S. B. SINHA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners who are admittedly owners of Plot No. 41/572 (earlier L. R. Plot No. 572) measuring an area of 4. 47 acres comprised in R. S. Khatian No. 217 J. L. No. 102 of Mouza-Shibpur have filed this writ application for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to cancel the notification dated 18-10-1996 issued by the Deputy Secretary, State of West Bengal in terms of S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, as contained in Annexure 'f' to the 4 writ application, inter alia, on 2 grounds, namely, (i) that the direction in the said notification purported to be under S. 17 (4) of the Land Acquisition Act is bad in law as there is no emergency, particularly in view of the fact that Indian Oil Corporation Limited had entered into negotiations with them for purchase of the said land and (ii) there is no public purpose involved in the said acquisition. Although no other point had been taken in the writ petition, in the affidavit in reply filed by the petitioners to the affidavit-in-opposition, a new point has been taken that the purported proceeding under the said Act, is bad in law, inasmuch as, provision of Chapter VII of the said Act, had not been complied with prior to the issuance of the said notification. ( 2 ) MR. Adhikari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in support of his aforementioned contentions has relied upon a decision in the case of Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1977 SC 183 , Dora Phalauli v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1594 and a judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in Santosh Kumar Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, reported in 1996 (1) Cal HN 83. ( 3 ) DR. ( 3 ) DR. Tapas Banerjee appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 6 on the other hand, has submitted that the lands are being acquired for a public purpose and in support of the aforementioned contention, my attention has been drawn to the statements made in paragraph 6 of the affidavit-in-opposition wherein, inter alia, it has been stated that the Barauni Refinery of the respondent-Corporation is not functioning to its rated capacity in view of the fact that the supply of crude oil is not adequate as it gets crude oil from Assam Oil Fields. It has been further stated that the availability of Assam Crude Oil to Barauni Refinery has been of the order of 2. 2mmtpa against the capacity of 3. 3 MMTPA although the said Refinery can process 4. 2 MMTPA, as a result whereof the present capacity of about 2 MMTPA remained unutilised. It has been further pointed out that the crude availability to Barauni Refinery from Assam Oil Fields was likely to go down after completion of expansion projects of the existing refineries and commissioning of Numaligarh Refinery. With a view to meet the large deficit in the region, Government of India approved a project for laying down 500 Km. long crude oil pipeline from Haldia to Barauni and the land in question is required for the purpose of setting up of a intermediate pump station. It has further been pointed out that laying down of the pipelines between Haldia and Barauni was approved by the Government of India as a project of national importance. It has been submitted that the said project is a time bound project for which 42 months time had been granted, but in view of the urgency, time schedule has been reduced to 30 months. According to Dr. Banerjee, therefore, installation of an intermediate pump station being very important, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the possession of the land in question was required to be taken over on emergency basis, failing which, national exchequer will incur a colossal loss. Learned counsel pointed that a declaration under S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act as well as an order under S. 7 had been issued, and thus, this writ application is not maintainable, inasmuch the petitioners have filed the application suppressing the aforementioned fact. Learned counsel pointed that a declaration under S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act as well as an order under S. 7 had been issued, and thus, this writ application is not maintainable, inasmuch the petitioners have filed the application suppressing the aforementioned fact. ( 4 ) AS regards the question of public purpose, learned counsel pointed out that in view of the fact that the respondent No. 6 is a Corporation within the meaning of S. 3 (cc) of the Act, it is not necessary to comply with the provision of Chapter VII of the Land Acquisition Act. Learned counsel in support of his aforementioned contentions has relied upon Union of India v. Praveen Gupta, reported in (1996) 9 JT (SC) 624 : ( AIR 1997 SC 170 ), Md. Ali v. State of U. P. , reported in (1996) 9 JT (SC) 435, Ramniklal N. Bhutia v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1997)1 SCC 134 : (1997 AIR SCW 1281), Sterling Computers Ltd. v. M/s. M. N. Publications Ltd. , reported in (1993) 1 SCC 445 : ( AIR 1996 SC 51 ) and Vasantkumar Radhakisan Vora v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, reported in AIR 1991 SC 14 . ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel appearing on behalf 5 of the State has very fairly produced records of the case, from a perusal whereof it appears that apart from the fact stated in the respective affidavits-in-opposition filed on behalf of respondent No. 3 as also Indian Oil Corporation, the aforementioned venture in question was treated as a joint venture and the acquisition in question has been made by the State in view of the request made by the Central Government. It further appears from the records that all other requirements for initiating a proceeding under S. 4 had been completed anti a declaration under S. 6 had also been issued. It further appears from the records that all other requirements for initiating a proceeding under S. 4 had been completed anti a declaration under S. 6 had also been issued. Although the impugned notification as contained in Annexure 'f' to the writ application does not state existence of any emergency, from the note sheet it appears that all the concerned authorities had in unequivocal terms stated that keeping in view the fact that the programme in question is a time bound programme and installation of an intermediate pump station is required for the purpose of transportation of crude oil from Haldia to Barauni in the State of Bihar, which, as noticed hereinbefore, has been declared to be a project of national importance, there had been an urgency in the matter. All the concerned authorities, including the Minister concerned had agreed with the said proposal, whereafter only the impugned notification has been issued. It is not in dispute that Indian Oil Corporation is a State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India, and is a Corporation within the meaning of S. 3 (cc) of the said Act, which expression includes anybody corporate established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, and includes a Government company as defined in S. 617 of the Companies Act. On the other hand, the word 'company' has been defined in S. 2 (c) to mean, a company- defined in S. 3 of the Companies Act, other than a Government company referred to in Cl. (cc ). In the year 1984, the Land Acquisition Act was amended by Act 68 of 1984, in terms whereof, inter alia, the words 'public purpose' has been defined. Clause (iv) of S. 2 (f) of the Act includes within the aforementioned expression, the provision of land for a Corporation owned or controlled by the State. Section 4 authorises the State to issue a notification under the said provision if the land in any locality is needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a company. From what has been seen hereinbefore, it is thus clear that a distinction exists between acquisition for a company and an acquisition for public purpose. Section 4 authorises the State to issue a notification under the said provision if the land in any locality is needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a company. From what has been seen hereinbefore, it is thus clear that a distinction exists between acquisition for a company and an acquisition for public purpose. Whereas, for the purpose of acquisition on behalf of a company, requirements of Chapter VII of the Act are required to be complied with, no such requirement is to be complied with if the acquisition is made for a public purpose. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the purpose for which the acquisition is being made, is a public purpose. The question which arises for consideration now is whether in view of the fact that as no urgency has been stated in the notification so as to enable the State to invoke its power under S. 17 (4) of the Act, the impugned notification is valid in law or not. In Narayan Govind's case ( AIR 1977 SC 183 ) (supra), the Apex Court was dealing with a matter prior to the Amendment Act, 1954. In view of the law as it then stood, it held that the burden of proof that a matter is an urgent one and thus requires invocation of S. 17, is on the State. In Dora Phalauli's case ( AIR 1979 SC 1594 ) (supra), a Division Bench of the Supreme Court no doubt struck down a notification as the same did not contain any statement that in the opinion of the Government there was any urgency to take recourse to the provision of S. 17 of the Act, but it appears that both the aforementioned decisions have been distinguished by the Supreme Court of India in Union of India v. Praveen Gupta, reported in (1996) 9 JT (SC) 624, in the following terms :"shri Sanghi, learned senior counsel has pointed out that there is no real urgency in this matter and the respondents could have been given an opportunity to contend that land is not needed for any public purpose. In support thereof, he placed strong reliance on the judgments in Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 1 SCC 133 : ( AIR 1977 SC 183 ); Dora Phalauli v. State of Punjab (1979) 4 SCC 485 : ( AIR 1979 SC 1594 ) and State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh 6 (1980) 2 SCC 471 : ( AIR 1980 SC 319 ). The decision in Narayan Govind's case, has been distinguished by this Court in several cases. " ( 6 ) THE Apex Court clearly held that each case has to be considered on its own facts. The Apex Court upon consideration of several decisions, held that a decision on urgency is an administrative decision and is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the appropriate Government on the basis of the materials available on records and, therefore, there was no need to pass any reasoned order to arrive at a conclusion that there is urgency so as to dispense with the enquiry under S. 5a in exercise of powers under S. 17 (4) of the Act. The Apex Court further held: that the language of the notification is not conclusive but the Court is required to consider the materials whether there existed any, urgency for the purpose of exercising the power under S. 17 (4) of the Act. While saying so, the Supreme Court followed its earlier decision in Joynarayan v. Union of India, reported in 1996 (1) SCC 9 : ( AIR 1996 SC 697 ). The decision of this Court reported in 1996 (1) Cal HN 83 appears to have been rendered in a different fact situation. In that case, the purpose of requisition was stated for the purpose of maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community and for increasing employment opportunities along with other facilities for construction of a civic centre, in CIT Scheme No. VIII. in that case, neither any affidavit-in-opposition was filed nor the records had been produced. However, the learned Judge observed as follows :-"13. Keeping in view the aforesaid provisions of the said Act, it is clear that the acquisition has not been made in compliance with any of these provisions. The impugned order in terms speaks of having been passed in exercise of powers under Ss. 17 (1) and S. 17 (4) of the said Act. No other section is referred to. Keeping in view the aforesaid provisions of the said Act, it is clear that the acquisition has not been made in compliance with any of these provisions. The impugned order in terms speaks of having been passed in exercise of powers under Ss. 17 (1) and S. 17 (4) of the said Act. No other section is referred to. Neither of these sections dispenses with the publication of the declaration under S. 6 of the said Act. it appears to be admitted from the affidavit-in-opposition that no such declaration was made at all. 14. Furthermore, there is no case of urgency made out justifying the use of such emergent powers by the authorities concerned. The pre-condition to the exercise of such power being absent, the order cannot be sustained. "the said decision is, therefore, not applicable to the fact of the present case. In the instant case not only a notice under S. 6 has been issued; in view of the statements made in the affidavit-in-opposition as also from the records I am satisfied that there exists an emergency. However, the opinion of the learned Judge to the effect that there cannot be any simultaneous notification issued under Ss. 4 and 17 (4), does not appear to be correct in view of the several Supreme Court's decisions where such notifications have been upheld including the decisions referred to hereinbefore. In Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 1997 (1) SCC 134 : (1997 AIR SCW 1281), the Apex Court was dealing with identical situation where negotiation took place for purchase of land but till then it was held that keeping in view the fact that there existed an emergency acquisition in terms of S. 4 of the said AC cannot be said to be mala fide. The Apex Court clearly held that the Courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power undo Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court clearly held that the Courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power undo Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. I further held :"it may even be open to the High Court to direct in case it finds finally that the acquisition was vitiated on account of non-compliance with some legal requirement that the persons interested shall also be entitled to a particular amount of damages to be awarded as a lump sum or calculated at certain percentage of compensation payable There are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong; quashing the acquisition proceedings is not the only made of redress. To wit, it is ultimately a matter of balancing the competing interest. Beyond this, it is neither possible nor advisable to say. "in Md. Ali v. State of U. P. reported in (1996) 9 JT (SC) 435, it has bee held that even prior to 1984 Amendment Act simultaneous publication of notification under S. 4 (1) and declaration under S. 6 was valid in law. As regards the State's power to dispense with an enquiry under S. 17 (4), the 7 Apex Court observed :"it is also seen that in relation to the State of Uttar Pradesh, Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 5 of 1991 has been brought into force w. e. f. February 17, 1991 and, therefore, in relation to the State of U. P. it is now settled law that when the State exercises the power of eminent domain and in exercise of the power under S. 17 (4) dispensing with the enquiry under S. 5-A to acquire the land under S. 4 (1) the State is entitled to have the notification under S. 4 (1) and the declaration under S. 6 simultaneously published so as to take further steps as required under S. 9 of the Act i. e. , issuance of the notice and taking possession thereof under S. 17 (2) of the Act. Thereafter the land stands vested in the State free from all encumbrances. In view of the urgency, the Government exercised power of eminent domain and dispensed with the enquiry under S. 5-A; we do not find any illegality in the action taken by the respondents in having the notification under S. 4 (1) and the declaration under S. 6 simultaneously published. In view of the urgency, the Government exercised power of eminent domain and dispensed with the enquiry under S. 5-A; we do not find any illegality in the action taken by the respondents in having the notification under S. 4 (1) and the declaration under S. 6 simultaneously published. "it is not disputed that a public purpose has been stated in the notification and such a public purpose is apparent from the records of the case. Once the State arrived at a satisfaction that there exists a public purpose for the purpose of acquisition of land, the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review would not interfere therewith. In the case reported in 1995 (2) SCC 442 : (1995 AIR SCW 218), the Apex Court in paragraph 10 (of SCC) : (Para 11 of AIR) observed :"as mentioned earlier when the State Government has exercised power under S. 4 (1) for public purpose and the public purpose was mentioned therein exercise of the power cannot be invalidated on account of mala fide so long as the public purpose is shown and land is needed or likely to be needed for the purpose of subsistence at the time of exercise of power. It is peremptorily for the State Government to decide whether there exists public purpose or not and it is not for this Court or High Court to value evidence and come to its conclusion whether or not there is public purpose unless it comes to the conclusion that it is mala fide or colourable exercise of the power. "this aspect of the matter has also been recently considered in Subhashgir Khushalgir Gosavi v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, reported in 1996 (8) SCC 282 : ( AIR 1996 SC 3169 ) in the following terms :-"but it is for the Government to take a decision and it is not for the Court to decide as to which place is more convenient. Since the Government have taken a decision that acquiring the land for extension of the bus stand and bus depot is in the public interest it cannot be said that the exercise of the power is arbitrary. Since the Government have taken a decision that acquiring the land for extension of the bus stand and bus depot is in the public interest it cannot be said that the exercise of the power is arbitrary. "in S. S. Darshan v. State of Karnataka, reported in 1996 (7) SCC 302 : ( AIR 1996 SC 671 ), the Supreme Court was dealing with almost a similar situation where an Information Technological Park was to be set up. The acquisition was made by a company but it was held that the acquisition is for the public purpose viz. establishing of a technological part of national importance which is a joint venture project involved three collaborators of Karnataka State. In the instant case from the records it appears that apart from the fact that the project in question has been considered as a joint venture of the Indian Oil Corporation as also the Central Government, the Indian Oil Corporation has been authorised to approach the State Government for acquiring of the land in question. In Collector, Ongole v. Narra Venkateswarlu, reported in 1996 (7) SCC 150 , the acquisition for providing houses to the weaker sections to the society was considered to be a public purpose. In S. S. Darshan's caes (supra) the Supreme Court held in the facts of that case upon taking into consideration the cumulative effect of all the documents that setting up of the technological park by the Government of Karnataka through the said Board and acquisition of this additional area became necessary on account of the inadequacy of the land acquired earlier under the Karnataka Act of 1966 is in public interest. In that case the Supreme Court had held that even the action of taking recourse to the provision of 8 S. 17 of the said Act could not have beer assailed on the ground of mala fide. In Vasantkumar Radhakisan Vora v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, reported in AIR 1991 SC 14 , the Supreme Court while considering a question of promissory estoppel held that it is well settled legal position that the private interest would always yield place to the public interest. In Vasantkumar Radhakisan Vora v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, reported in AIR 1991 SC 14 , the Supreme Court while considering a question of promissory estoppel held that it is well settled legal position that the private interest would always yield place to the public interest. As in the main writ application the petitioner had not taken any plea that the provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act had not been complied with the said plea could not have been allowed to be taken in view of the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Paschimbanga Prathamik Sikshak Sikshan Prapts Bakar-O-Sikshak Samiti v. President, West Bengal Primary School Council, reported in 1996 (7) SCC 333 : (1996 AIR SCW 28), even if such a plea is allowed to be raised in my opinion, in view of the change in law by reason of Act No. 682 of 1984 the said plea has no force. ( 7 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that there is no merit in this application which must accordingly, be dismissed. ( 8 ) BEFORE parting with this case, however this Court may take notice of the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Sterling Computers Limited v. M/s. M. and N. Publications Limited, reported in 1993 (1) SCC 445 : ( AIR 1996 SC 51 ), which has been relied upon by Dr. Banerjee wherein the Supreme Court lamented non-disposal of a tender matter at an early date in the following terms :"before were part with the judgment we shall like to strike a note of caution. It is a matter of common experience that whenever applications relating to awarding of contracts are entertained for judicial review of the administrative action such applications remain pending for months and in some cases for years. Because of the interim order passed in such applications, the very execution of the contracts are kept in abeyance, The cost of different projects keep on escalating with passage of time apart from the fact that the completion of the project itself is deferred. This process not only affects the public exchequer but even the public in general who are deprived of availing the facilities under different projects. This process not only affects the public exchequer but even the public in general who are deprived of availing the facilities under different projects. As such, it need not (sic) be impressed that while exercising the power of judicial review in connection with contractual obligations, Courts should be conscious of the urgency of the disposal of such matters, otherwise the power which is to be exercised in the interest of public and for public good in some cases become counter-productive by causing injury in general. "it is not appreciated as to why the aforementioned decision had been cited keeping in view the fact that the writ application was moved only on 3-2-1997 and an undertaking was given on behalf of the Indian Oil Corporation not to lake possession of the land in question for a week. The records had been produced only on 10-2-1997 and at the request of the parties, the matter was fixed on 19-2-1997 in order to enable the learned counsel for the petitioner to inspect the records. The matter appeared in the list and was heard on 19-2-1997 and the judgment is being pronounced today. ( 9 ) IN view of the fact that the decision as regards existence of emergency had to be arrived at on the perusal of the records, the petitioner cannot be saddled with costs. The parties are, therefore, directed to pay and bear their own costs. ( 10 ) PRAYER for stay of operation of this order is considered and refused. Petition dismissed.