JUDGMENT J. C. Mishra, J. (1.) THIS reference has been made by Hon. R. N. Ray, J. for decision as to whether earlier single Bench decision in Mahavir and another v. State of U. P., 1981 ACC 630, is a good law. In view of the provisions of Section 399 (1) (2) and of Section 401 (2), Cr. P.C. (2.) THE aforesaid reference has been made in the backdrop of facts given below : s Satya Naraln feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the revisional court filed writ petition challenging the aforesaid order. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Additional Sessions Judge committed error in re-appreciating the evidence and recording the finding of possession in favour of opposite party Ramesh Chandra. Reliance was placed on the pronouncement of this Court in Mahavir and another v. State of U. P., 1981 (18) ACC 630. The learned single Judge disagreed with the view taken in the Mahavir's case and in view of this conflict, he directed the record to be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for referring the matter to a large Bench for consideration whether the decision referred to above is good law in view of the proviso to Section 399 (1) (2), Cr. P.C. and of Section 401 (2), Cr. P.C. (3.) THE learned Chief Justice referred the matter to Division Bench. (4.) WE have heard Sri S. N. Verma, learned counsel for the petitioners, learned counsel for the opposite and Sri V. S. Mishra, learned Additional Government Advocate. Section 397, Cr. P.C. conferred revisional powers on the High Court as also on the Sessions Judge. Section 399 (1). Cr. P.C. provides that while deciding criminal revision a Sessions Judge may exercise all or any of the powers which may be exercised by the High Court under sub-section (1) of Section 401, Cr. P.C. Sub-section (2) of Section 399 provides that where any proceeding by way of revision is commenced before a Sessions Judge under sub-section (1). the provisions of sub-sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Section 401 shall, so far as may be, apply to such proceeding and references in the said sub-sections to the High Court shall be construed as references to the Sessions Judge. the provisions of sub-sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Section 401 shall, so far as may be, apply to such proceeding and references in the said sub-sections to the High Court shall be construed as references to the Sessions Judge. (5.) SUB-section (1) of Section 401 of the Code empowers the High Court to exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by Sections 386, 389, 390 and 391 or on a Court of Session by Section 307. By virtue of sub-section (1) of Section 399 this power conferred on the High Court can be exercised by the Sessions Judge. The powers of the appellate court are provided in Section 386. Clause (d) of Section 386 permits the appellate court in an appeal from an order (other than the order of acquittal or conviction) to alter or reverse such order. Clause (e) empowers the appellate court to make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper. (6.) THE said powers conferred on the appellate court by virtue of clauses (d) and (e) to Section 386 can be exercised by the Sessions Judge in view of Section 399 read with Section 401, Cr. P.C. The view of the learned single Judge in reference order is that the revisional courts are empowered to exercise powers of the appellate courts while disposing of the revisions and the restrictions imposed as in Mahavir's case are contrary to law. In other words, the revision courts like appellate courts can re- appreciate the evidence and record finding contrary to the trial court, if the finding recorded by the Inferior court is perverse. (7.) THE view taken by this Court in Mahavir v. State of U. P., 1981 (18) ACC 630 was that the jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge, acting as a court of revision and the powers which can be exercised by him in such proceedings are to be 1 found within the four-corners of Sections 397 and 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A reference to Sections 145 and 146 of the Code of Criminal J Procedure makes it clear that it is the satisfaction of the Magistrate, which forms grounds under the said Sections. THE revisional court may no doubt correct any error in the order passed by the Magistrate. A reference to Sections 145 and 146 of the Code of Criminal J Procedure makes it clear that it is the satisfaction of the Magistrate, which forms grounds under the said Sections. THE revisional court may no doubt correct any error in the order passed by the Magistrate. He cannot, however, re-assess the evidence and on such reassessment, arrive at a finding different than recorded by the Magistrate. In case the Sessions Judge was of the view that the said order, passed by the Magistrate was vitiated on account of any illegality or impropriety, he had ample Jurisdiction to set aside that order and to direct the Magistrate to decide the question of possession afresh. He could not made his own assessment of evidence on record and come to a conclusion that opposite party No. 2-II party and not the applicants. I party were in possession of the property attached. That jurisdiction had been conferred by the Legislature exclusively to the Magistrate. THE Sessions Judge, in the instant case, has committed a manifest error in usurping the jurisdiction, which did not vest in it and in passing the order under Section 145. Cr. P.C. (8.) IN Laxmi Narain v. Smt Munni Devi, 1990 (27) ACC 55, Hon'bale G. D. Dube, J. held that the view taken by the trial court was based on proper appraisal of the evidence and there was no jurisdiction to the revisional court to have substituted its view on improper appreciation of evidence. In Nohor Singh and another v. State of U. P. and others, 1990 (27) ACC 632 decided by Hon'ble S. R. Bhargava, J., it was held that the revisional court could hold the finding as perverse but cannot say that the party found in possession by the Magistrate, has failed to prove the possession. He can remand the case to the Court of Magistrate but cannot quash the entire proceedings under Section 145. Cr. P.C. (9.) THE learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the view taken by the High Court in Mahavir's case, and in Smt. Javitri Devi v. Rajpal Singh and others, 1986 (23) ACC 31, is correct. He can remand the case to the Court of Magistrate but cannot quash the entire proceedings under Section 145. Cr. P.C. (9.) THE learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the view taken by the High Court in Mahavir's case, and in Smt. Javitri Devi v. Rajpal Singh and others, 1986 (23) ACC 31, is correct. In Javitri case, it was observed that if the Sessions Judge was of the view of that the order of learned Magistrate was vitiated on account of illegality, impropriety or incorrectness, his jurisdiction was limited to set it aside and direct the Magistrate to decide the question of possession afresh in the light of the evidence. THE Sessions Judge was not justified to make his own assessment of the evidence and come to a different conclusion that the opposite party and not the revisionists were in possession. That jurisdiction has been specifically conferred upon the Magistrate by the Legislature by the use of the words "satisfaction of the Magistrate in the law Itself." THE Sessions Judge by making observation beyond his jurisdiction has committed a manifest error because that jurisdiction did not vest in him. (10.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner referred to the decisions of this Court and Supreme Court regarding powers of the revisional courts to interfere with the preliminary orders passed under Section 145, Cr. P.C. and contended that the finding recorded by the Magistrate cannot be reversed by the revisional court. In Nathilal v. Sunil Kumar Singh and another, 1983 ALJ 1217, a single Judge of this Court held that the High Court in revision should not go into the question of sufficiency of material which has satisfied the Magistrate to pass preliminary orders under sub-section (1) of Section 145, Cr. P.C. Reliance was placed on earlier decisions in Kalap Deen v. State, 1970 ALJ 837 ; Jaffar Hussain v. State. 1960 AU 1018 ; Musammat Husanti v. State, AIR 1956 All. 81 , which view finds support from the Supreme Court's observation in the case of R. H. Butani v. Miss Nani J. Desai, AIR 1967 SC 1441. The Supreme Court held that the satisfaction under sub-section (1) of Section 145 is of the Magistrate. The question whether on the materials before him he should Initiate the proceedings or not is. 81 , which view finds support from the Supreme Court's observation in the case of R. H. Butani v. Miss Nani J. Desai, AIR 1967 SC 1441. The Supreme Court held that the satisfaction under sub-section (1) of Section 145 is of the Magistrate. The question whether on the materials before him he should Initiate the proceedings or not is. therefore, in his descretion, which power no doubt to be exercised in accordance with the full recognition of Rules of law in that behalf. No hard and fast rule can, therefore, be laid down as to the sufficiency of the material for his satisfaction. The High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction would not go into the question of sufficiency of material which has satisfied the Magistrate. (11.) THE aforesaid view taken by the Supreme Court was approved by a larger Bench of the Supreme Court comprising of three Hon'ble Judges in Rajpati v. Bachan and another, AIR 1981 SC 18 . THE aforesaid cases are of no help in deciding the controversy involved. THE aforesaid pronouncements only held that sufficiency of the material on which the reported in AIR 1981 SC 18 . (12.) THE aforesaid cases are of no help in deciding the controversy involved. THE aforesaid pronouncements only held that sufficiency of the material on which the satisfaction contemplated by Section 145, Cr. P.C. was within the Jurisdiction of the Magistrate and the revisional court could not substitute its own satisfaction. Since the Magistrate acting under Section 145 (1), Cr. P.C. can only look into the police report or any other material to record its satisfaction and at that stage neither evidence is recorded nor any question of appreciation of evidence arises, the pronouncements relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners are of no help in determining whether the revisional courts have got power to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its finding at variance with the finding recorded by the Magistrate. It appears that in Mahavir's case, the view of the High Court was influenced by the aforesaid decisions, without appreciating that in these pronouncements, the courts were concerned with the powers of the Magistrate to pass preliminary order on being satisfied on the basis of police report or other information that there was apprehension of breach of peace, as is evident by the observation "A reference to Sections 145 and 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure makes it clear that it is satisfaction of the Magistrate which forms grounds under the said section." The learned single Judge failed to notice that the satisfaction of the Magistrate is confined to the stage of passing preliminary order and not beyond it. Once the parties enter into evidence, the Magistrate is required to record a judicial finding after appraisal of evidence. No discretion Is left to the Magistrate to record finding on his satisfaction and to uphold possession of any party of his choice. He has to adhere strictly to provisions of the Indian Evidence Act in recording finding as to which party was in possession on the relevant date. (13.) IN Mahavtr's case as also in other cases taking similar view, it was not noticed that the revisional courts had powers of appellate courts conferred by Section 386. Cr. P.C. (14.) THE powers vested in revisional courts under Section 397, Cr. P.C. are wider than possessed by civil courts under Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure. Whereas the civil revisional courts cannot Interfere with the order unless they suffer from Jurisdictional error or with material irregularity, the criminal revisional court can examine the record for satisfying itself or himself as to correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed by such inferior court. By virtue of clause (d) of Section 386, Cr. P.C. the revisional court can alter and reverse any finding if it is incorrect, illegal or Improper. In view of the aforesaid provision, it cannot be said that the revisional court cannot reverse any incorrect finding and if it disagrees with the finding, it can only remand the case to the inferior court for recording a finding afresh. This does not appear to be the legislative intent. In view of the aforesaid provision, it cannot be said that the revisional court cannot reverse any incorrect finding and if it disagrees with the finding, it can only remand the case to the inferior court for recording a finding afresh. This does not appear to be the legislative intent. (15.) THE learned counsel for the petitioner as also learned Government Advocate in support of their contention that revisional courts are not empowered J to record finding contrary to recorded by Magistrate, relied on the following 1 cases decided by the Supreme Court. 1 (16.) IN D. Stephens v. Nosibolla, AIR 1951 (38) SC 196, the Supreme Court observed that the revisional Jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Section 439 is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of 'acquittal', against which the Government has a right of appeal under Section 417, Cr. P.C. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidence on record. In Logendranath Jha v. Polailal Biswas, AIR 1951 SC 316 , the Supreme Court pointed out that the High Court is entitled in revision to set aside an acquittal if there is an error on a point of law or no appraisal of the evidence at ; " all. It is not sufficient to say that the judgment under revision is "Perverse" or "lacking in true correct perspective." (17.) IN K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1788 , the Supreme Court observed that an interference in revision with an order of acquittal can only take place if there is a glaring defect of procedure such as that the court had no jurisdiction to try the case or the court had shut out some material evidence which was admissible or attempted to take into account evidence which was not admissible or had overlooked some evidence. Although the list given by this Court is not exhaustive of all the circumstances in which the High Court may interfere with an acquittal in revision it is obvious that the defect in the judgment under revision must be analogous to those actually indicated by this Court. (18.) RELYING on the aforesaid decisions the Supreme Court in Mahendra Pratap v. Sarju Singh and another, AIR 1968 SC 707 , held that the High Court cannot re-weigh the evidence from its own point of view and reach inferences contrary to those of the Sessions Judge. The revisional court in dealing in revision with an acquittal cannot do so. In Khetra Bast Samal and another v. State of Orissa and others, AIR 1970 SC 272 , the Supreme Court observed that the revisional jurisdiction conferred under Section 439, Cr. P.C. should be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases where there is some glaring defect in the procedure and there is a manifest error or a point of law and consequently there has been a flagarant miscarriage of justice. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases, which will cover all contingencies. However, some cases of this kind, which will justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision may be where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce, or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. (19.) IN Bansi Lal and others v. Laxman Singh, AIR 1986 SC 1721 , the Supreme Court held that it Is only in glaring cases of injustice resulting from some violation of fundamental principles of law by the trial court, that the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of the acquittal and direct a retrial of the acquitted accused. From the very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. From the very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. The mere circumstance that a finding of fact recorded by the trial court, may in the opinion of the High Court be wrong, will not Justify the setting aside of the order of acquittal and directing a retrial of the accused. (20.) IN view of the aforesaid pronouncements, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the revisional court has got no power to re-appreciate the evidence. It may, however, be noticed that the aforesaid observations were made while the Supreme Court was considering the powers of the revisional courts in revisions preferred against an order of acquittal. The powers of the appellate courts in this regard are wider. Section 378 of the Code enables the State Government, subject to provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4), to direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appeal court order of acquittal passed by the Court of Sessions in revision. Sub- section (3) provides that no appeal under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be entertained/except with the leave of the High Court. Sub-section (4) provides that if such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court. If an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1996 (25 of 1996) or by any agency empowered to make investigation into an offence under any Central Act other than this Act. the Central Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal subject to the provisions of sub-section (3) to the High Court from the order of acquittal. He may approach the High Court for grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal. the Central Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal subject to the provisions of sub-section (3) to the High Court from the order of acquittal. He may approach the High Court for grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal. By virtue of powers conferred by Section 386 the appellate court can reverse an order of acquittal and direct that further inquiry be made or the accused be re-tried or committed for trial as the case may be or if he finds him guilty to pass a sentence on him, according to law. The revisional courts in view of the bar created by Section 401 (3) are not authorised to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. IN view of this bar the revisional court can only interfere with the order of acquittal If there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there Is a manifest error on the point of law and consequently it has resulted in flagarant mis-carriage of justice or the trial court had no Jurisdiction to try the case but had still acquitted the accused or where the trial court had wrongly shut out the evidence, which the prosecution wished to produce or the trial court had considered the evidence which was inadmissible or where the material evidence had been overlooked by the court concerned. It may. however, be mentioned that the Supreme Court was not required to consider the powers of the revisional courts to re-appreciate the evidence and in the aforesaid cases the aforesaid said observations were made in view of restrictions imposed on the revisional courts to convert acquittal into conviction and also in the light of principle of criminal Jurisprudence that all the benefits on account of any infirmity in the trial has to go to the accused. Even IN appeal against acquittal, the appellate courts cannot interfere with the finding if the appellate courts come to the conclusion that the other view taken by trial court is equally possible. The Supreme Court IN the aforesaid cases had no occasion to interpret Section 401 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which vests the revisional courts the powers of a Court of Appeal, under various sections including Section 386 by which an appellate court can alter or reverse any order. The Supreme Court IN the aforesaid cases had no occasion to interpret Section 401 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which vests the revisional courts the powers of a Court of Appeal, under various sections including Section 386 by which an appellate court can alter or reverse any order. In view of the powers conferred under clause (d) of Section 386 read with Section 401 (1). Cr. P.C. the revisional courts are not required to remand the case for recording finding afresh if they find that the order Is not correct. If the view taken by the learned single Judge In Mahavir's case is held to be correct, the revisional court can neither alter nor reverse any order. In other words, the revisional court can only set aside the order and remand the case for decision afresh. It cannot reverse the order despite this power being specifically conferred by virtue of clause (d) of Section 386. In our opinion, this does not appear to be the intent of the legislation. No provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure has been brought to our notice restricting the powers of the revisional court to re-appreciate the evidence and to reverse the order in exercise of revisional Jurisdiction against orders other than convictions and acquittals. (21.) THE learned single Judge in Mahavir v. State of U. P., referred to the relevant provisions contained in clause (d) of Section 386 but without considering its import held that the revisional court cannot re-assess the evidence and on such re-assessment arrive at a finding at variance with the finding recorded by the Magistrate. As observed earlier, if the view taken by the learned single Judge is accepted as correct, it will make the provision of clause id) of Section 386 nugatory or redundant. In our opinion, the revisional courts enjoy all the powers of the appellate courts in exercising powers under Section 397. Cr. P.C. read with Section 401, Cr. P.C. (22.) THE powers of revisional courts to interfere with illegal orders are very wide and in its revisional jurisdiction, the court can set aside any order passed by an inferior court unless it is an interlocutory order. THE revisional courts can interfere with final orders as well as intermediate orders. Cr. P.C. read with Section 401, Cr. P.C. (22.) THE powers of revisional courts to interfere with illegal orders are very wide and in its revisional jurisdiction, the court can set aside any order passed by an inferior court unless it is an interlocutory order. THE revisional courts can interfere with final orders as well as intermediate orders. While considering the orders of acquittal and conviction, the powers of revisional courts may not be wider, not on account of its powers to appreciate the evidence but on account of fact that the accused are entitled to benefit of doubt and the criminal courts should be slow in interfering with the orders of acquittal and to convert an order of acquittal into conviction or to maintain the conviction if the evidence is of doubtful character and does not establish the prosecution case beyond shadow of doubt. No such restriction can be imposed while the revisional courts are required to consider the legality and propriety of the orders other than the orders of acquittal or of conviction. If the court in a first instance in a proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P.C. or 125, Cr. P.C. records any finding which is obviously erroneous or it is based on no evidence or no finding on vital issues is recorded, the revisional court can look into the evidence and record contrary finding. Section 401. Cr. P.C. read with clause (d) of Section 386, Cr. P.C. confers powers on the revisional courts to record a finding on vital issues if the trial court had failed to record finding or the finding itself is patently erroneous. In appreciating evidence like appellate courts, the revisional courts should not interfere with the finding if two views are possible and the trial court has taken one view, which is equally possible. All the superior courts are expected to be slow in interfering with such findings. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the opinion that the revisional court should interfere with the finding recorded by the inferior court, if it is perverse and is based on mis-appreciation of evidence or ignoring the evidence on record or taking into consideration inadmissible evidence. (23.) WE are fortified in our view by an earlier decision of Oudh Judicial Commissioner's Court in Emperor through Kallumal v. Sarju Prasad, 1924 Cr LJ 1066. Mr. (23.) WE are fortified in our view by an earlier decision of Oudh Judicial Commissioner's Court in Emperor through Kallumal v. Sarju Prasad, 1924 Cr LJ 1066. Mr. Wazir Hasan J. C. who decided the case held that ordinarily the High Court will not interfere with findings of facts in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (equivalent to Section 397 of the new Code) but it has jurisdiction to review even questions of facts as the words of Section 435 of the Code clearly indicate and will do so where there is a clear miscarriage of Justice. The aforesaid observation was made in a reference arising out of the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In his reference, the Sessions Judge of Rae Bareilly opined that the order passed by the Magistrate under Section 145, Cr. P.C. should be set aside and the opposite party. i.e., Sarju Prasad be directed to move the civil court for the enforcement of his rights, if any, and to cease interfering with Kallu Mal's possession. The learned Judicial Commissioner accepted the recommendation, set aside the order of the Magistrate and directed that Sarju Prasad would not interfere with Kallu Mal's possession of the property in question but that he may move the civil court for the enforcement of his rights. (24.) WHETHER the revisional court can interfere with perverse or patently erroneous findings came up for adjudication before Full Bench of this Court in Shivkali Goswami v. Emperor, AIR 1944 AU 257 (FB). Iqbal Ahmad, C.J. Alisop and Dar JJ. presiding over the Bench gave separate judgments but expressed similar opinions. The Hon'ble Chief Justice held that according to its well- established practice, the court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, usually accepts the findings on questions of fact recorded by a subordinate Tribunal, unless the finding is manifestly perverse or patently erroneous. A corrollary of the same is that if the finding recorded by the subordinate Tribunal is manifestly perverse or patently erroneous the revisional court can Interfere with the finding. The Bench observed that the revisional powers of this Court are no doubt wide, but they are discretionary and must be exercised not as a matter of course but only where it is demanded in the interest of public justice. The Bench observed that the revisional powers of this Court are no doubt wide, but they are discretionary and must be exercised not as a matter of course but only where it is demanded in the interest of public justice. Similar opinion was expressed by Hon'ble Dar, J. who held that it is not the practice of this Court generally in revision to enter into evidence unless there is some legal defect in the findings or in the procedure, or the judgment against the accused is perverse or opposed to natural justice. The aforesaid observation made by the Full Bench indicates that the revisional courts in order to prevent substantial miscarriage of Justice can interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the inferior court, if there is some legal defect in the findings or in the procedure or the Judgment is manifestly perverse or patently erroneous or opposed to natural justice. (25.) SIMILAR view was taken by Patna High Court in Anand Ballabh Prasad and another v. State of Bihar, AIR 1953 Pat 313 , wherein it was held that usually the High Court is averse to consider question of facts upon an application in revision, but in suitable cases, it is not only right but it is the duty of the Court, if the ends of justice require, to go into facts. (26.) IN Daungarshi Madan Lal Zunzunwala v. M/s. Deviprasad Omprakash Bajoria and another, 1985 Cri LJ 1943, it was held that if the Court arrives at a finding without properly considering the evidence on record and without applying the principles of law correctly, it can never be called a "finding of fact" in the accepted sense, as in that case it will amount to perverse and illegal appreciation of evidence. Finding of fact given on this background, even if concurrent, can never be binding on the revisional courts. To maintain such a finding would lead to miscarriage of justice and amount to travesty of law. While exercising its revisional powers under Section 397 read with Section 401, the Court has full powers" of satisfying it itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding." An illegal finding does not become a legal one only because it is concurrent. While exercising its revisional powers under Section 397 read with Section 401, the Court has full powers" of satisfying it itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding." An illegal finding does not become a legal one only because it is concurrent. Before concluding, we may refer to the recent decisions of the Supreme Court which may, on a casual reading, give different impression but in fact it is not so. The observation may be appreciated in context of facts of the respective cases. (27.) IN Pathumma and another v. Muhammad, AIR 1985 SC 1436, the Supreme Court held that the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction was not justified in substituting its own view for that of the learned Magistrate on a question of fact. This observation was made as on consideration of the evidence on record the Supreme Court found that the finding recorded by the Magistrate was correct. (28.) IN State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu INgale and others, AIR 1993 SC 1126 , the Supreme Court held that ordinarily it is not open for the High Court to interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below specially by reappreciating the evidence in its revisional jurisdiction. This observation was made as the Supreme Court found that the High Court fell into patent error in rejecting the prosecution evidence. This pronouncement cannot be interpreted to mean that the revisional court cannot interfere with the concurrent findings of the court below by appreciating evidence in its revisional jurisdiction despite the fact that the concurrent finding is perverse and results in miscarriage of justice. It can only mean that the revisional courts will be slow in interfering with the concurrent findings. In Bakulabai and another v. Gangaram and another, 1983 SCC (Cri) 189, the wife had challenged the order of the Judicial Magistrate granting maintenance only with regard to the quantum of maintenance. The Sessions Judge committed illegality in allowing the revision and dismissing the application under Section 125. Cr. P.C. The Supreme Court found that the findings of the Magistrate on the disputed question of fact were recorded after a full consideration of evidence and did not suffer from any error of law and consequently the revisional courts were not justified in making further assessment of the evidence and substitute their own view for those of the Magistrate. Cr. P.C. The Supreme Court found that the findings of the Magistrate on the disputed question of fact were recorded after a full consideration of evidence and did not suffer from any error of law and consequently the revisional courts were not justified in making further assessment of the evidence and substitute their own view for those of the Magistrate. The Supreme Court, however, found that the view taken by the revisional court that the marriage of Bakulabai was void was correct. This finding was, therefore, confirmed. (29.) THE catena of cases referred to above indicate that the revisional courts are not expected to interfere with the findings recorded by the trial court if they do not suffer from a manifest error on a point of law resulting in agarant miscarriage of justice but if the finding is perverse, the revisional courts can exercise jurisdiction in re-appreciating the evidence. THE cases in which the revisional court was justified in interfering with the finding cannot be exhaustively enumerated. However, if the trial court had no jurisdiction .to try the case or the trial court had wrongly shut out the evidence which the party wished to produce or where it has considered evidence. Which was inadmissible or where material evidence has been overlooked, the revisional courts can certainly | interfere with the finding. This view finds support from a recent decision of the Supreme Court decided by three Hon'ble Judges. Hon. A. M. Ahmadi, C. J. and M. K. Mukherjee and S. C. Sen. JJ. In Md. Sharif v. State of Orissa, 1995 SCC(Cri) 1111. In that case, the High Court exercising revisional jurisdiction refused to look into evidence on a technical ground, namely, that there was no specific averment in that behalf in the revision petition and thereby deprived the revisionist from showing that the finding recorded by the courts below was not borne out by evidence. THE Supreme Court held that the view taken by the High Court depriving the revisionist to show that the finding was based on no evidence was incorrect. Therefore, allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the order and remitted the matter back to the High Court for fresh consideration of entire matter in revision. THE Supreme Court held that the view taken by the High Court depriving the revisionist to show that the finding was based on no evidence was incorrect. Therefore, allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the order and remitted the matter back to the High Court for fresh consideration of entire matter in revision. (30.) WE find that the view taken by the learned single Judge in Mahavir Singh v. State of U. P. and another, 1981 ACC 63, does not lay down a correct law and the High Court or the Sessions Judge in exercise of revisional jurisdiction can re-appreciate the evidence if the finding recorded by the Magistrate in an order under Section 145 (6), Cr. P.C. is perverse or patently erroneous or suffers from legal defects or is opposed to natural justice, or suffers from glaring defect of procedure, such as court had shut out some material evidence which was admissible or took into account evidence which was not admissible or - overlooked some material evidence, the revisional court in such cases can exercise the powers of appellate court and record its own finding and on its basis alter or reverse the order, under revision. The record with this opinion be returned to the Bench concerned.