JUDGMENT 1. :- The object of Rule 2 of Order 21 Civil Procedure Code is to ensure that the Court executing the decree shall not be troubled with any discputes between the parties with regard to any payment or adjustment unless the same has been duly certified or recorded. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 2 contemplates a certification by the decree holder and a record by the court of the payment or adjustment. Sub rule (2) of rule 2 contemplates an application by the judgment debtor. In that case notice is to be given to the decree holder and the court should give a judicial decision whether the payment or adjustment should be recorded as certified. In doing so the court is subjected to the restrictions provided in sub-rule (2-A) of Rule 2. Sub rule (2-A) is intended to operate as a proviso to sub-rule (2). Sub rule (3) of Rule 2 imposes a bar upon the court executing the decree and prevants it from recognising any payment or adjustment which has not been certified or recorded as certified as required by the rule. 2. The question that springing for consideration in the instant revision also relates to the interpretation of Rule 2 of Order 21 Civil Procedure Code. 3. The instant revision has been preferred by the judgment debtors calling in question the order dated July 31, 1996 of the learned Additional District Judge No.1 Ajmer whereby the application under Order 21 Rule 2 read with section 47 Civil Procedure Code, submitted by the judgment debtor was dismissed. 4. The facts giving rise to this revision lie in a very narrow compass. Late Bhanwar Lal Goyal instituted a suit for specific performance of the contract which was decreed on January 20, 1990 Bhanwar Lal initiated execution proceedings on March 3, 1990. The judgment debtors appeared before the learned executing court. Draft of the sale deed was filed. On April 28, 1992, draft of the sale deed was approved by the learned executing court and it was directed that the sale deed of the disputed property be registered at the cost of judgment debtors before the Sub Registrar. The decree holder was further directed to produce non-judicial stamps. Thereafter the decree holder sought time for producing non-judicial stamps. The matter was adjourned to 16.1.1993. The decree holder was further directed to produce non-judicial stamps. Thereafter the decree holder sought time for producing non-judicial stamps. The matter was adjourned to 16.1.1993. On the said date the decree holder and his counsel were not present whereas the judgment debtors and their counsel were present. The execution petition was ordered to be dismissed in default. Vide order dated March 27, 1993 the execution petition was restored and the decree holder produced stamps in the sum of Rs. 3500/- and the matter was posted for execution of sale deed. On August 21, 1993 draft of the sale deed was typed on the stamp papers and it was sent to the office of Sub-Registrar, Ajmer for registration. 5. On Feb. 26, 1994 counsel of the decree holder informed the executing court that the decree holder died. On the same day it was informed on behalf of the judgment debtor that they have already filed application under Order 21 Rule 2 Civil Procedure Code on December 18, 1993. Copy of the application was given to the counsel for the decree holder. On April 7, 1994 the legal representatives of the decree holder were brought on record and the application under Order 21 Rule 2 Civil Procedure Code was ordered to be dismissed in default. On September 24, 1994 the executing court was informed that there was possibility of compromise between the parties. On August 27, 1994 application under section 47 Civil Procedure Code read with Order 21 Rule 2 Civil Procedure Code was filed by the judgment debtors. The learned executing court recorded the evidence of both the parties in respect of the said application and dismissed it vide order dated July 31, 1996. 6. Mr. Resham Bhargava, learned counsel for the judgment debtors canvassed that the executing court committed error of jurisdiction in dismissing the application of the judgment debtors. He contended that the judgment debtors already paid Rs. 40,000/- and entered into compromise with late Shri Bhanwar Lal Goyal. The compromise deed was executed on Jan. 10, 1993 in the presence of the witnesses and it was agreed upon between the parties that the decree holder shall not appear on Jan. 16, 1993 before the executing court and shall not proceed with the execution. After complying this condition the decree holder did not appear before the executing court on Jan. 10, 1993 in the presence of the witnesses and it was agreed upon between the parties that the decree holder shall not appear on Jan. 16, 1993 before the executing court and shall not proceed with the execution. After complying this condition the decree holder did not appear before the executing court on Jan. 16, 1993 and the execution petition was dismissed but malafidely it was again restored. It was the duty of the executing court to provide an opportunity of hearing to the judgment debtors before restoring the execution proceedings. Mr. Resham Bhargava, learned counsel further contended that the learned executing court has illegally invoked the provisions contained in section 73 of the Evidence Act, as no circumstances existed for invoking the said legal provision. As the execution proceedings were dismissed it was not open for the executing court to keep the decree alive for further execution. The executing court has drawn its inference and assumption merely on the baiss of suspicion and committed illegality in not referring the disputed document for examination by hand writing expert. Mr. Resham Bhargava learned counsel has placed reliance on Khijiruddin and others vs. Emperor AIR 192.6 Calcutta 139 , Kesarbai vs. Jethabhai Jivan AIR 1928 Privy Council 27 7. 7. On the other hand, Miss Rama Goyal, learned counsel appearing for the decree holders supported the impugned order and placed reliance on Sultan Begum vs. Prem Chand Jain 1997 WBLR (SC) 115 . 8. I have given my anxious considerations to the rival contentions and carefully perused the documents as well as the authorities cited before me. 9. The alleged compromise deed was executed on Jan. 10, 1993. A perusal of certified copy of the order dated Jan. 16, 1993 demonstrates that the judgment debtors and their counsel were present on the said date whereas the decree holdre and his counsel were absent and the execution proceedings were ordered to be dismissed in default. 10. In the said order sheet dated Jan. 16, 1993 the judgment debtors did not make reference of the alleged compromise dated Jan. 10, 1993 whereas it was their duty to move an application under order 21 Rule 2 Civil Procedure Code for certification of the payment made out of the court. 10. In the said order sheet dated Jan. 16, 1993 the judgment debtors did not make reference of the alleged compromise dated Jan. 10, 1993 whereas it was their duty to move an application under order 21 Rule 2 Civil Procedure Code for certification of the payment made out of the court. It is well settled that unless the payment is certified it cannot be recognised, Sub rule (3) of Rule 2 Civil Procedure Code imposes a bar upon the executing court and prevent it from recognising any payment or adjustment which has not been certified or recorded as certified as required by the rules. 11. A further perusal of the order sheets goes to show that till Bhanwar Lal Goyal was alive the judgment debtors did not make any efforts to draw the attention of the learned executing court towards the said compromise deed. It was only on Feb. 24, 1994 when the counsel of late Bhanwar Lal informed the court about the death that the information regarding compromise deed was communicated for the first time. It is rather a strange fact that when the application was filed on December 18, 1994 why it was not placed before the learned executing court on the same day or thereafter. There is one more fact which requires consideration. The application filed under Order 22 Rule 2 Civil Procedure Code was dismissed on April 7, 1994 in the absence of the judgment debtor. The said application was never restored but a fresh application under section 47 Civil Procedure Code read with Order 21 Rule 2 Civil Procedure Code was filed on August 22, 1994 and without considering the fact that the earlier application under order 21 Rule 2 Civil Procedure Code was dismissed. The witnesses of the parties were examined. I have closely scrutinised the evidence of the parties. Admittedly Miss Rama Goyal who has been examined on behalf of the decree holders is the daughter of late Bhanwar Lal Goyal. She is a practising advocate. She categorically stated that the alleged compromise deed did not bear the signatures of his father Bhanwar Lal Goyal. The judgment debtor Ahsanula AW 1 admits in his cross examination thus- (English Translation) "I did not persuade Bhanwar Lal Goyal to get the compromise attested by his counsel Rama Goyal as I had full faith in Bhanwarlalji." 12. She categorically stated that the alleged compromise deed did not bear the signatures of his father Bhanwar Lal Goyal. The judgment debtor Ahsanula AW 1 admits in his cross examination thus- (English Translation) "I did not persuade Bhanwar Lal Goyal to get the compromise attested by his counsel Rama Goyal as I had full faith in Bhanwarlalji." 12. It is unbelievable that a decree holder whose daughter is an advocate and representing him before the executing court shall not consult her before enterning into compromise. 13. The alleged compromise deed dated Jan. 10, 1993 does not bear the signatures of Rama Goyal. Though the learned executing court invoked the provisions of section 73 of the Evidence Act and compared the signatrues of Bhanwar Lal Goyal but it was not necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case. It was the duty of the judgment debtor under sub rule (3) of Rule 2 to move an application for certification of the payment made out of the court. Sub Rule (2-A) of Rule 2 provides that no payment or adjustment shall be recorded at the instance of the judgment debtor unless (a) the payment is made in the manner provided in rule; or (b) the payment or adjustment is proved by documentary evidence and (c) the payment or adjustment is admitted by or on behalf of the decree holder in his reply to the notice given under sub-rule (2) of rule 1 or before the court. Sub Rule (3) of Rule (2) further provides that a payment or adjustment which has not been certified or recorded as aforesaid shall not be recognised by any court executing the decree. 14. In the case on hand the alleged compromise was said to have beer, entered upon on Jan. 10, 1993 but information about the said compromise was communicated for the first time by the judgment debtor on December 18, 1993 but the compromise deed was not produced along with the application moved on December 18, 1993. The said deed was produced for the first time in court on May 13, 1995. Admittedly no notice provided under Rule 2 of Order 21 was given to the decree holder and no explanation was given as to why the said document was produced on jan 16, 1993 when the judgment debtor appeared before the executing court. The said deed was produced for the first time in court on May 13, 1995. Admittedly no notice provided under Rule 2 of Order 21 was given to the decree holder and no explanation was given as to why the said document was produced on jan 16, 1993 when the judgment debtor appeared before the executing court. The delay in filing the alleged compromise deed was not properly explained by the judgment debtor. As already stated non-judicial stamps were produced before the judgment debtor and draft sale deed was sent to the Office of the Sub-Registrar Ajmer duly typed on non-judicial stamp papers in the presence of the judgment debtors but they did not inform the executing court about the alleged compromise. 15. The cases cited by Shri Bhargava relate to section 73 of the Evidence Act, but even without invoking the provisions of section 73 of the Evidence Act, I am of the considered opinion that no error of jurisdiction was committed by the learned executing court in dismissing the application of the judgment debtor filed under section 47 read with Order 21 Rule 2 Civil Procedure Code. In Sultana Begum vs. Prem Chand Jain (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court propounded thus "The plea relating to the delivery of possession in pursuance of compromise decree, if accepted would amount to an adjustment of the decree which shall consequently be treated to have been partially satisfied to the extent of eviction of the respondent as a tenant from the disputed property. That being so, it had to be recorded and certified under Order 21 Rule 2 since this was not done, the provisions of order 21 Rule 2(3) prohibiting the executing court from giving effect to the said plea were applicable and the executing court acted erroneously in refusing to execute the decree for eviction of the respondent on the ground that possession having been delivered to the appellant's attorney the decree to the extent stood satisfied." 16. In the result, the revision fails and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.Revision dismissed. *******