In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 19.6.95 passed by the Government of Assam in the Personnel (A) Department, suspending him from service. 2. The brief facts are that the petitioner has been working a Government servant belonging to Assam Civil Service. While he was working as Senior Block Development Officer at Marghenta Development Block, the impugned older dated 19.6.95 was passed by the Government of Assam in the Personnel (A) Department placing him under suspension under Rule 6(1) of the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964, with immediate effect. In the said order, it was alleged that the petitioner went to the house of one Smti Sarala Das, an LP School teacher of Segunbari Village with two others in the night of 10.10.94 and molested Smti Anjali Bora, a 14 years old maid servant of Smti Sarala Das by dragging her to the bath room in a drunken condition. It was further stated in the impugned order that there was sufficient material to draw up departmental proceedings against the petitioner and that the Governor of Assam was satisfied that it was necessary and expedient in the interest of public service to place the petitioner under suspension immediately. 3. Mr. RP Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, staled that besides the departmental proceedings, a criminal prosecution was also started against the petitioner in respect of the very same charge of molesting Smti Anjali Bora and the said criminal prosecution has now ended up in acquittal as would be evident from the judgment dated 1.6.96 of the Judicial Magistrate. 1st Class, Tinsukia in GR Case No. 1355/94. Mr. Sharma, accordingly, argued that along the suspension order was passed pending drawal of departmental proceedings, the fact that the petitioner has been acquitted by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Tinsukia in the aforesaid GR case and the petitioner has been exonerated of the charge of molestation which was also the subject matter of the departmental proceedings, was a relevant consideration for the authorities to revoke the suspension order. Mr. Mr. Sharma relied on various Executive Instructions which have been issued from time to time by the Government with regard to the suspension and argued that it is almost two years since the petitioner has been suspended from the service and the ends of justice require that the petitioner be reinstated in service or in the alternative the authorities be directed to review the whole question of suspension in view of the feet that the petitioner has been acquitted of the very same charge in the criminal prosecution. 4. Mr. SS Dey, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, Assam, on the otherhand contended that considering the nature of the charge against the petitioner which was very serious and grave, this is not a tit case in which the Court should direct the Government to reinstate the petitioner or to review the suspension order at this stage. Nonetheless, since the petitioner has been placed under suspension for almost two years, now a direction can be issued to the concerned authorities to complete the inquiry within a stipulated time. 5. In a recent case of Rt Rev BP Sugandhar Bishop in Medak vs. D. Dorothy Dayasheela Ebeneser, (1996) 4 SCC 406 , the Supreme Court had the occasion to decide an appeal against the direction of the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court for reinstating the delinquent employee on the ground that the period specified in the Service Rules for Completion of departmental inquiry was already over and that the Rules required reinstatement of the delinquent 'employee if the inquiry was not completed with the period specified by the Rules. In the said judgment, the Supreme Court took a view that having regard to the serious nature of charges against the employee, even though the Rules provided for reinstatement after the specified period for inquiry, the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court ought not to have directed reinstatement of the delin-quent employee and instead should have directed completion of the inquiry within a stipulated time and payment of full salary and allowances to the delinquent employee until then. In the said judgment, the Supreme Court particularly observed that in cases where the inquiry is not completed within the specified period of time, restoration cannot be automatic in all circumstances and the Court may in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, instead of directing restoration or reinstatement, strike an equibalance between the right of the employee vis-a-vis the right of the institution/society and the discipline among the co-employees. 6. In the fact of the present case, the impugned order of suspension dated 19.6.95 itself indicates that there was serious allegation of molestation of a young girl of 14 years of age against the petitioner and that the petitioner was suspended pending drawal of departmental proceedings in which the said allegation of molestation has to be enquired into. It is true that the petitioner has been acquitted of the very same charge of molestation in GR Case No. 1355/94 by the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Tinsukia, but then the law is well settled by the Apex Court by now that acquittal of a Government servant in a criminal proceeding of a charge which is based on very same set of facts on which the departmental proceeding has been drawn up against him, will not be a bar on the disciplinary authority to continue with the departmental proceeding. This is because the purposes of disciplinary proceeding and the criminal prosecution are different, while one is for enquiring into misconduct allegedly committed by a Government servant, the other is to try the Government servant for an offence; further while the nature of evidence that is required to hold the Govt servant guilty of the offence is strict and the offence has to be established beyond all reasonable doubt, the nature of evidence that is required in the departmental proceeding to hold a Government servant guilty of misconduct is not all that strict and the guilt need not be established beyond all reasonable doubt Considering all these aspects of the matter, I am of the view that the ends of justice would be met if a direction is given to the respondents to complete the departmental proceeding against the petitioner within a period of four months from today and it is further directed that in case the disciplinary proceeding is not completed within the aforesaid period of four months, the Government in the Department of Personnel (A) will review the order of suspension and after taking all aspects of the matter into consideration pass fresh orders on the question of suspension. 7. With me aforesaid observations and direction, the petition is finally disposed of. However, I leave the parties to bear their own costs.