JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner was working with the respondent-Society. While he was working an order was passed by the respondent-Society, terminating his services. Being aggrieved by the termination, the petitioner has preferred this writ petition. Learned Counsel for the respondents has urged by way of preliminary objections that the respondent-Society is a registered Society, which is a private body, unconcerned with any Government agency. In this view of the matter, his objection is that the writ petition is not maintainable as the respondents are not covered under the definition of "State" given under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. 2. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, to meet this argument of counsel for the respondents, urged that under Chapter III of the Constitution of India there are certain fundamental rights which are enforced not only against 'State' but against individuals as well. For this purpose, he has placed reliance on Article 15(2) of the Constitution wherein, he alleges, that no citizen shall, on the ground only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any one of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment etc. His case is that access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment, if refused to an individual then the refuser of such facility is to be proceeded against and not the Stale. Similarly, he submitted that under Article 19(1) of the Constitution freedom of speech and expression, assembly, formation of Association or Union and other kind of freedoms are, not only to be enforced against the State but some limes they are required to be enforced against individual(s) as well. On the same lines, he wants to urge that under Art. 21 of the Constitution where a person is deprived of his life and personal liberty by individual(s), he has a right to approach this Court for redress even against a private person. Under Art. 24 of the Constitution, his contention is that the child labour is not only prohibited for the State but also against private employers. The case of the petitioner is that fundamental rights which are to be enforced against individuals can only be enforced against individuals and there is no warrant in the Constitution that such rights can only be exercised against the State and not against other individuals. The case of the petitioner is that fundamental rights which are to be enforced against individuals can only be enforced against individuals and there is no warrant in the Constitution that such rights can only be exercised against the State and not against other individuals. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of the Court towards Art. 226 of the Constitution wherein in clause (1) exercise of the jurisdiction has been directed against a person or authority and also including, in appropriate cases, against the Government. His case is that Art. 226 of the Constitution primarily means against a person or authority and in appropriate case against the Government. Therefore, the initial thrust of exercise of powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution is against a person. The directions and orders which are liable to be issued under Art. 226 of the Constitution are of plenary character and they are not confined to any limited meaning. 4. The case of learned Counsel for the petitioner is that reference to prerogative writs, which has its origin in the Common Law of England, has only been referred as a reference. They have not been used in the limited sense, as these writs while being mentioned in the Article have been qualified by the prefix "writs in the nature of" and therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution is not confined to the narrow construction which the respondents want it to be given. Further, these powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution are not confined to Chapter III dealing with fundamental rights, it can be `for any other purpose' as well. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of this Court to a case reported in 1996 (1) SCC 490 : ( AIR 1996 SC 922 ) (Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty(Ms) - relevant page 499), wherein it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the fundamental rights can be enforced even against private reliance on a case reported in AIR 1986 SC 1571 : (1986 Lab IC 1312) (Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly) . In this judgment learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of the Court towards paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 wherein it has been observed that the term "State" cannot be confined to its meaning as given and explained by the narrow construction and a writ can be issued against a Company and therefore, the construction of word "State" was given a wide connotation. Since the Corporation in question in that case was carrying on business for the public at large thus such a Corporation becomes an instrumentality of the State. He has further placed reliance on 1990 (3) SCC 261 :(1990 Lab IC 1161) (Raj Soni v. Air Officer In-charge, Administration) , wherein though the Apex Court did not address itself whether the respondent was a State or not, however, the relief was granted to the petitioner who was an employee of a private school in Delhi because the Apex Court was of the opinion that the respondent-Management is under a statutory obligation to uniformly apply the provisions of the Act and Rules to employees in the school. When an authority is required to act in a particular manner under a statute it has no option but to follow the statute. The authority cannot defy the statute on the pretext that it is neither a State nor an "authority" under Article 12 of the Constitution. Every institution must frame and follow uniform rules for regulating its business. Therefore, according to him the relief was even granted against an institution which was not registered. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance on a case reported in 1976 LLJ 274 : (1976 Lab IC 303) (Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Rohtas Industries Staff Union) , wherein it has been held that power of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution is as wide as the amplitude of the language used and so can affect any person - even a private individual and be available for any other purpose, even one for which another remedy may exist. In this background learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that not only this that a writ can be issued against a private person or society but also the existence of an alternate remedy is no bar. 7. In this background learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that not only this that a writ can be issued against a private person or society but also the existence of an alternate remedy is no bar. 7. He has further placed reliance on a case reported in 1994 (I) WLC (Raj) 729 (K.M. Mohnot v. The Chairman, Bank of Rajasthan) , wherein this Court has held that a writ will be issued to a Bank by judging the nature of duties imposed and in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied. While deciding the controversy, this Court taken note of various Supreme Court pronouncements. One of them is AIR 1966 SC 81 (Dwarka Nath v. Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, D Ward, Kanpur) , wherein it has been observed that High Court can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs, as is understood in the England but it can, in addition to such, also issue directions, orders or writs other than prerogative writs. It has further been noted in this case that the words - "any other person or authority" used in Article 226 of the Constitution are not guided by Art. 12 and not to be confined only to "statutory authority or instrumentality of the State". They may be construed to be any other body or individual(s) than State Government. The purpose of the body is not very much relevant, what is relevant is nature of duties imposed on the body. In the aforesaid background, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the preliminary objection raised by the respondents should be overruled and the matter should be adjudicated on merits. 8. Alternatively, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that in terms of Section 28 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, this Court has power to issue directions, orders or writs, in the nature of prerogative writs, for the enforcement of such rights as are envisaged in law for the time being in force. That being the position even a law made available to an individual under an ordinary law is liable to be enforced by this Court under Sec. 28 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance by way of a prerogative writ, order or direction. That being the position even a law made available to an individual under an ordinary law is liable to be enforced by this Court under Sec. 28 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance by way of a prerogative writ, order or direction. Petitioner's termination from service being violative of his right to livelihood, asks for a judicial review by this Court by issue of even a writ under Sec. 28 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance. 9. Counsel for the respondents, in rebuttal to arguments of counsel for the petitioner, stuck to his stand in preliminary objection. It has been contended that the Samiti is an autonomous body and the Khadi and Village Industries Commission, State or the Central Government has no control upon the Samiti. The Commission only advances loans to the Samiti, against hypothecation and thus only lends financial assistance commercially, as any Bank can. The Samiti has its own aims and objectives and its activities are carried on under the management of elected bodies of the Samiti. The administrative and financial controls of the Samiti do not lie with the Commission, State or Union Government. The finances of the Samiti are supported by earning by sale of its products, grants and donations by other bodies. The Samiti is, thus, an autonomous body and has no control of any authority which may be termed 'State' under Art. 12 of the Constitution. The Samiti is, therefore, counsel for the respondents contended, not amenable to writ jurisdiction. 10. Further contention of the counsel for the respondents is that the Samiti is not saddled with any rights and owe no liabilities under any statute. No statutory or public duty it owes, for the enforcement of which a mandamus can be sought. Thus, being a private body it has no obligation to keep the petitioner under employment. The petitioner has no legal rights in relation to the Samiti enforcement of which he can seek in writ jurisdiction. 11. As regard the termination of the petitioner, it was submitted that petitioner was given notice to explain charges. The petitioner did not cooperate with the inquiry proceedings. The concerned body of the Samiti considered the matter and decided to terminate petitioner's services. Further, the petitioner expressed his unwillingness to continue with the employment of the Samiti. 11. As regard the termination of the petitioner, it was submitted that petitioner was given notice to explain charges. The petitioner did not cooperate with the inquiry proceedings. The concerned body of the Samiti considered the matter and decided to terminate petitioner's services. Further, the petitioner expressed his unwillingness to continue with the employment of the Samiti. The appointment of the petitioner with the Samiti was on contractual basis and his employment was governed by the conditions of services of the Samiti. However, while terminating petitioner's services he was offered 3 months' salary as an indulgence. Further contention of the respondents in this regard is that if petitioner feels infringement of any obligation of the employer under the service conditions, he may seek appropriate remedy for breach of contract before appropriate forum. 12. I have considered the rival submissions. The petitioner in this writ petition is seeking relief against a society, which is almost a voluntary organization. Interference in the internal matters of such a society under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India will amount to extend the scope of extraordinary jurisdiction beyond the judicial restraints which the Courts have so far been observing. It is no doubt true that a High Court under Art. 226 can pass an order in all circumstances, if it is satisfied that interference Under extraordinary jurisdiction is warranted but in the instant case no such case is made out. Rather, the petitioner himself has been behaving in a fashion wherein he has been putting on record and stating that he is not in a position to continue to work. Such a document is available on record as Annex. R/3. Annexure R/4 shows his unwillingness to continue with the respondent-society. In this background, when the petitioner has shown his unwillingness then the question of a particular service condition being gone into is unnecessary, more particularly under the circumstances when the respondent-society is almost a private organization, only remotely connected with the Khadi and Village Industries Commission. Thus, no interference is called for. I find no merit in this case and the same is, therefore, dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******