R. V. RAVEENDRAN, J. ( 1 ) THIS second appeal is by the second plaintiff in O. S. No. 16/1979 on the file of the Civil Judge, puttur. ( 2 ) THE appellant herein and his minor sister filed the suit for (a) declaration that the sale deed dated 3. 12. 1976 executed by defendants 1 to 4 in favour of fifth defendant in regard to the suit schedule properties (two items of land measuring 1 acre 12 cents and 40 cents in Sy. Nos. 33 and 32 of Bellare Kasba village) was not valid or binding on the family and for cancellation of the said sale deed; (b) directing the fifth defendant to deliver up possession of the suit schedule properties to the family of plaintiffs and defendants-1 to 4 represented by the first defendant; (c) for a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the fifth defendant in doing any new work or putting up buildings in the suit properties; (d) for means profits from 3. 12. 1976 till date of suit and for future mesne profits. The suit was filed on 11. 4. 1979. ( 3 ) THE plaintiffs alleged that first defendant is the Yajamanathi of her Aliyasanthana Kutumba consisting of herself and her married daughter (defendant-2) and two unmarried daughters (defendants-3 and 4), that suit properties were allotted to the share of the said family at a division on 8. 3. 72; plaintiffs-1 and 2 who were minors at the time of filing of the suit were the daughter and son of the second defendant; the family was in affluent circumstances; and there was reasonable income from the schedule properties; and though there was no need for sale of the schedule properties, defendants-1 to 4 sold them to fifth defendant and such sale was not for family necessity or benefit. They also alleged want of consideration for the sale. They contended that fifth defendant got the sale deed execute by defendants 1 to 4 by exercising undue influence. Defendants 1 to 4 did not contest the suit and virtually supported the case of the plaintiffs. ( 4 ) FIFTH defendant-purchaser contested the suit. He contended that the suit properties were allotted to the branch of first defendant of which she was the Yajamanathi under a partition deed dated 8. 3. Defendants 1 to 4 did not contest the suit and virtually supported the case of the plaintiffs. ( 4 ) FIFTH defendant-purchaser contested the suit. He contended that the suit properties were allotted to the branch of first defendant of which she was the Yajamanathi under a partition deed dated 8. 3. 1972; that first defendant had two unmarried daughters (defendants 3 and 4) and required money for celebrating their marriage; and the sale of suit properties by defendants 1 to 4 in favour of fifth defendant was for legal necessity and for the benefit of the family. He denied the allegation that the suit properties were the only family properties and that the family of first defendant had no other means of livelihood; that he had put any kind of pressure to execute the sale deed; that no consideration passed in regard to the sale; and that there was no legal necessity for the sale and the sale was not for family benefit. He contended that the house situated in the suit property was very old and was in dilapidated condition. He contended that the lands, were not in a good state and required improvement. He contended that the land was only an Arecanut garden for namesake. ( 5 ) THE Trial Court negatived the plaintiffs' contention that the sale was vitiated by fraud and undue influence. It however held that the fifth defendant had failed to prove that the sale in his favour by defendants-1 to 4 was for legal necessity. The, Trial Court also held that fifth defendant had failed to prove that he had made due enquiries before purchasing the properties. Consequently, the suit was decreed declaring that the sale deed dated 3. 12. 1976 was not binding on the family of plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 4 and further directing fifth defendant to deliver up possession of the suit properties and pay mesne profits. Feeling aggrieved, the fifth defendant filed an appeal. The first Appellate Court held that the sale was for legal necessity and for family benefit. Consequently, the first Appellate Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. Feeling aggrieved, the second plaintiff in the suit (the first plaintiff having died in the meanwhile) has filed this second appeal. Feeling aggrieved, the fifth defendant filed an appeal. The first Appellate Court held that the sale was for legal necessity and for family benefit. Consequently, the first Appellate Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. Feeling aggrieved, the second plaintiff in the suit (the first plaintiff having died in the meanwhile) has filed this second appeal. ( 6 ) SECTION 29 (1) of Madras Aliyasanthana Act, 1949 provides that no sale of immovable property of a Kutumba, shall bind the Kutumba unless it is executed by the Yajaman, for consideration, for Kutumba necessity or benefit and with the written consent of the majority of the major members of the Kutumba. ( 7 ) THE appellant contends that except the recidals in the sale deed and the oral evidence of the fifth defendant who was examined as DW-1, there was no evidence to prove that the sale was for legal necessity or family benefit. It was also contended that the admissions made by DW-1 (fifth defendant) showed that there was no necessity for the sale and he had not made due enquiries to know whether there was legal necessity. The appellants, therefore, contended that, ultimately, except the recitals in the sale deed, there was nothing to prove legal necessity; and mere recitals in the deed of sale about legal necessity not supported by other evidence, is not sufficient to make out legal necessity and, therefore, the first Appellate Court seriously committed an error in law in holding that sale was on account of legal necessity. The next contention urged by the appellant is that though a clear inference could be drawn from the evidence of fifth defendant that he had not made proper enquiries as he was not in a position to give particulars about the position of the family or the need for selling the property, and though the same was considered by the Trial Court as a ground for decreeing the suit, it was completely ignored by the first appellate Court. ( 8 ) THE principles in regard to legal necessity and its proof, are now well settled. It is sufficient to refer to two decisions which have been referred to in the judgment of the first Appellate Court. ( 8 ) THE principles in regard to legal necessity and its proof, are now well settled. It is sufficient to refer to two decisions which have been referred to in the judgment of the first Appellate Court. The first is the decision in RADHAKRISHNADAS vs. KANURAM, AIR 1957 SC 574 wherein the Supreme Court observed thus:" where an alienation, by way of sale of the family property made by a Hindu father is challenged by his sons on the ground of want of legal necessity then it is now well established that what the alienee is required to establish is legal necessity for the transaction and that it is not necessary for him to show that every bit of the consideration which he advanced was actually applied for meeting family necessity. The reason is that the alienee can rarely have the means of controlling and directing the actual application of the money paid or advance by him unless he enters into the management himself. " (Emphasis supplied) the second is the decision in RANI vs. SANTA BALA, AIR1971 SC 1028 , (1970 )3 SCC722 , [1971 ]2 SCR603 , 1971 (III )UJ51 (SC ) wherein the Supreme Court held as follows: "legal necessity does not mean actual compulsion; it means pressure upon the estate which in law may be regarded as serious and sufficient. The onus of proving legal necessity may be discharged by the alienee by proof of actual necessity or by proof that he made proper and bona fide enquiries about the existence of the necessity and that he did all that was reasonable to satisfy himself as to the existence of the necessity. Recitals in a deed of legal necessity do not by themselves prove legal necessity. The recitals are, however, admissible in evidence, their value varying according to the circumstances in which the transaction was entered into. The recitals may be used to corroborate other evidence of the existence of legal necessity. The weight to be attached to the recitals varies according to the circumstances. The recitals are, however, admissible in evidence, their value varying according to the circumstances in which the transaction was entered into. The recitals may be used to corroborate other evidence of the existence of legal necessity. The weight to be attached to the recitals varies according to the circumstances. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 9 ) IN this case, the sale deed recited the following reasons for selling the suit schedule property (a) that it was very small and the income was insufficient to meet the family maintenance; (b) that funds were required by the family to repay the loan amount due to the fifth defendant; and (c) that monies were required for celebrating the marriage of defendants-3 and 4 who were not married. These three reasons are proved by the recitals and the admitted facts. In regard to the first reason, it is admitted that the land consists of 12 acres of Nanja and 32 cents of Punja and the vendors were not staying in the village, but away, thereby making it difficult to manage such a small property without incurring loss. The second reason is supported by the evidence of dw-1. The third reason is not disputed, but is an admitted fact. The facts of this case are peculiar and there these reasons are proved by the admitted facts and evidence of DW-1. In the circumstances, when the recitals which form the basis of legal necessity are admitted or cannot be disputed, the question of proving the same by independent evidence does not arise. As pointed out above, no evidence is required to prove that the property is small, no evidence is required to prove that defendants-3 and 4 were not married. In the circumstances, the grounds of legal necessity which are mentioned as recitals in the sale deed have been proved not only by mere recitals, but by either admissions or by the evidence of DW-1. In the circumstances, the contention of the plaintiffs that there is no evidence to prove the recitals, is without any basis. ( 10 ) THE next contention is that certain admission of DW-1 have not been considered. If the time reasons mentioned in the deed of sale are not disputed, legal necessity in the sale deed are proved,. In the circumstances, the contention of the plaintiffs that there is no evidence to prove the recitals, is without any basis. ( 10 ) THE next contention is that certain admission of DW-1 have not been considered. If the time reasons mentioned in the deed of sale are not disputed, legal necessity in the sale deed are proved,. e. , property being small and income therefrom to be insufficient, loan amount being due to fifth defendant and defts 3 and 4 not being married, it is irrelevant whether fifth defendant is in a position to give further details of the same or not. As laiddown by the Supreme Court, what is required to be proved is the existence of legal necessity and not that the sale consideration was expended for the said legal necessity. In this case, there cannot be any doubt or dispute that performance of marriage of two unmarried daughters is legal necessity, repayment of loan due to the fifth dependent is legal necessity and that the property was very small not generating sufficient income to repay the loan or performing the marriage of defendants-3 and 4. In the circumstances, the contention of the plaintiffs that there is no legal necessity cannot be accepted. ( 11 ) ONE other factor require to be noticed. The sale deed is executed by the first defendant who is the Yejamanathi and her three adult daughters,. e. , all the major members of the family have joined in the execution. It is not as if that these four vendors were wrongly advised. The yejamanthi's husband was alive and the second defendant's husband was also alive. In fact, the second defendant's husband and father of plaintiffs, is an attestor to the sale deed. Having regard to the facts and circumstances and having regard to the fact that the execution of the sale deed which is not challenged and defendants-1 to 4 having had the benefit of the sale, it is not possible for defendants-1 to 4 to avoid the sale by setting up the minor children of second defendant. Such a course should be deprecated and should not be encouraged. There is no merit in the appeal. No question of law muchness substantial question of law arises for consideration. The two questions sought to be raised, do not involve any substantial question of law. Consequently, this Second Appeal is rejected with costs.