executing the sale deed on 23.12.1957 (Ext. A) in favour of Sham shunnisha is without any legal effect. Learned Counsel for the appellants has placed during the course of argument the contents of the sale deed. The relevant part of the sale deed reads as follows: His submission is that the contents of the document leaves no doubt that title had passed to the purchaser by execution of the sale deed, learned Counsel for the appellants had relied in this connection the decision reported in a. I. R.1931 Patna 236 (Ramdhari Rai V/s. Gorakh Rai) wherein it was held that "title passes on execution and registration of deed, though purchase money may remain wholly or partly unpaid except where there is an agreement that the sale should take effect only if the consideration is first paid. "he has further relied on a decision reported in a. I. R.1938 Patna 505 (Radhamohan thakur and others V/s. Bipin Bihari Mitra and another) and submitted that when a document expressly expressed that the vendee should acquire title and possession from execution of the deed as has been done in this case, the title suit should be deemed to have been passed on the registration of the deed and payment of consideration is not essential. He further submits that in fact registration receipt was not handed over by the seller and the original sale deed (Ext. A/1)was produced by the contesting defendants is of no legal consequence, but the Appellate Court has erroneously placed reliance on these aspects. 8. Learned Counsel for the appellants has next contended that the learned Appellate Court also went wrong in taking the view, that the suit was barred by the law of limitation. According to his submission, the appellants had purchased equity of redemption under the. sale-deed (Ext. A/1)relating to the land in suit and the suit had been instituted, inter alia, with the prayer that a decree of redemption in favour of the plaintiff be passed and the defendants be directed to hand over the mortgaged deed and possession over the concerned land after accepting the mortgaged money. The period of limitation in such a suit according to his submission is 30 years, because Article 61 of the Limitation Act would apply; but that the learned Appellate Court has wrong taken the suit was barred by the law of limitation because it had not been instituted within 12 years. His further contention is that the nature of possession of Shamshunnisha as mortgagee could not change only because the mortgagor after, she had already sold the land to Bipati, executed the sale deed in favour of Shamshunnisha and the later sale deed must be held to legally ineffective for the purpose of transferring the title over or in any way affecting right or interest in the concerned land. 9. Learned Counsel for the appellants has placed during the course of his argument some of the observations made by the learned Appellate Court in the judgment, which will be referred to later. 10. 9. Learned Counsel for the appellants has placed during the course of his argument some of the observations made by the learned Appellate Court in the judgment, which will be referred to later. 10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the finding of the learned court below holding that the suit is barred by the law of limitation is ab-solutely proper and justified in law. According to him the fact of execution of the sale deed in favour of the respondents (Samsunnisa) had become known to the mother of the appellants, Bipati, who had taken notice also of the fact of the execution of the deed of cancellation by Janki and thereafter mentioning all these facts executed the Ladavi deed (Ext. E) on 17.1.1958, and of if the suit was not filed within 12 years from that date (17.1.58), the suit must be held to be barred by the law of limitation and article 65 of the Limitation Act will apply; because the suit is based on title. According to him as the suit was instituted in August, 1970, when 12 years had expired on 17.1.70 and so the learned Appellate Court below was right in taking the view that the suit was barred by the law of limitation. Learned counsel for the appellants in reply had submitted that there cannot be any question of adverse possession in this case because no plea had been taken in the written statement about adverse possession, and it is settled law that if a party relies on this defence, adverse possession should be pleaded as well as proved. He reiterated the principle that once title to Bipati had already passed, the nature of possession of the contesting defendants who had come in possession of the land in question originally in tthe capacity of mortgagee, will not change by any subsequent act of the mortgagor (Janaki ). During the course of argument two more decisions have been cited - one reported in A. I. R.1963 s. C.70 (Padma Vithoba V/s. Mohd. Multani and another)and A. I. R.1957 Patna 157 (Sri Bhagwan Singh V/s. Rambasi kuer ). Ratio of the latter decision given in completely different factual context in my opinion is not at all of any avail to the respondents. The first decision will be referred to later. Multani and another)and A. I. R.1957 Patna 157 (Sri Bhagwan Singh V/s. Rambasi kuer ). Ratio of the latter decision given in completely different factual context in my opinion is not at all of any avail to the respondents. The first decision will be referred to later. Learned Counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the decision for the proposition that even if adverse possession is not specifically pleaded, if from the facts by the courts below, it would appear that title had been extinguished by operation of the provision of Article 144 of the old limitation Act a party can rely on principle of adverse possession even if there is no pleading. 11. I may first make reference to some of the reasonings adopted by the learned first Appellate Court. The learned Appellate Court while referring to the two sale deeds, which had been executed on the same date 23.8.57 by janki in favour of Bipati has taken notice of the fact that one of them had been executed by Janki alone, and she other executed by her and by another person, and she also acted as guardian of a minor, and so the title acquired by the sale deed (Ext. A/1) was defective. The reasoning of the Appellate Court in this regard runs like this: "there is no evidence that sale deed was executed for the title of the plaintiffs because the share of the minors would not go by execution of the sale deed Ext. A (1) or ext.3, therefore, the plaintiffs had purchased the land if at all it will be deemed to be in the eye of law but they have purchased the defective title as they cannot become the owners in respect of the entire disputed land because of the defect as pointed out above". I must say that this reasoning was not permissible under the facts and circumstances of this case. It was not disputed by any party that Janki was the previous owner of the land. She had admittedly executed mortgaged deeds in favour of Samshun Nisha in 1954, by virtue of which the respondents claimed to have got possession. Both the parties also claimed to have purchased the land under the sale deeds executed by Janki. It is different matter as to whether two sale deeds were effective in transferring the title. She had admittedly executed mortgaged deeds in favour of Samshun Nisha in 1954, by virtue of which the respondents claimed to have got possession. Both the parties also claimed to have purchased the land under the sale deeds executed by Janki. It is different matter as to whether two sale deeds were effective in transferring the title. But there can be no doubt that both the parties had admitted Janki to be previous owner of the mortgaged property. In such a situation, the reasoning of the learned Appellate court seems to be completely misconceived and it wrongly appears to have taken the view that there was defect in title only because Janki alone had not executed both the sale deeds. 12. The Appellate Court further observed in paragraph- 13 of his judgment as follows: "now, the contention of the parties is that it was the outlook of the respondents purchasers to pay the zerpeshgidar at once or wait for till the period of limitation for redemption. There is ambiguity between the parties as no time was allotted in execution of ext. A (l) as to when the zerpeshgi amount was to be paid This is an ambiguity which can have to be considered by the conduct and other circumstances of the parties. If this was a fact that the intention of the parties were to wait till the period of limitation for redemption then they had no wait. They would not have tendered this amount before the expiry of limitation. They should have waited till the limitation for redemption. Since they tendered the money before the expiry of limitation, it is clear that the intention of the parties were that zerpeshgi amount was to be paid before the registration receipt was exchanged. Since no registration receipt has been changed it is clear that Bipati had not tendered this amount and therefore, no registration receipt was handed over because the intention of the parties were that this zerpeshgi amount should be tendered atonce, therefore, since zerpeshgi amount was not tendered, nothing passed under the sale deed, the intention of the parties were that the title would pass only after the consideration amount is paid or zerpeshgi amount is paid and therefore, the title remained with Janaki. " This line of the reasoning of the learned Appellate court seems to be completely erroneous in law. " This line of the reasoning of the learned Appellate court seems to be completely erroneous in law. There is nothing in the sale deed to indicate any particular time by which the mortgage money of Rs.2,000/-, which had been kept in deposit, was to be paid to the, mortgagee. No surmises or conjecture was permissible on this aspect, as the law of the Limitation Act prescribed the period (of 30 years) for redemption of mortgage. Similarly the learned Appellate Court seems to have drawn conclusion that the sale deed mentioning consideration of rupees 1,000/- was farzi sale deed and the same was in the custody of Janaki and she later handed over the same to the plaintiff. Such type of imaginary reasoning, in my opinion, is perverse. Again in paragraph- 22 the learned Appellate Court has observed that "for the first time money was tendered in the year 1970,13 years after the execution of the sale deed and before the expiry of the period of limitation, which shows that money was to be tendered atonce and there was no condition that amanat would be paid after the expiry of the limitation and therefore, the plaintiffs-respondents have not acquired title by virtue or disputed sale deed". I have referred to the contents of the sale deed (Ext. A/1), part of which has been quoted above and in my opinion the learned Appellate court was not justified legally to make such observations. 13. Another reason given by the appellate Court is that in view of the provision of Money Lenders Act, 1974 usufructuary mortgage automatically stood redeemed after seven years from the date of its execution and the learned court below has also relied on the decision reported in 1981 B. L. J. R.72 (wrongly typed as 400) (Mohd. Yunus V/s. The State of Bihar) : 1980 BLJ 470 in this connection. But provision of law was introduced by amendment that had come into force in the year 1974 and, that could not apply to the instant case for the simple reason that the suit had been instituted in the year 1970 that is before the provision for termination of usufructuary mortgage after completion of 7 years was provided in law. But provision of law was introduced by amendment that had come into force in the year 1974 and, that could not apply to the instant case for the simple reason that the suit had been instituted in the year 1970 that is before the provision for termination of usufructuary mortgage after completion of 7 years was provided in law. So, the learned Appellate Court seems to have misapplied the provision and even the learned Counsel for the respondents has conceded that there was wrong application of that provision by the learned appellate Court below. 14. The learned Appellate Court further observed in paragraph- 26 of the judgment that when there was registration on 23.12.1957 of the the sale-deed in favour of the respondents, it will amount to notice of the sale-deed to the plaintiff because registration amounts to notice and the plaintiff-appellants should have filed this suit within 12 years from the date of execution of the sale deed, on 23.12.57, in favour of the respondents. On this ground the learned Appellate Court held that the suit was barred by the law of limitation. On this point also the learned Appellate court seems to have committed error in law. The appellants had claimed to have purchased the land in suit under the sale deed, which had been executed on 23.8.57. Relevant provision regarding registration that may amount to notice is contained in Explanation 1 of the transfer of Property Act, 1982, which reads as follows: "where any transaction relating to immoveable property is required by law to be and has been effected by a registered instrument, any person acquiring such property or any part of, or share or interest in, such property shall be deemed to have notice of such instrument as from the date of registration. " It would appear from this that registration of a document transferring interest in immoveable property amounts to notice only for such person, who acquire such property later than the date of the registration of the document. Registration of document subsequently could not be a notice for a person, who bad previously purchased the land. " It would appear from this that registration of a document transferring interest in immoveable property amounts to notice only for such person, who acquire such property later than the date of the registration of the document. Registration of document subsequently could not be a notice for a person, who bad previously purchased the land. Obviously, this is based on the simple principle that if any person in tends to acquire any property, he may make inquiry from the registration office and obtain no encumbrance certificate from the registration office; but after acquisition of any property he cannot be expected to watchful in future as to whether or not any other document is going to be registered with regard to the same property. On this point also the view taken by the learned first Appellate Court is legally untenable. 15 Now coming to the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant, i may notice at the very outset that on perusal of the contents of the saledeed ext. A/1 (3), it appears from the wording and expression used that Janaki had transferred her interest in the land covered by the sale deeds and title did pass to the purchaser under the sale deed on its execution. The execution of the sale deed has not been disputed. What is said by the contesting respondents is that some terms of the same were not abided by the purchaser and therefore, Janaki did not give registration receipt and allow the purchaser to take delivery of original registered document (which had been produced by respondents and only its certified copy by the appellants ). In my opinion, since from the contents of the sale deed, it appears that title had pr , vd to the purchaser, any subsequent action or omission of the vendor, janaki will have no legal effect on the right, title and interest of the purchaser with regard to the land in question. So, the execution of deed of cancellation by Janaki Devi could not in any way effect the title, which already stood transferred in favour of Bipati, whose legal heirs are the appellants on the execution of the sale-deed dated 23.8.57. The subsequent sale-deed executed by Janaki in favour of the respondents (defendants) on 23.12.1957 also could not have any legal effect for Janaki after execution of sale deed Ext. The subsequent sale-deed executed by Janaki in favour of the respondents (defendants) on 23.12.1957 also could not have any legal effect for Janaki after execution of sale deed Ext. A/1 dated 23.8.57 had no right, title or interest in the land, which she could have transferred. This is also the finding of the Courts below. 16. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that the learned first Appellate Court has rightly dismissed the suit on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation is based on the reasoning advanced by him that at least after execution of Ladavi deed (Ext. E) on 17th of January, 1958 by Bipati, the possession of the respondents must be held to have become adverse, because: for the Ladavi deed, which, according to him, could be used for collateral purpose, even though it is not registered, indicated that Bipati (whose heirs are the appellants) became aware of the cancellation of the saledeed executed on 23.8.57 and execution of the sale-deed in favour of the respondents by Janki on 23.12.57, when this later sale deed was inoperative for transferring the title by Janki over the suit land for title had already passed by execution of the sale-deed in favour of bipati on 23.8.57. According to his submission in this regard when the suit was instituted in August, 1970, it was already barred by limitation because Ladavi deed (Ext. E) was executed on 17.1.1958, then so the suit at best could be instituted by 18.1.1970, otherwise it must be held to be barred by limitation, and by being adverse possession for over 12 years the respondents could be deemed to have acquired title, if their sale deed was invalid and inoperative. His further submission in this connection is that the suit being based on title, article 65 of the Limitation Act would be applicable, which prescribes only 12 years period of limitation. Further he submitted that after execution of the sale deed in favour of the defendants who were previously the mortgagee, the equity of redemption could not have continued, and Principle that once a mortgage always a mortgage would not apply to the facts of this case. 17. This line of reasoning, in my opinion, is fallacious. Further he submitted that after execution of the sale deed in favour of the defendants who were previously the mortgagee, the equity of redemption could not have continued, and Principle that once a mortgage always a mortgage would not apply to the facts of this case. 17. This line of reasoning, in my opinion, is fallacious. When the mortgagor Janaki executed the sale deed in favour of the defendants on 23.12.57, she had already ceased to have sale-deed in favour of the respondents could not change the nature of possession of the mortgagee. By that time by virtue of the earlier sale-deed dated 23.8.58 (Ext. A/1) in favour of Bipati the right to redeem the mortgage had been acquired by Bipati and after her death, on her heirs that in the appellants. Action of Janaki, who had, in effect ceased to be mortgagor after 23.8.58, could not change the nature of possession of the mortgagee (that is respondents) nor could mortgagee by any unilateral declaration could change the nature of possession, which they had acquired as mortgagee on the execution of the mortgage by Janaki on 7.8.54. The first appellate Court seems to have rightly held that Ladavi deed (Ext. E) could not be used for even collateral purposes. In the written statement no case of acquiring title by adverse possession has been pleaded specifically. The suit had been brought not only for declaration of title but also for decree of redemption and for issuing a direction to the defendants (respondents) to hand over the original mortgage deed dated 7.8.54 and deliver possession of the land mortgaged after taking the mortgage money. It was also alleged in the plaint that the mortgaged money had been tendered but that was refused and the last tender and refusal was alleged to be the cause of action in the plain. 18. In A. I. R.1963 S. C.70 the principle was reiterated that "when a person gets into possession of properties as mortgagee, he cannot by any unilateral act or declaration of his prescribe for a title by adverse possession against the mortgagor because in law his possession is that of the mortgagor". 18. In A. I. R.1963 S. C.70 the principle was reiterated that "when a person gets into possession of properties as mortgagee, he cannot by any unilateral act or declaration of his prescribe for a title by adverse possession against the mortgagor because in law his possession is that of the mortgagor". To be sure, it was also stated in this decision (vide paragraph-7) that "if the mortgagor and mortgagee subsequently enter into a transaction under which the mortgagee is to hold the properties thereafter not as a mortgagee but as owner that would be sufficient to start adverse possession against the mortgagor if the transaction is for any reason inoperative under the law. " Learned Counsel for the respondents has relied upon this observation and has submitted that in this case also the mortgagor had executed a sale-deed in favour of the mortgagee, which was inoperative as had been by both the courts below and so time for acquiring title by adverse possession started running from the date of execution of the sale-deed in favour of the respondents on 23.12.57, about which notice was also taken in the Ladavi deed (Ext. E) executed on 17.1.58. 19. But this argument cannot be accepted because the mortgagor Janaki in this case after transferring the title over the mortgaged land to Bipati on 23.8.57 under the sale deed (Ext. A/1)had lost the capacity of mortgagor and the purchaser Bipati had stepped into the sue of mortgagor Janaki. So, any action of Janaki after 23.8.57, in my opinion, could not have effect either in favour of the appellants or in favour of the respondents, either with regard to the title or with regard to the nature of possession. The sale-deed dated 23.8.57 also contained recital that the purchaser had been put in possession over the land through the mortgagee. 20. The Ladavi deed (Ext. E) executed by bipati on which reliance has been placed by the respondents definitely could not be operative for relinquishment of any right by Bipati over the land in question. It could not in my opinion be used for collateral purpose for affecting the rights of the parties, if it could not effect relinquishment of right. There is no plea taken in the written statement about this Ladavi deed. It could not in my opinion be used for collateral purpose for affecting the rights of the parties, if it could not effect relinquishment of right. There is no plea taken in the written statement about this Ladavi deed. Of course, statement made therein by bipati could be treated as admission; but when it is inadmissible piece of evidence because of lack of registration, i do not think that it could be used for the purpose of giving any finding in favour of the respondents. In my opinion, the provision of Article 61 of the Limitation Act prescribing 30 years for instituting suit for redemption would be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case and not the provision of Article 65, which prescribes 12 years period of limitation. The suit out of which this appeal had arisen had been brought within 30 years from the date of the execution of the mortgage deed, and so it cannot be held to be barred by limitation. In my opinion the learned first Appellate Court below has taken erroneous view in law in holding that the suit was barred by limitation. Principle of adverse possession is also not applicable to the facts of this case. I, accordingly, decide the substantial question of law in this second appeal by holding that the learned Appellate court below was not justified in reversing the finding of the Trial Court. 21. Accordingly, I allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the first Appellate Court. The judgment and decree of the Trial Court shall stand restored. Under the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as Jo cost. Appeal Allowed