Judgment :- 1. Plaintiffs in O.S. No. 317 of 1987, on the file of Principal District Munsifs Court, Kulithalai, are the appellants. 2. There are two items of properties A and B. In this Second Appeal, we are concerned only with the B Schedule Item. 3. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the ‘A’ Schedule property belonged to one Kothan Mulhiriar and he executed a Trust Deed by which his wife and two sons were directed to manage the Trust without alienating the same. Till his death, he was managing the Trust A Schedule properties, and on his death, his widow became the Trustee, and on the death of the widow, his two sons Karuppannan and Sellaperumal were jointly performing the charities. It is also alleged that out of the income of the ‘A’ Schedule properties, ‘B’ Schedule properties were purchased in the name of Karuppannan and the same also forms part of the Trust. The first defendant is the wife of Krishnan and second defendant is bis daughter. Since Krishnan was not on good terms with his wife and daughter, a suit for maintenance was filed against him as O.S. No. 572 of 1957 by which they were awarded separate maintenance. It is further averred that the father of third defendant Rajalingam was a co-worker with Karuppannan in Railways and he was residing adjacent to Karuppannan and Sellaperumal. He had an evil eye on the properties. Karuppannan died on 26.7.1978, and even thereafter, defendants 1 and 2 were living separately. It is said that after the death of Karuppannan, Sellaperumal, the other brother was doing the Charities. First plaintiff is the son of Sellaperumal, second plaintiff is the wife of Sellaperumal and plaintiffs 3 and 4 are the daughters of Sellaperumal. 4. It is said that due to evil influence of Rajalingam and his son, a lease has been created in respect of ‘B’ Schedule properties. The lease is invalid. Sellaperumal had no right on such lease deed, and the same also forms part of the trust property. Third defendant is not the lessee of the B Schedule property and, therefore, he cannot claim any benefit of the Tenancy Legislations. His possession is only that of a trespasser. Sellaperumal died on 3.9.198S, and thereafter, first plaintiff alone was enjoying the ‘A’ Schedule properties. Third defendant is not the lessee of the B Schedule property and, therefore, he cannot claim any benefit of the Tenancy Legislations. His possession is only that of a trespasser. Sellaperumal died on 3.9.198S, and thereafter, first plaintiff alone was enjoying the ‘A’ Schedule properties. It is said that defendants 1 and 2 were won over by third defendant, and, at the instance of third defendants brother, they attempted to interfere with the possession and enjoyment of the suit properties by first plaintiff. A suit for injunction was filed. In that suit, third defendant has filed a written statement questioning the status of the plaintiffs. Therefore, the suit was filed for declaration that plaint A and B Schedule properties are family trust properties, and for recovery of B Schedule Items from defendants 3 to S. In paragraph 15 of the plaint, it is further averred that the so called lease deed alleged to have been executed by Sellaperumal and also the Will alleged to have been executed in favour of defendants 3 to 5 are also invalid, and plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession of the plaint ‘B’ Schedule properties. 5. In the written statement filed by second defendant, i.e., daughter of Krishnan, she admitted the relationship of plaintiffs with Sellaperumal, and she also admitted that Sellaperumal was performing the charity after the death of his father. According to her, she has no objection for passing a decree since the third defendant has no right over the property and plaintiffs alone are entitled to the entire property without any encumbrance. 6. In the written statement filed by third defendant, it is said that the properties are self-acquired properties of Sellaperumal and they are not family properties. According to him, plaintiffs are not the children of Sellaperumal, and they have no right over plaint Schedule Items. Sellaperumal never married second plaintiff, and Sellaperumal died unmarried It is also his case that since the third defendant and his father were all residing close to Sellaperumal and Karuppannan and they were looking after the affairs of Sellaperumal, a Will was executed in their favour, and he became the absolute owner of the properties. He also contended that in respect of Items 5 to 12 of A Schedule and the B Schedule properties, he is the owner. He also contended that he is a cultivating tenant in respect of those properties. He also contended that in respect of Items 5 to 12 of A Schedule and the B Schedule properties, he is the owner. He also contended that he is a cultivating tenant in respect of those properties. After the death of Sellaperumal, he has become the absolute owner. 7. On the above pleadings, the trial Court, after taking evidence, both oral and documentary, decreed the suit as prayed for. The question of mesne profits was deferred to be decided in execution proceedings. 8. Aggrieved by the judgment, an appeal was filed by defendants 3 to 5 as A.S. No. 247 of 1989, on the file of Sub Court, Karur. The lower Appellate Court also confirmed the findings of the trial Court regarding the status of the plaintiffs as widow “and children of Sellaperumal, It further found that the Will alleged to have been executed in favour of third defendant by Sellaperumal is a fraudulent document, that there is no personal cultivation by defendants and, therefore, they are not cultivating tenants as defined under the Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, though they may be treated as lessees. It was further found that the claim of title by defendants 3 to 5 is not bona fide. They have no title either over the property described in B Schedule, and B Schedule properties also form part of the Trust properties. But the defendants are not liable to be evicted from ‘B’ Schedule property since notice of forfeiture was not issued. The appeal was allowed in part. In regard to the ‘B’ Schedule property, the suit was dismissed. In regard to the ‘A’ Schedule properties, the decree of the trial Court was confirmed. 9. It is against the said judgment, plaintiffs have preferred this Second Appeal. 10. At the time of admission of the Second Appeal, the following substantial question of law was raised for consideration:— “Whether the lower Appellate Court is correct in law in coming to the conclusion that in the instant case there ought to have been a notice under Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act, and without such a notice the appellants are not entitled to a decree for possession especially when the alleged lease is Tor agricultural purposes, which are excluded from the provisions contained in Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act by virtue of Sec. 117 of the Transfer of Property Act?” 11. As I said earlier, the only reason for dismissing the suit so far as the plaint ‘B’ Schedule property was concerned is, that the plaintiffs have not issued notice of forfeiture as contemplated under Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act. Learned counsel for appellants submitted that the said provision has no application since it is an agricultural lease and, therefore, exempted under Section 117 of the Transfer of Property Act. The argument is that the provisions of Section 111 (g) also will not apply in cases of agricultural lease and, therefore, notice under Sec. 111 (g) is not required. 12. As against the said contention, learned counsel for respondents placed reliance on the decision reported in AIR 1965 S.C. 1923 (Mohd. Amir v. Municipal Board, Sitapur) wherein their Lordships said that under the principle of equity, justice and good conscience, the principle enunciated in Sec. 111 (g) is applicable to agricultural lease also. In paragraph 11 of the judgment, their Lordships held thus:— “Section 111 (g) embodies in statutory form this incident of a tenancy and it reads: “a lease of immoveable property would be determined by forfeiture in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself to quote the material words. No doubt, the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act were not, it is stated in terms, applicable to the area in question, but it has been laid down that the principles embodied in S. 111(g) are equally applicable to tenancies to which the Act does not apply on the ground of the same being in consonance with justice, equity and good conscience (See Maharaja of Jeypore v. Rukmini Pattamahadevi, 46 Ind. App. 109; (AIR 1919 P.C. 1)” The further argument of learned counsel for respondents is that if the principle of Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act is made applicable, naturally, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession. The denial of title must be before institution of the suit, and the lessor must have expressed his intention to put an end to the lease arrangement, and only in such cases, recovery could be had. The denial of title must be before institution of the suit, and the lessor must have expressed his intention to put an end to the lease arrangement, and only in such cases, recovery could be had. For this said purpose, learned counsel relied on the decision reported in A.I.R. 1948 Madras 275 = 61 L.W. 93 (F.B.) (Brahmayya v. Sundaramma) wherein a Full Bench of our Court has reiterated that although S. 106, T.P. Act does not apply to leases for agricultural purposes by virtue of S. 117 of the Act, nevertheless the rules in S. 106 and in the other Sections (Ss. 105 to 116) in Chapter V of the Act are founded upon reason and equity; they are the principles of English law and should be adopted as statement of the law in India applicable to agricultural cases. The said principle was not fully accepted by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 228 (Namdeo v. Narmadabai) wherein their Lordships said that the principle of this Court was not fully correct. It was held thus:— “The statement in A.I.R. 1948 Mad. 275 = 61 L.W. 93 (F.B.) that Ss. 105 to 116, Transfer of Property Act, are founded upon principles of reason and equity cannot be accepted either as correct or precise. Of course, to the extent that those Sections of the Act give statutory recognition to principles of justice, equity and good conscience they are applicable also to cases not governed by the Act”. Even if the principles of justice, equity and good conscience are to be applied, I do not think that the contention of the respondent could be accepted. 13. In one of the earlier decisions of the Punjab High Court reported in A.I.R. 1970 Punjab and Haryana 511 (Soda Ram & others v. Gajjan Shiama), their Lordships said that prior notice is not required, and asking the landlord to file another suit is also not necessary. If the denial of title is in the very same suit, eviction can be ordered, for, the filing of the suit and the continuance of that suit itself shows the intention of the landlord to get possession and to terminate the lease. If the denial of title is in the very same suit, eviction can be ordered, for, the filing of the suit and the continuance of that suit itself shows the intention of the landlord to get possession and to terminate the lease. Explaining these reasons in paragraphs 6 to 8 of the judgment, their Lordships held thus:— “The binding nature of the two judgments referred to above has been taken away by the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Raja Mohammed Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur, AIR 1965 SC 1923 , wherein it was held- ‘No doubt the provisions of the Transfer of property Act were not, it is stated in terms, applicable to the area in question, but it has been laid down that the principles embodies in Section 111 (g) are equally applicable to tenancies to which the Act does not apply on the ground of the same being in consonance with justice, equity and good conscience”. In paragraph 18 of the report, their Lordships further observed:— “We consider the law to be that unless there is a disclaimer or renunciation in clear and unequivocal terms, whether the same be in a pleading or in other documents, no forfeiture is incurred”. From the observation it is clear that a disclaimer or renunciation in clear and unequivocal terms, in the written statement to the suit can also result in the forfeiture of the tenancy. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that the denial of the tenancy in the written statement cannot be taken advantage of in that suit but can be taken advantage of only in a subsequent suit to be filed by the landlord, does not appeal to us. It will lead to unnecessary multiplicity of legal proceedings if the landlord is obliged to file a second suit for ejectment of the tenant on the ground of forfeiture entailed by his denial of his character as a tenant in the written statement and not allowed to avail of that plea in the suit in which the written statement has been filed as especially when. It has been pleaded in the plaint that the defendant had denied his character as a tenant of the plaintiff orally before the institution of the suit as was pleaded in the two suits out of which the present appeals have arisen. It has been pleaded in the plaint that the defendant had denied his character as a tenant of the plaintiff orally before the institution of the suit as was pleaded in the two suits out of which the present appeals have arisen. The relevant portion of Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act reads as under- “a lease of immovable property would be determined by forfeiture in case the lessee renounces bis character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself”. According to this Section it is not necessary that the renunciation of the character as lessee should be in writing before the institution of the suit. It is correct that no cause of action will accrue to the landlord to eject the tenant on the ground of forfeiture of tenancy unless the forfeiture had taken place prior to the institution of the suit. That renunciation can either be in writing or verbal as has been mentioned in Paragraph 1391 at page 666 of Volume 23 of Halsburys Laws of England, Third Edition. The material portion of that paragraph reads as follows:— ‘There is implied in every lease a condition that the tenant shall not do anything that may prejudice the title of the landlord; and that if this is done, the landlord may re-enter for breach of this implied condition. Thus it is a cause of forfeiture if the tenant denies the title of the landlord by alleging in writing or, in the case of a tenancy from year to year, either in writing or verbally that the title to the land is in himself or another; or if he assists a stranger to set up an adverse title, as where he acknowledges the freehold title to be in him in order to enable him to set up a title. In the case of a tenancy from year to year the effect of such denial of title is that the tenancy may be forthwith determined by the landlord without notice to quit.’ The matter can be looked at from another angle. When the tenant denies his character as the tenant of the landlord in his written statement, he can be taken to be putting an end to the tenancy, thus giving right to the landlord to claim possession from him. When the tenant denies his character as the tenant of the landlord in his written statement, he can be taken to be putting an end to the tenancy, thus giving right to the landlord to claim possession from him. This principle is expressed thus in Platt on Leases:— “The holding being from year to year subject to the mutual will of landlord and tenant to determine it on giving the usual 6 months notice, evidence of a disclaimer is evidence of an election to put an end to the tenancy and supersede the necessity for such notice Hence verbal or written denials of a tenancy have rendered a notice to quit unnecessary, but it does not appear that they have effected a forfeiture of the term”. The denial of the relationship of landlord and tenant by the tenant in his written statement to a suit for ejectment determines a tenancy forthwith, thus “giving the right to the landlord to the possession of the leased property, when the lease is not for a fixed period but from year to year or at will as in the present cases. A year to year tenancy or a tenancy at will gets determined by such a denial or renunciation of title.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. In A.I.R. 1974 Himachal Pradesh 22 (Shiv Parshad v. Shila Rani) also, the same principle was applied. In para 5 of the judgment, it was held thus:— “Now the further question that arises is whether in such a case a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary to be issued to the tenant by the landlady for determination of the tenancy. My answer to this question is that in view of the fact that there was denial of the relationship of the landlady and the tenant between the two there was hardly any necessity for the landlady to issue an notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Properly Act presupposes the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties before a tenancy can be determined by issue of a notice under the Act. The repudiation of the title of the landlady entailed forfeiture of the tenancy as is also obvious from Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act There is no need to discuss this point because there is a denial of the title of the landlady by the tenant and, therefore, I am of the view that the non-issue of a notice as contemplated under Section 106 did not in any way prove fatal to the case of the landlady so as to dismiss her petition by the Rent Controller as also by the Appellate Authority”. 15. In A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 588 (Rattan Lal v. Vardesh Chander) it was further considered, and in paragraphs 22, 24 and 26, their Lordships held thus, (Headnote):— “Once the inapplicability of the T.P. Act to the lease in question is assumed and the parties stake their claim to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, the basic question to be considered is: What is the essence of equity in the matter of determining a lease on the ground of forfeiture caused by the breach of a condition? Statutory technicality such as notice in writing prescribed in S. 111(g) of the T.P. Act cannot be called a rule of equity. It is no more than a legal form binding o n those Transactions which are covered by the law by its own force. The substance of the matter-the justice of the situation - is whether a condition in the lease has been breached and whether the lessor has, by some overt act, brought home to the lessee his election to eject on the strength of said breach. (Para 22) The touchstone is simply whether the formal requirement of the law is part of what is necessarily just and reasonable. In this perspective, the conclusion is clear that a notice in writing formally determining the tenancy is not a rule of justice or canon of commonsense. If so, the mere institution of the legal proceeding for eviction fulfils the requirement of law for determination of the lease. The conscience of the Court needs nothing more and nothing else. The conclusion emerges that the landlords termination of the tenancy in such a case is good even without a written notice”. (Paras 24 & 26) (Emphasis supplied) 16. If so, the mere institution of the legal proceeding for eviction fulfils the requirement of law for determination of the lease. The conscience of the Court needs nothing more and nothing else. The conclusion emerges that the landlords termination of the tenancy in such a case is good even without a written notice”. (Paras 24 & 26) (Emphasis supplied) 16. In A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 2187 (M. Subbarao v. P. V.K. Krishna Rao), which was a case under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, the same principle was accepted. In that case, their Lordships said that ‘to insist that a denial of title in the written statement cannot be taken advantage of in that suit but can be taken advantage of only in a subsequent suit to be filed by the landlord would only lead to unnecessary multiplicity of legal proceedings as the landlord would be obliged to file a second suit for ejectment of the tenant on the ground of forfeiture entitled by the tenants denial of his character as a tenant in the written statement’. As held by the Supreme Court in AIR 1989 SC 2187 (Supra), by denial of title, the right of the tenant to hold on to the property has come to an end. That can be taken note of in that suit itself, and for moulding the relief, the contention in the written statement can also be looked into. Driving the landlord to file a separate suit will be unjust in such cases, and that will only amount to a premium to the person who violates the contract. The argument of learned Counsel for respondents is based only on the principle of justice, equity and good conscience. The party who has come to Court with a fraudulent document and has denied the title on that basis, does not deserve any equitable consideration. In such cases, the conscience of the Court alone has to be considered, as was held in AIR 1976 SC 589 (supra). 17. An argument was taken by learned counsel for respondents that respondents are cultivating tenants, and eviction can be had only through provisions of the Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. Learned counsel submitted that the landlord has remedy only through a (Revenue Divisional Officer and then alone possession could, be ordered. For the said purpose, he relied on Section 6-A of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. Learned counsel submitted that the landlord has remedy only through a (Revenue Divisional Officer and then alone possession could, be ordered. For the said purpose, he relied on Section 6-A of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. That the respondents are, cultivating tenants, according to him, is also proved by the fact that their names have been registered under the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands Record of Tenancy Rights Act, 1969. 18. Considering the scope of Section 6-A, the Supreme Court in 1970-II-M.L.J. 114 = (1971) 84 L.W. 5 S.N. (S.C.) (Chinnamuthu Gounder & others, etc. v. P.A.S. Perumal Chettiar) has held that only to those persons who are entitled to claim as cultivating tenants, Sec. 6-A will be applicable. In that case also, tenants denied the title of the landlord and the question was, whether in such a case, the Civil Court was bound to transfer the suit to the Revenue Divisional Officer for necessary action. Their Lordships said that the Civil Courts jurisdiction is not ousted since the tenant has forfeited his right to be a tenant, and the Civil Court is competent to pass a decree. It was held thus:— The clear import of Section 6-A is that in any suit before any Civil Court for possession, if the defendant proves not only that he is a cultivating tenant but also that he is entitled to the benefits of the Act the Civil Court is bound to transfer it to the Revenue Divisional Officer and cannot proceed to try and dispose of it itself. In the present case it has been found by the High Court as also by the trial Court that the appellants had wilfully denied the title of the respondent who is the landlord. They thus became disentitled to the benefits of the Act. Consequently the Civil Court had jurisdiction to proceed with the trial and there was no question of its transferring the suit to the Revenue Divisional Officer. There had been a consistent course of decisions of the Madras High Court that in order to attract the applicability of Section 6-A both the conditions must co-exist, namely, the defendant must be a cultivating tenant within the meaning of the Act and he should be entitled to the benefit s of the Act. If both these conditions are not satisfied no question of any transfer under Section 6-A will arise. If both these conditions are not satisfied no question of any transfer under Section 6-A will arise. The Civil Court may have to determine, for the purpose of coming to the conclusion whether, a suit has to be transferred under Section 6-A certain questions which are within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court under the Act. But that cannot affect the interpretation of the words “cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of the Act.”. ” In view of these binding precedents, I do not think that the finding of the lower Appellate Court that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession in this suit is correct. Consequently, the question of law is found in favour of the appellants, and the appellants art also given a decree to recover possession of ‘B’ Schedule properties from defendants. As directed by the trial Court, the question of mesne profits will be decided in execution. The Second Appeal is allowed as indicated above. The appellants are entitled to their costs in all the three Courts.