JUDGMENT : 1. These three writ petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India impugn the orders of the Industrial Court, Pune, dated September 7, 1990 made in Complaints (ULP) Nos. 143 to 147 of 1987 under the provisions of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 2. Though the facts in these writ petitions are marginally different, the facts common in all the writ petitions are : Respondent-workmen in each of these writ petitions were employed in the service of the Petitioners for more than four years on jobs essentially of a permanent nature. Despite having been employed on work of a permanent nature for periods in excess of four years, and having completed more than 240 days working each of the Respondent workmen was treated, as a temporary employee. The Respondent workmen moved complaints (ULP) Nos. 143 to 147 of 1987 before the Industrial Court at Pune invoking Item 6 of Schedule IV read with Section 28 of the Act. It was the case of the Respondent-workmen before the Industrial Court that despite being employed on work of permanent nature, which each of them had been carrying out for more than four years continuously and having completed 240 days of working, they had been deliberately deprived of the status and benefits of permanency in work. That there is difference in the status and the benefits of permanent workmen and temporary workmen, is not in dispute. 3. The complaints were opposed by the Petitioners on the ground that the Petitioners are not an 'industry' and that each one of the Respondents had been made permanent in service by an order dated July 6, 1990 and, therefore, the cause of action had ceased to exist. The Petitioners, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the complaints. The Respondent workmen examined themselves before the Industrial Court and supported their cases. The crux of the evidence given by the Respondent workmen was that they were working on jobs which were of a permanent nature, that they were working for more than 240 days throughout unbroken periods in excess of four years and that they had deliberately not been accorded the status and benefits of permanent workmen with a view to deprive them of such status and benefits. Significantly, the Petitioners led no evidence whatsoever before the Industrial Court. 4. Significantly, the Petitioners led no evidence whatsoever before the Industrial Court. 4. The Industrial Court assessed the only evidence on record and came to the conclusion that the Respondent workmen had proved that each of them had worked for 240 days, that each of them was employed on a job the nature of which was essentially permanent and that each one of them had not been made permanent. In view of the fact that no evidence had been led in by Petitioners to explain why the Respondent workmen had not been made permanent, the Industrial Court was constrained to conclude on the basis of the evidence before it that the only objective was to deprive the Respondent workmen of their status and benefits of permanency. The Industrial Court, therefore, found that the Petitioners had indulged in unfair labour practices within the meaning of Item 6 of Schedule IV of the Act. However, since the Respondent workmen had already been made permanent from different dates in July 1986, the Industrial Court merely directed that they should be extended with all benefits available to the permanent employees from the date on which each of them had completed 240 days working. These orders of the Industrial Court are impugned in the present writ petitions. 5. At the out set, it must be noticed that these writ petitions are under Article 227 of the Constitution of India wherein the jurisdiction of this Court is to ensure that the lower Tribunal has acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction and that the order impugned is not perverse. I have been taken through the orders impugned in these three writ petitions and the evidence on record of the Respondent workmen. The conclusions drawn by the learned Judge of the Industrial Court are conclusions of fact and, therefore, there is hardly any scope for interference with these conclusions in writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Since, Mr. Kochar, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners, vehemently urged certain legal issues by citing some judgments, I propose to examine them. 6. Mr. Since, Mr. Kochar, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners, vehemently urged certain legal issues by citing some judgments, I propose to examine them. 6. Mr. Kochar relied on the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Punjabrao Krishi Vidyapeeth, Akola by its Registrar v. General Secretary, Krishi Vidyapeeth Kamgar Union and another 1994 I L.I.C. 930 and contended that the law laid down in this case should equally apply to the case of the present Petitioners. In Punjabrao Krishi Vidyapeeth case (supra) a complaint had been moved by temporary employees of the Punjabrao Agricultural University on the ground that they had been employed continuously as temporary employees by years together without being granted the benefit of permanency or the benefits flowing from permanency. Lie University had been established under the Maharashtra Agricultural Universities (Krishi Vidyapeeth) Act, 1983 under which authority to sanction posts vested only with the Government and the University was statutorily prohibited from creating posts of labourers unless sanctioned by the Government. The Employer University had repeatedly sought sanction of the Government for additional posts, but, for reasons not discernible from the record, the Government had not sanctioned the posts. It is in these circumstances that a learned Single Judge of this Court took the view that the Employer, Punjabrao Agricultural University, could not be said to have indulged in an unfair labour practice within the meaning of Item 6 of Schedule IV of the Act with the object of depriving the employees of their legitimate benefits. It is for these reasons that the learned Judge held that tangible evidence is required to show that the deprivation was deliberate. This judgment is clearly distinguishable on facts. In the present case, there is total lack of evidence on the part of the Petitioners. As far as the Petitioners are concerned, they are part and parcel of the Government and there is singular lack of evidence as to whether at any time sanction for posts had been applied for which was delayed or refused. In these circumstances I am of the view that the ratio of the Punjabrao Krishi Vidyapeeth case (supra) cannot assist the Petitioners in the present case. 7. The Petitioners then relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Madhyamik Siksha Parishad, U.P. Vs. Anil Kumar Mishra and others etc., (2005) 5 SCC 122. In these circumstances I am of the view that the ratio of the Punjabrao Krishi Vidyapeeth case (supra) cannot assist the Petitioners in the present case. 7. The Petitioners then relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Madhyamik Siksha Parishad, U.P. Vs. Anil Kumar Mishra and others etc., (2005) 5 SCC 122. This was a case where the Education Board had engaged some workmen on ad-hoc basis for the work of preparing certificates to be issued by the Education Board to the candidates successful at the examinations conducted by it. The certificates were in printed proformas and the workmen were required to fill up the particulars of the candidate, name of the school, date of birth, etc., in the appropriate spaces. After the backlog of work pertaining to preparation of certificates was completed The workmen challenged the terminations of their services by way of writ petition before the High Court. The High Court directed the Education Board to take the employees back in service as casual workers and continue their service upon to the regular employees doing similar work. The High Court further directed that the employees be considered for regular appointment Lower Division Clerks as and when these posts were filled up on, the basis of their qualifications and seniority as daily wage labourers and further that their services should not be dispensed with till they were 15 absorbed on a regular basis. On appeal to Supreme Court, the Supreme Court was pleased to hold that, inasmuch as the workmen's services had been engaged in on ad-hoc manner for some additional or contingency work, from the mere fact that they had completed 240 days of work, it was difficult to envisage for them the status of permanent workmen on the analogy of the provisions u/s 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In my view, the reliance placed on this judgment by the Petitioners is wholly inapposite. 8. Finally, Mr. Kochar relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gram Sevak Prashikshan Kendra v. The Workmen employed under them represented by the Manjri Farm Karm ar Union and Others (Judgment arising out Of SLP (C) No. 4658/1993 & 571/1993 dated August 18, 1994). This again is a case of Mazdoors appointed in Manjri Agricultural School, Pune, established under Rahuri Agricultural University, Maharashtra, pursuant to the provisions of the Maharashtra Agricultural Universities Act, 1967. This again is a case of Mazdoors appointed in Manjri Agricultural School, Pune, established under Rahuri Agricultural University, Maharashtra, pursuant to the provisions of the Maharashtra Agricultural Universities Act, 1967. This was also a case where, upon a reference made u/s 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the industrial Tribunal was satisfied on evidence that, though the workmen concerned had worked for more than 240 days in the three years they were not made permanent on the ground that the Government had sanctioned only 36 sanctioned posts and directed regularisation of the service of workmen on permanent basis. The Supreme Court also found that, as a matter of fact, the nature of work done by the workmen was seasonal and therefore, they could not be styled as permanent workmen round the year. It was in these circumstances that the Supreme Court was persuaded to hold that the workmen concerned were not entitled to the benefits arising from regularisation of their services as permanent workmen. 9. After having considered the three judgments cited by Mr. Koehar, I am of the considered view that the present writ petitions must fail on facts. The findings recorded by the learned Judge of the Industrial Court in each of the impugned orders are wholly unassailable since they are clearly based on evidence of the Respondent workmen, there being no evidence to the contrary adduced by the Petitioners. The view taken by the Industrial Court is certainly a plausible one on the evidence before it and cannot be characterised as perverse. In these circumstances, I am not persuaded that the impugned orders need to be interfered with in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 10. In the premises, the writ petitions are dismissed. Rules discharged with no order as to costs.