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1997 DIGILAW 9 (GAU)

Sudhir Debnath v. State of Tripura

1997-01-21

S.BARMAN ROY

body1997
By this writ petition, petitioners seek to challenge the order dated 18.9.96 passed by the LA Collector, South Tripura, Udaipur, in Case No. 1 (LA)/28 (A)/ 96 rejecting the prayer of the petitioners under section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for short, the Act, for enhancement of compensation. 2. The case, in short, is that notification dated 9.1.89 under section 4 of the Act was issued by the Government of Tripura in respect .of various plots of land measuring about 12.66 acres. Ultimately said land was acquired. Some portions of the said acquired land belonged to the petitioners. Land Acquisition Collector by his award dated 11.12.89 granted compensation at the rate of Rs. 17,000/- per kani of nal land and Rs. 14,000/- per kajii for basti land. Against the compensation awarded by the Collector, petitioner did not seek any reference under section 18 of the Act for enhancement of compensation granted in respect of the portions of the acquired land belonging to the petitioners. However, some other persons who were owners of some other portions of the same acquired land sought reference under section 18 of the Act for enhancement of compensation and accordingly only their cases were referred to the LA Judge. It may be mentioned here that the cases of the petitioners and the cases of those persons in which reference were made under section 18 of the Act on their prayer were all covered by the aforesaid notification dated 9.1.89 under section 4 of the Act. Learned kani for nal land and Rs.21,000/- per kani for basti land with usual rate of interest and solatium. 3. Petitioners could learn that the learned LA Judge passed the award on 18.6.94 in Misc (LA) 40/92, 41/92, 45/92 and 46/92 enhancing their compensation at the aforesaid rate. Soonafter that petitioners filed application under section 28A of the Act on 1.8,94 seeking enhancement of their compensation at the rate at which learned LA Judge awarded compensation to some other persons in the aforesaid LA Cases on a reference under section 18 of the Act Further case of the petitioners is that their eases as well as other cases in which learned LA Judge enhanced the compensation on a reference under section 18 of the Act were all covered by the notification dated 9.1.89 issued by the Government of Tripura under section 4 of the Act. 4. 4. However, learned LA Collector by the impugned order dated 18.9.96 passed in Case No.1/LA/28(A)/96 held that the prayer of the petitioners under section 28A was filed beyond the limitation of 3 months and as such he rejected the same. According to the learned LA Judge the earliest award passed in connection with some other cases but covered by the said notification dated 9.1.89 issued by the Government of Tripura under Section 4 of the Act was passed on 21.12.93 in Misc LA 37/92, 38/92, 39/92, 42/92 and 43/92. Therefore the earliest award was passed by the learned LA, judge on 21,12,93 in some other oases covered by the same notification under section 4 of the Act. Petitioners filed their application under section 18 of the Act only on 1.8.94 and therefore learned Collector was of the view that the application under section 28A was clearly barred by limitation and accordingly he dismissed the same. 5. I have heard Mr. BB Deb, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as Mr. UB Saha, learned Government Advocate. 6. Petitioners alongwith their application under section 28A of the Act produced the award dated 9.6.94 passed by the learned LA Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur in Misc LA Case Nos. 40/92, 41/92, 45/92 and 46/92 before the learned LA Collector. According to Mr. Deb they did not rely upon the other awards passed by the learned LA Judge on 21.12.93. They relied upon the award passed oh 8.6.94. Petitioners filed the said application on 1.8.94. Therefore, the said application tinder section 28A was filed by them within a period of 2 months from the date of the award dated 8.6.94 relied upon by them before the learned Collector. It is submitted by Mr. Deb that they were earlier totally ignorant about any such award passed by the learned LA Judge. Section 28A of the Act provides as follows: "28A. It is submitted by Mr. Deb that they were earlier totally ignorant about any such award passed by the learned LA Judge. Section 28A of the Act provides as follows: "28A. Redetermination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court - (1) Where in an award under this part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by me award of the Collector may, notwithstanding mat they had not made an application to the Collector under section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be redetermined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court: Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of me award shall be excluded. (2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section (1), a reasonable opportunity of being heard and made an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants. (3) Any .person who has not accepted the award under sub-section (2) may, by written application to the Collector, require mat the matter be referred by die Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under section 18." 7. It is true that the cases under the aforesaid award dated 21.12.93 and 8.6.94 are covered by the same notification under section 4 of the Act This aspect of the matter is not in dispute. Equally it is not in dispute that the case of the petitioners i also covered by the same notification under section 4 of the Act issued by the Government of Tripura. Now the question is whether the earliest of the successive awards would furnish the starting period of limitation of 3 months as provided in the proviso to section 28 A (1). Now the question is whether the earliest of the successive awards would furnish the starting period of limitation of 3 months as provided in the proviso to section 28 A (1). Collector held that the earliest award having been passed by the learned LA Judge on 21.12.93 and the application seeking enhancement under section 28 A of the Act having been filed on 1.8.94, such application was barred by limitation. Therefore, this Court is called upon to decide as to whether such decision of the Collector is correct or not. 8. It is true that the Supreme Court in Baburam vs. State of UP, (1995) 2 SCC 689 held that in the teeth of the express language in sub-section (1) of section 28A, if limitation of three months once expires in respect of earliest assistance to revive the lapsed time under section 28A (1) nor provide fresh cause of action or successive causes of action when multiple awards are made at different times or dates. Same view was reiterated again by the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Karnail Singh, (1995) 2 SCC 728 . In that case the Apex Court held that cause of action for making an application under section 28A would arise when an award has been made by the civil Court, on a reference under section 18, enhancing the compensation over and above the amount awarded by the Collector in his award under section 11 and the earliest of the successive awards would furnish the starting period of the limitation of three months as provided in the proviso to section 28A (1). 8. However, these two decisions were passed by two Judges Benches of the Supreme Court. But subsequently a larger Bench of the Supreme Court expressed just the opposite view. That decision was by. a three Judges Bench of the Apex Court. In this case Supreme Court considered the aforesaid earlier two decisions in Baburam and Larnail Singh. In the case of Union of India vs. Pradeep Kumari, (1995) 2 SCC 736 decision was rendered by a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court and this decision was rendered after the decisions in Baburam and Karnail Singh were rendered. In the case of Pradeep Kumari Supreme Court considered its earlier two decisions in Baburam and Karnail Singh. In the case of Union of India vs. Pradeep Kumari, (1995) 2 SCC 736 decision was rendered by a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court and this decision was rendered after the decisions in Baburam and Karnail Singh were rendered. In the case of Pradeep Kumari Supreme Court considered its earlier two decisions in Baburam and Karnail Singh. In the case: of Pradeep Kumari Supreme Court held that application for redetermination of the compensation is required to be made within three months from the date of the award of the Court. Right to make the application under section 2&A arises from the award of the Court on the basis of which the person making the application is seeking redetermination of the compensation. There is nothing in sub-section (1) of section 28 A to indicates that this right is confined in respect of the earliest award that is made by the Court after coming into force of section 28A. By restricting the benefit of section 28A to the first award that is made by the Court after the coming into force of section 28A, the benefit of higher amount of compensation on basis of the subsequent award made by the Court, would be denied to the persons invoking section 28A and the benefit of the said provision would be confined to redetermination of compensation on the basis of lesser amount of compensation awarded under the first award that is made after the coming into force of section 28A. There is nothing in the wordings of section 28A to indicate that the Legislature intended to confer such a limited benefit under section 28A. Such a construction would thus result hi perpetuating the inequality in the payment of compensation which the Legislature wanted to remove by enacting section 28A. The object underlying section 28A would be better achieved by giving the expression 'an award' in section 28A its natural meaning as meaning the award that is made by the Court in Part III of the Act after the coming into force of section 28A. The object underlying section 28A would be better achieved by giving the expression 'an award' in section 28A its natural meaning as meaning the award that is made by the Court in Part III of the Act after the coming into force of section 28A. In that case Supreme Court further observed in paragraph 11 that since the cause of action for moving the application for redetermination of compensation under section 28A arises from the award on the basis of which redetermination of compensation is sought, the principle that "once the limitation begins to run, it runs its full course until its running is interdicted by an order of the Court" can have no application because the limitation for moving the application under section 28A will begin to run only from the date of the award on the basis of which redetermination of compensation is sought. In this case, Supreme Court ultimately overruled its decisions in Bauram and Karnail Singh and held the aforesaid view. Therefore, the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumari is now binding upon us. Petitioners alongwith their application under section 28A before the Collector produced the award passed by the learned LA Judge on 8.6.94 in Misc LA Cases 40/92,41/92,45/92 and 46/92. They relied upon the aforesaid judgment and award dated 8.6.94 passed by the learned LA Judge and filed their application under section 28A on 1.8.94 and accordingly sought redetermination of their compensation. This being so, it is clear that the application filed by the petitioners before the Collector under section 28A for redetermination of compensation is well within time. This is clearly covered by the decision of the Apex Court in Pradeep Kumari. 9. It is of course true that the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Pradeep Kumari was not brought to the notice of the learned Collector. Only two decisions of the Supreme Court in Baburam and Karnail Singh were brought to his notice and, as such, the Collector was naturally misled. Had the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pradeep Kumari been brought to the notice of the Collector, I am sure, he would have passed correct order holding that the application of the petitioners under section 28A was within limitation and accordingly would have decided the same on merit according to law. 10. Had the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pradeep Kumari been brought to the notice of the Collector, I am sure, he would have passed correct order holding that the application of the petitioners under section 28A was within limitation and accordingly would have decided the same on merit according to law. 10. In view of the aforesaid, I am left with no option but to allow this petition and accordingly I allow the same and set aside the impugned order passed by the learned Collector on 18.9.96 in Case No.1/LA/28(A)/96 and I further direct him to treat the petition filed by the petitioners under section 28A for redetermination of compensation to be within time and not barred by limitation and the Collector shall proceed to decide their.application on merit. 11. Petition is accordingly disposed of. Parties to bear their costs.