Sree Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores represented by Partner, Sushil Kumar Gupta v. Srinivasiah
1997-08-30
S.JAGADEESAN
body1997
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is a tenant under the respondent. Eviction petition was filed to evict the petitioner on the ground that the building is required for owners occupation, that is for the partnership business of the respondents sons. This has been opposed by the petitioner herein. But however, the Rent Controller has ordered eviction and allowed the R.C.O.P. The appeal filed was dismissed by the appellate authority. Now the petitioner has filed the present revision. 2. Mr.S.V.Jayaraman, learned senior counsel for the petitioner contended that the primary factor is bona fide in a case where eviction is sought for on the ground of owners occupation. The respondent filed earlier H.R.C.No. 1659 of 1987 stating that his son Madanagopal is interested in setting up a business of his own and therefore he requires the shop for own use. The said petitions was dismissed holding that the son of the respondent was not carrying on any business and has also not made any preparation for the business. The appeal preferred by the respondent was also dismissed. Subsequently the respondent required the premises for owners occupation, that is for the partnership business of N.S.V.Balakrishnan Chetty, of which the respondent is one of the partners. That was not pursued. Now the petition has been filed for the owners occupation stating that the respondents sons Sekar and Madanagopal are carrying on business in partnership under the name and style of ‘Sri Renuka Enterprises’ in rented premises and they want to occupy the petition premises.- In view of the different stand and different point of time by the respondent, it has to be construed that the requirement of me landlord is not bona fide one. The other contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that admittedly during the pendency of the proceedings, of the two sons the partners in ‘Sri Renuka Enterprises’, one of the partners Sekar had retired from partnership and as such the business concern has become a proprietary’ concern of Mr.Madanagopal one of the sons of the landlord. The requirement sought for originally do not exist and hence eviction cannot be ordered.
The requirement sought for originally do not exist and hence eviction cannot be ordered. The further contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that when admittedly several portions of the property fell vacant and the respondent did not occupy the same for the purpose of ‘Sri Renuka Enterprises’, the non-occupation by the petitioner as and when other portions fell vacant would also extinguish the requirement of the landlord for owners occupation. 3. On the contrary, counsel for the respondent contended that both the Authorities below have considered the materials available on record and concurrently held that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide.. The finding is purely a question of fact and as such this court cannot reappraise the evidence. Both the authorities below have found that the portions fell vacant during the pendency of the proceedings are not suitable for the business of ‘Sri Renuka Enterprises’ and as such the non-occupation of the premises, which fell vacant during the pendency of the proceedings do not vitiate the bona fide requirement of the landlord. 4. I carefully considered the contention of both the counsel. Though before the courts below the bona fide has not been urged, learned senior counsel Mr.S.V.Jayaramun, very fairly represented that before the trial court only the question of res judicata as per sec. 19 of the Rent Control Act has been given much importance. Virtually bona fides has been left out; but since he does not find any merit on the plea of res judicata he is not pressing the same; and he should be permitted to argue on the question of bona fides. As already pointed out, counsel for the petitioners submitted that the requirement of the landlord is not bona fide only due to the different versions put forth at different point of time, I do not find any merits. Earlier the R.C.O.P has been filed for the requirement of the business, which is to be com-menced by Madanagopal, one of the sons of the landlord. Admittedly no arrangement has been made for the commencement of the business and hence the same was dismissed. Subsequently, notice has been issued c aiming eviction on the ground that the building is required for the partnership concern of Messrs. N.S.V. Balakrishna Chetty, & Co. of which the landlord is one of the partners.
Admittedly no arrangement has been made for the commencement of the business and hence the same was dismissed. Subsequently, notice has been issued c aiming eviction on the ground that the building is required for the partnership concern of Messrs. N.S.V. Balakrishna Chetty, & Co. of which the landlord is one of the partners. But that has not been pursued Merely the landlord has not persued the matter further after the issue of the notice, would not make the claim of the landlord as a mala fide one. There is no dispute that the landlords sons Sekar and Madanagopal are carrying on the business Sri Renuka Enterprises’ as a partnership concern at the time of filing the R.C.O.P and they are carrying on the business in the rented building. When the landlords sons art not occupying a building of their own, they are entitled to get an order of eviction on the ground of owners’ occupation. 5. The only question is when the requirement was made for the occupation of the partnership concern and subsequently one of the sons having been retired from the partnership, the partnership business becomes a proprietary concern. Hence the proprietary concern is not the one for which eviction is sought for and the requirement of the landlord is not bona fide. The contention of the counsel for the petitioner cannot be countenanced. Eviction has been sought for on the basis that the building is required for the partnership concern of the sons of the landlord. One son retired from the partnership concern. The business became a proprietary concern. By the change of the nature of ownership, the requirement of the landlord do not change or vary. The requirement remains for the occupation of the son of the landlord. Hence I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner. 6. So far as the premises falling vacant during the pendency of the proceedings, it is found from the evidence that P.Ws. 1 and 2 have admitted about the vacancy of the premises and further they have explained saying that those portions have been occupied by the daughter-in-law and other sons, considering the non-suitability of the building for the required business.
So far as the premises falling vacant during the pendency of the proceedings, it is found from the evidence that P.Ws. 1 and 2 have admitted about the vacancy of the premises and further they have explained saying that those portions have been occupied by the daughter-in-law and other sons, considering the non-suitability of the building for the required business. It is not the case of the petitioner that as and when the other portion of the premises fell vacant, such portions of the premises have been let out by the landlord without occupying the same for their own use. In the absence of such plea, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the other buildings were not suitable for the business of the partnership business and hence it was not occupied for the use of ‘Sri Renuka Enterprises’ has to be accepted. Moreover, both the authorities below have concurrently found that the premises as and when fallen vacant were occupied only by the other sons and daughter-in-law of the landlord. I do not find any reason to differ from the findings of the authorities below. Though learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the judgments reported in Aishah Najiya v. Lal Chand Keval Ram , (1989)2 L.W. 123 ; Mangalanath Kshirsagurand A.Amirtharaj v. Dr.(Mrs.) K.Inayath Ali A.Amirtharaj v. Dr.(Mrs.) K.Inayath Ali A.Amirtharaj v. Dr. (Mrs.) K.Inayath Ali (1979(2 MLJ. 324 reported in and learned counsel for the respondent citied the judgments (1975)1 MLJ 325 and S. Devon and others v. N. Palaniappan S. Devon and others v. N. Palaniappan S. Devon and others v. N. Palaniappan , (1996)2 L.W. 555 , I do notthink there is any need to refer to those judgments since I have disposed of the revision on the evidence available on record. Accordingly, the civil revision petition is dismissed. The petitioner is granted three months time to vacate and hand over, vacant possession, consequently, C.M.P.Nos. 9503 of 1992 and 10513 of 1997 are also dismissed. The time is granted on condition that 1st petitioner shall file an affidavit of undertaking to vacate and hand over vacant possession to the respondent within three weeks from today. (30.8.1997).